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ABSTRACT
This thesis aims to understand the motivation underpinning Malaysia’s foreign policy during the period 
when Dr Mahathir Mohamad was its prime minister (1981-2003). In particular, it questions the 
adequacy of understanding Malaysia’s foreign policy as being driven only by concerns for security and 
a search for acquisition o f wealth. This thesis proposes that the desire to seek recognition was also 
significant, even if it might not be, in some instances, the driver o f Malaysia’s foreign policy.
In exploring the quest for recognition, this thesis adopts a qualitative method of inquiry. It 
discusses the ‘belief system’ of Mahathir and uses both public and private pronouncements of his 
beliefs as evidence of the importance of his personal quest for recognition as compared to other motives 
o f enhancing security and wealth acquisition. For this purpose, this thesis draws on Axel Honneth’s 
insights on the struggle for recognition in order to offer a systematic understanding of the different 
modes o f recognition.
The case studies o f this thesis focus on three separate foreign policy addressees -  the 
developing countries o f the ‘South’, the Islamic ummah and the countries o f East Asia. These three 
respective areas pertaining to Malaysia’s foreign policy issues were given significant emphasis by 
Mahathir and received special attention by foreign policy decision - makers. In addition, they make 
appropriate case studies because understandings of their importance are generally attributed only to the 
country’s search for security or its economic interest.
In answering the question to what extent the desire for recognition enhances our 
understanding of Malaysia’s foreign policy under Mahathir, this thesis concludes that in some areas of 
policy, the search for recognition was a dominant, and almost an over-arching motivation. In other 
areas, the struggle for recognition remained significant, even though it might not have been the primary 
motivation.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
In formulating foreign policy, are leaders motivated by factors concerning security and 
acquisition of wealth only, or are they also driven by a struggle for recognition? The aim 
of this thesis is to demonstrate that a search for recognition can be a significant and, in 
certain circumstances, the overriding motivation that underpins foreign policy. The term 
‘the struggle for recognition’1 is used here to refer to the basic human psychological 
disposition that finds expression in the quest for prestige, esteem, grandeur and status, 
and is also related to a sense of entitlement or ‘face’.
It is commonly observed that Malaysia during the era of Dr Mahathir 
Mohamad was significantly different from the times of the previous prime ministers. In 
the domestic sphere the nation’s economic progress was evident through world class 
infrastructure and impressive construction projects. This was accompanied by the 
growing confidence of its people, exemplified by the much-expressed ‘Malaysia BolehV 
(‘Malaysia Can!’) slogan. As an observer wrote:
“He [Mahathir] took a country still shuffling timidly out o f colonialism and gave it identity, 
direction and purpose, creating a real sense of independence.”2
1 The theory o f the struggle for recognition will be explained in greater detail in Chapter Two.
2 David Watts, ‘A Prescription for Change’, The Times, special supplement entitled ‘A Focus on Malaysia’, 
31 March, 2004, p. 14.
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This sense of independence was also clearly present in Malaysia’s foreign 
policy under his leadership. As regards foreign policy under Mahathir, another observer 
noticed:
“The common thread was his [Mahathir’s] desire to stand up for Malays, Malaysia, Muslims and 
developing countries in general; and to combat forces such as globalization, the colonialist 
mentality and unequal, Western-dictated financial and market structures.”3
To ‘stand up’ and be counted as ‘equal’ and being ‘independent’ are prevalent 
descriptions of Malaysia’s foreign policy during the premiership of Mahathir Mohamad.4 
The puzzle is, when it comes to academic studies of Malaysia’s foreign policy such 
behaviours are either dismissed, overlooked or mentioned only in passing. Even if 
highlighted, they remain a puzzle that is perceived by academics to be too difficult to 
solve. A review of the literature will show that this relates to the underlying assumptions 
made in the studies about motivation. A few studies seem to consider motivation in 
terms of a search for security. Most studies emphasise economic factors, or motivation 
related to the quest for acquisition of wealth to explain the transformation of Malaysia’s 
foreign policy under Mahathir. In short, there seems to be a disconnect between 
descriptions of Malaysia’s foreign policy behaviour and attempts to explain these with 
reference to motivation.
3 ‘Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad, Champ and Chump’, The Guardian, 31 October 2003, p.27.
4 Aziz Zariza Ahmad wrote, “A sense of pride emerged among the people, especially the Malays, who were 
proud of their leader’s ability to speak to on equal terms with leaders of more powerful Western nations,” 
and “Mahathir’s foreign policy ... is based on a sense of commitment to independent, clearly defined 
goals.” Aziz Zariza Ahmad, Mahathir’s Paradigm Shift: The Man Behind the Vision, Taiping: Firma, 1997, 
p. 136. Similarly, on Mahathir’s foreign policy, Khoo wrote that, “[h]e was beholden to none and he 
relished wearing ‘a truly independent look’”. Khoo Boo Teik, Paradoxes o f  Mahathirism: An Intellectual 
Biography o f  Mahathir Mohamad, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, p.79.
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1.1. LITERATURE REVIEW
There are still only a handful of analytical writings on Malaysia’s foreign policy under 
Mahathir, although the number of write-ups about the man and his administration has 
surged since his retirement in 2003. The literature that touches significantly on 
Malaysia’s foreign policy under Mahathir can be categorised in a number of ways. 
Firstly, in terms of the place of publication. The majority of works published locally 
during the Mahathir period contained glaring biases that seek to support Mahathir and his 
administration. Although their objectivity is somewhat suspect, to a large extent these 
works are also father historical in their approach. Works by Murugesu Pathmanaban and 
David Lazarus,5 Chamil Wariya,6 as well as Aziz Zariza Ahmad7 fall into this category, 
although the latter concentrates more on the prime minister rather than foreign policy. 
Foreign publications tend to offer a more balanced analysis of Malaysia’s foreign policy 
under Mahathir. These publications contain writings of both foreign and Malaysian 
academics. They include the works of David Camroux, Stephen Milne and Diane 
Mauzy, Shanti Nair, Johan Savaranamuttu and Chandran Jeshurun. An important 
category of analytical writings on Malaysia’s foreign policy under Mahathir are PhD 
theses, most of which remain unpublished. The theses that deal exclusively with foreign 
policy under Mahathir have been written by Mohd Yusof Ahmad, Rajmah Hussain and 
Karminder Singh Dhillon.
The literature on Malaysia’s foreign policy during Mahathir’s period focuses 
predominantly on the extent of continuity and change in Malaysia’s foreign policy in
5 Murugesu Pathmanathan and D. Lazarus, Winds o f  Change: The Mahathir Impact on Malaysia's Foreign 
Policy, Kuala Lumpur: Eastview, 1984.
6 Chamil Wariya, Dasar Luar Era Mahathir, Petaling Jaya: Fajar Bakti: 1989.
comparison to the periods of Mahathir’s predecessors. There is still no work that deals 
specifically with motivations underpinning Mahathir’s foreign policy. However, all the 
major works contain implicit assumptions about Mahathir’s motivations. This section 
aims to clarify these assumptions. Furthermore, it is also important to discuss the 
scholars’ observations on the extent of Mahathir’s role in bringing the identified changes 
in Malaysia’s foreign policy. This is because the discussion relates to the fundamental 
premise of this thesis, which posits that Malaysia’s foreign policy to a large extent, 
flowed directly from the motivations of Mahathir.
Most literature on Malaysia’s foreign policy during the Mahathir era 
recognises the strong influence of the prime minister.8 Yusof, although arguing that there 
was more continuity than change in Malaysia’s foreign policy, due to what he perceived 
to be the endurance of its “national interests”, nevertheless observes that the role of 
leadership and idiosyncratic variables in the policy-making process was markedly 
enhanced under Mahathir.9 According to him, the “new dimensions” of Malaysia’s 
foreign policy can be discerned as anti-British and anti-Commonwealth, culminated in 
the Buy British Last Policy, and the pro-Japan attitude as illustrated by the ‘Look East’ 
policy. To Yusof, both were attributed to “increased leadership inputs” from the prime 
minister.10 Yusof remarks that the precise origin of these policy decisions is difficult to 
ascertain. However, he observes that there was a close linkage between the prime-
7 Aziz, M ahathir’s Paradigm Shift.
8 See Mohd.Yusof Ahmad, Continuity and Change in Malaysia’s Foreign Policy, 1981 -1986, a 
dissertation presented to the Faculty of the Fletcher School o f Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1990; 
Carol Jean Bowman, Exploring the Effects on Regime Fragmentation on Foreign Policy Behaviour in 
Southeast Asia, a dissertation submitted to the Faculty o f the Colombian School o f Arts and Sciences of the . 
George Washington University, 1999; David Camroux, ‘Looking East’ ... and Inwards: Internal Factors
in Malaysian Foreign Relations During the Mahathir Era, 1981 -  1994, Australia -  Asia Papers No.72, 
Queensland: Centre for the Study o f Australia -  Asia Relations, Faculty of Asian and International Studies, 
Griffith University, Australia, 1994.
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minister’s style and world-view and these policy decisions, from the manner of the 
decision-making process and the intensity of its pursuits.11 Moreover, according to him, 
the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Wisma Putra, as it is fondly known, 
rationalised these foreign policy decisions in the context of “status-oriented” pursuits.12
Y usof s argument that there was more continuity than change is based on his 
view that Malaysia’s primary national interests remained the same during the Mahathir 
period. Amongst the components of national interests he ranked “the need to survive 
within an environment that is essentially hostile and predatory” - that is, the pursuit of 
Malaysia’s “core-value needs for national security” as the top priority.13 This reflects the 
Realist assumption as regards motivation underpinning foreign policy in Yusof s study. 
Other important national interests that remained consistent, according to Yusof, (during 
the period of his study (1981-1986)) was the internal “socio-political, cultural and 
religious stability.”14 This again points to the Realist preoccupation with security, 
although in this case it refers to the domestic security of the country. In addition, Yusof 
also highlights the importance of “greater economic growth”, or put differently, the 
economic or acquisition of wealth factor.15 Importantly, Yusof identifies the pursuit of 
“status-oriented” goals as another dimension of national interest. Such pursuits for status, 
he observes, became more significant under Mahathir, demonstrated for example by 
Malaysia’s policy on Antarctica. However, Yusof dismisses this dimension claiming that
9 Yusof, Continuity and Change, p.356.
10 Yusof, Continuity and Change, p. 3.
11 Yusof, Continuity and Change, p.367.
12 Yusof, Continuity and Change, p. 3 68.
13 Yusof, Continuity and Change, p.376.
14 Yusof, Continuity and Change, p.376.
15 Yusof, Continuity and Change, p.376.
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“activities at this level were generally given lower priority.”16 Even though his case 
studies of the policies to Buy British Last, Look East, and Malaysia’s resolute efforts to 
make Antarctica a common heritage of mankind show changes in Malaysia’s foreign 
policy, these policy changes are dismissed as idiosyncratic influences of Mahathir. Yusof 
argues that they are not representative of the more important national interests, which he 
defines primarily in security terms, and believes to have remained unchanged during the 
Mahathir era.
Rajmah, on the other hand, observes that “change became the hallmark of 
[Mahathir’s] administration and the conduct of foreign policy bore the stamp of his 
assertive style.”17 In terms of motivation, she underscored that “[t]he thrust of Dr 
Mahathir’s foreign policy” was “economic rather than political.”18 She also accepts 
security motives as being important. For example, she argues that the increasing 
“Islamisation” of foreign policy was motivated by the quest “to bring petro-dollars and 
Arab aid into the country”, as well as to protect the security of the regime by countering 
the influence of the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) domestically.19 Like Yusof, Rajmah 
also grapples with some aspects of Malaysia’s foreign policy that seemed to contradict 
motivation rationales based on either security or economic concerns alone. For instance, 
in terms of the increasing “Islamisation” of foreign policy, she accepts that it was also 
motivated by the search to “bolster Malaysia’s role in the community of Islamic 
nations”.20 In addition, Mahathir’s decision to pursue the decision to make Antarctica a
16 Yusof, Continuity and Change,pp.377.
17 Rajmah Hussain, Malaysia at the United Nations: A Study o f  Foreign Policy Priorities, 1957 -1987 , 
thesis submitted to the University o f London in partial fulfilment o f the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor o f Philosophy in International Relations, July 1988, p.73.
18 Rajmah, Malaysia at the United Nations, p.77.
19 Rajmah, Malaysia at the United Nations, p.78.
20 Rajmah, Malaysia at the United Nations, p.78.
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common heritage of mankind at the United Nations (UN) is interpreted in terms of “his 
desire to assert himself internationally while at the same time putting Malaysia on the 
map.”21 Thus, while security and acquisition of wealth as motivations are analysed, 
motivation based on the struggle for recognition is also mentioned, albeit only as a 
conjecture without any in-depth examination. For example, it is not explained why 
Mahathir was driven to “put Malaysia on the map.”
Similarly, Dhillon asserts that there was a significant shift in Malaysia’s 
foreign policy under Mahathir from what he terms “traditional” to “modem.”22 To him, 
traditional foreign policy means a primary focus on security and defence, whereas 
modem foreign policy emphasises commercial and developmental diplomacy.23 This 
reflects an assumption of economic interest, or acquisition of wealth, as the significant 
motivation underpinning the shift in foreign policy under Mahathir. Yet, Dhillon does 
not overlook security factors. For example, he argues that Malaysia’s foreign policy 
initiatives were used to maintain the stability of the regime and to dilute any challenge to 
it, as well as to promote economic growth and development.24 In addition, Dhillon 
cautions against analysing the personality of the prime minister, in what he calls the 
‘great man in history’ approach 25 Rather, he aims to show that the shift was a result of 
the interactions of three main groups of factors, namely Mahathir’s idiosyncrasy, and the 
domestic and external concerns. He treats these factors as the independent variables and
21 Rajmah, Malaysia at the United Nations, p.81.
22 Karminder Singh Dhillon, Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era, 1981 -  2003, a dissertation 
submitted in partial fulfilment o f the requirements for the degree of Doctor o f Philosophy, University of 
Boston, 2005, p .l.
23 Dhillon, Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era, p. 11.
24 Dhillon, Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era,p.6.
25 Dhillon, Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era, p. 15.
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illustrates how their interactions shape the foreign policy (in other words, his ‘dependent 
variable’).
While this thesis does not dispute the importance of the domestic and external 
structures, it argues that it would be misleading to consider them as isolated ‘independent 
variables’ that interacts to produce a specific foreign policy. Indeed, it would be more 
appropriate to consider the agency of Mahathir, as working within both the domestic and 
international structures, constantly interpreting the constraints and opportunities that 
these structures provide. Mahathir was both impacted by these structures and influenced 
them at the same time. From this perspective Malaysia’s foreign policy is not an output 
of a deterministic interaction between variables, but an outcome of a complex interplay 
between the agency of Mahathir and other foreign policy agents (such as the constraints 
and opportunities provided by the important international and domestic structures).
Like Dhillon, Liow sees the development of Malaysia’s foreign policy under 
Mahathir in terms of the interactions of three determining factors, namely, Mahathir’s 
personal role and influence, domestic imperatives and international exigencies.26 He 
argues that the first phase of Mahathir’s period (1981-1984/5) was significantly 
influenced by the Cold War and the threat of Communism, which resulted with 
Malaysia’s security and economic reliance on its Western allies. In addition, he believes 
that Mahathir’s personal influence in this first phase was not only constrained by
26 Joseph Liow, ‘Personality, Exigencies and Contingencies: Determinants o f Malaysia’s Foreign Policy in 
the Mahathir Administration’, in Mahathir’s Administration: Performance and Crisis in Governance, Ho 
Khai Leong and James Chin (eds.), Singapore, Kuala Lumpur: Times Books International, 2001, pp. 120- 
157.
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international exigencies, but also by Ghazali Shafie, the foreign minister who remained a 
key player.27
Although the Cold War still provided the over-arching framework for foreign 
policy in the second phase (1985-1989/90), Liow argues that changes were taking place 
that offered opportunities for Mahathir to make an imprint on foreign policy, particularly 
due to the reduced importance of traditional security issues and the increased importance 
of trade and economic matters,28 which were deemed to be Mahathir’s “forte”.29 
Therefore, he stresses that Mahathir’s ability to impose his personal vision on the 
international political and economic spheres not only rested on his growing assertiveness 
as a “nationalist” and a “leader”, but also on the changing external environment that lifted 
the prior constraints, allowing Mahathir to pursue the distinctive form o f diplomacy that 
he would not have been able to do otherwise.30 Liow also stresses the domestic political 
crises during this period to explain Mahathir’s more acute protest diplomacy, especially 
on issues that would enhance his position domestically as “an Islamic leader and 
Malaysian nationalist.”31 Liow further argues that resources expended in this context 
were mostly rhetorical, but that during this period Mahathir still managed to “set the 
stage for the convergence of foreign policy with Malaysian nationalism.”32 Thus, on the 
one hand, Liow explains increasing identification with the Third World and Islamic 
countries in the context of Mahathir’s focus on foreign policy as a tool to defend the 
security o f his position and regime domestically.33 On the other hand, he also emphasises
27 Joseph Liow, ‘Personality, Exigencies and Contingencies in Mahathir's Administration, pp. 155-6.
28 Joseph Liow, ‘Personality, Exigencies and Contingencies in Mahathir’s Administration, p.141.
29 Joseph Liow, ‘Personality, Exigencies and Contingencies in Mahathir's Administration, p. 156.
30 Joseph Liow, ‘Personality, Exigencies and Contingencies . . . ’, in Mahathir’s Administration, p. 146.
31 Joseph Liow, ‘Personality, Exigencies and Contingencies . . . ’, in Mahathir’s Administration, p. 156.
32 Joseph Liow, ‘Personality, Exigencies and Contingencies . . . ’, in Mahathir's Administration, p. 156.
33 Joseph Liow, ‘Personality, Exigencies and Contingencies . . . ’, in Mahathir’s Administration, p. 144.
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the increased importance of Malaysia’s economic relations with Third World countries, 
and the interest in promoting South-South co-operation, in terms of a search for new 
markets for Malaysian products.34
In the third phase (1990-2003), Liow argues that factors of Mahathir’s 
idiosyncrasy had merged with domestic influences to override external exigencies as the 
dominant factors in foreign policy formulation.35 For him, the end of the Cold War was 
pivotal in effectively lifting the constraints on Mahathir to pursue economic relations 
more vigorously.36 To Liow, Mahathir’s sense of nationalism was a central part of his 
idiosyncrasy. In this regard, Liow writes:
“More importantly from the vantage point o f Mahathir’s own aspirations and legitimacy, the
construction of an assertive, independent and activist foreign policy plotted against the hegemonic
Western world, conducted through protest diplomacy, and bound to the scripting of a new
Malaysian national identity under the auspices of Vision 2020, meant that foreign policy was in
37fact being used as an outlet for Malaysian nationalism.”
There are various points that are pertinent here. Firstly, while it is probably 
correct to conclude that Mahathir was constrained by external as well as internal 
structures (for example, the Cold War and a strongly independent foreign minister in the 
first phase of his premiership), it is misleading to think that Mahathir was less motivated 
for Malaysia to forge closer ties with Third World developing countries, and Islamic 
countries during this period. Mahathir’s Third World activism was already strong and 
clear since his days as a backbencher during the period of the first prime minister Tunku 
Abdul Rahman,38 (as reflected in Mahathir’s criticisms of the Tunku’s pro-West policy 
and his involvement with the group of UMNO ‘young Turks’ to bring Malaysia into the
34 Joseph Liow, ‘Personality, Exigencies and Contingencies . . . ’, in Mahathir’s Administration, p.143.
35 Joseph Liow, ‘Personality, Exigencies and Contingencies . . . ’, in Mahathir’s Administration, p.148.
36 Joseph Liow, ‘Personality, Exigencies and Contingencies . . . ’, in Mahathir’s Administration, p. 156.
37 Joseph Liow, ‘Personality, Exigencies and Contingencies . . . ’, in Mahathir’s Administration, p. 156.
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fold of the countries of the Afro-Asian group). This will be illustrated in greater detail in 
Chapter Three. While Liow takes into consideration the Buy British Last policy that was 
launched early in Mahathir’s premiership (in 1981), he underestimates the seriousness of 
the diplomatic row with the UK and Mahathir’s contemplation to withdraw Malaysia 
from the Commonwealth as a result. The softening of Mahathir’s stance was more 
because of the overdue recognition from the British, as reflected in their changed 
approach towards Malaysia and Mahathir, as well as input from Mahathir’s top academic 
advisor, Dr Noordin Sopiee, who was the head of the Institute of International and 
Strategic Studies (ISIS). In addition, the Antarctica proposal was also launched at the 
UN General Assembly during this period, which was definitely in line with Mahathir’s 
non-aligned and Third World approach in diplomacy, and one that has been rationalised 
entirely on the basis of the idiosyncrasies of the prime minister.39 The same argument is 
applicable with regard to Mahathir’s interests in international Islamic issues and his 
motivation to pursue closer ties with Islamic countries. Mahathir’s interests in issues 
related to the Muslim ummah were apparent since he expounded on the matter in his 
book The Malay Dilemma,40 written in 1970, and especially in Menghadapi Cabaran,41 
written in the mid-1970s. Furthermore, Mahathir’s intention to strengthen bilateral ties 
with Muslim countries was already apparent when he decided to make official visits to a 
group of Islamic countries in the Middle East early on in his premiership.42 Therefore, 
while external exigencies are undeniably important in constraining and enabling certain 
actions of foreign policy, they do not shed sufficient light on the totality of motivations
38 From now onward, will be referred to as ‘the Tunku’ in the thesis.
39 Yusof, Continuity and Change, pp.364-9.
40 Mahathir Mohamad, The Malay Dilemma, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur: Times Books International, 1970.
41 Mahathir Mohamad, Manghadapi Cabaran, Kuala Lumpur, Pustaka Antara, 1976. The book was later 
translated into English as The Challenge (Subang Jaya: Pelanduk, 1986).
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underpinning foreign policies. There are solid grounds to suppose that as far as Mahathir 
is concerned, his aspirations about the forms that Malaysia’s foreign policy should take 
were consistent even before he became prime minister and remained so throughout his 
premiership.
In detecting the diminished constraints of the external exigencies in the 
second and third periods, Liow describes the dominance of Mahathir’s idiosyncratic 
influence in the terminology of nationalism. In this regard, he makes clear references to 
the domestic considerations of acquiring legitimacy for the leadership, and national 
identity building. He correlates what he terms nationalistic posturing of foreign policy 
with the motivation to maintain the security of Mahathir’s UMNO regime. Yet, Liow 
does not engage with any theory of nationalism in an explicit and systematic manner.
Savaranamuttu believes that Mahathir played a vital role in Malaysia’s foreign 
policy-making. To him, Mahathir’s imprint was especially clear in four distinctive 
features of Malaysia’s foreign policy during his period. He distinguished these foreign 
policy features as “a strong identification with the ‘East’, a close identification with the 
‘South’, persistent connection with Muslim issues, and deepening opposition to 
increasing Western pressure both in the form of economic policies articulated through the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the American unilateralism.”43 Savaranamuttu 
also argues that the “[c]ore foreign policy objectives of political independence and 
territorial integrity remained stable in the Mahathir period, but middle-range possesion 
goals of enhancing the nation-state were evident in the quest of the Newly Industrialised
42 This will be illustrated in greater details in Chapter Six.
43 Johan, ‘Iconoclasm and Foreign Policy . . . ’, in Reflections, p.307. See also Johan Savaranamuttu, 
‘Malaysia’s Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Period. 1981 -  1985: An Iconoclast Come to Rule’, in Asian 
Journal o f  Political Science, June 1996, pp. 1-16.
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Country (NIC) status while long-range objectives were linked to the goal of Malaysia’s 
aspiration to become a developed country by the year 2020.”44 From these quotes the 
security and economic factors can be inferred as pivotal in Savaranamuttu’s assumption 
on the motivation underpinning Malaysia’s foreign policy under Mahathir. The quest for 
recognition as an important motivation is overlooked although their manifestation was 
apparent. (For example, achieving the NIC status is deemed an important foreign policy 
goal, but the underlying motivation is not defined as a quest for recognition.)
While agreeing that Malaysia’s foreign policy transformed during the 
Mahathir era, Camroux also cautions against explaining it purely in the light of the 
psychological make-up of the leader.45 In explaining the transformation he employs 
insights from three areas: the study of the middle power behaviour, theories of 
globalisation and regionalism, and the politics of identity as the over-arching domestic 
preoccupation.46 By stressing power in his categorisation of states, (in this instance, 
Malaysia as a ‘middle-power’), Camroux follows the Realist preoccupation with power 
and security as the underlying motivation in foreign policy. In elaborating the concept of 
the middle power, he refers to Oran Young’s47 work and illustrates three dimensions of 
behaviour typical of the middle powers. These so-called dimensions of behaviour of 
middle powers are firstly, to act as catalysts (providing intellectual and political energy to 
trigger an initiative); secondly, as facilitators (setting agendas and building coalitions or 
associations), and thirdly, as managers (building institutions and/or developing
44 Johan, ‘Iconoclasm and Foreign Policy . . . ’, in Reflections, p.315.
45 Camroux, 'LookingEast’ ... Inwards , p .l.
46 Camroux, 'LookingEast’ ... Inwards, p.3.
47 See Oran Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes fo r  Natural Resources and the 
Environment, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989.
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conventions and norms).48 While this is probably a credible description of the behaviour 
of a middle-power country, it does not in any way explain the motivation behind the 
foreign policy behaviour. Certainly, the status of a middle-power confers specific roles 
and responsibility. Therefore, a more relevant inquiry to explain motivation would look 
at why Mahathir felt that it was necessary for Malaysia to adopt this co-called middle- 
power role rather than a descriptive behavioural analysis of Malaysia as a middle power.
The concept of middle power is also employed by Ping in his analysis of 
Malaysia’s statecraft in selected multilateral fora.49 The underlying assumption of 
economic motivation can be detected in Ping’s work when he refers to the hierarchy of 
states prevailing in the international order mainly in terms of political economy.50 Thus, 
Ping takes into consideration, among other factors, Gross Domestic Products (GDP), and 
trade and export figures in categorising the great, middle and small powers.51
While not engaging directly with the concept of the struggle for recognition, 
Camroux introduces the idea of ‘good international citizenship’ in order to explain 
Malaysia’s behaviour, for example as “a good Islamic brother”, “defender of the Third 
World”, or “Asian spokesperson”.52 Arguably, the desire to be considered a ‘good 
international citizen’ is a manifestation of the motivation for recognition. Ping, however, 
criticises this approach of applying the idea of ‘good international citizenship’ in 
explaining middle-power behaviour, by suggesting that middle powers are primarily
48 Camroux, ‘LookingEast’ ... Inwards, p.3.
49 Jonathan H. Ping, Middle Power Statecraft: Indonesia, Malaysia and the Asia-Pacific, Aldershot, 
Burlington: Ashgate, 2005.
50 Ping, Middle Power Statecraft, p. 1.
51 Ping, Middle Power Statecraft, pp.73-102.
52 Camroux, 'LookingEast' ... Inwards, pp.3-4.
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motivated by their self-interests and not necessarily behave as good international 
citizens.53
Milne and Mauzy recognise that leaders, even as “iconoclastic” as Mahathir, 
have to work within certain structural constraints to make their mark on foreign policy. 
Yet, they accept that Mahathir “did effect changes.”54 In analysing Mahathir’s foreign 
policy, they too raise questions that remain unanswered. For example, they argue that 
while “it is clear” why Mahathir would show interests in Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), it is “not easy” to understand why he championed the cause of the 
South.55 They speculate that it might be because of Mahathir’s personal ambition “to 
exercise his political talents in the wider field.”56 Moreover, in relation to the South and 
Mahathir’s seemingly anti-Western bias, they believe that “Mahathir was driven by a 
hatred of what he perceived as unjust.”57 Therefore, in Milne and Mauzy’s analysis, 
there is a speculation that the struggle for recognition was an important motivation 
behind Malaysia’s foreign policy under Mahathir, but, they do not pursue this line of 
inquiry deeper and the quest for recognition as an important motivation remains a 
conjecture.
For Stubbs, the motivation of Malaysia’s foreign policy is predominantly 
influenced by “the need to serve the goals of national integration and national welfare in 
order to mitigate the problems produced by the fundamental divisions within the
53 Ping, Middle Power Statecraft, pp. 189-91.
54 R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Malaysian Politics under Mahathir, London and New York: Routledge, 
1999, p. 123.
55 Milne and Mauzy, Malaysian Politics under Mahathir, p. 133.
56 Milne and Mauzy, Malaysian Politics under Mahathir, p. 133.
57 Milne and Mauzy, Malaysian Politics under Mahathir, p. 134.
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Malaysian society.”58 In this sense, domestic security concerns are deemed fundamental 
by Stubbs as the main motivations for Malaysia’s foreign policy. Specifically, Stubbs 
lists two main sets of objectives of the Malaysian state. The first is “to maintain national 
security” and the second refers to “the need to ensure economic growth.” 59
The latest addition to the literature on Malaysia’s foreign policy is Chandran 
Jeshurun’s Malaysia: Fifty Years o f Diplomacy, 1957-2007. The book provides a dense 
and historically informative account of Malaysia’s diplomatic history over the first fifty 
years since its independence in 1957. Jeshurun benefits from in-depth interviews with 
Mahathir himself, as well as with various ministers and senior officials who were 
involved in foreign policy-making throughout the period. In covering the periods of all 
five Malaysian prime ministers thus far, the book allots nearly three out of its six chapters 
to Mahathir (in line with his 22-year premiership). The author clarifies that the book 
does not intend to duplicate scholarly works on Mahathir’s foreign policy but instead to 
take a historical approach in providing a critical assessment.60 As regards Mahathir’s 
role, Jeshurun observes that Mahathir was the first (compared to his predecessors) to 
identify closely with international affairs.61 In fact, after he came into power in 1981, the 
position of the foreign minister became less important in the context of foreign policy 
formulation because “the primary source of Wisma Putra’s mandate was the Prime 
Minister’s Office.”62 Jeshurun argues further that because foreign policy during
58 Richard Stubbs, ‘The Foreign Policy of Malaysia’ in The Political Economy o f  Foreign Policy in 
Southeast Asia, David Wurfel and Bruce Barton (eds.), London: Macmillan, 1990, p. 101.
59 Stubbs, ‘The Foreign Policy of Malaysia’ in The Political Economy o f  Foreign Policy, pp. 103-4.
60 Chandran Jeshurun, Malaysia: Fifty Years o f  Diplomacy, 1957-2007, Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press, 
2007, p. 162.
61 Jeshurun, Malaysia: Fifty Years o f  Diplomacy, p. 187.
62 Jeshurun, Malaysia: Fifty Years o f  Diplomacy, p.230.
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Mahathir’s time became so personalised (due to the dominance of the prime minister 
“worldview”), it would be inevitable for his successor to make his own adjustments.63
In relation to motivation, Jeshurun seems to agree with other writers’ (for 
example, Savaranamuttu’s) conclusions, that changes in Malaysia’s foreign policy were a 
result of the prime minister’s “almost total obsession with economic goals.”64 However, 
he also repeats Camroux’s emphasis on the “geopolitical factors” that influenced 
Mahathir’s worldview, which he recognises as “rather set in his ways.”65 Jeshurun also 
stresses the importance of Mahathir’s domestic power base, which he rightly understands 
to have motivated Mahathir’s “thinking on national economic strategy and how to deal 
with the emerging realities of a new international economic order.”66 Thus, the implicit 
assumptions made by other authors on foreign policy motivations (relating to the search 
for security, whether external or internal, and the acquisition of wealth as illustrated by 
the emphasis on economic goals), are also reflected in Jeshurun’s book.
Yet, Jeshurun also recognises the problem facing students of Malaysian 
foreign policy in rationalising “the seeming shifts and slides in Mahathir’s projection of 
his pet likes and dislikes in the field of external relations.”67 While realising “the 
primacy of his nation-building tasks”, the timing of Mahathir’s diplomatic postures is 
argued as always “unexpected” and “unpredictable”.68 Jeshurun realises that many 
commentators have resorted to analyse these unpredictable phenomena in terms of “ the 
vagaries of Mahathir, both as prime minister of his country and a citizen o f the Third
63 Jeshurun, Malaysia: Fifty Years o f  Diplomacy, p.301.
64 Jeshurun, Malaysia: Fifty Years o f  Diplomacy, p. 163.
65 Jeshurun, Malaysia: Fifty Years o f  Diplomacy, p. 164.
66 Jeshurun, Malaysia: Fifty Years o f  Diplomacy, pp. 164-5.
67 Jeshurun, Malaysia: Fifty Years o f  Diplomacy, p. 182.
68 Jeshurun, Malaysia: Fifty Years o f  Diplomacy, p. 183.
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World.”69 Further, he argues that such a discussion is bound to lack in objectivity simply 
because, “much of what people perceived from his deliberate comments when he 
addressed international audiences cannot be fully understood without also understanding 
his own game plan, if at all there was such a thing.”70 In other words, he seems to 
caution against interpreting and rationalising Mahathir’s motivations based solely on 
Mahathir’s own proclaimed rationalisations. Jeshurun still admits that at times Mahathir 
did open up in public and quotes one such occasion as when he delivered a speech at the 
Trinity College at the University o f Oxford in April 1985 entitled ‘Holier Than Thou -  A 
Mild Critique’. According to Jeshurun, “it was clear that his passionate concern here was 
to establish a rationale for his otherwise quixotic efforts to understand the inequities and 
injustices of the existing international order.”71 On the one hand, Jeshurun feels that the 
void in the academic literature on Malaysia’s foreign policy under Mahathir is due partly 
to the methodological challenge involved in understanding motivations based on 
Mahathir’s own pronouncements. On the other hand, he accepts that at times, Mahathir 
did open up, and offered insights into the motivations that drove his foreign policy 
postures. In this connection, Jeshurun emphasises Mahathir’s preoccupation with 
inequities and injustices of the existing international order as being crucial in the prime 
minister’s personal motivation. As will be explained in Chapter Two, perceptions of 
injustices are fundamental in arousing motivations relating to the struggle for recognition. 
While highlighting elements linked to the struggle for recognition, (for example the fact 
that media coverage on Mahathir’s many trips abroad, and the stream of visits by foreign 
heads of government to Malaysia, gave the ordinary Malaysians “a new-found sense of
69 Jeshurun, Malaysia: Fifty Years o f  Diplomacy, p. 185.
70 Jeshurun, Malaysia: Fifty Years o f  Diplomacy, p. 185.
71 Jeshurun, Malaysia: Fifty Years o f  Diplomacy, p. 186.
self-importance”72) Jeshurun concedes that his work in “understanding the man and his 
time” is rather “impressionistic” and that there remains a need for “a better disciplined 
and more accurate understanding of Dr Mahathir’s role in having charted the course of 
Malaysian foreign policy for nearly half of the country’s fifty years.”73
In sum, a review of the major existing works in the literature on Malaysia’s 
foreign policy under Mahathir illustrates an incomplete understanding due to the absence 
of a systematic and detailed analysis of struggles for recognition as the basis for foreign 
policy motivations. In explicit terms, most of the existing literature seem to deal 
primarily with motivations related to the quest for security and the acquisition of wealth. 
Yusof for example, maintains that Malaysia’s foreign policy did not significantly change 
under Mahathir, while Malaysia’s primary interest, defined in the Realist context of 
national self-preservation and security, did not change. Those authors who admit that 
there were transformations attribute them to the ascending importance of economic 
interests (the search for prosperity or the acquisition of wealth) as the main foreign policy 
motivation. This is especially true in the case of Rajmah, Dhillon and Savaranamuttu. 
Camroux on the other hand, emphasises Malaysia’s changed national identity as a 
function of its newly acquired middle power status under Mahathir.
All these writers face problems in their explanations and tend to lump the 
unexplainable under the idiosyncratic factor of the prime minister. This is illustrated by 
Yusof s treatment of Buy British Last, ‘Look East’ and the Antarctica policy, and 
Rajmah’s treatment of the same Antarctica policy. Camroux has to resort to a concept of 
‘good international citizenship’ in order to supplement his explanation based mainly on
72 Jeshurun, Malaysia: Fifty Years o f  Diplomacy, p. 187.
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the middle power theory. Milne and Mauzy highlight the puzzle and rightly hint to the 
struggle for recognition as the missing link in understanding Mahathir’s foreign policy, 
but do not go any further than that.
1.2. ADDRESSING THE PUZZLE - THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 
RECOGNITION
The existing literature shows a tendency amongst writers on Malaysia’s foreign policy 
under Mahathir to consider only motivational factors relating to security and the 
acquisition of wealth (economic). The struggle for recognition as a motivation has only 
been alluded to. On several occasions recognition factors have been invoked but only in 
a haphazard and unsystematic manner in order to supplement the main argument, which 
could be traced to either security or economic, (acquisition of wealth) motivations. There 
is here a clear gap in the literature. This thesis argues that to form an understanding of 
what are perceived to be inconsistencies in Malaysia’s foreign policy under Mahathir, it 
is crucial that the struggle for recognition be considered as well. In this regard, this 
study will focus specifically on the motivation side of foreign policy making.
In order to examine the struggle for recognition as an important motivation, the 
personality of Prime Minister Mahathir must be central to the analysis. This is because 
motivation based on the struggle for recognition is linked to a human’s psychology. 
Although it is correct to emphasise structural constraints to the leader’s agency, they do 
not exist as ‘independent variables’ that interact in a deterministic manner to shape
73 Jeshurun, Malaysia: Fifty Years o f  Diplomacy, p. 165
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foreign policy output. A leader like Mahathir operates within layers of overlapping 
structures, both domestic and international, which constrain him and are influenced by 
him at the same time. Therefore, in studying motivation, it is essential to pry open the 
black box commonly referred to in the literature as the idiosyncratic factor.
While some authors have attempted to do this in order to explicate the belief 
system of Mahathir, none has achieved a systematic elucidation of ‘what made Mahathir 
tick’. Under the umbrella of the idiosyncratic factor, elements such as Mahathir’s 
upbringing and education are taken to have impacted his personality and worldview. 
Writers such as Dhillon and Liow employ the notion of nationalism to further explain 
Mahathir’s idiosyncratic factors. A common observation in the literature as highlighted 
for example by Milne and Mauzy, is that Mahathir was driven by a strong sense to 
oppose what he perceived as unjust. In addition, Malaysia’s foreign policy under 
Mahathir has also been described as independent and assertive (for example in Liow’s 
work). There is certainly nothing fundamentally wrong with these descriptions but they 
still fail to tackle the core of the puzzle. Mahathir’s nationalistic impulses are never 
satisfactorily and systematically analysed by Liow or anyone else. The question remains 
as to what made Mahathir resent the hegemony of Western countries and the unequal 
international order so much. This thesis aims to address this gap in the literature by 
employing the concept of the struggle for recognition in order to understand Mahathir’s 
motivations.
Most writers are reluctant to consider motivational factors relating to the 
struggle for recognition because of the methodological challenge it involves. This 
important consideration is, for example, raised by Jeshurun. Foreign policy motivations
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based on the search for recognition are deemed problematic to ascertain due to the fact 
that they can only be inferred through the leader’s pronouncements. But, this does not 
mean it cannot be done. In order to detect a struggle for recognition, this study looks for 
Mahathir’s expressed moral claims, specifically his conceptions of what is right, just and 
fair. This is because, as will be explained in greater detail in Chapter Two, a struggle for 
recognition is triggered when there is a perception of violation of preconceived 
conceptions of justice.
1.3. SELECTION OF CASE STUDIES
To reiterate, the aim of this thesis is to test the significance of ‘the search for recognition’ 
as a key motivation in Malaysia’s foreign policy under Mahathir. Towards this end, this 
thesis identifies three major components of foreign policy during Mahathir’s time as 
prime minister, namely South -  South co-operation, issues concerning the Muslim 
ummah and policies towards the nations of East Asia. These three foreign policy 
addressees were deemed very important by the Mahathir administration and therefore 
qualify them for study in this thesis.
Further, the selection of case studies in this thesis follows the rule of including at 
least one ‘crucial case’, as well as a ‘least likely’ case. A ‘crucial case’ is a case that 
would most likely confirm the hypothesis. A failure to even satisfy the most likely case 
would result in an all-out blow to the hypothesis. In contrast, if the hypothesis is
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confirmed even in the least likely case, then it has survived the most difficult test.74 With 
regard to the cases chosen in this thesis, South -  South co-operation and foreign policy on 
issues related to the Muslim ummah can be considered as the ‘least likely cases’. This is 
because analyses of South-South co-operation mainly recognise acquisition of wealth or 
economic factors as its main underlying motivations. Analyses of Mahathir’s foreign 
policy to strengthen identification with the global Muslim ummah generally imply that it 
was driven by the domestic need for regime security. Both of these cases therefore seem 
unlikely to expose struggles for recognition as the key motivational factors. However, 
elements of recognition struggles are quite prevalent in the studies of East Asian nations, 
as portrayed by the many works on ASEAN emphasising culture and norms, as well as 
the discourse surrounding the Asian Values debate.75 In this sense, foreign policy that 
was concerned with Malaysia’s relations with its ASEAN neighbours and other East 
Asian countries can be considered as the crucial case that is most likely to confirm the 
struggle for recognition as a significant motivation.
74 See Harry Eckstein, ‘Case Study and Theory in Political Science’, in Handbook o f  Political Science, Vol. 
VII, Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (eds.), Reading, MA: Assison-Wesley, 1975, pp.80-127.
75 This of course, does not overlook the abundant studies o f security and economic factors governing 
relations of ASEAN, and also East Asian, countries.
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Figure 1.1 Foreign Policy-making: The relationship Between Domestic and International Realms.
Figure 1.1 above shows the relationship between domestic and international realms in the 
process of foreign policy-making. In the context of the domestic structure, it illustrates 
the central role played by Mahathir as the prime minister. In the international realm, it 
illustrates the three overlapping communities that Mahathir identified Malaysia with, 
which directly relates to the three different components of foreign policy that this thesis 
sets to investigate (South - South co-operation, policies related to the Muslim ummah, 
and policies towards East Asian countries).
1.4. THE METHOD OF STUDY
As the objective of the thesis is to understand the rationale held by decision-makers of 
Malaysia’s foreign policy, the thesis adopts an interpretive approach in order to make
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sense of the perceptions, values, interpretations and the ‘theorist’ inside the crucial 
decision-maker, Prime Minister Mahathir himself. This thesis relies on both primary and 
secondary data. The primary data was obtained via in-depth elite interviews including 
with Mahathir himself, as well as his written works and speeches. Other interviewees 
included ministers and important senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Malaysia. Not all o f these interviews can be cited in order to respect some interviewees’ 
request for anonymity. The secondary data comprises published and unpublished 
documents including official government documents, media reports and transcripts, and 
also biographies and other books written on Mahathir and Malaysia’s foreign policy 
under him. More elaboration on the method adopted by this study is contained in Chapter 
Two.
1.5. OUTLINE OF STUDY
The following chapter will elaborate on the theoretical framework of the thesis. Firstly, it 
will consider studies on motivation in foreign policy and illustrate the reason why the 
struggle of recognition has been sidelined as a motivation. This chapter will also 
introduce and explain Axel Honneth’s theory of the struggle for recognition and illustrate 
the compatibility of its use in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA).
Chapter Three will attempt to trace Mahathir’s belief system, which will be an 
important tool in the analysis to understand the motivation in accordance with Mahathir’s 
interpretations of his surroundings and his conceptions of justice. This chapter takes a 
historical approach and analyses the development of Mahathir’s political ideology from
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his early youth until the time just before he became the prime minister. Chapter Four 
focuses on the Malaysian state under Mahathir. It will attempt to illustrate the correlation 
between domestic and international structures and the agency of Mahathir in relation to 
both.
Chapter Five to Seven comprise the main empirical sections of the study. 
Chapter Five will attempt to test the extent of the struggle for recognition as the 
underpinning motivation for Malaysia’s South-South co-operation. This is a particularly 
hard case to prove because most studies attribute the motivation underpinning South- 
South co-operation to economic motives. The analysis will cover Malaysia’s policies 
towards the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Group of 15 (G-15) and the 
Commonwealth. It will also touch on Malaysia’s bilateral initiatives in providing 
technical assistance to developing South countries under the Malaysian Technical Co­
operation Programme (MTCP). In addition, Malaysia’s bilateral relations with South 
Africa will be looked at more specifically as an example of a South -  South bilateral co­
operation. Chapter Six is an empirical chapter that deals with Malaysia’s foreign policy 
towards the Muslim ummah. Most studies explain Malaysia’s motivation to increase its 
focus on issues related to the Muslim ummah in terms of internal security interests, that 
is, the maintenance of the domestic political regime. In this case, the analysis will focus 
mainly on Malaysia’s role in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC). 
Malaysia’s policies towards Palestine and Bosnia-Herzegovina will also be examined. In 
addition, Mahathir’s discourse on terrorism will also be discussed to detect a struggle for 
recognition as the key motivation underpinning Malaysia’s foreign policy towards the 
Islamic ummah. The final case study is Malaysia’s foreign policy towards East Asian 
nations. This can be considered the easier case to prove because a quest for recognition
can be discerned quite obviously in the discourse concerning the Asian value debate. In 
this case, this thesis will look at the significance of factors related to the struggle for 
recognition in Malaysia’s views on ASEAN and Mahathir’s proposal for 
institutionalising an East Asian regionalism in the form of the East Asian Economic 
Caucus (EAEC). It will also discuss Malaysia’s role in the development of ASEAN Plus 
Three (APT). Moreover, Mahathir’s discourse in the Asian value debate will also be 
explored to ascertain the significance of a quest for recognition in Mahathir’s foreign 
policy towards the East Asian nations. Chapter Eight is the Conclusion chapter that will 
summarise and analyse the findings of the empirical chapters and illustrate how they have 
or have not covered the gap in the literature concerning motivations behind Malaysia’s 
foreign policy under Mahathir.
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CHAPTER 2 THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION AS A 
MOTIVATION IN FPA
As highlighted in Chapter One, Malaysia’s foreign policy during the premiership of 
Mahathir Mohamad shows a significant change in direction. Under Mahathir, Malaysia’s 
foreign policy identity underwent a transformation, from a country firmly grounded in the 
Western alliance since it achieved its independence in 1957, to a country that staunchly 
championed the causes of developing countries of the ‘South’, the Islamic ummah and 
East Asia. This thesis seeks to understand this foreign policy behaviour by examining the 
motivations behind these policies. As highlighted in the previous chapter, merely 
considering security and economic factors seems inadequate in making sense of this 
transformation. The objective of this study is thus to examine whether greater 
understanding can be attained by focusing on recognition as an important motivation. 
What interests us in terms of recognition motives are Mahathir’s grievances and moral 
claims, developed from his perceptions of injustices, denial of rights and quest for self­
esteem in relation to Malaysia’s position in the prevailing order of the international 
society.1
1 According to Hedley Bull, a society of states exists when states conceive themselves to be bound by a 
common set o f rules in their relations with one another, and share in the workings o f common institutions. 
Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study o f  Order in World Politics, Basingstoke, London: 
Macmillan, Second Edition, 1995, p.13.
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Central to this thesis is the idea that, ‘on the ground’ foreign policy is 
conducted by individuals. Inter-state relations are carried out by state agents, political 
leaders and senior bureaucrats. It is from among these individuals that motivations for 
foreign policy originate. Empirically, motivation is anchored in individuals’ perceptions 
that invoke specific emotional responses, which consequently trigger actions. 
Furthermore, according to Crawford:
“Because behaviors are ambiguous, foreign policy decision makers constantly attribute causes and 
motives to others’ behaviour ... [and that] the prior emotional relationship between groups may 
influence the assignment o f reasons and intentions (attributions) to others’ behaviour.”2
This illustrates that diplomatic interactions and foreign policy actions undertaken by 
individual agents do not take place in an environment void of emotion, meaning and 
social contexts.
This chapter will firstly look at how motivation in general, has been 
considered in studies of foreign policy. It argues that the reason why recognition has not 
been dealt with routinely in FPA relates, in part, to the assumptions about human 
motivation articulated by the dominant Realist perspective. Before engaging with the 
specific concept of recognition as a motivation, this chapter will first scan the three major 
categories of motivation that have been considered in the literature, namely 
fear/survival/power, achievement/economic/profit and affiliation/recognition. In the 
process, it will illustrate that Realism’s sole preoccupation with the fear/power motive 
has caused other motives to be neglected. In addition, motivation is also overlooked as 
an area of inquiry in IR due to Neo-Realism’s ontological emphasis on structure and 
states as its units, rather than individuals. Secondly, this chapter will illustrate how
2 Neta Crawford, ‘The Passion o f World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships’ in 
International Security, Vol.24, No.4 (Spring 2000), p. 134.
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recognition has been discussed as a motivation within FPA thus far. Thirdly, this chapter 
will introduce Honneth’s theory of the struggle for recognition as a key analytical tool 
(for examining recognition motives in FPA inquiries). Finally, this chapter will deal with 
methodological questions arising from efforts to apply Honneth’s theory of the struggle 
for recognition in FPA.
2.1. THE STUDY OF MOTIVATION
Motivation is what drives human behaviour. It is by nature, an attribute of individuals.3 
“Motives supply direction and energy for action.”4 According to the prominent 
personality psychologist David McClelland, motivation refers to the “motive disposition 
aroused at a particular moment in time”.5 In terms of aroused motive for action, 
McClelland identifies three basic ‘motive systems’ in human lives centring on 
achievement, power and affiliation.6 Freyberg-Inan observes that these three basic 
motives have been widely studied and the practice of classifying human motivations in 
this way has been common across disciplines and issue areas.7 In The Psychological 
Assessment o f  Political Leaders Winter, for example, presented a method of measuring 
these three motives of power, achievement and affiliation in political leaders through
3 Annette Freyberg-Inan, What Moves Man: The Realist Theory o f  International Relations and Its Judgment 
o f  Human Nature, USA: SUNY Press, 2004, p.95.
4 David G. Winter, ‘Measuring the Motives of Political Actors at a Distance’ in The Psychological 
Assessment o f  Political Leaders: With Profiles o f  Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton, Jerrold M. Post (ed.), 
Ann Arbor: University o f Michigan Press, 2003, p. 153.
5 David McClelland, Human Motivation, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p.85.
6 McClelland, Human Motivation, pp. 223 -  369.
7 According to her, works utilising McClelland’s categorisation o f motive systems include Abraham 
Maslow’s Motivation and Personality, Richard Cottam’s Foreign Policy Motivation, and Graham Allison 
and Gregory Treverton (eds.) Rethinking America’s Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order. 
Annette Freyberg-Inan, What Moves Man, p. 109.
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systematic content analysis of their speeches, interviews and other verbal materials.8 
According to Freyberg-Inan, these motives correspond to the thesis of Athenian 
motivations in the Peloponnesian war, which are fear, desire for honour and the quest for 
material success or profit.9 However, Thucydides’ analysis of the war adopted a view of 
all three motives as “divisive, competitive and destructive.”10 Realism thus provides little 
space for the affiliation motive that engenders social and cooperative behaviour due to its 
dim view on human nature.
This is certainly not the case in practice because in general state leaders 
normally do build friendships and are not always suspicious of one another, making them 
become preoccupied with security issues. However, Realism, being “arguably the 
dominant paradigm in the field of the study of international relations and foreign policy 
today”11 has resulted in the dearth of inquiries explicitly engaging motives beyond 
security. Recognition motives, which concern “the conditions for identification with 
other relevant actors”12 are closely identifiable with McClelland’s affiliation motives. An 
illustration of how recognition motives have been dealt with in FPA will follow later in 
the chapter. Here, it is important to show how the Realist conception of human nature
8 Winter, ‘Measuring the Motives . . . ’, pp. 153 -  177.
9 Freyberg-Inan, What Moves Man, p.l 12.
10 Freyberg-Inan, What Moves Man, p.l 12.
11 Freyberg-Inan, What Moves Man, p.2.
12 William O. Chittick and Annette Freyberg-Inan, “ Chiefly for Fear, Next for Honour, and Lastly for 
Profit’: An Analysis o f Foreign Policy Motivation in the Peloponnesian War’ in Review o f  International 
Studies, No.27, 2001, p.71.
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has contributed to the over-emphasis of the fear or security motive and the goal of 
survival in the rationale of state’s behaviour.13
2.1.1. Fear: The Primary Motivation in Realism
While not ignoring motivation, Realists make simplified assumptions about it.14 Realists 
“presuppose an account of state motivation and treat it as a constant.”15 Realism, founded 
on a Hobbesian view of the state of nature, sees human beings as selfish egoists whose 
natural state is in a war of all against all. In this scenario, the motive of fear becomes 
overwhelming. Consequently, the goal of self preservation or security is paramount.16 
The interest of states is a given assumption in the Realist tradition - the pursuit of 
power.17 Realism posits a simple power determinism whereby behaviour of states flow 
directly from their relative power potential.18
The preoccupation of power due to their grim assumptions of human nature 
can be observed clearly in classical Realist writers.19 Morgenthau in Politics Among 
Nations wrote that, “whatever the ends that leaders may seek to achieve, their doing so is
13 Although Realist writers can be distinguished by some shared understanding on international relations, 
there remain certain disagreements between them. For example, Morgenthau recognised the agency of 
states but not Waltz. See John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’ in 
International Security, Vol. 19. No. 3 (Winter 1994 -  1995), footnote 20, p.9. Furthermore, ‘defensive 
Realists’ like Morgenthau emphasises the need for survival. On the other hand, ‘offensive Realists’ like 
Mearsheimer focus on ‘influence’ in their emphasis on power. In any case, it still makes sense to speak of 
Realism as an entity. Welch writes, “[t]he language of Realism has changed over the centuries,... but the 
central themes have survived the modernization process largely intact.” David A. Welch, Justice and the 
Genesis o f  War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p .l 1.
14 Richard W. Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Theory and a Case Study, Pittsburgh: The 
University o f Pittsburgh Press, 1977, p. 15.
15 Welch, Justice and the Genesis o f  War, p. 10.
16 “ ... states in the international system fear each other. .. .There is little room for trust among states.” 
Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise . . . ’, p.l 1.
17 Chris Brown, Understanding International Relations, Basingstoke: Palgrave, Second Edition, 2001, p.33.
18 Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation, pi 6.
19 Neo-Realists like Waltz mainly concentrate on the structure o f the international system and treat power 
as an assumed motivation.
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mediated and constrained by all states deploying their power to pursue their own ends, so 
that power itself becomes the proximate interest of any state’s foreign policy.”20 
Therefore, he argued that, “What is important to know, if one wants to understand foreign 
policy, is not primarily the motives of a statesman, but his intellectual ability to translate 
what he has comprehended into successful political action.”21
2.1.2. Impacts of Neo-Realism Deterministic Theory on the Study of Motivation
Neo-Realism in an attempt to systematise Realism on the ‘third image’ perspective22 
shifts the level of analysis to the international system. Neo-Realist Waltz argues that the 
anarchic nature of the international system, without an overarching authority makes states 
vulnerable to war.23 The emphasis of structure in Waltz’ structural Realism obscures the 
agency of individuals, relegating the role of motivation further.24 In fact, Waltz even 
omits motivation in his analysis at the individual level because Realism treats motivations 
as “axiomatic” and “invariant”.25 More current ‘offensive Realists’ like Mearsheimer 
also share this pre-occupation with power and security. He argues that, “the most basic 
motive driving states is survival.”26
20 Quoted in John G. Ruggie, Constructing The World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalism, 
London: Routledge, 1998, pp.5-6.
21 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle fo r  Power and Peace, Boston: MacGraw-Hill, 
1993, p.6.
22 Robert O. Keohane, (ed.), Neorealism and Its Critics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, 
p.165.
3 See Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2001.
24 Freyberg-Inan, What Moves Man, p.95.
25 Welch, Justice and the Genesis o f  War, pp. 14-5.
26 Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise p. 10.
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Motivation is pushed further into the background in Neo-Realism, which 
minimises the agency of human individuals.27 In its quest to produce scientific 
explanations of international relations by uncovering causal laws in the structure of the 
international system, Neo-Realism conceives states as variables subjected to deterministic 
behaviour akin to the dynamics of billiard balls. Focussing on the structural constraints 
of the system, this form of Realism asks not what states want, but what it is possible for 
them to have.28 In this view, foreign policy-makers are constrained both by the anarchic 
structure and their fixed goal of self-preservation. Realist motivational assumptions not 
only contribute to a deterministic view of states’ behaviour, but also affects its 
understanding of the role of morality in foreign policy.29
Moreover, in the Realist paradigm, motivation of states (assumed to be power 
seeking for the purpose of self-preservation), is subsumed under the concept of ‘the 
national interest’.30 In this regard, an analysis of the concept of ‘national interest’ is 
essential in exposing how Realists treat motivation of foreign policy. For classical 
Realists like Morgenthau, it is both possible and desirable that foreign policy be 
conducted strictly on the basis of “sober calculations of national interest, excluding the 
“distorting” influence of values, sentiments, and aspirations.”31 However, according to 
Graham Allison’s model of bureaucratic politics32, ‘the national interest’ can merely be
27 For a discussion of structure and agency in FPA, see Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics o f  Foreign 
Policy, New York: Palgrave, 2003, especially pp.25-30. For a Constructivist discussion on structure and 
agency in IR, see Alexander Wendt, Social Theory o f  International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999.
28 Freyberg-Inan, What Moves Man, p.95.
29 Freyberg-Inan, What Moves Man, p. 102.
30 Welch, Justice and the Genesis o f  War, p. 12.
31 George, On Foreign Policy: Unfinished Business, Boulder, London: Paradigm Publishers, 2006, p.4.
32 See Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence o f  Decision, New York, Harlow: Longman, Second 
Edition, 1999.
34
the name of the policy that wins in the bureaucratic power struggle.33 Whatever it is that 
constitutes the national interest, the concept is inadequate in shedding light on foreign 
policy motivations. As argued by Hill:
“the national interest is not something that can be usefully objectified in terms of power, security, 
prosperity, independence and the like, all o f which can be taken for granted as the high level goals 
o f all state foreign policy, but which lead to disagreement as soon as discussion becomes more 
specific.”34
Similarly, Bloom felt that the concept of national interest has “little use” as an 
academic tool for analysing foreign policy because “it is bounded by value ideas of what 
is best for the nation and, as Fumiss and Snyder stated, national interest is frequently 
‘whatever the decision-maker says it is’.”35
Indeed, when it comes to the specifics, the national interest as foreign policy 
motivation encompasses more than power, to include achievement and affiliation motives 
as well. The dominance of Realism as the paradigm of inquiry is actually perpetuated by 
methodological practices that protect Realist assumptions on human nature and 
motivation.36 This has to do with the quest for scientific explanations of international 
relations. The systemic theory of Neo-Realism explains foreign policy in terms of 
rational actor model, which makes power maximisation central in the pursuit of the 
national interest. The rational actor model is also shared by Neo-Liberalism. However, 
Neo-Liberalism challenges Realism’s focus on states as the primary actors and security as 
their primary goal. However, in their study of institutions (rather than states) and 
economic (rather than power) goals, Neo-liberals share the view of the international
33 Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, ‘Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making’ in British 
Journal o f  Political Science, Vol. 16, No.3. (Jul., 1986), p.283.
34 Hill, The Changing Politics o f  Foreign Policy, p. 119.
35 William Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990, p.83.
36 Freyberg-Inan, What Moves Man, p. 156.
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system as one that necessitates self-help and assume their actors to behave as egoist value 
maximisers as well.37 While a rational actor is said to maximise self-interest in the form 
of utility that his preferred choice entails, the rational actor model does not explain the 
source of this preference, nor does it specify whether it is aimed at enhancing profit, 
power or status.38 The fact is, in order to arrive at their preferences, individual actors 
“interpret information, monitor their performance, reassess their goals”.39 However, in 
FPA, where decision-making is emphasised and the study of emotional based motivations 
like recognition would be most appropriate, its analysis has mostly focused on ' 
‘cognition’.40 ‘Cognition’, which refers to the human thought processes, specifically 
information processing capability of the human mind, is quite distinguishable from the 
processes of sensation and emotion.41 In this sense, actors’ interpretations are by-passed 
and instead, structural features, such as bureaucratic positions, are given particular 
attention.42 The problem is, to quote Simon, “human behaviour is not always the result 
of deliberate calculation” but sometimes, the products of passionate powerful impulses.43
Therefore, the reasons for the neglect of the study of motivation are twofold. 
Firstly, it is a consequence of the dominance of Realism as an approach in analysing 
international relations. This dominance, which began with Thucydides’ writing on the 
Peloponnesian War, has continued to thrive especially after World War II amongst both
37 See David Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: the Contemporary Debate, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1993. See also Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (eds.), Transnational 
Relations and World Politics, Cambridge, Mass., 1971.
38 Hollis and Smith, ‘Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making’, p.272.
39 Hollis and Smith, ‘Roles and Reasons in Foreign policy Decision Making’, p.283.
40 Crawford, ‘The Passion of World Politics’, p. 118.
41 Herbert A. Simon, ‘Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science’ in The 
American Political Science Review, Vol.79, No.2, June 1985, p.295. Similarly, Hill defines cognition as 
the intellectual function of the human mind and observes that it has been a more prominent line of inquiry 
compared to ‘affective’ (emotional) factors in FPA. See Hill, The Changing Politics o f  Foreign Policy,
p . 1 ° 9.
Hollis and Smith, ‘Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making’, p.269.
43 Simon, ‘Human Nature in Politics . . . ’, p.301.
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academics and policy-makers.44 It has led to ‘power’ being the motivation mostly 
studied. Other motivations, namely economic (profit) and affiliation (recognition) have 
been dealt with in a less explicit manner. This is not to say that the Realist account of 
motivation is incorrect. However, it is certainly incomplete. Welch recognises that while 
some wars were fought for Realist reasons, others seemed anomalous from the Realist 
perspective, and this is simply because some leaders behave like Realists, while others do 
not.45 The fact is, leaders demonstrate motivations that are based on profit and affiliation, 
as well as power factors. Secondly, the drive to achieve scientific explanations has 
contributed towards the neglect of the study of motivation due to the avoidance of 
adopting interpretive methods to study emotions, which would be a prerequisite if we are 
to understand motivation. This for example, can be observed in Waltz explanation of the 
causes of war in Man, the State and War.46
2.1.3. Beyond Fear: Motivation Relating to Profit/Achievement and Affiliation
The quest for achievement motive refers to the desire to do something better ‘for its own 
sake’.47 It can be detected by “references to excellence, doing a ‘good’ or ‘better job’, or 
carrying out some unique accomplishment or innovative action.”48 McClelland illustrates 
how achievement motives were relevant in understanding the entrepreneurial 
characteristic of Protestants as described by Weber, which led to the flourishing of 
modem capitalism in Protestant communities.49 With reference to works in foreign
44 Allison and Zelikow, Essence o f  Decision, p.26.
45 Welch, Justice and the Genesis o f  War, p. 18.
46 See Waltz, Man, the State and War.
47 McClelland, Human Motivation, p.228.
48 Winter, ‘Measuring the Motives ...•’, p.154.
49 McClelland, Human Motivation, pp. 255-60.
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policy motivation by Wolfers50 and Cottam,51 Freyberg-Inan holds the achievement 
motive to include ‘possessional’ and economic motivations.52 In the example of the 
Athenians’ motivation, Freyberg-Inan again associates achievement motive with the 
quest for profit or material success.53 The motive for achievement or profit should not be 
understood in the narrow and strictly material sense. Instead, it arises from a perception 
or the need for opportunities, which inspires the pursuit of all those resources that can 
improve human lives, for example, money, education or personal rights.54 However, the 
term ‘achievement’ as a motivation will not be used in the analysis of this thesis. This is 
because this study aims to differentiate as much as possible economic motives understood 
as either a search for prosperity or purely an acquisition of wealth, from the quest for 
achievements along the lines of a search for status, prestige or social standing. Instead, 
such quests will be covered by references to profit or economic motives. While the 
motive of fear and the corresponding goal of acquiring power and security has tended to 
be the preoccupation of Realism, the profit motive and the goal of prosperity has been the 
focus of Liberal theories.55 The works of Keohane for example, emphasise that states 
have common interests, including the pursuit o f economic prosperity, which motivate 
them to co-operate.56
50 Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics, Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1962.
51 Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation.
52 Freyberg-Inan, What Moves Man, p. 109.
53 Freyberg-Inan, What Moves Man, p. 112.
54 Chittick and Freyberg-Inan, “ Chiefly for Fear, ...\p .71 .
55 Chittick and Freyberg-Inan, “ Chiefly for F ear,... ’, p.69.
56 See Robert O. Keohane, ‘Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions’ in World 
Politics, Vol.38, October 1985, pp.226-54; and After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in World 
Political Economy, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984.
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The affiliation motivation is derived from “the need to be with people” due to 
the “fear of rejection.”57 However, affiliation oriented people are only friendly to people 
who are similar to themselves, those who they agree with and like. In contrast, they can 
be less friendly and agreeable with people who they perceive to be different.58 In foreign 
policy, the affiliation motive can inspire nations to seek integration into a community and 
internalise the norms that identify the community.59 It refers to a concern for close 
relations with other nations.60 However, any community of states is always exclusive 
because members perceive certain common unique identities. Nations will accentuate 
values that increase their common identities with other members of the community, and 
that separate them from the rest.61
The affiliation motives relate to the sense of identity of actors, which 
presuppose state’s relations as social relations. This is the premise of Constructivist 
writers in IR.62 According to Constructivists, “actors cannot decide what their interests 
are until they know what they are representing.”63 According to Wendt, “structures of 
human behaviour are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces,” 
and that, “the identities and interests of the purposive actors are constructed by these 
shared ideas rather than given by nature.”64 However, Wendt takes a ‘holistic’65 approach
57 McClelland, Human Motivation, p.347 & p.356.
58 Winter, ‘Measuring the Motives . . . ’ s, p. 157.
59 Chittick and Freyberg-Inan, “ Chiefly for F ear,. . . ’, p.71.
60 Winter, ‘Measuring the Motives . . . ’, p. 156.
61 Chittick and Freyberg-Inan, ‘Chiefly for F ear,. . . ’ p.71.
62 There remains “a lack of any clear definition” of what Constructivist approach might involve. Brown, 
Understanding International Relations, p.52. However, for examples o f Constructivist writers, see 
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory o f  International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge Universtiy Press, 1999. 
Friedrich V. Kratochwil, The Humean Perspective on International Relations, Center for International 
Studies: Princeton University, 1981 and Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, Paul Kovert (eds.), 
International Relations in a Constructed World, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998.
63 Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein, ‘Norms, Identity and Culture in 
National Security’ in The Culture o f  National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, Peter J. 
Katzenstein (ed.), New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, p.60.
64 Wendt, Social Theory o f  International Politics, p.21.
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and maintains that the units of the international system are states, as opposed to 
individuals.66 Similar to the structural Realist Waltz, he refuses to reduce his level of 
analysis below the level of the international system. Wendt justifies this move by 
pointing out that both are interested in international politics, not foreign policy.67 In 
contrast, this thesis takes the view that the individual level of analysis is necessary in 
inquiries into motivation because motivation is naturally an attribute of individuals. 
Hence, this thesis is grounded within the FPA scholarship, instead of IR. In this 
connection, Freyberg-Inan voices her frustration with IR in the following manner:
“A  comparison of three major schools o f IR theory -  realism, liberalism and constructivism -  
reveals that each of these schools coheres around one o f the three basic motivational complexes of 
power, achievement, and affiliation. It is suggested that new integrative frameworks to the study 
o f international behavior should incorporate all three of these motives to avoid the type of bias that 
has been identified in realist theory. ... the search for such new frameworks stands to gain from 
disregarding entrenched epistemological divisions, which serve to uphold theoretical biases.”68
By situating this thesis within FPA, this study represents an attempt to 
develop or at least build on the idea of such integrative framework called for by analysts 
such as Freyberg-Inan. This thesis aims to highlight recognition motives, but not at the 
expense of downplaying security or economic motives where they exist.
2.2. RECOGNITION IN FPA
The concept of recognition is not often used within FPA. Recognition motives are most 
closely related to affiliation motives in McClelland’s definition. In this thesis,
65 “ ‘Holism’ refers to any approach which accounts for individual agents (human or otherwise) by appeal 
to some larger whole.” Martin Hollis, The Philosophy o f  Social Science: An Introduction, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 15.
66 Wendt, Social Theory o f  International Politics, pp.7-8.
67 Wendt, Social Theory o f  International Politics, p. 11.
68 Freyberg-Inan, What Moves Man, p. 155.
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recognition is distinguished by moral claims that form the gist o f the struggles. In a 
foreign policy context, recognition is relevant because states’ behaviour reflects the 
beliefs of their leaders and “state leaders are human beings with innate moral faculties.”69 
This means that states’ relations are bound to be affected if leaders perceive that a 
violation of their particular claims to ‘justice’ has occurred, which impacts on their self- 
confidence, self-respect and self-esteem.
In FPA, recognition motives have been covered but in a rather unsystematic 
manner. Here, it will be illustrated that FPA scholars have acknowledged the 
significance of recognition motives like esteem, prestige, grandeur, status, entitlement 
and face but so far, theirs are disparate individual concepts lacking the organising 
function of an overarching analytical concept. Although in this section the concepts will 
be dealt with separately, it will be apparent that esteem, prestige, grandeur, status, 
entitlement and face are inter-related, which allow all of them to be subsumed under the 
desire for recognition.
2.2.1. Esteem
The most notable coverage of the esteem motive in FPA is probably in the work of Janis 
on ‘groupthink’.70 In studying decision-making process in small groups, Janis concludes 
that the desire of group members to maintain self-esteem resulted in concurrence-seeking 
behaviour, which is a symptom of ‘groupthink’.71 According to Janis, concurrence- 
seeking is a means of providing mutual support in order to cope with the stresses of
69 Welch, Justice and the Genesis o f  War, p.21.
70 Irving L. Janis, Victims o f  Groupthink: A Psychological Study o f  Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972.
71 Janis, Victims o f  Groupthink, pp.202-3.
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decision-making.72 In addition, he argues that for individual decision-makers, 
“participating in a unanimous consensus along with the respected fellow members of a 
congenial group will bolster the decision-maker’s self esteem.”73
2.2.2. Prestig dGrandeur
Cottam includes grandeur in his taxonomy of foreign policy motivation. In his view, 
grandeur refers “to a concern for the dignity and prestige of a community with which a 
large group of individuals identify.”74 Grandeur relates to the feeling of pride and 
prestige that any man would feel in the achievement of his community. Cottam argues 
that the community that individuals identify most in modem era is usually “the nation 
organized as a state” and that “[w]here nationalism exists, concern for the prestige, 
dignity and world respect for the nation-state can be a primary motivating force behind 
foreign policy.”75
An example of empirical study centred on the motive of ‘grandeur’ is Cemy’s 
work on de Gaulle’s France.76 According to Cemy, de Gaulle’s policy of grandeur was 
underpinned by his worldview, which Cemy summarised as follows:
“That France should be great, that the potential for greatness is written in her history and present 
in the spirit o f her culture, and that it ought to be the inspiration o f her politics also, was at the core 
o f that ‘certain idea of France’ which he formed at an early age and carried with him throughout 
his career.”77
72 Janis, Victims o f  Groupthink, p.202.
73 Janis, Victims o f  Groupthink, p.203.
74 Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation, p.36.
75 Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation, p.36.
76 Philip G. Cemy, The Politics o f  Grandeur: Ideological Aspects o f  de Gaulle's Foreign Policy, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
77 Cemy, The Politics o f  Grandeur, p.3.
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From the above quotation, the prestige or grandeur motivation can be 
understood as being related to the sense of entitlement and perceptions of role status of 
the nation, which will also be considered here.
2.2.3. Status
Vertzberger sees status as an important concept, along with belonging and role, which 
constitute the national self-image that provides states’ identity. This identity directly or 
indirectly influences state’s behaviour.78 With reference to Holsti,79 Vertzberger posits 
that the status conception of the state relates to the roles that it believes it should play.80 
There are various dimensions of status by which states are ranked in the international 
society -  military, political, economic, technological, cultural, and so on.81 In this 
connection, Holsti contends that status is a term that is used in analyses of international 
stratification.82 According to Holsti:
“Any international system has a pattern of stratification which reflects differentials of involvement 
in the affairs o f the system, the extent o f foreign commitments, military capabilities, prestige, 
economic-technological levels. Conventional terms for example “great powers” or “middle 
powers” do not necessarily indicate how much diplomatic influence states wield within any set of 
relationships, but they do suggest rough distinctions of status.”83
Vertzberger also points out that the state’s ‘ascribed status’ (the status that 
other states in the international system believes it deserves) may not necessarily be 
identical as the status that it believes it deserves (its ‘achieved status’, which is a self
78 Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception 
in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1990, p.282.
79 K.J. Holsti, ‘National Role Conception in the Study of Foreign Policy’ in International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol.14, No.3, September 1970, pp.233-309.
80 Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds, p.291.
81 Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds, pp.291-2.
82 Holsti, ‘National Role Conception . . . ’, p.242.
83 Holsti, ‘National Role Conception . . . ’, p.242.
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conception).84 Connected to this, Holsti highlights ‘role prescriptions’, which are external 
factors for example, system-wide values and world opinion that buttress national role 
conceptions.85 States that perceive a gap between its achieved and ascribed status would 
tend to demonstrate frustration and externalise ‘conflictory’ behaviour.86 In addition, 
although belonging, role and status are state-level variables, empirically it affects the 
individual level of analysis.87 It is the state leaders who interpret, operationalise and 
enact concepts of belonging, role and status in foreign policy. Similarly, Holsti believes 
that “it is reasonable to assume that those responsible for making decisions and taking 
actions for the state are aware of international status distinctions and that their policies 
reflect this awareness.”88
Status motivation is implicit in Morgenthau’s typology of states that is based 
on a passive-active continuum. In this regard, Morgenthau described three possible 
policies in the international realm: for the status quo, imperialism or prestige.89 Moreover, 
Carr argues that war which began based on motives for security, then became “wars of 
aggression and self-seeking.”90 In this sense, Carr seems to allude to the incessant 
dissatisfaction of status experienced in men, although in this case defined primarily in 
power terms. It can be interpreted that according to him, war is also pursued to satisfy a 
quest for status. Status motive is dealt with more explicitly in Schweller’s work on
84 Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds, p.291.
85 Holsti, ‘National Role Conception p.245.
86 Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds, p.291.
87 Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds, p.293.
88 Holsti, ‘National Role Conception p.242.
89 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle fo r  Power and Peace, New York: McGraw- 
Hill, 1993.
90 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis: 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, 
New York: Palgrave, p.105.
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Hitler’s Germany.91 To Schweller, it matters whether the motivation of the state is 
revisionist or for the status quo. Germany under Hitler was clearly a revisionist state 
driven by the motivation to achieve the status of world power.92
2.2.4. Entitlement
Vertzberger’s concept of achieved status, or the status that the state perceives it deserves 
can also be termed as ‘entitlement’. In a similar vein, Welch, in examining the genesis of 
war, puts forth a theory of the justice motive, which he defines as “the drive to correct a 
perceived discrepancy between entitlements and benefits.”93 For the justice motive to 
come into play, the agent has to perceive that an entitlement exists and that the 
entitlement is not being fulfilled or respected (what he terms as ‘benefits’). Notably, 
Welch emphasises that the accuracy of those beliefs concerning entitlements are entirely 
irrelevant.94 What is important is the perception that entitlements exist. In this regard, 
Welch also stresses the important role that state leaders play. As he puts it, “The 
behaviour of states, of course, reflects the decisions of state leaders. State leaders are 
human beings with innate moral faculties.”95
Welch’s insights are not per se new. Leifer’s study on Indonesia’s foreign 
policy touches on the entitlement motive.96 He argues that “[pjride in revolutionary 
achievement, a consciousness of vast territorial scale, an immense population, extensive 
natural resources, as well as a strategic location, produced the conviction that Indonesia
91 Randall L. Scweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and H itler’s Strategy o f  World Conquest, New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1998.
92 Scweller, Deadly Imbalances, p.94.
93 Welch, Justice and the Genesis o f  War, p. 19.
94 Welch, Justice and the Genesis o f  War, p. 19.
95 Welch, Justice and the Genesis o f  War, p.21.
96 Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy, London: Published for the Royal Institute o f International 
Affairs by Allen & Unwin, 1983.
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was entitled to play a leading role in the management of regional order within South-East 
Asia.”97 Indonesia’s sense of regional entitlement can clearly be observed in the rhetoric 
and actions of its first president, Sukamo, particularly during Indonesia’s ‘confrontation’ 
campaign against the formation of Malaysia.98 However, according to Leifer, Indonesia’s 
sense of regional entitlement persisted during the time of Suharto too, although it was 
less openly displayed.99
Another work that can be viewed in the light of entitlement motive is Drifte’s 
on Japan’s Quest for a Permanent Security Council Seat.100 While arguing that the 
Security Council seat is sought by Japan because it would confer it with prestige and 
status, Drifte also underlined that the quest relates to the ‘dignity’ of the nation and is 
underpinned by the concern that Japan be treated the same way as other major powers.101 
Brands’ work, which contains the argument that the single theme that pervades the 
history of American thinking about the world is “that the US has a peculiar obligation to 
better the lot of humanity,”102 hints an entitlement motive underpinning American 
leaders’ mission for a world leadership role for the US. Similarly, Mao’s China has also 
been analysed as encapsulating an entitlement motive by believing that it was a natural 
ally of the oppressed peoples, thus having the obligation to hold the banner of anti­
imperialism and anti-colonialism of the US and other Western imperialist powers.103 In 
addition, Cemy’s work on de Gaulle’s foreign policy, which has been cited under
97 Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy, p.xiii.
98 Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy, pp.75-110.
99 Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy, pp. 173-4.
100 Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Quest fo r  a Permanent Security Council Seat: A Matter o f  Pride or Justice?, 
New York, London: St. Martin’s Press, Macmillan, 2000.
101 Drifte, Japan’s Quest..., pp.95-6.
102 H.W. Brands, The Struggle fo r  the Soul o f  Foreign Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998, p.vii.
103 Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War, Chapel Hill & London: The University o f North Carolina 
Press, 2001, p.4.
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prestige/grandeur motive can also be viewed in terms of the effect on foreign policy of a 
sense of entitlement that de Gaulle felt the French nation deserved.104
2.2.5. Face
When Colombian President Alvaro Uribe ended the involvement of Venezuelan President 
Hugo Chavez in hostage negotiations with a rebel group, Venezuela reacted by recalling 
its ambassador to Colombia because the act was perceived as “a spit in the face” by the 
Venezuelan President.105 According to Cottam, the desire to avoid humiliation is amongst 
the most ubiquitous determinants of foreign policy and he links this motive to the feeling 
of dignity and prestige that individuals hold for their community.106 There is definitely a 
connection between face, entitlement, status and esteem. Loss of face would occur only 
when there is a sense of entitlement to an ascribed status, which would inevitably lead to 
arousing expectations of a certain proper treatment. A denial of the proper treatment 
expected can be considered as a snub and non-recognition of the achieved status, thus 
presents a slight that disturbs one’s self esteem. In the example quoted above, clearly 
Chavez perceived himself as occupying a certain status in the region that entitles him to 
play a leadership role. The loss of face in this instance occurred due to the withholding 
of the recognition on the part of Colombia for the status that Chavez thinks he and/or 
Venezuela deserves, by ending Chavez’s role in the negotiation process. The search for 
recognition as a motive pertaining to face relates to Vertzberger’s view that a state tends 
to exhibit frustration and ‘conflictory’ behaviour if there is a gap between ‘achieved’ and 
‘ascribed’ or sought status. Similarly, Welch’s argument .that the justice motive would be
104 Cemy, The Politics o f  Grandeur.
105 ‘Diplomatic Words’, The Economist, December 1st-  7th, 2007, p.9.
106 Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation, p.36.
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triggered when there is a discrepancy between perceived entitlements and actual benefits 
also suggests that moral conflicts arise from experiences of being snubbed or humiliated - 
in other words, from a perceived loss of face.
Leifer’s study on Cambodia reveals that Sihanouk’s reluctance to see 
Cambodia enter the grouping of neutralist states was because of his concern for position 
and status. While not wanting Cambodia to be submerged beneath the weight of other 
powerful neutrals, Sihanouk was also frank to admit that the other reason why he refused 
to join was because, “[t]he invitation, which came from President Tito to participate in 
the deliberations of the major neutrals came too late to satisfy his pride.”107 In this case, 
the crucial function of the recognition motive pertaining to face can be detected in 
Leifer’s writing as follows:
“Sihanouk has a long memory for alleged slights, and there is little doubt that he regarded the 
recognition o f his neutral eminence as too long delayed. In refusing Tito, he was therefore only 
paying back in kind the insults accorded to him by sins of omission.”
The significance of face (or its denial) in foreign policy is also alluded to in Leifer’s work 
on Singapore. For example, he observes that the difficult bilateral relations between 
Singapore and Malaysia have partly been the result of “a quality of hubris expressed, at 
times, in a disdainful view of Malaysia arising from superior economic accomplishment 
... [which is] viewed with resentment in Kuala Lumpur .. .”109
The preceding deliberation on some of the recognition-related concepts that 
have been covered within FPA illustrates their inter-related nature. For example, esteem, 
prestige and grancleur presuppose entitlement, which prescribes proper role and treatment
107 Michael Leifer, Cambodia: The Search fo r  Security, London: Pall Mall Press, 1967, p .l 15.
108 Leifer, Cambodia: The Search fo r  Security, p.l 15.
109 Michael Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping With Vulnerability, London and New York: 
Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2000, p.54.
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- the non-recognition of which would result in the loss of face. Recognition ( to which 
esteem, prestigdgrandeur, status, entitlement and face allude) is also concerned with 
legitimate relations between states, as the example of Indonesia’s sense of entitlement in 
Southeast Asia illustrates. At the core of recognition struggles are moral claims'10 - 
claims based on perceived entitlements to proper and appropriate treatment, or in other 
words, “presupposed conceptions of justice” normally related to individuals’ 
understanding of “what are considered to be legitimate social arrangements, institutions 
or forms of interaction.”1" This allows for the understanding that social conflicts 
encompassing struggles for the establishment of relationships of mutual recognition can 
be based on individuals' negative experiences of having their “moral expectations” 
violated."2
Thus, the common basis underpinning recognition motives is the moral claims 
that are invoked in these struggles. As illustrated, leaders regularly make moral claims in 
the conduct of state relations. However, despite the importance of the quest for 
recognition in foreign policy, it remains understudied in FPA. At the most, it can be said 
that the search for recognition has only received a disparate treatment in FPA. This also 
shows in the lack of any analytical tools that can be the prism through which recognition 
factors can be studied systematically. The following section will therefore elaborate on 
Honneth’s theory of the struggle for recognition and illustrate how in this study, his 
insights can be employed for the purpose. In this regard, it will look specifically at 
Honneth’s three categories of ‘practical relations-to-self; self-confidence, self-respect
110 Jurgen Haacke, ‘The Frankfurt School and International Relations: On the Centrality o f Recognition’ in 
Review o f  International Studies, 31, 2005, p. 186.
111 Haacke, ‘The Frankfurt School . . . \p .l8 9 .
112 Joel Anderson, ‘Translator’s Introduction’ in Axel Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, Cambridge, 
Mass.: The MIT Press, 1995, p .x i.
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and self-esteem. These three practical relations-to-self stem from three distinctive modes 
of recognition; emotional support, cognitive respect and social esteem, which are central 
to Honneth’s recognition theory.
2.3. HONNETH’S THEORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION
It has been argued that the disparate concepts related to recognition struggles covered in 
some FPA works can actually be analysed in a more all-encompassing and systematic 
manner using Honneth’s theory of the struggle for recognition. In this regard, Honneth’s 
theory provides a useful scheme whereby relations between subjects can be analysed with 
greater sharpness by looking at the different claims to recognition. Its usage directs our 
attention to the grievances relating to perceived acts of disrespect, which can be identified 
and analysed systematically according to the different modes of practical relation-to- 
self.113 Practical relation-to-self refers to positive self identification, and will be 
explained in greater details later in this section. At'this juncture, it is essential to expand 
Honneth’s account of recognition, before the different modes of practical relation-to-self 
are examined.
2.3.1. Recognition according to Honneth
‘Recognition’ has become a concept that is central in attempts to conceptualise today’s 
struggles over identity and difference in societies.114 Contra Hobbes, who focuses on the
113 Haacke, ‘The Frankfurt School . . . ’, p.193.
114 Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, ‘Introduction: Redistribution or Recognition?’ Nancy Fraser and Axel 
Honneth , Redistribution or Recognition: A Political -  Philosophical Exchange, translated by Joel Golb, 
James Ingram and Christiane Wilke, London: Verso, 2003, p .l.
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motive of self-preservation in explaining social conflicts, Honneth emphasises the 
concept of the struggle for mutual recognition. In other words, Honneth draws on the 
struggle for recognition as the key motivation underpinning moral claims in social 
conflicts. Basically, his explanation is derived from understanding the accounts of what 
justifies these struggles.115
As a cognitive process, recognition operates within the psychological 
consciousness of individual human beings. Recognition is therefore a social and 
intersubjective concept. It concerns the interpretation of individuals’ identities, as defined 
by themselves and others.116 According to Taylor,
“our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by misrecognition o f others, and 
so a person or group o f people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society 
around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of 
themselves.”117
Reflecting the centrality of identity in recognition, fundamental to Honneth’s 
theory is the awareness or consciousness of the subject of the social meaning of his or her 
behaviour. The concept of the struggle for recognition is linked to Hegel’s notion of 
master-slave dialectic.118 Honneth builds on the premise of Hegel’s early works,119 which 
posit “that practical identity-formation presupposes inter-subjective recognition.”120 
However, Honneth moves beyond Hegel and turns to the Social Psychologist George 
Herbert Mead121 by using Mead’s conceptions of the inter-subjective ‘I ’ and ‘Me’
115 Anderson, ‘Translator’s Introduction’ in Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p.x.
116 The discussion here is on individuals’ identities. For a discussion of the formation states’ identities in 
international politics, see Wendt, Social Theory o f  International Politics.
117 Charles Taylor, ‘The Politics o f Recognition’ in Multiculturalism: Examining The Politics o f  
Recognition, Amy Gutmann (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, p.25.
118 Haacke, ‘The Frankfurt School . . . ’, p. 187.
119 Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, chapters 2 & 3, pp.l 1-63.
120 Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p.92.
121 See George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self and Society From the Standpoint o f  a Social Behaviorist, Charles 
W. Morris (ed.), Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1934, reprinted in 1967.
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identities to explain the formation of such a consciousness.122 In this regard, according to 
Honneth, “one possesses knowledge of the intersubjective meaning of one’s actions only 
if one is capable of generating the same reaction in oneself that one’s behavioural 
expressions stimulated in the other.”'23 In other words, to be able to predict and control 
reactions of others, an individual must have an understanding of what his or her conduct 
means or represents to others in their shared action and communicative environment. In 
this regard, Mead distinguishes the individual’s consciousness of ‘Me’ as the image that 
is being reflected of the individual’s self by others, based on his or her actions in the past. 
In contrast, the ‘I’ consciousness represents “the unregimented source” of all of the 
individual’s current actions.124 In sum, the ‘I’ identity is thus self-constituted, whereas 
‘Me’ is socially constituted.125
The concept of ‘socialisation’ is important here. Socialisation refers to the 
process whereby individuals internalise the norms of their relations through 
generalisations of patterns of behaviours of others. The existence of shared social norms 
provide the base on which co-operative relations can take place. Individuals come to 
realise what they can expect from others and also the obligations they have towards other 
members of the society. In this context, the ‘Me’ image is defined through individuals’ 
experiences and their learning process of conceiving their selves, from the perspectives of 
the ‘generalised others’. In this regard, what is important to individuals are their 
perceptions of their positions and roles in society.126
122 Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, Chapter 4, pp.72-91.
123 Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p.73.
124 Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p.74.
125 Wendt, Social Theory o f  International Politics, p.229.
126 Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p.78.
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Here, it is important to stress that Honneth’s analysis is grounded in 
individuals as subjects. By utilising Mead’s conception of individuals’ consciousness in 
the forms of the ‘I’ and ‘Me’ identities, Honneth’s understanding of individuals’ claims 
to recognition is “harnessed in every subject as a motive which is continually capable of 
being activated.”127 According to Haacke, by grounding the struggle for recognition 
within each individual, the concept can be used universally to understand social struggles, 
regardless of culture and normative orders.128 Bearing in mind the original grounding of 
Honneth’s theory of the struggle for recognition in individuals and the society, how then 
can it be transferred to FPA? FPA would be a natural location to apply Honneth’s theory
i
of the struggle for recognition because of the possibility and utility of actor-specific 
approaches in empirical inquiries. Analysis at the level of the individual is possible in 
FPA because FPA actually deals with “the ground” of international relations.129 In this 
connection, Haacke argues that Honneth’s theory of the struggle for recognition can be 
utilised to provide the basis for a systematic research agenda in FPA.130 According to 
him, “what form particular struggles for recognition take is always going to be an 
empirical rather than a theoretical question.”131 As examples, Haacke illustrates at least 
three possible approaches. Firstly, a research can focus on “the extent to which 
individual leaders or collective leaderships are occupied with seeking recognition.” 
Secondly, it can “distinguish the ways in which recognition is sought for particular types 
of identities,” and thirdly, the theory can be adopted “to investigate how either perceived
127 Haacke, ‘The Frankfurt S c h o o l p . l 88.
128 Haacke, ‘The Frankfurt S chool. . . ’, p. 118.
129 “A “ground” means the conceptualization of the fundamental or foundational level at which phenomena 
in the field of study occur.” Valerie M. Hudson, ‘Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the 
Ground o f International Relations, in Foreign Policy Analysis, N o.l, 2005, p .l.
130 Haacke, ‘The Frankfurt School... ’, p.193.
131 Haacke, ‘The Frankfurt School . . . ’, p. 193.
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snub and/or a perceived loss of face have led to grudges that have caused conflicts or 
difficult relations between particular states.”132
‘Actor-specific’ analyses in FPA at the level of individuals have particularly 
concentrated on state leaders. In this context, Alexander George and Ole Holsti have 
been active in pursuing an approach that aims to “study individual differences in thinking 
about the world -  a man’s assumptions, his categories, his “operational code”, the lessons 
he has learned from his past experiences.”133 Also, Byman and Pollack asserted that it is 
important to study the factor of leadership in foreign policy.134 According to them, the 
twentieth century cannot be satisfactorily explained without reference to Adolf Hitler, 
Joseph Stalin, Vladimir Lenin, Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Mahatma Gandhi 
or Mao Zedong.135 An example of the study of leadership in FPA is Hermann’s, which 
highlights four broad types of personal characteristics of leaders that she argues affect 
foreign policy style and content. The types of personal characteristics that Hermann 
analysed are beliefs, motives, decision style and interpersonal style.136 Therefore, there is 
a clear potential for the benefits of transplanting Honneth’s theory of the struggle for 
recognition into FPA. This is because motivations have already become an area of 
inquiry in FPA, although they remain understudied. In the context of FPA inquiry into 
motivations of leaders, Honneth’s theory of the struggle for recognition can be employed 
as the basis of psychological approaches applied to leadership.
132 Haacke, ‘The Frankfurt School p. 193.
133 Lloyd S. Etheredge, A World o f  Men: The Private Sources o f  American Foreign Policy, Cambridge, 
Mass., London: MIT Press, 1978, p.8.
134 Daniel L Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, ‘Let Us Now Praise Great Man: Bringing Statesmen Back 
In’, International Security, Vol.25, No.4, Spring 2001.
135 Byman and Pollack, ‘Let Us Now Praise Great Man’, p. 108.
136 Margaret G. Hermann, ‘Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of 
Political Leaders’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol.24, N o.l, March 1980, pp.7-46.
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2.3.2. Honneth’s Concept of ‘Practical Relations-to-Self
According to Honneth, central to the ‘I* identity is the concept of ‘practical relations-to- 
self, which refers to the positive way that one relates to oneself.137 To Honneth, there are 
three distinctive modes of practical relations-to-self: self-confidence, self-respect and 
self-esteem. Anderson explains that these ‘practical relations-to-self are not an 
individual’s “emotional state” but rather that, “they relate to the dynamic process in 
which individuals come to experience themselves as having a certain status, be it as a 
focus of concern, a responsible agent, or a valued contributor to shared projects”.138 A 
fully realised identity means an equilibrium in individuals’ practical relations-to-self. 
This reflects the requirement for the social recognition of ‘Me’ to be consistent with the 
‘I* identity, as Taylor explained in the preceding quote. The three modes of practical 
relations-to-self can also be understood in the context of individuals’ needs for emotional 
support, cognitive respect and social esteem.139 Honneth builds on Hegel and stresses that 
coming to relate to oneself positively in the different modes of self-confidence, self- 
respect and self-esteem necessarily involves experiencing recognition from others.140 
Anderson summarised Honneth’s approach as follows:
“The possibility for sensing, interpreting, and realizing one’s needs and desires as a fully 
autonomous and individuated person -  in short, the very possibility of identity-formation -  
depends crucially on the development of self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem. These 
three modes of relating practically to oneself can only be acquired and maintained 
intersubjectively, through being granted recognition by others whom one also recognizes. As a 
result, the conditions for self-realization turn out to be dependent on the establishment of 
relationships of mutual recognition,”.141
137 Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p.143.
138 Anderson, ‘Translator’s Introduction’ in Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p.xii.
139 Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, esp. pp.92-130.
140 Anderson, ‘Translator’s Introduction’ in Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p.xii. See also 
Haacke, ‘The Frankfurt S chool. . . ’.
141 Anderson, ‘Translator’s Introduction’ in Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p.xi.
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In other words, social struggles can be seen to originate from the perceived 
failure to recognise an individual’s identity. Using Mead’s terminologies, conflict arises 
when there is a discrepancy between the individual’s self understanding in the form of ‘I’ 
identity and his or her reflexive image -  the ‘Me’ identity.
The three modes of practical relations-to-self provide us with the analytical 
tool to empirically study the forms of disrespect that trigger struggles for recognition, as 
shown in figure 2.1 below. In this regard, of particular relevance to international 
relations, according to Haacke, are the modes of cognitive respect and social esteem, 
which “might find expression respectively in membership status and the recognition of 
contributions to the workings of international society.”142 However, in contrast to 
Haacke, this thesis posits that the dependence aspect in the social relationship of love and 
the connected practical relation-to-self in the mode of basic self-confidence is still 
relevant in analysis at the level of social relations between states, especially in the context 
of colonialism.
Love and Basic Self-Confidence
Honneth defines self-confidence in the context of one’s ability to express one’s needs and 
desires without fear of abandonment, rather than one’s feelings about one’s capabilities.143 
In explaining the concept, Honneth refers to the work of the psychologist Winnicott and 
links basic self-confidence to the concept of love between parent and child.144 According 
to Winnicott, parent and child are in a complex relationship during the child’s formative
142 Haacke, ‘The Frankfurt S c h o o l p .  193.
143 Anderson, ‘Translator’s Introduction’ in Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p.xiii.
144 Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p. 104.
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process. In this relationship, both parent and child try to extricate themselves from a 
‘symbiosis’ relationship.145
Practical relation to self in the mode of basic self-confidence thus refers to the 
emotional support that the subject needs. In this relationship, the ‘parent’ figure is seen 
to have the role of the ‘mother’ although it does not necessarily have to be the biological 
mother in reality. In this sense, self-confidence is derived within the child from the 
assurance that he or she learns through experience that he or she would not be abandoned 
by the ‘mother’, no matter what his or her antics are. Self-confidence, explained in the 
form of the ‘basic capacity to be alone’ refers to the trust that the child gain in him or 
herself to deal with self anxiety due to feelings of certainty of the ‘mother’s’ love.146 
Unique to this concept of self-confidence (the need for love and concern) as a practical 
relation to self is the fact that it transcends cultural and historical segmentation.147 It will 
be explained later that the ways in which both respect and esteem are being accorded 
have undergone significant historical transformation.
Because Honneth anchored practical relation-to-self in the mode of basic self- 
confidence primarily in the individuals' experience of love relations, it seems problematic 
to transfer this concept from the analysis at the level of individuals' social relations to 
international relations. In other words, how can it be applicable to foreign policy? In this 
regard, what is important in the social relations emphasised by Honneth is the element of 
dependency in the form of emotional support that the subject needs. Colonialism can be 
regarded as a relationship of dependency that impacts the confidence of the colonised 
nation. Furthermore, perceptions of abuse, which is the form of act of disrespect linked
145 Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, pp.99-100.
146 Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p. 104.
147 Anderson, ‘Translator’s Introduction’ to Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p.xiv.
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to self-confidence as a mode of practical relations-to-self can occur in international 
society as well. For example, Mahathir’s discourse, which is examined particularly in 
Chapter 5 will expose that he considered colonialism as an experience of abuse on the 
Malaysian nation, which impacted on the nation’s self-confidence.
Rights and Self Respect
To Honneth, self-respect refers to one’s sense of having ‘the universal dignity as persons’ 
rather than about having a high opinion of oneself.148 To have self-respect means having 
“the ability to relate to oneself as a legally equal interaction partner with all fellow 
humans.”149 In other words, it means being recognised and given the status as “morally 
responsible” agents who are “capable of participating in the sort of public deliberation 
that Habermas terms ‘discursive will-formation’.”150 In this context, recognition is linked 
to individuals’ ability to act based on reasons, in the process of determining and drafting 
of laws that have direct impact on their lives and well-being. This is what is meant by 
‘discursive will formation’, thus indicating that this mode of recognition has a significant 
legal dimension.151 Here again, colonialism can be considered as an example. Unequal 
relationships between colonised nations and imperial powers define colonialism, whereby 
colonised peoples have very little or no legal status to participate in the administration of 
their own nations.
148 Anderson, ‘Translator’s Introduction’ in Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p.iv.
149 Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p. 134.
150 Anderson, ‘Translator’s Introduction’, in Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p.xv. On the idea of 
discursive will formation, see Jilrgen Habermas, The Theory o f  Communicative Action, Vol.l, Reasons and 
Rationalization o f  the Society, London: Heinemann, 1984.
151 Anderson, ‘Translator’s Introduction’ in Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p.xv.
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Self-respect therefore denotes the positive relations-to-self that legal 
recognition makes possible.152 Drawing on Joel Feinberg, Honneth asserts that human 
dignity is founded on “the recognizable capacity to assert claims.”153 Honneth also 
invokes Mead’s argument that ‘dignity’ is achieved when individuals are recognised as 
members of the community with the granting of rights.154 In this situation, the individual 
is in a way dignified through the assurance of the value of his or her identity to the 
community. In sum, self-respect thus relates to the real capacity of individuals to raise 
and defend their claims in a discursive process through the granting of rights.155
Through ‘socialisation’ or the internalisation of social norms that regulate co­
operation in a society, individuals become aware of the rights that are accorded to them 
and know that they can legitimately depend on their rights to ensure that their demands 
are respected.156 Moreover, by realising the reciprocal obligations of each towards the 
other, individuals actually recognise one another as legal persons. This form of 
recognition creates positive relation to self because it provides subjects the status of fully 
accepted members of the society. It means subjects are recognised as moral and 
responsible agents who can participate in the cooperative dynamics of the society based 
on reciprocal respect of rights.157
In the international society, just like in domestic societies, states are bound by 
a common set of rules that govern their relations with one another and also take part in
152 Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p.l 18.
153 Anderson, ‘Translator’s Introduction’ in Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p.xv. See also Joel 
Feinberg, ‘The Nature and Value of Rights’ in Rights, Justice and the Bounds o f  Liberty: Essays in Social 
Philosophy, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980.
154 Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p.79.
155 Anderson, ‘Translator’s Introduction’ in Axel Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p.xv.
156 Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p.79.
157 Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p.80.
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various institutions, which engender specific obligations and rules of behaviour.158 
Therefore, we can expect that conflicts based on perceptions of denials of rights, which 
trigger the struggle for recognition in the form of cognitive respect to also occur in the 
realm of international society. In this context, the concept of sovereign equality is 
important in governing relations between states. The concept refers to the claim of every 
state to be autonomous. In this sense, sovereign states can be expected to refuse 
recognising that there is any external person or body, who can legitimately exercise 
authority within the jurisdiction of their territories.159
Solidarity and Self-Esteem
To recap, self-respect is about individuals occupying the same status due to the 
possession of the same rights for every person. In contrast, self-esteem involves the 
feeling of what makes one special, unique or in Hegel’s term ‘particular’.160 What 
distinguishes one from others is something unique and considered valuable by one’s 
community. In this context, individuality and self-esteem are linked. On this point,
Honneth refers to Mead’s discussion of personal identity who claims that distinguishing
\
oneself from others as an individual is a matter of what ‘we do better than others’.161
Esteem thus depends on the social condition that individuals find themselves 
in. What is considered as valuable varies from society to society, depending on its 
prevailing values. By looking at esteem according to the values strata within a particular 
culture, Honneth provides the possibility of examining the conditions for self-esteem as
158 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 13.
159 Chris Brown, Sovereignty, Rights and Justice: International Political Theory Today, Cambridge,
Malden MA: Polity, 2002, p.4.
160 Anderson, ‘Translator’s Introduction’ in Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p.xvi.
161 Anderson, ‘Translator’s Introduction’ in Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p.xvi.
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an area of conflict.162 To elaborate, social conflicts might be motivated by a group of 
individuals who seek recognition as valuable contributors to the society’s common good. 
The claimants for recognition in this scenario might have felt that the prevailing social 
culture and arrangements have failed to recognise their unique contribution to the society, 
or worse, denigrate their subculture.
Pronouncements that invoke national sentiments of pride, esteem and prestige 
are regularly made by leaders. The feeling of esteem is also normally linked to the 
nation’s unique status in the international society. In this regard, achievement and status 
can be in terms of membership in certain groups, for example, developed nations, or the 
United Nations Security Council, which denote a special status and along with it, the role 
conception of the state.163 Similarly, perceptions of denigration and insult also do occur 
in inter-state relations. Descriptions of a ‘rogue state’ or ‘pariah nation’ are banded by 
dominant powers in the international society to insult particular states that are considered 
a threat to the existing order, with the hope that the others would conform.164 Such cases 
include North Korea when it sought to acquire nuclear weapons, or Serbia when it 
apparently strove for hegemony in the Balkans in the 1990s.
162 Anderson, ‘Translator’s Introduction’ in Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition .p.xvii.
163 See Holsti, ‘National Role Conceptions
164 Hill, The Changing Politics o f  Foreign Policy, p. 184.
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M ode of Recognition Emotional support Cognitive respect________ Social Esteem
Dimension of 
Personality
Needs and emotions Moral responsibility Traits and abilities
Form s of Recognition Primary relationships 
(love, friendship)
Legal relations (rights) Community of value 
(solidarity)
Developmental
Potential
- Generalization, de­
formalization
Individualization,
equalization
Practical Relation-to- 
Self
Basic self-confidence Self-respect Self-Esteem
Form s of Disrespect Abuse and rape Denial of rights, 
exclusion
Denigration, insult
Threatened Physical Integrity Social integrity ‘honour’, ‘dignity’
Com ponent of 
Personality
Figure 2.1 The structure of relations of recognition.165
Figure 2.1 represents a summary of the functions of the respective component 
o f the modes of practical relation-to-self according to Honneth. Honneth’s theory is 
useful in empirical studies of social recognition motives in FPA because it can direct 
analysts to identify forms of disrespect (abuse, denial of rights or denigration) as 
experienced by the subjects, which trigger the struggle for recognition in the context of 
either self-confidence, self-respect or self-esteem.
2.3.3. Disrespect and the Moral Grammar of Social Struggles
Honneth’s ‘formal conception of ethical life’ is the normative ideal of a society. In such a 
society, there exist the inter-subjective conditions for recognition that would allow 
individuals to acquire the self-confidence, self respect and self-esteem necessary for them 
to fully develop their identities. It is quite a widespread phenomenon to hear claims by 
certain groups of individuals of having been abused, unjustly treated, insulted or 
humiliated. According to Honneth, such descriptions of mistreatment can be categorised
165 Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p. 129.
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as forms of disrespect, that is, a denial of recognition.166 Such mistreatment is not only 
harmful because it restricts the freedom for individuals to act, but it also negatively 
affects the individuals’ understanding of themselves which have been acquired inter- 
subjectively. Feelings of being disrespected points to the vulnerability of individuals due 
to their internal dependence for recognition from one another. It refers to the normative 
image of ‘Me’ that needs to be constantly supported by others. Experience of disrespect 
can raise conflicts of the normative image of ‘Me’ and can injure a subject’s whole 
identity to the point o f collapse.167
In sum, acts of disrespect can lead to conflicts of identity within individuals 
due to the withdrawal and withholding o f recognition. In this sense, certain social 
struggles can be understood as demands for the expansion of recognition. In this context, 
Honneth’s distinctions of three different modes of practical relations to self (self- 
confidence, self-respect and self esteem) provides us the framework to analyse the many 
forms of acts of disrespect that can be understood as motivations for social struggles. 
According to Honneth:
“In this sense, the distinctions between three patterns of recognition gives us a theoretical key 
with which to separate out just as many kinds o f disrespect. Their differences would have to be 
measured by the various degrees to which they are able to disrupt a person’s practical relations-to- 
self by denying him or her recognition for particular claims to identity.” 168
Honneth believes that, it is only by employing this framework that we can 
begin to analyse how the perceptions of disrespect, which involves the affective side of 
human experience, can become the motivational impetus for social resistance and 
conflict -  that is the struggle for recognition.169
166 Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p. 131.
167 Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p. 131.
168 Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p. 132.
169 Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p. 132.
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The idea of social conflicts having a ‘moral’ dimension is not new and 
Honneth himself refers to the works of E.P. Thompson and particularly the historian 
Barrington Moore for empirical support.170 However, Honneth takes the case further by 
arguing that:
“‘moral’ motives for revolt and resistance -  that is, those based on a tacit understanding of what 
one deserves -  do not emerge only in the defence of traditional ways of life (as Thompson and 
Moore argue) but also in situations where those ways of life have become intolerable”.171
Negative emotional reactions resulting from acts of disrespect, whether in the 
form of personal violations as to impede self-confidence, exclusion denying self-respect, 
or degradation injuring self-esteem, if proven to be experienced and shared by more than 
just an individual, can become a basis for collective action for social resistance and 
revolt.172
To reiterate an important point made earlier, although the elaboration on 
Honneth in this section has largely maintained his original context of individuals’ 
recognition struggles in domestic societies, the arguments encapsulated in his theory of 
the struggle for recognition can also be employed to make sense of social conflicts 
prevailing in the international society as well. This is because Honneth’s explanation, 
anchored in individuals’ experiences, illustrate the importance of humans’ social relations 
in influencing their motivation for actions. In understanding the potential of Honneth’s 
theory in FPA, it is important to remember that human beings are the agents in 
international relations, and these individuals are the ones who socialise and become
170 Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p. 167. See also Barrington Moore, Injustice: The Social Bases 
o f  Obedience and Revolt, White Plains, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1978 and Edward P. Thompson, The Making o f  
the English Working Class, London: Gollancz, 1963.
171 Anderson, ‘Translator’s Introduction’ in Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p.xix.
172 Anderson, ‘Translator’s Introduction’ in Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p.xix.
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socialised at this level of interactions.173 In order to utilise this potential, the relevant 
question to ask next is how it is going to be achieved methodologically in this study.
2.4. METHODOLOGY
Honneth’s theory of the struggle for recognition provides insights into deep 
motivational psychology, which is applicable to FPA. Honneth’s theory of emancipation 
makes use of a communicative theory on society in his explanations of motivations 
underpinning actions.174 Honneth’s insights are useful as the basis of a more systematic 
research inquiry in studying the search for recognition as motivations in FPA. Drawing 
on Haacke, the question of what particular form a struggle for recognition takes would 
best be answered through an empirical rather than theoretical inquiries.175 This thesis for 
example, probes into the different ways in which Mahathir sought recognition from the 
three different foreign policy addressees that he identified Malaysia with, namely the 
developing countries of the ‘South’, the Muslim ummah and the East Asian nations. In 
the process, it employs Honneth’s modes of practical relations-to-self as a useful scheme 
to direct analysis towards self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem as forms of 
recognition struggles. This is therefore in line with Haacke’s argument, in terms of 
Honneth providing the basis of a systematic research agenda. In this connection, Haacke 
provides examples that a researcher can set out to probe the motivations for struggles of 
recognition in foreign policy that stem from perceptions of disrespect as experienced by 
leaders or policy makers whether in terms of violation of the body that injures self­
173 Valerie M. Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory, Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2007, p. 10.
174 Haacke, ‘The Frankfurt School p. 186.
175 Haacke, ‘The Frankfurt School . . . ’, p. 193.
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confidence, the denial of rights that negatively impacts self-respect or the denigration of 
the ways of life that disturbs self-esteem.176
Honneth’s theory therefore can be applied in the tradition of actor-specific 
tradition of inquiries in FPA. According to Hudson, FPA has developed the actor- 
specific theory that enables it to focus on the “ground” of international relations.177 
According to her: “All that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in 
human decision makers acting singly or in groups. ” 178 In addition, Vertzberger 
contends that:
“Although the conception of belonging, role and status are state-level variables, they obviously 
affect the individual level o f analysis. State leaders are often exposed to the consequences of 
others’ role and status conceptions about their state, and it is they who interpret, operationalise, 
and enact these concepts in foreign policy.” 179
At this juncture, it is important to remember that the preoccupation of studies in this area 
has been to concentrate mainly on cognition. It also needs to be reiterated that cognition 
is quite different to recognition. The latter relates to the long-standing beliefs that 
individuals form about their environments.
In terms of methodology, the starting point of this thesis is that we need to 
understand what motivated Mahathir in his foreign policy decisions. The analysis taken 
in this study is thus at the level of the individual. In this regard, this thesis focuses 
attention on the personal experiences of Mahathir Mohamad, the leader of Malaysia, who 
played a central role in the country’s foreign policy-making during his premiership. 
Importantly, the thesis also sets to ascertain whether his foreign policy decisions were 
motivated by experiences of disrespect. In this regard, this thesis applies an interpretive
176 Haacke, ‘The Frankfurt S chool. . . ’, p. 193.
177 Valerie M. Hudson, ‘Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory p.2.
178 Valerie M. Hudson, ‘Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory p.2.
179 Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds, p.294.
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method in order to form a coherent understanding of Mahathir. In exploring recognition 
as a significant motivation, Mahathir’s beliefs that are relevant in this study are firstly, 
those concerning what was legitimate and just; and secondly, those about what needed to 
change. Thus, Mahathir’s preconceptions of what is fair or just are central in this inquiry. 
These understandings would form part of his world-view or belief system. These 
preconceptions of justice constitute an integral part of motivations, which this thesis 
seeks to scrutinise. Mahathir’s pronouncements will be examined in this study to identify 
his core beliefs and motivations that made him ‘tick’.
Alexander George was considered a pioneer in recognising the significance of 
political belief systems of the elite and analysing their role in foreign policy making.180 
According to Holsti, a number of studies have illustrated the important correlation 
between belief systems, perceptions and foreign policy.181 It is important to note though 
that both George and Holsti adhere to the American tradition of FPA that focuses the 
utility of belief systems in organising information effectively or efficiently. For example, 
in emphasising the importance of beliefs in influencing actions of political leaders, 
George elaborates:
“A political leader’s beliefs about the nature of politics and political conflict, his views regarding 
the extent to which historical developments can be shaped, and his notions of correct strategy and 
tactics -  whether these beliefs be referred to as “operational code,” “Weltanschauung,” “cognitive 
map,” or an “elite’s political culture,” -  are among the factors influencing that actor’s 
decisions.” 182
180 Deborah Larson, ‘The Role of Belief Systems and Schemas in Foreign Policy Decision-Making’, 
Political Psychology, Vol. 15, N o.l, Special Issue: Political Psychology and the Work o f Alexander L. 
George, March, 1994, p. 17.
181 Ole R. Holsti, ‘The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study’, The Journal o f  Conflict 
Resolution, Vol.6, No.3, September 1962, p.244. The studies include M. Rokeach, The Open and Closed 
Mind, New York: Basic Books, 1960; M.B. Smith, J.S. Bruner and R.W. White, Opinions and Personality, 
New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1956 and R.C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and B. Sapin, Decision-Making as an 
Approach to the Study o f  International Politics, Princeton N.J: Princeton University Press, 1954.
182 Alexander L. George, ‘The “Operational Code”: A Neglected Approach to the Study o f Political 
Leaders and Decision-Making’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No.2, June 1969, p. 197.
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In this connection, Holsti posits that the belief system:
“may be thought of as the set of lenses through which information concerning the physical and 
social environment is received. It orients the individual to his environment, defining it for him 
and identifying for him its salient characteristics.” 183
The function of belief system therefore is to order information for the individual that 
otherwise would be unmanageable.184 In addition, “[b]eliefs about what should be affect 
beliefs of what is.”185 Similarly, Cottam talks of the construction of the ‘world view’ in 
his perceptual analysis, which he defines as “the primary device for depicting the 
decisional environment.”186 George distinguishes two kinds of beliefs that a political 
leader holds. The first is his ‘instrumental beliefs’, which refers to “his beliefs about 
ends-means relationships in the context of political action,” and secondly, his 
‘philosophical beliefs’, that is, “assumptions and premises he makes regarding the 
fundamental nature of politics, the nature of political conflict, the role of the individual in 
history, etc.”187 In other words, it can be said that ‘instrumental beliefs’ relates to 
leadership style, whereas ‘philosophical beliefs’ can also be termed ‘the leader’s political 
philosophy’.
However, in this study what is relevant is Mahathir’s preconceptions of 
justice, which arguably form his belief system or world-view. Thus, the belief system is 
important in the methodology of this thesis insofar as it is able to extrapolate the 
important long-standing meanings and ideas that Mahathir has about his social world, 
which are deemed significant in influencing his motivations. Yet, while it is recognised 
here that there are important meanings attached to the social world (in contrast to the
183 Holsti, ‘The Belief System and National Images . . . ’, p.245.
184 Holsti, ‘The Belief System and National Images . . . ’, p.245.
185 Hollis and Smith, ‘Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making’, p.279.
186 Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation, p.32.
187 George, ‘The “Operational Code” . . . ’ , p.199.
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natural world) by its inhabitants or the social actors through their experiences, how can 
we go about exploring them in a systematic manner? To reiterate in a more specific 
manner, the premise here is that Mahathir’s actions in foreign policy were informed by 
his preconceptions of justice and motivated by what he perceived to be violations of 
justice. These beliefs crucially influenced his expectations about what other peoples’ 
actions towards him. They also influence his definitions of his own personal identity and 
the identity of the Malaysian nation.
The challenge involved in this methodology concerns the problems related to 
the interpretive method in social inquiries. This hermeneutic or interpretive tradition 
posits that “action must always be understood from within.”188 However, if one based 
this hermeneutic understanding on the actor’s pronounced rationalisations, how can an 
analyst be certain that these rationales are ‘real*. Therefore, ascertaining the ‘truth’ can 
be hugely problematic.
In the attempt to understand what Mahathir intended by his foreign policy 
actions, this study relies on both primary and secondary data. The sources of primary 
data include Mahathir’s writings, speeches and the author’s interview with Mahathir 
himself and other senior members of Malaysia’s foreign policy elite during the period of 
Mahathir’s premiership. Secondary data include works written on Mahathir, which 
include biographies, academic theses and media reports.
In order to overcome the problem of ascertaining the ‘real’ motivations, this 
study will identify consistencies in Mahathir’s pronouncements of his beliefs or 
conceptions of justice over the long period of his political activism, from his youth until
the end of his premiership. The methodological premise is this: if there are correlations
188 Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, Oxford: 
Clarenden Press, 1991, p.72.
between the objectives of these policies and Mahathir’s belief system, then it can be 
concluded that motivation for Malaysia’s foreign policy was derived primarily from 
Mahathir himself.
In charting his belief system, the following chapter will illustrate the 
influences of both his leadership style (instrumental beliefs) and his political philosophy 
(philosophical beliefs, mainly his preconceptions of justice). In this connection, this 
thesis will highlight Mahathir’s grievances relating to his experiences of being 
disrespected, either personally or through identification with the Malays, 
Malaya/Malaysia or the Islamic ummah. By concentrating on his conceptions of justice 
and perceptions of injustice, the thesis will analyse the role played by recognition motives 
in influencing Mahathir’s foreign policy decisions. The empirical analyses of the case 
studies to illustrate the role played by recognition motives are undertaken in Chapters 5, 6 
and 7. Here, it is important to bear in mind that recognition motives do not exclude the 
influences of security and economic motives as drivers of Malaysia’s foreign policy.
2.5. CONCLUSION
This chapter has discussed the three basic underlying motivations: 
fear/security/power, economic/profit and affiliation/recognition. This follows from the 
first chapter, which identifies a lacuna in the literature on Malaysia’s foreign policy under 
Mahathir. This gap in the literature seems to imply recognition struggles as being 
significant motivations, which the existing literature fail to address satisfactorily. While 
illustrating that recognition motives have been covered in FPA works, this chapter has 
shown that it has been done in a disorganised and unsystematic manner. This thesis has
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introduced Honneth’s theory of the struggle for recognition as the possible analytical 
framework to be employed in examining recognition as a motivation underpinning 
Mahathir’s foreign policy. Specifically, Honneth’s three modes of practical relation-to- 
self will be used to identify the different forms of acts that disturbed the equilibrium 
between the expected and experienced treatment within Mahathir, and consequently 
triggered the struggle for recognition in terms of self-confidence, self-respect and self­
esteem. Honneth’s theory of the struggle for recognition can be adopted in FPA in the 
tradition of ‘actor-specific’ theory that has been pursued by scholars such as Alexander 
George and Ole R. Holsti. This thesis, in employing Honneth’s theory of the struggle for 
recognition in explaining Malaysia’s foreign policy under Mahathir, anchors its analysis 
on the personality of Prime Minister Mahathir himself as the foreign policy actor. 
Although this will undoubtedly reduce the generalising power of its findings, it is hoped 
that it will produce a rich and complex study and understanding of how recognition 
motives come into play in influencing foreign policy.
This chapter has illustrated that as a motivation, recognition has been 
understudied in FPA. Firstly, this is due to the dominance of the Realist school of 
studying international relations. As discussed, the Realist assumption of human nature 
accentuates the motive of fear above all else. This leads to the preoccupation of Realists 
with the study of security and power. Secondly, according to Neo-Realism’s 
epistemology, the ontology of Neo-Realism’s studies is the structure of the international 
system and states as units within it, and not the individuals. Neo-Realists do this in the 
hope that certain natural laws governing interactions between states can be uncovered. 
The epistemology based on individuals as actors and interpretive methods of inquiry are 
deemed unscientific. Against this view, this thesis believes that an interpretive approach
is valuable to shed light on motivations underpinning foreign policy. In this regard, 
Mahathir’s belief system, particularly his conceptions of justice and fairness, is crucial in 
this study insofar as it illuminates the actor’s understanding and meanings of his social 
world. The thesis is therefore interested also in Mahathir’s experiences of disrespect, 
suffered by him personally or by the groups that he identified himself with: the Malays or 
Malaysia. The aim is to identify the significance of the struggle for recognition as a key 
motivation underpinning Mahathir’s foreign policy.
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CHAPTER 3 TRACING MAHATHIR’S BELIEF SYSTEM: AN
ANALYSIS OF HISTORICAL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
The theoretical background elaborated in the previous chapter posits the central role of 
Mahathir’s belief system in the analysis of recognition as a key motivating factor in 
Malaysia’s foreign policy under Mahathir. According to Hoslti, a belief system “may be 
thought as a set of lenses through which information concerning the physical and social 
environment is received. It orients the individual to his environment, defining it for him 
and identifying for him its salient characteristics.”1 It is important to note that, the image 
that we have of ourselves and our surroundings - our ‘belief system’, is formed through 
“messages we receive from the past.”2 In this context, it is essential for us to study how 
images grow and change3 to ultimately understand an individual’s, in this case the Prime 
Minister Mahathir’s order of preference when he made his decisions. Therefore, this 
chapter aims to trace the formation and development of Mahathir’s belief system. What 
is most relevant here are Mahathir’s conceptions of justice or fairness in social 
arrangements, whether as regards local, national, regional or global society. As 
explained, a struggle for recognition is triggered when there is a perception of violation
1 Ole Holsti,‘The Belief System and National Images’ in International Politics and Foreign Policy, J. 
Rosenau (ed.), New York: The Free Press, 1969, p.544.
2 Ole Holsti,‘The Belief System and National Images’ in International Politics and Foreign Policy, p.544.
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of preconceived conception of justice. Crucially, this is a historical analysis. Since 
Mahathir’s worldview was necessarily shaped by experiences before assuming the office 
of the prime minister, the focus of this chapter is to reconstruct its development all the 
way back to his early youth. This historical analysis also introduces us to Mahathir’s 
personality and leadership style. »
Mahathir operated in a number of different environments. Firstly, the most 
salient environment that influenced Mahathir’s belief system is his own family 
environment. Mahathir’s upbringing, family background and social status were 
important not only in shaping his personality, but also his views on the Malay society. 
The second salient environment is the local environment that he grew up in. Alor Setar, 
the capital of the north-western state of Kedah was a sleepy town of predominantly 
Malay Muslim inhabitants that had experienced occupation by the British, Japanese and 
Thais during Mahathir’s youth. The third is the national environment. Mahathir was 
deeply influenced by the experience of colonisation, the struggles against the Malayan 
Union, Malays’ economic deprivation and political turmoil over the precarious ethnic 
balance. Fourthly, at the regional level, Mahathir was influenced by the development of 
Malaya’s and then, Malaysia’s relations with Sukarno’s Indonesia. The role played by 
Lee Kuan Yew and Singapore, straddling both the third (national) and fourth (regional) 
environment at different times, also proved important in shaping Mahathir’s worldview. 
Finally, Mahathir was also influenced by the international environment; by the emerging 
brotherhood of newly independent countries embodied by the Afro-Asian group, and 
‘Islamic’ nations as new sub-communities within the international society.
3 K. Boulding, ‘National Images and International Systems’ in International Politics and Foreign Policy, J. 
Rosenau, (ed.), New York: The Free Press, 1969, p.423.
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This chapter will explore these influences in turn. Methodologically, 
Mahathir’s belief system, particularly his perceptions of injustices will be ascertained 
primarily on the basis of Mahathir’s own pronouncements and writings, as well as 
biographical and secondary literature.
3.1. FAMILY INFLUENCES IN MAHATHIR’S EARLY YEARS
Mahathir’s upbringing had a crucial impact on his belief system. Bom on 20th December 
1925 in Alor Setar, the capital town of the north-western state of Kedah, Mahathir was 
the youngest of nine children. His father, Mohamad Iskandar, rumoured to have been of 
sub-continent Muslim descent, was the first Malay headmaster of a reputable English 
school in Kedah.4 Mahathir’s mother, Cik Wan Tempawan Cik Wan Hanapi was a 
housewife. Mahathir had a strict disciplinarian upbringing in which education was hugely 
emphasised. His own father broke the mould by acquiring an English education when it 
was widely viewed as a threat to the Malays’ Islamic faith.5
Mahathir’s formal English education was complemented by informal Islamic 
education at home, first by his own mother and later by a local religious teacher, Encik 
Zakaria. Writing in the late 1980s, Adshead noted that, "the precepts he leamt so early in 
his life remain a staunch foundation of his character.”6 This combination of emphasis on 
both an English-based secular education and traditional Islamic teachings undeniably left
4 In Mahathir’s letter to Tunku Abdul Rahman dated 17 June 1969, he expressed his disappointment at the 
Tunku’s apparent doubts over Mahathir’s Malay origin, claiming that he only had ‘two spoonful o f 
Pakistani blood’ in him. See ‘Surat Terbuka Mahathir Kepada Tunku Bertarikh 17 Jun 1969’, Annex II in 
Sivamurugan Pandian, Legasi Mahathir, Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications, 2005, p.409.
5 Robin Adshead, Mahathir o f  Malaysia, UK: Hibiscus Publishing Company, 1989, p.27. See also J.V. 
Morais, Mahathir: A Profile in Courage, Petaling Jaya: Eastern University Press, 1982, p . l .
6 Adshead, Mahathir o f  Malaysia, p.27.
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a great imprint in his belief system, which later became obvious in his writings, as we 
shall see below.
Thus, the value of hard work and discipline had been instilled in Mahathir 
from a very early age. His family’s (new) middle class status in a society still steeped in 
Malay feudal traditions would prove influential in determining Mahathir’s outlook on the 
Malay value system, especially in relation to the traditional Malay aristocracy. 
Moreover, his father’s questionable Malay credential could have also contributed towards 
the complex suffered by the family, which increased the need for acceptance and 
recognition of the family by its local community. The foundation of Mahathir’s belief 
system was set via his experiences of social relations as lived primarily by his family, 
particularly his father. For Mahathir’s family, social recognition and status had to be 
based on discipline and hard work, as it was not available in the feudal tradition of 
inheriting recognition and status as aristocratic birthright.
While his family environment was pivotal in providing Mahathir with the 
value of hard work and discipline, it was the experience of the Japanese occupation that 
made him realise the Malays’ weak position in the economy. During this period, 
Mahathir’s brothers and cousins lost their jobs as clerks with the government and were 
forced to hawker fruits along roadsides. Mahathir observed that their lack of knowledge 
in business was pitiful and it was difficult for them to make a living. Mahathir himself 
was obliged to suspend his education and started a stall selling bananas. He was struck 
by Malay poverty and realised that “the weakness of the Malays (in business) needed to 
be corrected so as to have the same standard of living as the non-Malays.”7 This 
realisation underpinned Mahathir’s emphasis on economic factors in his recognition
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struggle for the Malays. The need to correct what he saw as a humiliating economic 
handicap experienced by the Malays due to their poor grasp of business became an 
important motivation for Mahathir to become active in politics.8
3.2. THE BEGINNING OF MAHATHIR’S POLITICAL ACTIVISM
3.2.1. Influences From Local Independent Movements
Mahathir’s involvement in politics began when the British returned to Malaya with the 
intention of introducing the Malayan Union.9 The Malayan Union was to be a direct 
British colony consisting of all the Peninsular Malay States and the British settlements of 
Penang and Malacca. Most importantly, the Chinese and Indians who had come to work 
in Malaya were to be recognised as full citizens, equal to the Malays. At this time, 
Mahathir was pursuing his secondary education at Sultan Abdul Hamid College in Alor 
Setar. He led a group of friends to demonstrate against the Malayan Union. At night, 
they put up anti-Malayan Union posters. His father encouraged him and contributed 
financially towards the publication of articles supporting anti-Malayan Union 
movements.10 Mahathir then joined Kesatuan Melayu Kedah (Kedah Malay 
Association), and Kesatuan Pemuda Melayu Kedah (Kedah Malay Youth Association).
7 Adshead, Mahathir o f  Malaysia, pp. 30-31.
8 See Adshead, Mahathir o f  Malaysia, pp 31-32 and Khoo Boo Teik, Paradoxes o f  Mahathirism: An 
Intellectual Biography o f  Mahathir Mohamad, Kuala Lumpur, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996,
P-8 7 -
The British released a White Paper to introduce Malayan Union on 22 January 1946. It contained two 
significant proposals to the Malays. Firstly, their sultans would be stripped off their powers and secondly, 
non-Malays were to be given unrestricted opportunity to obtain citizenship. See N.J. Funston, Malay 
Politics in Malaysia: A Study o f  the United Malays National Organisation and Party Islam, Kuala Lumpur: 
Heinemann, 1980, p.76.
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Later, he also joined a reformist organisation called ‘SABERKAS’11 and then attended as 
an observer the congress of Malay organisations that led to the founding of United 
Malays National Organisation (UMNO). In 1946, Kesatuan Melayu Kedah became part 
of UMNO, making Mahathir one of its earliest members. Mahathir was 20 at the time.12
The literature suggests that, having nurtured a political ambition, Mahathir 
thought that he had to become someone important and of high standing in his community 
to achieve his political goals.13 Without gaining sufficient social recognition and status, 
he believed it would be difficult for him to realise his political ambition. Although keen 
to study law in England, in 1947, he accepted a Federal Government scholarship to study 
medicine at the King Edward VII College of Medicine in Singapore, where he stayed 
until 1953.14
3.2.2. Influences from Sojourn in Singapore
Mahathir honed his writing skills when he was studying in Singapore by contributing to a 
column in Singapore’s The Sunday Times, under the pseudonym C.H.E. Det. The young 
Mahathir offered crisp and critical analysis of the Malays’ social and political conditions
10 Aziz Zariza Ahmad, Mahathir’s Paradigm Shift: The Man Behind The Vision, Taiping: Firma Malaysia 
Publishing, 1997, p. 16.
11 Acronym from the Malay name ‘Sayang Akan Bangsa Erti Redha Korban Apa Saja’, loosely translated 
as ‘Love o f the People Transcends A ll\  See Zainuddin Mai din, The Other Side o f  Mahathir, Kuala 
Lumpur: Utusan Publications, 1994, p. 12.
12 See also Adshead, Mahathir o f  Malaysia’, p.33.
13 See for example Adshead, Mahathir o f  Malaysia, p.34.
14 Khoo, Paradoxes o f  Mahathirism, p.87. See also Pandian, Legasi Mahathir, p.22.
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in these articles.15 Although some of his articles contain observations on culture, these 
contributions also clearly demonstrate his underlying discontent with the Malays’ 
economic position. For instance, he highlighted that Malay housewives would buy 
materials from the Chinese or Indian textile shops in preparing for the Eid and also 
argued that catching fish in the ‘sawah’ (paddy field) would remain a past-time activity 
that would never help supplement the economies of paddy planters.
Other articles explicitly illustrate Mahathir’s emerging belief system. 
Education was central in Mahathir’s discourse, covering three articles. Also, Mahathir 
wrote about feudalism in Malay society, focusing for example, on the unfairness of the 
‘padi-kuncha’ system to paddy planters16 and the perceived negative practices of Malay 
royal rulers. His article on nationality carried his most explicit political commentary on 
the condition of the Malays. According to Khoo “barring minor differences in 
terminology, it could qualify as a lengthy ‘abstract’ for ‘The Malay Dilemma’.”17
Mahathir’s writings under the pseudonym of C.H.E. Det highlighted the 
Malay consciousness at the very core of Mahathir’s emerging political beliefs. 
Essentially, his concerns centred on the powerlessness of the Malays in their own land, 
which he saw as a consequence of their weak economic clout. The realities of Singapore 
accentuated Mahathir’s concerns about the economic discrepancy between Malays and
15 The titles o f his articles are; ‘Malays and the Higher Education’ (Sunday Times, 26 September 1948); 
‘Malays and the Higher Education: Summing-up’ (Sunday Times, 17 Octoberl948); ‘Ronggeng is Popular’ 
( Sunday Times, 9 January 1949); ‘Rains Bring Fish to “Sawahs”’ (Sunday Times 6 February 1949);
‘Malay -  Modem and Standard’ (Sunday Times 24 April 1949); ‘Tapak Cherpu Duli Yang Maha Mulia’ (7 
July 1949); ‘Malay Housewives are Busy’( Sunday Times 24 July 1949); ‘The Rulers are Losing Loyalty’ 
(Sunday Times 7 August 1949); ‘Weekly Fair at Alor Star’ (Sunday Times 18 September 1949); ‘Rulers 
and Ra’ayats -  Climax is Near’ (Sunday Times 9 October 1949); ‘Malay Padi Planters Need Help’ (Sunday 
Times; 30 October 1949); ‘Changing Malay Marriage Customs’ (Sunday Times 20 November 1949); 
‘Malay Progress and the University’ (Sunday Times, 27 November 1949); ‘Malays in South Siam Struggle 
On’ ( Sunday Times 8 January 1950); ‘New Thoughts on Nationality’ (Sunday Times 9 April 1950);
‘Plight o f Malay Fisher folk’ (Sunday Times 23 April 1950). See Khoo, Paradoxes o f  Mahathirism, and 
Pandian, Legasi Mahathir.
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Chinese. In a land where Malays used to rule, Mahathir witnessed with anguish how the 
Malays increasingly lived in “the poorer quarters” and in “dilapidated ‘attap’ and plank 
huts sometimes only a stone’s throw from the palatial residences of the Chinese 
millionaires.”18 In Singapore, Mahathir witnessed that the Chinese entrepreneurs were no 
longer just running small Chinese shops ubiquitous in the peninsular but had established 
a dominance. His journalism revealed unambiguously the young Mahathir’s perceptions 
of injustices that were suffered by his people, in their own land.
3.3. MAHATHIR IN ACTIVE POLITICAL LIFE: IDENTIFYING
INFLUENCES OF NATIONAL. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTS
After concluding his studies in Singapore, Mahathir started his medical career as a 
government doctor and from 1953-1957 served in Penang, Alor Setar, Perlis and 
Langkawi.19 In 1957, Mahathir resigned from the government service to enable him to 
pursue a political career. In that year, Malaya also gained its independence under the 
leadership of the Kedah prince, Tunku Abdul Rahman who became Malaya’s first prime 
minister. After resigning, Mahathir set up MAHA Clinic, which was the first Malay 
private medical practice in Alor Setar. Mahathir quickly established a reputation as a 
kind and progressive Malay doctor in the town. He also owned one of the biggest cars in
16 Morais, Mahathir: A Profile in Courage, p. 145.
17 Khoo, Paradoxes o f  Mahathir ism, p.85. The Malay Dilemma is discussed below.
18 Mahathir Mohamad, ‘New Thoughts on Nationalism’ in the Sunday Times, 9 April 1950 quoted in Khoo, 
Paradoxes o f  Mahathirism, pp. 101-2.
19 It has been widely noted that Mahathir’s medical training has been responsible for his methodical style in 
politics and administration. See for example Khoo, Paradoxes o f  Mahathirism, pp.294-303 and Adshead, 
Mahathir o f  Malaysia, p.53.
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Alor Setar then -  a Pontiac. Not many Malay commoners owned cars at the time. The 
car has been said to symbolise his aspiration to prove the capabilities of the Malays.20
3.3.1. Mahathir during the Tunku’s Period (1957-1970)
Mahathir’s early political career was influenced to a large extent by his relationship with 
the Tunku. Although both were from Kedah, they represented two different sets of 
Malay leaders. Mahathir’s family has no link to Malay aristocracy. Arguably, this made 
Mahathir ‘of the people’.21 Mahathir, in his early anti-colonialist activities befriended 
students and teachers of Malay and religious schools and top movement leaders in Kedah. 
These people were viewed with suspicion by the British administration, the traditional 
Malay aristocrats and the palace.22 The main reason for this was that they were 
influenced by nationalist movements of Indonesian and Malay students at the Al-Azhar 
University in Cairo. They defined their political agenda according to the philosophy of 
Islamic reformism and envisioned Malaya’s independence within a greater ‘Melayu 
Raya’.23
In contrast, the Tunku was a royal, educated at Cambridge and at the Inns of 
Courts in London. His long sojourn in England made him partial to the customs of the 
English gentleman. Later in their political careers, the Tunku’s ‘Western’ lifestyle 
became persistent points of Mahathir’s criticisms. For example, Mahathir was deeply
20 Zainuddin, The Other Side o f  Mahathir, p.7.
21 Zainuddin, The Other Side o f  Mahathir, p. 14.
22 Khoo Kay Kim, Malay Society: Transformation & Democracy, Subang Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 
2001, p. 185. See also, Zainuddin, The Other Side o f  Mahathir, p. 12.
23 Joseph C. Liow, The Politics o f  Indonesia -  Malaysia Relations, New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005, 
pp.54-6. Mahathir however was never a socialist, an admirer of Sukarno nor supporter of Melayu Raya - 
interview with Zainuddin Maidin, London, 22 April 2007.
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critical of the Tunku’s penchant for gambling, drinking, and golf, as well as that of his 
ministers and senior civil servants.24
The first public skirmish between Mahathir and the Tunku was in the run up 
to the 1959 elections. Mahathir had been vocal in protesting Malaya’s defence pact with 
Britain.25 He also came to know that the Tunku was suspicious of his handling of Kedah 
UMNO’s internal politics.26 Mahathir was hurt by what he felt as the Tunku’s distrust in 
him and withdrew from Kedah’s political scene. However, many Kedah UMNO 
members maintained close contacts with Mahathir despite the Tunku’s apprehension.27 
They managed to convince Mahathir to contest as an Alliance Party28 candidate for Kota 
Setar Selatan in 1964. He won and started his career as a Member of Parliament (MP). 
Mahathir’s first term as an MP coincided with Indonesia’s ‘Confrontation’ 
(‘KonfrontasV) and Lee Kuan Yew’s ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ campaign.29
The Centrality of the Tunku in the Government and Its Pro-Western Ideals
The Tunku played a central role in determining his government’s policies. Domestically, 
the Tunku believed that there should be a grand bargain to accommodate the interests of 
the two key ethnic groups. The Malays who formed the majority were to be given 
political powers and the Chinese would be allowed to maintain their control over the 
economy. This was designed to guarantee a harmonious multi-ethnic nation. Foreign
24 See for example Mahathir’s letter on Tun Razak’s birthday celebration in Zainuddin, The Other Side o f 
Mahathir, p. 14.
25 Zainuddin, The Other Side o f  Mahathir, p. 11.
26 See Zainuddin, The Other Side o f  Mahathir, p. 13.
27 Zainuddin, The Other Side o f  Mahathir, p. 16.
28 Alliance Party was the ruling coalition party comprising the United Malays National Organisation 
(UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). See 
Funston, Malay Politics in Malaysia, p.4.
29 Malaysia, consisting o f states within the Malayan Federation, Singapore, and the states of Sabah and 
Sarawak in Borneo was formed in 1963.
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policy was “formulated and directed” by the Tunku, who held both the positions of prime 
minister and the minister of foreign affairs throughout his premiership.30 In such a 
centralised decision-making process, the Tunku’s Western values and personality formed 
through his education and long stay in England translated into a pro-West and staunchly 
anti-Communist foreign policy.31
The pro-Western orientation of the Tunku’s foreign policy culminated in three 
major decisions from the time he became prime minister in 1957. Firstly, its decision to 
conclude the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA).32 Secondly, his decision to 
join the •Commonwealth and thirdly, its anti-Communist stance. AMDA was signed on 
12 October 1957, a few weeks after Malaya won its independence. The agreement 
obliged the United Kingdom (UK) to defend Malaya from any external attacks and to 
train and develop the Malayan armed forces. In return, Malaya undertook to assist the UK 
in case of attacks on any British colonial territories in the region. It also allowed the 
stationing of the Commonwealth reserve forces comprising the British, Australian and 
New Zealand in its territories.33 AMDA was vehemently opposed, not only by 
opposition parties but also by ‘extreme’ nationalists within UMNO. Like other 
nationalists, Mahathir argued that AMDA compromised Malaya’s independence and 
sovereignty.34 In other words, these nationalists felt morally aggrieved by the fact that
30 Abdullah Ahmad, Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia’s Foreign Policy, 1963-1970, Kuala Lumpur: 
Berita Publishing, 1985, p .l.
31 Abdullah, Tengku Abdul Rahman..., especially p. 9 and pp. 138 -  139. Savaranamuttu however argued 
that the Tunku’s pro-West attitude was shared by his colleagues in the form of the ‘elite ideology’. See 
Johan Saravanamuttu, The Dilemma o f  Independence: Two Decades o f  Malaysia’s Foreign Policy, 1957- 
1977, Penang: Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, 1983, p.47.
32 For an extensive study o f AMDA, see Chin Kim Wah, The Anglo-Malayan (Malaysian) Defence 
Agreement: A Study in Alliance Transformation, thesis submitted in partial fulfilment o f the degree for 
Doctor o f Philosophy, University o f London, 1976.
33 See Abdullah, Tengku Abdul Rahman ..., p.26 and Michael Leifer, The Foreign Relations o f  New States, 
Camberwell Vic.: Longman Australia, 1974, p.47.
34 Abdullah, Tengku Abdul Rahman..., p. 1.
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Malaya had to continue to be dependent on its former colonial power to defend its 
territories even after gaining independence.
Secondly, the Tunku believed that the Commonwealth was a ‘good club’ that 
could bring the relationship between Britain and its newly independent former colonies 
closer.35 Considering Mahathir’s strong criticisms of the Tunku’s pro-West attitude, it is 
unlikely that Mahathir shared the Tunku’s belief on the Commonwealth. This later 
became apparent when, soon after assuming leadership, Mahathir relegated the priority 
that Malaysia would attach to Commonwealth, below those of ASEAN, the OIC and 
NAM.
Malaya’s support for the US and South Vietnam was an unambiguous 
expression of its pro-West and staunch anti-Communist beliefs. The Tunku visited South 
Vietnam in 1958. The Tunku’s pro-West stance was also reflected in Malaya’s 
recognition of Israel.36 In addition, Malaya’s economic policy was guided by Western 
liberal ideals. Despite its developing country economic characteristics, Malaya did not 
espouse any form of economic nationalism policy, as did many Third World countries. 
Rather, it was committed to a ffee-market capitalist ideology, which resulted with much 
of its economy being left in foreign, especially British control. A categorical pro-West 
posture and a staunchly anti-Communist stance isolated Malaya from the ‘non-aligned’ 
philosophy of the majority of Afro-Asian countries and the Tunku was seen “as only 
‘Slightly better’ than Chiang Kai Shek, Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam and Syngman 
Rhee of South Korea”.37 In criticising the Tunku, Mahathir stressed the virtue of non- 
alignment. To Mahathir, pursuing a policy of non-alignment was important to
35 Abdullah, Tengku Abdul Rahman..., pp.28-29.
36 The only other Islamic countries to do so were Turkey and Iran. Malaysia’s recognition of Israel was 
later withdrawn. Abdullah, Tengku Abdul Rahman..., p.27.
substantiate Malaysia’s independence status. Mahathir was clearly outraged when 
Indonesia under Sukarno disparaged Malaysia as a neo-colonialist of the British. This 
drove him and other UMNO ‘young Turks’ to actively promote closer links with the non- 
aligned newly-independent countries of Asia and Africa, especially through Razak with 
whom the ‘young Turks’ had close association. This will be dealt with in greater details 
later in the chapter.
Indonesia’s ‘Confrontation’ KonfrontasP)
Indonesia’s ‘Confrontation’ against the formation of Malaysia started with the 
announcement by Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Dr. Subandrio in January 1963, charging 
the Malaysian project as “neo-colonialist” and “neo-imperialist”.38 Sukarno also, in 
justifying his ‘Confrontation’ policy argued that Malaysia was a project of “neo­
colonialism” to prolong British rule in Southeast Asia.39 Arguably, the ‘Confrontation’ 
was a pivotal experience that influenced Mahathir’s belief system concerning the 
attributes of Malaysia’s true independent status, the importance of recognition of its 
independent status by other newly-independent countries and Malaysia proper 
relationship with its former colonial power, the UK. Importantly, the ‘Confrontation’ 
taught Malaysian leaders, including Mahathir about the struggle for recognition and the 
rivalry that existed in the bilateral relationship with Indonesia, Malaysia’s bigger 
neighbour with whom it possesses a great deal of affinity.40 At the core of
37 Abdullah, Tengku Abdul Rahman ..., p.27.
38 Johan, The Dilemma o f  Independence, p. 62.
39 See Subandrio’s ‘Konfrontasi’ announcement as reported in The Straits Times, 26 January 1963 quoted 
in Abdullah, Tengku Abdul Rahman ..., p.36. At about the same time, the Philippines renewed its claim on 
Sabah.
40 For an examination of the rivalry and ‘special relationship’ between Malaysia and Indonesia, see Liow, 
The Politics o f  Indonesia -  Malaysia Relations.
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‘Confrontation’ was Indonesia’s refusal to recognise Malaysia. Further scrutiny exposes 
more specific recognition factors underlying the conflict. Firstly, a competition for 
status. Sukarno felt AMDA threatened Indonesia’s regional political and militaristic 
supremacy and the Tunku was certain that Malaysia’s economic potential would eclipse 
Indonesia and could even induce the Sumatrans to join Malaysia.41
Secondly, different political ideals underpinned the two nations. Malaya 
emulated a liberal democratic model with a constitutional monarchy whereas Indonesia’s 
republicanism was championed by its Communist party {Parti Komunis Indonesia -  
PKI).42 The Malays took great pains to preserve their monarchy whereas Sukarno’s 
‘people’s struggle’ abolished their powers.43 Moreover, Indonesia went through a bloody 
struggle whereas Malaysia achieved its independence through peaceful negotiations, and 
continued to maintain links with its colonial power 44
Recognition struggles also existed at the personal level between the Tunku 
and Sukarno. Sukarno, ‘the chief architect’45 of Confrontation talked of “chewing up 
Malaysia and spitting out the bits!”46 He claimed that he was insulted because neither the 
British nor the Tunku consulted him about the formation of Malaysia.47 The Tunku, on
41 Abdullah, Tengku Abdul Rahman ..., p.39. The threat o f Sumatra seceding was ‘real’ to Indonesia. See 
Dewi F. Anwar, Indonesia In ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism, Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 1994, p.25 and Nicholas Tarling, Regionalism in Southeast Asia: To Foster the Political 
Will, London and New York: Routledge, 2006, p.l 13.
42 The Tunku believed that Malaysia was a target of China’s expansionism and being part o f the plan o f the 
Jakarta -  Peking -  Hanoi -  Pyongyang axis. See Johan, The Dilemma o f  Independence, p.72.
43 Abdullah, Tengku Abdul Rahman..., p.32.
44 Indonesia had been “bom in fire unlike other nations which were bom in the rays of the full moon”. 
Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy, London: Published for the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs by Allen & Unwin, 1983, pp 75-110. See also Abdullah, Tengku Abdul Rahman...
45 F.B. Weinstein, Indonesia Abandons Confrontation: An Inquiry Into The Functions o f  Indonesian 
Foreign Policy, New York: Cornell University, Interim Report Series: Modem Indonesia Project, 1969, p.3
46 D. Hyde, Confrontation in the East: A Background Book, London: The Bradley Head Ltd., 1965, plO.
47 Abdullah, Tengku Abdul Rahman..., p.31. The Malayan government actually informed Indonesia o f the 
proposal in August 1961 and there was no objection. See Hyde, Confrontation in the East, pp.30-1 and 
Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN, p.23.
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the other hand, felt that Sukarno had a strong personal dislike towards him.48 Clearly, the 
recognition struggles between the two was a culmination of opposite personal 
backgrounds. The royal and Western educated Tunku was instrumental in defining 
Malayan liberal identity. In contrast, the commoner Sukarno was proud of Indonesia’s 
‘people’s struggle’. To Sukamo, the Tunku’s credentials were suspect. He was a 
traditional and Western trained aristocrat who did not lead a bloody, revolutionary 
independent struggle49 Further, Sukamo aimed to be acknowledged as a world 
statesman, and was already positioning himself to replace India’s Nehru as the 
spokesman for the non-aligned Third World.50
In the context of the ‘Confrontation’, the Afro-Asia group became the arena 
for Indonesia’s propaganda. Indonesia was influential since hosting the Bandung Afro- 
Asia Conference in 1955. The Tunku, even after independence, “did not do much nor 
seek seriously to prove itself a good Afro-Asian nation”.51 This became the centre of 
criticisms of the Tunku from the ‘young Turks’ like Mahathir and other nationalists who 
disagreed with the Tunku’s pro-West stance at the expense of support from other newly- 
independent countries of Asia and Africa. It was clear that to Mahathir, acceptance by 
other proud newly independent nations was crucial because he felt that Malaysia should 
belong to this group due to their shared experience of colonialism. Thus, it must have 
been humiliating to Mahathir and his associates when Malaysia’s applications to 
participate in the groupings of newly-independent nations were rejected a few times. In 
February 1963, due to Indonesia’s lobbying, Malayan and Singaporean representatives
48 Abdullah, Tengku Abdul Rahman..., p.39.
49 Abdullah, Tengku Abdul Rahman...; Hyde, Confrontation in the East, p.32 and Anwar, Indonesia in 
ASEAN, p.25.
50 Hyde, Confrontation in the East, p.21.
51 Abdullah, Tengku Abdul Rahman..., pp.29 and 41.
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were excluded from participating in the Afro-Asia Peoples’ Solidarity Organisation 
(AAPSO) in Tanganyika. Malaysia was also refused admission at the second Non- 
Aligned Movement (NAM) Conference in Cairo in 1964. After that, Sukamo aimed to 
further embarrass Malaysia through a formal expression of denunciation of Malaysia at 
the consequent NAM Conference in Algiers.52
Unlike the Tunku, Razak realised that winning over the Afro-Asia group was 
important. His view was encouraged by younger intellectuals within UMNO -  the 
‘young Turks’, of which Mahathir was a member. In November 1964 Razak visited 
some African countries to win over support for Malaysia amidst the threat of Indonesia- 
led formal denunciation at the next NAM Summit in Algiers. Razak made no distinction 
in terms of the governments’ respective ideology and visited not only “the neo-Fascist 
state of Ethiopia”, but also the one party states Kenya, Tanzania, Algeria and the United 
Arab Republic.”53 Mahathir was personally involved in these visits and in his report 
wrote that the purpose was solely “to win their sympathy and understanding.”54 During 
the trip, Razak persistently faced questions concerning AMDA.55 However, Malaysia 
continued to be excluded from NAM when Indonesia hosted an Afro-Asian Islamic 
Conference in March 1965.56
In May 1965, Mahathir led an unofficial Malaysian delegation to the non­
governmental AAPSO Conference in Winneba, Ghana. The. delegation was endorsed by
52 The scheduled NAM in Algiers in June 1965 however did not take place due to the military coup led by 
Colonel Houari Boumedienne, which ousted President Ben Bella. The appeal o f Afro-Asian solidarity 
started to wane after that. The next NAM conference was held in Lusaka, Zambia in 1970. See Abdullah, 
Tengku Abdul Rahman..., p.58.
53 Abdullah, Tengku Abdul Rahman..., p.58.
54 Mahathir Mohamad, ‘Political Report on the Occasion of the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity 
Organisation Conference in Winneba, Ghana’, Kuala Lumpur, 1965, quoted in Abdullah, Tengku Abdul 
Rahman..., p.58.
55 Abdullah, Tengku Abdul Rahman..., p.l 14.
56 Abdullah, Tengku Abdul Rahman..., p 58.
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Razak but departed without the knowledge of the Tunku. The Tunku did not approve of 
AAPSO because he considered it susceptible to communist manipulations. In contrast 
and as earlier explained, the ‘young Turks’ within UMNO believed that it was crucial to 
win the support of Afro-Asia countries.57 In the event, the Malaysian delegation was 
declined formal participation. This was considered again a humiliation even by the 
Tunku, but he also reprimanded the delegates for going in the first place.58 Importantly, 
Mahathir and the ‘young Turks’ managed to lobby for the formation of a parliamentary 
committee to review foreign policy after the so-called Winneba incident. In its report, the 
Committee proposed “the widest diplomatic representation possible with countries 
irrespective of their ideologies.”59 This presented a small victory for the ‘young Turks’ 
in influencing the Tunku’s foreign policy to also seek the support from the non-aligned 
countries of Asia and Africa, amidst Indonesia’s disparaging claim of Malaysia’s being a 
neo-colonialist project of the British.
When Lt General Suharto assumed power, he banned the PKI and declared 
‘Confrontation’ illegal on 11 March 1966. Peace talks were held in Bangkok on 31 May 
1966 leading to Indonesia’s recognition of Malaysia.60 Malaysia and Indonesia signed an 
accord to end hostilities and renew diplomatic ties on 12 August 1966.61 The end of the 
‘Confrontation’ opened up a new chapter in Malaysia’s foreign policy, in particular in its 
relations with its regional neighbours. It ultimately led to the formation of the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) when Indonesia, Malaysia, the
57 Abdullah, Tengku Abdul Rahman..., p.60.
58 Johan, The Dilemma o f  Independence, p.70
59 Johan, The Dilemma o f  Independence, p.72.
60 See Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, Political Awakening, Kuala Lumpur: Pelanduk Publications, 1986,
p.81.
1 For analysis behind Indonesia’s decision to end ‘Confrontation’, see F.B. Weinstein, Indonesia Abandons 
Confrontation and Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995, pp.27-31.
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Philippines, Singapore and Thailand signed the Bangkok Declaration on 8 August 1967. 
In the negotiations leading up to ASEAN’s formation, a great deal of manoeuvrings took 
place by diplomats of especially Malaysia and Indonesia in order to accommodate the 
sense of entitlement of Indonesia as the biggest nation in the region. Thus, even if 
‘Confrontation’ was over and Sukamo was out of the picture, Indonesia’s struggle for 
regional recognition persisted but this time, Malaysia seemed to have learnt its lesson.62
3.3.2. The Separation of Singapore
Another event that had a significant impact on Mahathir was the separation of Singapore, 
which the Tunku announced on 9 August 1965. The background to the event was 
provided by Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew’s ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ campaign. The 
campaign advocated equality of all citizens based on meritocracy, and was viewed by 
most Malays as a direct attack on the Malays’ special rights. It reignited the Malays’ 
insecurity about losing their homeland that had galvanised their struggle to thwart the 
Malayan Union.63 Lee asserted that none of the three major races could claim to be 
indigenous because all their ancestors came to Malaysia not more than a thousand years 
before. The Malays took this as an insult.64 The insecurity felt by Malays was 
accentuated by the humiliation Lee caused by his derisory attitude towards Malay culture. 
Lee described the Malay culture as “antiquated”, “primitive and soft” and even likened it
62 For the analysis o f the background to ASEAN formation and the persistence of competing recognition 
struggles between Malaysia and Indonesia, see Jtirgen Haacke, ASEAN Diplomatic and Security Culture, 
London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, esp. pp.40-45.
63 “Ever since Singapore joined Malaysia, the Malays feared a repetition of the Malayan Union”. Abdullah, 
Tengku Abdul Rahman p.94.
64 Alex Josey, Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore: Donald Moore Press, 1968, p.97. See also The Straits Times, 5 
May 1965 quoted in Abdullah, Tengku Abdul Rahman .... p.91.
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to that o f the ‘orang hutan’ (jungle people)!65 He derided Malay leaders as “feudalistic”, 
“not of the right calibre” and “naive”.66 Lee’s campaign also threatened the political 
bargain between the main ethnic groups as championed by the Tunku through the 
Alliance Party coalition.67 He mercilessly attacked the Malaysian Chinese Association 
(MCA) moderate Chinese leaders, especially Tan Siew Sin, the Finance Minister68 in 
order to see his Peoples’ Action Party (PAP) replacing the MCA as the main party 
representing the Chinese interests in Malaysia.69
Mahathir’s first term as a parliamentarian coincided with this tumultuous time 
in Malaysian history. He achieved prominence during this period especially because of 
his heated exchanges with Lee Kuan Yew in the Parliament and was identified as a 
member of the extremist group within UMNO branded as the ‘ultras’. Funston 
distinguishes two different factions of the ‘ultras’; the first being UMNO ‘young Turks’ - 
intellectuals branded ‘ultras’ by the Tunku whom he accused of harbouring an agenda to 
topple him because of their opposition to his ‘moderate’ leadership and the group’s desire 
to bring Malaysia closer to the anti-colonial and somewhat socialist stance of the Afro- 
Asian countries. Secondly, the ‘ultra’ group labelled by Lee Kuan Yew, whom Lee 
accused of advocating an uncompromising position vis-a-vis the non-Malays.70 Khoo 
however concluded that in reality, these two groups actually comprised more or less the 
same people.71
65 Michael D. Barr, Lee Kuan Yew: The Beliefs Behind The Man, Richmond: Curzon, 2000, pp. 29 & 77.
66 Abdullah, Tengku Abdul Rahman ..., p.90 and Michael Barr, Lee Kuan Yew, p.77.
68 Lee’s dislike towards Tan Siew Sin was obvious in his memoir. See Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore
Story, Singapore: Times, 1998, for example, p.543.
69 Lee, The Singapore Story, p.547 and Said Zahari, Meniti Lautan Gelora: Sebuah Memoir Politik, Kuala 
Lumpur: Utusan Publications, 2001, pp. 191-2.
70 Funston, Malay Politics in Malaysia, pp. 178-179.
71 Khoo, Paradoxes o f  Mahathirism, p.49.
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Most cited of all Mahathir’s heated exchange with Lee Kuan Yew was during 
the session of ‘Address of Thanks’ for the King’s (Yang di-Pertuan Agong) at the 
Parliament on 26 May 1965. During the occasion, Mahathir charged that the supposedly 
non-communal parties of the Socialist Front and the PAP were the most communal and 
racialist parties of all. “Basically they are pure Chinese chauvinists, or they derive their 
inspiration from a common dislike for the Malays.”72 He further attacked the PAP as 
embodying the “type of Chinese” that were “insular, selfish and arrogant” and,
“have in most instances never crossed the causeway. They are in fact overseas Chinese first -  
more specifically Chinese of the southern region as in their mind China is at the centre of the 
world -  and Malaysia a poor second -  a status so utterly artificial to them that it finds difficulty in 
percolating through their cranium.”73
Mahathir’s courage to challenge Lee who was known for his brilliant debating skills won
him admiration amongst Malay politicians.74 Mahathir, not intimidated by Lee,
dismissed with disdain his “mad ambition” to be the first Chinese prime minister of
Malaysia.75 He claimed that the PAP’s modus operandi in the Parliament was to “assume
a brave front and dare everyone in the hope that it will overawe what it presumes to be
the less clever and more timid groups into refusing to rise to the challenge.”76 Mahathir’s
strong performance in the Parliament was recognised by UMNO with a promotion to its
Supreme Council in 1965. This episode of the Malaysian history clearly left an indelible
imprint on Mahathir’s beliefs concerning the position of the Malays in their own country.
It was apparent that Mahathir was outraged by Lee’s callous and degrading remarks on
the Malays, humiliating their culture and leaders. Against what he believed to be the
72 Dewan Ra ’ayat Parliamentary Debates, II, 3, 26 May 1965, col.77 quoted in Khoo, Paradoxes o f  
Mahathirism, p. 19. It is also referred in Lee, The Singapore Story, pp.608-611.
73 Dewan R a ’ayat Parliamentary Debates, II, 3, 26 May 1965, col. 84 -85 quoted in Khoo, Paradoxes o f  
Mahathirism, p. 19.
74 Khoo, Paradoxes o f  Mahathirism, p. 19.
75 Dewan Ra ’ayat Parliamentary Debates, II, 3, 26 May 1965, col. 84 quoted in Khoo Boo Teik,
Paradoxes o f  Mahathirism, p.20.
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Malay ways, Mahathir refused to be intimidated and challenged Lee in the Parliament in 
a similar blunt and up-front manner.77
Lee Kuan Yew’s abrasive and undiplomatic style particularly when dealing 
with the Malays have been widely observed, although such traits might not have been 
shared by the majority of Malaysian Chinese. Singapore’s former Deputy Prime Minister 
Toh Chin Chye explained that Lee’s “outrageous”, “inflammatory” and “anti-Malay’ 
speeches were due to Lee’s little understanding of Malay culture.78 Similarly, the British 
Deputy Commissioner Philip Moore observed “how poorly Lee dealt with the Malay 
leadership and encouraged him to be more diplomatic.”79 Even Lee’s Peninsula bom 
friend, Maurice Baker considered that Lee “did not understand the subtleties of Malay 
conversations.”80 Nevertheless, as a leader of the predominantly Chinese Singapore, Lee 
impacted significantly in the precarious race relations within Malaysia then. Due to his 
remarks, the Malays perceived Lee as ungrateful, arrogant and downright disrespectful. 
The Malays were further alarmed when Lee suggested that Malaysia should be 
partitioned into North Malaya (for Malays) and South Malaya (for Chinese), if Sino- 
Malay conflict could not be resolved.81
The heated exchanges with Lee in the parliament were therefore Mahathir’s 
responses to Lee’s challenges of the Malays’ constitutional supremacy and his derogatory 
comments about the Malays. In this sense, Mahathir was driven to defend the Malay 
honour from further being disrespected by Lee and Singapore’s PAP. The importance of
76 Khoo Boo Teik, Paradoxes o f  Mahathirism, y.20.
77 Mahathir’s beliefs on the Malay characteristics and value system, for example their aversion of conflicts 
are exposed in The Malay Dilemma, which will be examined later in the chapter.
78 Barr, Lee Kuan Yew, pp.29-30.
79 Barr, Lee Kuan Yew, p.30.
80 Barr, Lee Kuan Yew, p.30.
81 Sin Chew Jit Poh, 5 May 1965 quoted in Abdullah, Tengku Abdul Rahman .... p.7.
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the events in the period will be clear when Mahathir’s thoughts encapsulated in The 
Malay Dilemma is examined later in the chapter. The book was written in the aftermath 
of the race riots of 13 May 1969. Although the Tunku decided on the separation of 
Singapore in August 1965, racial polarisation caused by Lee’s ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ 
campaign continued to beset the nation, culminating in the tragedy of 13 May 1969.
3.3.3. 13 May 1969 Race Riots
The 13 May 1969 racial riots that erupted in Kuala Lumpur was perhaps the greatest 
direct influence on Mahathir’s thinking about the situation of the Malays. As mentioned 
earlier, inter-ethnic understanding continued to remain low even after Singapore’s 
separation in 1965.82 Polarisation persisted between Malays and Chinese. The Malays 
felt they had compromised too much and stood to lose everything. Still, the DAP 
continued the PAP’s propaganda that the Chinese did not receive equal political 
treatment.83 The Alliance Party did poorly in Kuala Lumpur in the General Election on 
10 May 1969. The victorious Chinese dominated DAP held a victory parade across the 
capital during which its supporters taunted the Malays with slogans like ‘Kuala Lumpur 
belongs to the Chinese’ and ‘Malays go back to the kampungs (villages) ’. This enraged 
many Malays, leading ultimately to violent attacks on the Chinese and their businesses, 
sparking retaliatory actions from the Chinese community.
Tension between Mahathir and the Tunku peaked after the riots. Mahathir 
who himself lost his Kota Setar Parliamentary seat in the elections to PAS candidate
82 Zainuddin, The Other Side o f  Mahathir, p. 17.
83 Zainuddin, The Other Side o f  Mahathir, p. 17.
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Yusof Rawa by 989 votes84 wrote an open letter to the Tunku, criticising his leadership. It 
was widely circulated among the Malays in the capital.
In the letter, Mahathir blamed the riots on the Tunku’s lack of leadership and 
called for his resignation. He accused the Tunku of giving in too much to the Chinese, to 
the extent that the Malays were left economically marginalised, weak and ultimately 
subjected to disrespect and humiliation.85 Consequently, Mahathir was expelled from the 
party on 12 July 1969 for not following party discipline.86 Apparently, an order was 
issued to arrest Mahathir but it was stopped by Razak.87
The race riots were the beginning of the end for the Tunku. In the aftermath 
of the riots, more and more UMNO members were looking towards Razak to assume 
leadership.88 At the same time, the Tunku felt let down by his allies. The British Labour 
government refused to provide assistance during the race riots and the Australian media 
reported the riots in a very alarmist and exaggerated manner.89 Mahathir, in his exile 
returned to Kedah and to practising medicine. It was during this period that he wrote The 
Malay Dilemma, which was banned in Malaysia until 1985.
84Apparently, Mahathir made a remark that he did not need the Chinese votes, which angered the Chinese
and made them vote for the Islamic Party (PAS). See Zainuddin, The Other Side o f  Mahathir, p.32. See
also Khoo, Paradoxes o f  Mahathirism, p.21.
85 Mahathir’s letter to the Tunku in Sivamurugan Pandian, Legasi Mahathir, Annex II, pp.407 -  410. See 
also Khoo, Paradoxes o f  Mahathirism, p.23 and Mahathir Mohamad, A New Deal fo r  Asia, Subang Jaya: 
Pelanduk, 1999, pp.21-2.
86 Zainuddin, The Other Side o f  Mahathir, p.34.
87 Zainuddin, The Other Side o f  Mahathir, p.30.
88 Tunku later became aware of the moves to replace him and soon after the ousting of Mahathir, remarked 
that there were ‘extremists’ within the UMNO who wanted to seize power. See Zainuddin, The Other Side 
o f  Mahathir, p.29.
8 Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, May 13: Before and After, Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Melayu Press, 1969, 
p.169.
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3.3.4. The Malay Dilemma90
The Malay Dilemma encapsulated Mahathir’s thoughts on the riots. It exposed the 
widespread feeling of the Malays that they were suffering gross injustices and their 
anxiety of losing Tanah Melayu (the Malay land) to non-Malays. In the book, Mahathir 
categorically declared that Malays were “the rightful owners of Tanah Melayu ”,91 a clear 
rebuke to Lee’s assertion.
According to Mahathir, Malays were insecure because they felt they were 
economically disadvantaged in their own country. He observed that after independence, 
Malays were unable to compete with the more business savvy Chinese in securing 
lucrative government contracts. The Chinese had “more business acumen, [were] 
capable of improvising at short notice, and backed by newly-founded Chinese banks and 
their own considerable personal wealth.” (p.50). Consequently, he argued, Chinese 
companies began to replace British ones in independent Malaya/Malaysia. To him, 
independence had failed to bring the Malays’ economic salvation and their frustration 
actually deepened (p.51). In Mahathir’s terms, the Malay dilemma was indeed 
essentially an economic dilemma (p.61). This argument challenged unequivocally the 
Tunku’s view that the Malays’ position was secured due to their rein on political power. 
Indeed, Mahathir seemed certain that the humiliation that the Malays suffered at the 
hands of the likes of Lee Kuan Yew and the DAP protesters on the eve of 13 May 1969 
was due to their low economic status.
90 In this section, references from the book are indicated by their page numbers unless elaborations are 
needed in footnotes.
91 Mahathir Mohamad, The Malay Dilemma, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore: Times Book, 1970, p. 126. In 
addition, on page 133 he said, “I contend that the Malays are the original or indigenous people who can 
claim Malaya as their one and only country.”
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Mahathir dissected the Malay problem of not being able to compete 
effectively with the immigrant Chinese as being rooted firstly in hereditary and 
environmental factors and, secondly, in the Malays’ value system. Mahathir’s medical 
training was discernible in his reasoning that the Malays’ negative characteristics were 
moulded by their environments and had been passed down hereditarily. He suggested 
that Social Darwinist explanations could account for the Malays’ weaknesses (p. 19). 
Firstly, Mahathir contrasted the fertile land, good climate and rare occurrence of natural 
disasters in the Malay Peninsular, which had not forced the survival of the fittest among 
Malays (pp.20-1 & 106), to the harsh environments of disaster prone China (p.24). 
Secondly, Malays tended to in-breed, preferring to marry relatives even as close as first 
cousins, and the negative effects were scientifically proven (p. 18). In contrast, the 
Chinese custom prohibited marriage within the same clan, making in-breeding almost 
non-existent (p.24).
Mahathir criticised in particular the Malays’ value system. He argued that an 
understanding of the Malay value system and ethical code was essential in planning their 
future (p. 155). To him, the ‘Malay character’ was an integral part, and in fact accentuated
the complexity and magnitude of the inter-racial problem in Malaysia (p.l 16). He argued
\
that the absence of open racial conflict before 13 May 1969 was because Malays “lack a 
capacity to bring about open conflict” due to their value system and character, not 
because there was racial harmony (p.5).
To Mahathir, the Malay value system extolled non-aggressiveness. “The good 
Malay is always unobtrusive and self-effacing, unwilling to impose his will if it conflicts 
with others, and ever willing to compromise.” (p. 160). While the aggressive newcomers 
exploited the richness of their land, the Malay character, which upheld politeness and
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self-restraint as marks of good breeding (p. 117) compelled the Malays to unobtrusively 
stand on the side. There was conflict within the Malays, although there was no open 
conflict. To Mahathir, such self-restraint was never natural. When their patience ran thin, 
self-restraint would be taken over by a kind of violent outbreak. They went amok, as 
happened on 13 May 1969 (p.l 18).
Mahathir believed that feudalism in the Malay society engendered excessive 
emphasis on politeness. There was always the proper way to conduct oneself, especially 
towards those wielding authority -  royals, chiefs and imams. Although not necessarily a 
negative attribute (pp 170-1), feudalism in the Malay society produced outdated values; 
He wrote;
“The Malay social code contributes greatly to making the Malays what they are today. Self- 
restraint and a desire not to displease does not make for an aggressive society. The world is 
getting more and more rude. Frankness is the order of the day. In politics, as much as in sciences 
there is a growing dedication to facts. Old ideas, half-truths and an adulation o f form are giving 
way before the pragmatism of the modem approach. For the most part the Malay social code is 
therefore somewhat anachronistic and can only lessen the competitive abilities o f the Malays and 
hinder their progress.” (p. 171)
It is clear that Mahathir’s up-front and forthright style as displayed in his exchanges with 
Lee Kuan Yew in the parliament was a deliberate action to counter what he believed to be 
the Malays’ over-emphasis on politeness and aversion to conflicts. Later, when he 
became prime minister, he was known for his less than diplomatic outbursts and straight- 
talking. To those without the insights of Mahathir’s long-standing beliefs on the Malay 
character, it is all a little bit peculiar and perplexing. Thus, Mahathir’s personality is said 
to be full of paradoxes.92 Brash in public, yet he was a-quiet, soft-spoken and polite man 
in private.93
92 Khoo, Paradoxes o f  Mahathirism, p.3.
93 See for example, Adshead, Mahathir o f  Malaysia, p.4.
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Colonialism and Malay Value System
Mahathir touched extensively on what he perceived to be the impacts of colonialism on 
the Malay value system in The Malay Dilemma, It has been observed that his strong sense 
o f anti-colonialism motivated his political activism from the very beginning.94 He 
“identified British colonialism as the ‘culprit’ that had enslaved the bumiputras, the sons 
o f the soil, in their own land.”95 In The Malay Dilemma, Mahathir illustrated how the 
Malays’ good manners were misinterpreted by the British as signs of the Malays’ 
approval of their unequal relationship (p. 116). Mahathir believed that the British held 
degrading views of the Malays as being weak, submissive and lazy. He was offended by 
the description of Malays in the Encyclopaedia Britannica as ‘indolent’. Mahathir argued 
that if  Malays were ‘indolent’, it was due to the British policy, which had made them 
internalise the inferiority as projected by the colonisers. He believed that Malays’ 
negative character was partly “a result of the administrative policies of colonial rulers.”96 
It can be argued that this is the core of what has often been described as Mahathir’s 
nationalist predisposition. Mahathir’s beliefs in the impacts of colonialism on the Malay 
character and mindset are important in understanding his foreign policy decisions, 
particularly as regards Malaysia’s identification with non-aligned developing countries of 
the ‘South’, policies to ‘Buy British Last’ and ‘Look East’.
In addition, Mahathir also blamed the British for Malaysia’s ethnic problems. 
During the British time, there was an unmanageable influx of Chinese and Indians. They
94 Some examples o f these observations are as follows: “This belief in the menace o f colonialism on his 
people’s culture and values was in fact instrumental in motivating Mahathir to join the independence 
struggle from a youthful age. From early on, he was intent to wipe out any remnants of colonialism and its 
way o f thinking.” Zainuddin, The Other Side o f  Mahathir, p.95. “Mahathir has blamed the British for the 
Malay dilemma.” Morais, Mahathir: A Profile in Courage, p.53.
95 Morais, Mahathir: A Profile in Courage, p. 120.
96 Morais, Mahathir: A Profile in Courage, p. 120.
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came to work in British tin mines and plantations and did not intend to stay permanently. 
They thus did not make the effort to assimilate into the local culture, unlike the small 
numbers of Chinese and Indians who came before British colonialism. Moreover, the 
British ‘divide and rule’ policy resulted in minimal contacts among the ethnic groups. 
Mahathir asserted that “had the British not encouraged the Chinese and Indians to 
immigrate in unmanageable numbers and then segregated them from the Malays, these 
people would have fewer differences with the Malays, and the Malay problem would not 
have emerged.” (p. 134).
Islam and the Malay Value System
Mahathir believed that Islam plays a major influence in the Malay value system (pp. 154- 
5). This thesis argues that Mahathir’s understanding of the vital place of Islam in Malay 
identity drove him to pursue a more rigorous foreign policy on issues that concerned the 
Muslim ummah. In The Malay Dilemma, Mahathir expounded on what he perceived as 
the crux of the Malays problem relating to their religion, that is their misinterpretations of 
Islamic doctrines (p. 155). Moreover, Mahathir argued that a great deal of the Malay 
value system was derived not from Islam but from adat or custom, which was unrelated 
to faith (pp. 155-6).
He highlighted Malays’ confusions and misinterpretations of Islamic 
doctrines. These included disregard of time (while seemingly valuing life) (p. 163), 
hopelessness (construing it as a sign of patience) (p. 160) and fatalism (as spiritualism) 
(p. 164). Thus, life was considered as preparation for the hereafter (p. 162). He argued 
that this was not Islamic, but actually mere “escapism from the realities of life, an 
insulation against the envy” of the prosperity o f “other races and other countries” (p. 162).
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Thus, their dedication to the hereafter was to convince themselves that they were “not 
missing anything” if they did not have “worldly goods” (p. 162). In addition, the Malays’ 
attitude towards money and property was “undeveloped” (pp. 166-7). He lamented that 
such an attitude would not bring Malays progress. The Malay Dilemma is therefore 
significant in expounding Mahathir’s belief on the right interpretation of Islamic 
doctrines, which should not hinder but encourage the pursuit of education, progress and 
economic success. As regards foreign policy, it will be illustrated in Chapter Six that an 
important motivation for Mahathir was to make Malaysia a model Muslim country, 
which would seal the overhaul of the Muslim Malay character and identity.
In sum, the book elaborates on Mahathir’s proposal for a two-pronged strategy 
as the solution for the Malay dilemma. Firstly, he emphasised the need for a 
psychological ‘revolution’ to accompany efforts to better the economic standing of 
Malays. Secondly, he advocated “constructive protection” (p.31) in favour of the 
Malays. This implied positive discrimination measures for example in granting
government contracts, scholarships and university places.
3.3.5. Mahathir During the Razak Years (1970-1976)
In the aftermath of the race riots, Parliament was suspended temporarily. A National 
Operations Council (NOC) headed by Razak was established to rule Malaysia by decree. 
The Tunku who still headed the Cabinet as prime minister came under increasing 
pressure to resign, especially from UMNO ‘young Turks’, of whom Mahathir was a
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prominent member.97 The Tunku eventually bowed to pressure and resigned in 
September 1970 when a face-saving exit emerged in the form of heading the new 
‘Islamic Commonwealth’ based in Jeddah. The change of government was significant 
because it started the discourse centred on the Malay supremacy in the formation of 
Malaysia’s national identity.98
Pivotal to this discourse on the formation of a Malay centric national identity 
was the New Economic Policy (NEP) launched by the Razak government.99 Many agreed 
that Mahathir’s analysis in The Malay Dilemma became the underlying rationale for the 
‘restructuring’ agenda initiated by Razak.100 Enshrined in the NEP was a ‘reconstruction 
strategy’ that aimed to meet two inter-related problems: “the economic backwardness and 
poverty of the Malays; and the psychological feeling among Malays of relative 
deprivation, alienation, and inferiority, which presumably accounted for Malay jealousy 
and hatred of the non-Malays.”101 Thus, the government came to agree that the race riots 
were due to increasing Malays’ discontent concerning their relative economic 
deprivation, as argued by Mahathir in The Malay Dilemma. It can be understood as a
97 Although at the time Mahathir was expelled from UMNO, he remained close to others identified in the 
group. They were Musa Hitam and Ghaffar Baba (who later became Deputy Prime Minister to Mahathir) 
and Abdullah Ahmad, Tun Razak’s Political Secretary. Apparently, Tun Dr Ismail was more determined to 
avoid a putsch against the Tunku than Tun Razak by promising the group that the Tunku would resign 
within six months to a year. See Abdullah, Tengku Abdul Rahman..., p.105.
98 Liow, The Politics o f  Indonesia-Malaysia Relations, p .l 16.
99 The NEP had a two-prong strategy. Firstly, to eradicate poverty, by rising income levels and create 
employment for all Malaysians irrespective of race. Secondly, it aimed at correcting the economic 
imbalance and therefore eliminate the identification of race with economic activity. This process would 
involve “the modernisation of rural lives, a rapid and balanced growth of urban activities and the creation 
o f a Malay commercial and industrial community in all categories and at all levels o f operation, so that 
Malays and other indigenous people will become full partners in all aspects o f the economic life o f the 
nation.” Government of Malaysia, Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-1975, Kuala Lumpur: Government Printing 
Office, 1971, p .l, quoted in Gordon Means, Malaysian Politics, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1976, 
p.408.
00 See Khoo, Paradoxes o f  Mahathirism, p.27,
101 Means, Malaysian Politics, p.408.
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move by the government to reinstate the notion of what is considered just and fair by the 
Malays in the arrangements of the Malaysian society.
Clearly, Razak shared at least some of Mahathir’s political beliefs. Being one 
of UMNO ‘young Turks’, Mahathir enjoyed close association with Razak’s office and 
“held him (Razak) in the highest esteem”.102 In 1972, Mahathir was re-accepted into 
UMNO and rejoined its Supreme Council. Mahathir was firstly appointed to the Higher 
Education Advisory Council. A year later, he was nominated to the upper house, the 
Senate or Dewan Negara. In 1974 elections, Mahathir won unopposed as the MP for 
Kubang Pasu and was appointed Minister of Education.103
Mahathir’s strong views on education appear to have been influenced by his 
own father who himself was a respected educationist.104 As the Minister of Education, 
Mahathir introduced a number of changes to improve the opportunities for bumiputra105 
students to further their education to local and foreign learning institutions. They 
included admission quotas and policy changes on the selection of students to these 
institutions. Also, specific facilities were introduced like scholarship awards and 
exclusive teaching institutions like MARA Junior Science Colleges.106
102 Zainuddin, The Other Side o f  Mahathir, p.42. Mahathir’s influence with Tun Razak was primarily 
through his close friendship with Abdullah Ahmad, Tun Razak’s Political Secretary -  Author interview 
with Zainuddin Maidin, 22 April 2007.
103 Pandian, Legasi Mahathir, 2005, p.28.
I0,1“ . . .the name of Mohamad Iskandar was almost synonymous with development and progress o f education 
in the state of Kedah.” Morais, Mahathir: A Profile o f  Courage, p. 1. See also Aziz, Mahathir's Paradigm 
Shift, p. 14.
105 The term literally means ‘sons of the soil’. It refers to the indigenous people of both the Malays and 
tribal type. See Means, Malaysian Politics, p.380.
106 Aziz, Mahathir's Paradigm Shift, p. 14.
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Mahathir wrote his second book ‘Menghadapi Cabaran'y which was later 
translated as The Challenge when he was Education Minister.107 The book reflected 
Mahathir’s difficult experiences with Malay students, at home and abroad, especially at 
the beginning of his tenure. Believing that education was the one important means for 
Malays to change their fate, Mahathir was impatient and frustrated with those who 
became involved in anti-government activities while receiving government scholarships. 
He thus initiated amendments to the University and College Act, controversially 
including provisions for stronger government control on students’ discipline and 
activities at higher institutions.
In mid 1975, students at the Mara Institute of Technology (ITM) in Kuala 
Lumpur and Malaysian students represented by the Kelab Malaysia United Kingdom 
(Malaysian Club United Kingdom - KMUK) demonstrated against the government’s 
decision to withdraw scholarships to students considered to be anti-government. 
Mahathir was especially unhappy with the KMUK because of its allegations that the 
government was un-Islamic and anti-Islam.108 This event not only made Mahathir realise 
the challenges the government was facing in implementing the NEP, but also illustrated 
to Mahathir how Malay students were being influenced by the global Islamic resurgence. 
During his visit to London in June 1975 as Education Minister, Mahathir personally bore 
the brunt of the KMUK’s anti-government attitude and was annoyed that his talk at the 
Malaysia Hall was boycotted by KMUK leaders. Furthermore, Mahathir felt that he was 
slandered in the sermon during Friday prayers there.109
107 ‘Menghadapi Cabaran’ was first published in 1976. The English translation, ‘The Challenge’ was first 
published in 1986. See Mahathir Mohamad, Menghadapi Cabaran, Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1976, 
and The Challenge, Subang Jaya: Pelanduk, 1986.
108 Zainuddin, The Other Side o f  Mahathir, p.250.
109 Zainuddin, The Other Side o f  Mahathir, p. 252.
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Moreover, the episode also pointed to Mahathir’s emerging style of 
leadership, which can be considered as determined and ruthless, once he set his goals. 
Mahathir refused to back down to KMUK’s demand for the scholarships to be reinstated, 
arguing that it was necessary because this small group of students was hampering the 
studies of others by their actions. He reminded the students that their success was crucial 
for the Malay progress, to “put the races in Malaysia on equal footing”.110
The Challenge111
The Challenge was specifically targeted to the Malay youths. Unlike The Malay 
Dilemma, it was originally written in Malay and Mahathir adopted “the accepted dual 
evidence in the study of Islam -  dalil ‘aqli and dalil naqli, i.e. rational argument and 
excerpts from the Quran (the Islamic Holy book) and hadith (traditions of the Prophet) to 
engage them (Introduction). Mahathir expressed concerns because Islam, which once 
made its followers progressive and powerful had been invoked to reject materialism and 
“healthy involvement in worldly concerns”, which he feared would lead to its 
“weakness”, “retrogression” and “eventual collapse” (Introduction). True to his medical 
training, he sought to analyse why this happened, because “diagnosis is the first step 
towards cure” (pp.2-3).
Mahathir dealt directly with issues raised by the students which included their 
demands for freedom of expression, right to activism and demonstrations, calls for 
nationalisation of foreign owned industries and allegations of corruption. However, at 
the very core, The Challenge dealt with the influence of Islam in the Malay value system, 
consequently affecting the Malays’ attitude towards education and materialism. Mahathir
110 See excerpts o f the letter in Zainuddin, The Other Side o f  Mahathir, pp.252-3.
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seemed concerned with the increasing attractiveness of political Islam amongst Malay 
youths and how socialist and communist ideals were being defined and adopted by this 
movement
Mahathir reiterated his frustration that since embracing Islam, Malays were 
only stressed to study aqidah (spirituality), ibadah (religious rites) and akhlak (morality), 
forgetting “other areas of knowledge which had been explored and pioneered by Islamic 
writers, scientists and mathematicians”(p.l9). The problem worsened when such 
‘worldly’ knowledge’ was embraced by Europeans, and propagated in their colonies at 
schools ran by Christian missionaries. Thus, knowledge like mathematics and the 
sciences which actually originated from Islamic scholars was shunned as ‘Western’ and 
un-Islamic - Christian and later, ‘secular’. He believed that there was no separation 
between the religious and the secular (p.82). Muslims became weak because of their 
misperception of ‘worldly’ knowledge, which was necessary for its survival (p.36). For 
example, scientific knowledge was vital for the defence of the Muslim community 
(pp.78-9).
Another misinterpretation of Islamic doctrines that Mahathir attacked in the 
book was Muslims’ rejection of materialism (p. 107). He believed the ‘much confusion 
about the definitions and the roles of spirituality’ led to the calls made by most Islamic 
leaders to preserve only spiritual values and reject materialism (p.l 15-6). He also argued 
that material equality, as championed by socialists and communists, was never a 
characteristic of Islamic societies (p. 108) as illustrated by Islamic system of taxation and 
redistribution of wealth (p.l 12). Further, the materialistic achievements of past Arab and 
Indian Muslims were instrumental in the spread of the religion. In short, he argued that
111 In this section, references from the book are indicated by the page numbers within the paragraphs.
106
material success was vital in Islamic societies to guarantee the continued propagation of 
the religion and existence of its followers.
Mahathir considered it ‘strange and shameful’ that 70 million oil-rich mostly 
Muslim Arabs could not defend themselves against the threat of 2 million Israelis 
‘without wealth’ (p.l 14). To Mahathir, this was due to the Muslims’ Tack of ‘worldly’ 
ability and efficiency (as a result of insufficient pursuit of worldly knowledge)” (p.l 14). 
Consequently, the Muslims had to depend on the US (capitalists) and the USSR 
(communists) for their defence (p. 114). The situation of Muslims in West Asia was 
therefore ‘precarious’ because insofar as defence was concerned, they were ‘forced to be 
beggars’ despite their rich resources (p.79). To Mahathir, this proved that wealth without 
knowledge was ‘ineffective’ (p.79). Mahathir lamented;
“ .... Muslims are forced to bow to materialists, to beg for aid and protection. In the face o f this 
fact, it is difficult to convince anyone that spirituality brings happiness. Palestinian refugees who 
are attacked, hounded, displaced and slaughtered by both Jews and fellow-Muslims can hardly 
accept claim that spiritual values bring happiness.” (p.l 15)
In this regard, Mahathir’s thoughts concerning the place of the Malays in the global 
community of the Muslim ummah is clear. What is also plain is that in upholding the 
correct interpretation of Islamic doctrines, Mahathir aspired for the Malays to progress 
and attain economic success so that they could redeem the honour of Islam and its 
ummah.
Mahathir’s anti-colonialism came to the fore in the essay on East and West. 
The examples he used, like men having long hair (p.44), and attire (pp.45-47), were 
undeniably simplistic and crude. Nevertheless, the crux of his contention was 
unmistakable, that is, his perception of continued domination of the East by the West. He 
observed that whatever came from the West would be deemed superior and emulated by
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the East (p.44). According to him, this psychological imbalance was due to colonisation. 
Throughout history, the West had been the East’s ‘powerful conquerors, defeating and 
subjugating’ them.
“The success o f the Western nations overawed the Easterners. If the West was so successful, it 
must be because of the qualities its people had. From this notion to the notion that the same 
success could be achieved by copying Western qualities is a logical step. And so the East copied 
the West in all fields, form the political and administrative system to the language, religion, 
culture and countless other aspects.” (p.45)
Mahathir was not against copying Western culture per se, but stressed for 
analysis and careful selection (p.45). In this context, he extolled discipline above 
everything else. He argued that the British managed to colonise the world because of 
their strict discipline (as reflected in the strict code of attire of the British upper class) 
(pp.45-46). To Mahathir, only through strict discipline came effective organisation 
(p. 132). The discipline and organisational skills o f colonial British were emulated by the 
Malays in their successful bid for independence (pp.46 & 133) Mahathir related how the 
Japanese had intelligently copied only the positive attributes of the Western culture while 
at the same time maintained their own advantageous cultural values (p. 13 3). In addition, 
Mahathir argued that discipline and organisation actually constituted Islamic teachings 
and practice, exemplified in the way the religion was successfully propagated and in 
Islamic rituals of worship -  ‘ibadah’(p.\36). Thus, while not rejecting Western culture in 
total, Mahathir criticised the mentality that continued to look up towards the West and the 
attitude to uncritically copy Western ways. He believed that such mentality and attitude 
only reflected the internalised inferiority complex that was developed during 
colonisation.
In sum, this section has illustrated the significant recognition factors in 
Mahathir’s belief system as rendered in The Challenge. What motivated Mahathir was
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his desire to bring recognition for the Malays, through improvement of their social status 
-  defined primarily in terms of economic success. However, Mahathir’s tone in The 
Challenge had changed compared to that of The Malay Dilemma. While the latter was 
critical of the government’s oversight of Malay problems and discontent, The Challenge 
defended the government’s policies. When most of what he championed had already 
been implemented under the NEP, Mahathir who was already a Cabinet member by then 
worried that the Malay youths would be swayed from focussing their efforts to realise 
NEP’s objectives. Again, the personality of the would be Prime Minister was beginning 
to unfold -  methodical in his approach to problems and impatient, ruthlessly 
uncompromising in achieving his objectives.
3.3.6. Foreign Policy under Razak
It is difficult to discern Mahathir’s direct role in shaping foreign policy during the Razak
years because he did not hold any official position relating to foreign policy. However,
Razak’s foreign policy clearly moved away from the Tunku’s in the direction that
Mahathir had called for. As the Prime Minister, Razak now had the free hand to forge
112strong relations with the Afro-Asia group and pursue non-alignment and neutralisation.
As already illustrated, Razak’s position on foreign policy was closer to the demands of 
the UMNO ‘Young Turks’, of whom Mahathir was a prominent member, as compared to 
the Tunku’s.
Under Razak, non-alignment was put into practice in the form of 
neutralisation policy in Southeast Asia as had been argued by Mahathir and his Young
112 See for example, B.A. Hamzah, ‘Introduction: ZOPFAN -  Its Strategic Intent’ in Southeast Asia and 
Regional Peace, Kuala Lumpur: ISIS, 1991, p.2 and Tarling, Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p. 150.
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Turks cohorts during the Tunku’s period. Non-alignment was not received favourably by 
the Tunku when it was first proposed by Dr Ismail in 1968, although endorsed by 
Razak.113 Ghazali Shafie, the Foreign Ministry Permanent Secretary first declared 
neutralisation as Malaysia’s policy at the Preparatory NAM Conference in Dar es Salaam 
on 17 April 1970. The neutralisation of Southeast Asia was reiterated by Razak at the 
NAM Summit in Lusaka in September that year. This NAM Summit also marked the full 
acceptance of Malaysia in the community of non-aligned nations. Thus, Malaysia under 
Razak came a long way from the time when Malaysia’s unofficial delegation led by 
Mahathir was humiliated and declined participation at the AAPSO Conference in 
Winneba in the 1960s.
While it is difficult to ascertain Mahathir’s position at the time, Malaysia’s 
policy towards the Southeast Asian region was clearly governed by the growing complex 
security concerns. For the country, Vietnam illustrated the perils of superpowers 
involvement in regional conflicts.114 At the same time, Malaysia’s traditional ally, the 
British planned withdrawals from all its bases east of Suez in 1971. Australia and New 
Zealand were considering the same move.115
Malaysia was also increasingly suspicious of the PRC whose influence in 
Indochina was growing.116 As part of its neutralisation policy, Malaysia proceeded to 
recognise the PRC as early as in 1971. Malaysia hoped that this would compel the PRC 
to respect the norm of non-interference, and recognise the ruling coalition in Kuala
1,3 Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, p.54. However, according to Hanggi, a Malayan 
delegate talked about a ‘neutrality bloc’ at the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi as early as 1947. 
See also H. Hanggi, ASEAN and the ZOPFAN Concept, Singapore: ISEAS Pacific Strategic Papers, 1991, 
P-2.
Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, p.55. See also Mohamed Nordin Sopiee, ‘Towards 
A ‘Neutral’ Southeast Asia’ and Ghazali Shafie, ‘Neutralisation of Southeast Asia’ in Southeast Asia and 
Regional Peace, Kuala Lumpur: ISIS, 1991,pp. 17 & 43.
115 Noordin, ‘Towards a “Neutral” Southeast Asia’, in Southeast Asia and Regional Peace, p.16.
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Lumpur. The ethnic riots involving Chinese minority and Communist insurgents made it 
imperative for Malaysia to seek Beijing’s pledge of non-interference.117
At the ASEAN level, Malaysia initiated a policy of neutralisation which 
culminated in the ASEAN’s Kuala Lumpur Declaration on Zone of Peace, Freedom and 
Neutrality (ZOPFAN) on 27 November 1971. However, in the process Malaysia deferred 
to Indonesia in defining the concept in terms of ‘national resilience’. Such deference 
shows continuing struggles for recognition in the relations of both countries even after 
iKonfrontasi\n i
In Malaysia’s case, neutralisation policy was motivated by recognition factors 
as well as security. It was based on the frustration felt because Malaysia and Southeast 
Asia in general had been denied of their proper role in world politics.119 Haacke argues 
that the struggle for recognition (in the form of the ‘grammar o f nationalism’) articulated 
in the context of neutrality and non-interference by Southeast Asia leaders was motivated 
by their grievances of not being able to control events which affected them.120 Also, it 
was clear that the Razak government wanted to change Malaysia’s identity from the pro- 
West characteristics shaped by the Tunku. In addition, the policy was aimed to raise 
Malaysia’s prestige.121 Chapter Seven will illustrate that much of the philosophy that 
underpinned Malaysia’s strong support for the ASEAN’s norms of neutrality and non­
interference under Razak, continued to be upheld, and possibly with even greater vigour 
under Mahathir. Therefore, even if  Mahathir’s direct role in foreign policy under Razak
116 Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, p.54.
117 Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security, p.55 and Tarling, Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.160.
118 See Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, p.58 for argument concerning Indonesia’s 
struggle for security and recognition in the process. For Indonesia’s argument that ZOPFAN was its idea 
all along, see Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN, p. 177.
1,9 Bilveer Singh, ZOPFAN and the New Security Order in the Asia-Pacific Region, Petaling Jaya:
Pelanduk, 1992, p.42.
120 Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, pp.60-1.
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cannot be discerned, the continuity of the issues pursued under Mahathir albeit with 
different emphasis makes it logical to conclude that Razak and Mahathir shared the same 
beliefs and ideas concerning foreign policy.
Another aspect of this continuity is Razak’s initiatives to improve Malaysia’s 
relations with Muslim countries. Before that, Malaysia’s position vis-a-vis the Muslim 
world was low key, with a token withdrawal of recognition of Israel following the 
decision taken at the first Islamic Summit Conference in Rabat in 1969, held in response 
to the Israeli burning of the Al-Aqsa mosque.122 Under Razak, Malaysia hosted the 
Islamic Summit Conference in Kuala Lumpur in June 1974.
In the area of international political economy, under Razak, Malaysia began to 
assume a Third World posture in international economic and trade issues. Again, this 
position was bolstered even further by Mahathir after he assumed the premiership, during 
which he elevated Malaysia to a position of leadership amongst the developing countries 
of the ‘South’. However, it was during Razak’s time that Malaysia started to join forces 
with other developing countries in calling for a “new economic world order”.123 During 
UNCTAD III, at the World Multilateral Trade Negotiations in Tokyo in 1973, Malaysia 
was elected to serve on the governing body of UNCTAD’s Trade and Development 
Board and its head of delegation was chosen as the Vice President of the Conference. 
This was a “testimony that Malaysia had become increasingly recognised as a champion 
of Southern causes.. .”124
121 Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, p.55.
122 Malaysia (under the Tunku) along with Turkey and Iran were initially the only Muslim countries to 
recognise Israel. The recognition was later withdrawn.
123 Johan, The Dilemma o f  Independence, p. 109.
124 Johan, The Dilemma o f  Independence, p. 108.
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Razak passed away in 1976 and was succeeded by Tun Hussein Onn. 
Unexpectedly, Mahathir was appointed Deputy Prime Minister. He felt that Hussein who 
barely knew him, had heard good words about him from Razak.125 His rise was meteoric, 
considering that he had barely been in the Cabinet fori 8 months!
3.3.7. Mahathir during the Hussein Period (1976-1981)
Hussein’s was a transitional period during which not many initiatives were introduced.126 
Hussein “operationalised” and “concretised” the basic thrusts of Malaysia’s foreign 
policy already set by Razak127 and Malaysia continued to focus on non-alignment and 
regional neutrality. At the Summit in Bali in 1976, ASEAN adopted two important 
documents - the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Co­
operation (TAC). TAC was significant because it provided the mechanisms for the 
pacific settlement of disputes between members. ASEAN’s all important rules of non­
intervention and mutual respect for the territorial integrity of member states’ territories 
are enshrined in TAC. It will be shown in Chapter Seven that Mahathir firmly believed 
and adhered to these principles as the cornerstone for establishing legitimate relations 
among the regional neighbours. In addition, under Hussein, Malaysia either on its own or 
via ASEAN, continued to make peace overtures to the Communist Indochinese countries. 
At the ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur in 1977, members reaffirmed ASEAN’s desire 
to develop “peaceful and mutually beneficial relations with all countries in the region,
125 The other UMNO Vice Presidents were Ghafar Baba and Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah. Both received 
more votes in the election to the post and had been Vice Presidents longer. See Aziz Zariza Ahmad, 
Mahathir: Triumph and Trials, Kuala Lumpur: S. Abdul Majeed & Co., 1990 , p.33. See also Zainuddin, 
The Other Side o f  Mahathir, p.42.
126 Pandian, Legasi Mahathir, p. 13.
127 Johan, The Dilemma o f  Independence, p. 146.
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including Kampuchea, Laos and Vietnam.1'128 Two months before the summit, Tengku 
Ahmad Rithaudeen, Malaysia’s Foreign Minister visited Hanoi and Vientiane.
It was in the international economics and trade area that Mahathir’s direct 
influence could be deduced because of his position as the Minister for International Trade 
and Industry (MITI) as well as Deputy Prime Minister during this period. Mahathir 
embarked on an aggressive agenda for the country to woo foreign investments, which 
included investment and trade promotions abroad. As the MITI minister, his 
understanding of international economic diplomacy was obviously enhanced. Also, his 
inclination to work closely with the private sector began to show as he personally 
encouraged Malaysia’s private sector to work with the government in promoting trade 
and investment.129
Malaysia also increasingly identified its policies with the South and promoted 
the New International Economic Order (NIEO).130 For example, a national seminar was 
held at the end of 1975 on ‘The New International Economic Order and UNCTAD IV’. 
However, growing realisation of die limitations of the UN frameworks led to Malaysia 
also taking unilateral and regional approaches in promoting its developing world 
economic agenda. Malaysia increasingly relied on ASEAN to pursue its economic 
interests.
Mahathir succeeded Hussein as Malaysia’s fourth Prime Minister on 16 July 
1981, upon Hussein’s retirement from politics due to ill health.
128 Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 August 1977, quoted in Johan, The Dilemma o f  Independence, p .145.
129 Aziz, Mahathir’s Paradigm Shift, pp.24-5.
130 Johan, The Dilemma o f Independence, p. 147.
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3.4. CONCLUSION
It can be concluded that the ‘lens’ through which Mahathir made sense of the situation of 
his nation - his ‘belief system’, focused essentially on the Malay identity, culture and 
psyche. Central to Mahathir’s motivation was proper recognition for the Malays. The 
need for recognition stemmed from his belief that Malays’ discontent was rooted in their 
feelings of injustices suffered and humiliation for being economically marginalised in 
their own land.
Information received from the environment is processed via the belief system 
in terms of what it is (fact), and what it ought to be (value).131 Facts about the Malays in 
Mahathir’s view were that they were poor, seen as weak, lazy and uninterested in worldly 
or material achievements. The Malays, he believed, ought to be able to participate 
equally in Malaysia’s economy and enjoy the riches of their land. This is Mahathir’s idea 
of what the social arrangement ought to be, or in other words, his conceptions of justice 
for the Malays. To Mahathir, the Malays ought to be helped to escape the poverty trap 
that was causing them much grief and humiliation. The analysis of Mahathir’s early 
environments and experiences is crucial in understanding his rationales of what was 
happening and what ought to take place.
This chapter has dealt firstly, with Mahathir’s personal characteristics and 
secondly, Mahathir’s political ideology. Both are essential in understanding Mahathir’s 
belief system. Mahathir’s political ideology has been pivotal in shedding lights on 
Mahathir’s preconceived conceptions of justice.
131 Ole Holsti, ’The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study’ in J. Rosenau (ed.), International 
Politics and Foreign Policy, pp.544-5.
115
The strict upbringing, courtesy of his headmaster father inculcated in him the 
appreciation of achievements based on discipline and hard work. He believed that 
discipline was the key to success, as exemplified by the Islamic civilisation and the 
British Empire. Thus, he was critical of feudalism within the Malay culture. His father’s 
suspect Malay credentials and lack of link to the traditional Malay aristocracy made it 
even more imperative for the family’s social status to be recognised in terms of hard 
work. In addition, Mahathir’s personality was also shaped by his medical training. He 
valued facts and was methodical in solving problems.
Central to his political belief was Mahathir’s staunch anti-colonialism. 
Mahathir resented the subjugation under colonialism, which represented itself in the form 
of mental and psychological suppression as well as physical and material exploitation. He 
was not anti-West. However, Mahathir was critical of colonialism’s underlying 
assumption of Western cultural superiority and its negative impacts on Malaysian society.
Mahathir’s motivation can therefore'be understood in terms of a struggle for 
recognition built on Malays’ grievances, articulated in the rhetoric of anti-colonialism 
and nationalism. He believed that the denigration of colonised people did not end with 
political independence. The Malays continued to suffer from an internalised inferiority 
complex, which made them weak and unable to compete with the immigrants. This was 
the root of their economic dilemma. Consequently, due to their poverty, they were being 
looked down on as the underclass in their own land. Thus, Mahathir’s struggle was 
primarily to promote the Malays’ status through economic achievements, for their self 
respect and esteem. In this context, recognition was the motivation but the main goal was 
economic achievement.
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How did Mahathir’s belief system affect his views on the country’s foreign 
policy? Mahathir was against the Tunku’s unequivocal pro-West stance. He strongly 
opposed AMDA because he felt that it compromised the country’s independent foreign 
policy, especially in the eyes of other newly-independent countries. He was also 
concerned that the Tunku’s pro-West ideology and Western influenced lifestyle were 
giving the wrong impression and would prolong the mental and psychological 
subjugation of the Malays.
Mahathir, along with other UMNO ‘young Turks’ campaigned for non- 
alignment and the strengthening of ties with the Afro-Asia group. In addition, Mahathir 
stressed the importance of re-establishing the link with Islamic countries, which were 
represented significantly in the Afro-Asia group. To him, acceptance by this group of 
proud newly-independent countries was crucial as recognition of Malaysia’s 
independence.
The struggle for recognition exemplified by Mahathir’s support for a policy of 
non-alignment was due to Indonesia’s ‘KonfrontasV. Indonesia accused Malaysia of neo­
colonialism, thus directly challenging Malaysia’s independent status. The conflict 
between the two nations could itself be understood in terms of recognition struggle and it 
persisted even during Mahathir’s premiership. This will be analysed in a later chapter.
Singapore was important in influencing Mahathir’s belief system. Firstly, his 
experience there triggered the fear of what would entail if the Malay economic problems 
was left uncorrected. Secondly, Lee Kuan Yew became the personification of Singapore 
and Chinese ruthless and crass behaviour, and boundless ambitions. Lee subjected the 
Malays to public humiliation and degradation the way he callously and arrogantly 
promoted the ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ concept. He challenged the Malays’ indigenous
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status and their special privileges, and disparaged their leaders. The bitter experience 
during the brief period of their unification under Malaysia, and the way Singapore was 
ejected continued to haunt relations between Malaysia and Singapore. It led to a 
competition and struggle for recognition, which was mostly goaded by leaders of the two 
countries.
Malaysia’s foreign policy shifted to properly embrace non-alignment after the 
Tunku resigned. Arguably, Mahathir as a member of UMNO ‘young Turks’ was 
influential in Razak’s policy shifts. Non-alignment became the cornerstone for 
Malaysia’s policy within ASEAN. However, recognition struggles between the regional 
neighbours continued to challenge members’ aspirations concerning ASEAN.
Mahathir continued to be guided by his anti-colonialism and Malay 
nationalism when he joined the Cabinet in 1975. As Minister of Education, he was 
focused on improving the education of the Malays in order to improve their economic 
and, consequently, social status. As Minister of International Trade and Industry, 
Mahathir positioned Malaysia closer to third world countries and identified with the call 
for the NIEO.
The next chapter will analyse the Malaysian state during Mahathir’s 
premiership. It will expand on Mahathir’s personality by looking at his government’s 
decision-making process and further illustrate the centrality of recognition struggles in 
Mahathir’s belief system by analysing Malaysia’s policy goals. In this context, it will 
also try to expose the link between domestic and foreign policy agenda centring on Malay 
recognition struggles, as defined by Mahathir.
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CHAPTER 4 THE MALAYSIAN STATE UNDER MAHATHIR
In the previous chapter I have traced and outlined Mahathir’s belief system, which I 
argued had Malay nationalism as its core. This Malay nationalism became the basis of 
Mahathir’s recognition struggle that motivated most of his policies, including foreign 
policy. This chapter aims to illustrate, firstly, how Mahathir’s personal traits translated 
into the Prime Minister’s leadership style, one which made Mahathir the central figure in 
the Malaysian government policy making structure. This would lend credence to the 
argument that to understand Malaysia under Mahathir, it is vital to understand Mahathir 
himself, hence the importance of making sense Mahathir’s belief system. Secondly, this 
chapter will show how Mahathir’s recognition struggle based on his beliefs about the 
‘Malay problems’ was translated into policy priorities in the domestic Malaysian setting. 
Thirdly, the chapter will make the connection between domestic needs and foreign 
policy. In this regard, it offers a brief overview of Malaysia’s foreign policy to illustrate 
how the agency of Mahathir, who had a specific domestic agenda, interpreted and reacted 
to constraints of international structures.
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4.1. THE MALAYSIAN GOVERNMENT UNDER MAHATHIR
There were two significant features of the Malaysian government under Mahathir. First, 
in terms of leadership style and decision-making processes, there was an increased 
centralisation of power in the executive hands of the prime minister. Secondly, in terms 
of what underpinned policy outputs, there was a clear rise in recognition fervour.
Mahathir inherited a system of government which was already centralised. 
From the time of the Tunku, the executive branch had wielded extreme power over policy 
making.1 However, Mahathir adopted a style of leadership which further strengthened 
the executive’s power. Under Mahathir, the Malaysian structure had been described as a 
semi-democracy2, ‘restricted democracy’ and an ‘authoritarian populist state’3. Mahathir 
had also been described as a ‘Presidential Premier’.4 Further, Leifer observed that 
Mahathir had “bent the politics of Malaysia to his will’ and “effectively rewrote the rules 
of Malaysian politics”.5 Similarly, to encapsulate the centrality of Mahathir, Milne and 
Mauzy proposed that the word ‘under’ in their book title not only refers to the period, but 
actually conveys the very considerable degree of control by Mahathir over the Malaysian 
government.6 They also argued that Mahathir’s “determination to exercise power” was 
“fortified by his belief that he has never been wrong.”7 Mahathir pursued specific 
measures in relation to Malaysia’s administrative and political organs in order to rein in
1 See Abdullah Ahmad, Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia’s Foreign Policy 1963-1970, Kuala Lumpur: 
Berita Publishing, 1985.
2 William Case, ‘Semi-Democracy in Mahathir’s Malaysia’ in Reflections: The Mahathir Years, Bridget 
Welsh (ed.), Washington D.C: SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, 2004, p.79.
3 See Anne Munro-Kua, Authoritarian Populism in Malaysia, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996.
4 In-Won Hwang, ‘Malaysia’s “Presidential Premier”: Explaining Mahathir’s Dominance’ in Reflections, 
p.67.
Michael Leifer, ‘Foreword’ in R.S. Milne R.S. and Diane K. Mauzy, Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir, 
London: Routledge, 1999, p.ix.
6 Milne and Mauzy, Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir, p .l.
7 Milne and Mauzy, Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir, p. 159.
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their power. They included the political party organ -  Barisan Nasional (BN) and 
UMNO; and government structures -  the Cabinet, Parliament, the Judiciary and even the 
Constitution.
Milne and Mauzy observe that given the circumstances, the Barisan Nasional 
(National Front) coalition which comprised UMNO, MCA and MIC parties was bound 
to win Malaysian General Elections and the only valid question to ask concerned the 
extent of their win.8 They allude to government’s manipulation of the electoral system9 
and the effective control of the media by the government and the ruling party. UMNO 
has always been the most important power base in Malaysian politics. The ruling 
coalition, the Barisan Nasional, was dominated by UMNO, which occupies “the position 
of first among equals” and “calls the shots”.10 In addition, Malaysia’s prime minister has 
always been the UMNO president. Therefore, the position of the UMNO president is 
crucial because it relates directly to the position of the prime minister, which makes 
UMNO the centre for factional rivalries and infighting.11 Throughout his period, 
Mahathir strengthened the power of the incumbent UMNO president. The challenge by 
Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah in 1987, which Mahathir won by only 51 percent of the votes 
made Mahathir realise the importance of asserting his control within UMNO. He then 
embarked on measures to reorganise the party centring on his personality.12 The 
opportunity arose when the High Court ruled that UMNO should be deregistered under 
the Societies Act in February 1988 after finding that some of its branches were illegal.
8 Milne and Mauzy, Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir, p.181.
9 Milne and Mauzy, Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir, p.2.
10 Maznah Mohamad, ‘Mahathir’s Malay Question’ in Reflections, p. 163.
11 Ho Khai Leong, ‘The Political and Administrative Frames: Challenges and Reforms under the Mahathir 
Administration’ in Mahathir’s Administration: Performance and Crisis in Governance, Ho Khai Leong and 
James Chin (eds.), Singapore and Kuala Lumpur: Times Books, 2001, p. 16.
12 John Hilley, Malaysia: Mahathirism, Hegemony and the New Opposition, London: Zed Books, 2001,
p.88.
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The forced dissolution of UMNO led. to the creation of the ‘New UMNO’ (UMNO Baru). 
What Mahathir did in the year after the dissolution of UMNO was to “rebuild a ruling 
party around his dominant personality” and in the process, ruthlessly and effectively 
drive out his political rivals from UMNO Baru.13
Therefore, the manner in which Mahathir handled his challengers in the party 
and the Cabinet portrays a combination of pragmatism, tactical moves and downright 
Machiavellian ruthlessness, when necessary. Many in his Cabinet believed that he knew 
almost everything about his ministers, but had no qualms using them for specific 
purposes to achieve his goals. He expected loyalty above all else, but would use what he 
knew to demand it when he had to. He practised what some of his Cabinet colleagues 
described as “compartmentalised” way of viewing and relating to people and issues.14 He 
had no problem working with someone whom he had a disagreement with previously, on 
another separate issue if they agreed on it.
Mahathir’s period also saw the ascendancy of Malay businessmen-politicians 
who became extremely powerful within UMNO. This new bumiputera corporate group 
were beneficiaries of Mahathir’s drive to fulfil the NEP goals by dispersing government 
contracts through a system of party patronage, usually done through privatisation.15 The 
system of government -  party -  business became so fused that ultimately UMNO itself 
became directly involved by owning some of the biggest Malaysian companies through 
its proxies, for example Halim Saad of Hatibudi Holdings, Yahya Ahmad of DRB 
HICOM and Wan Azmi Wan Hamzah of Land and General. The involvement of UMNO
13 In-Won Hwang, Personalized Politics: The Malaysian State under Mahathir, Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2003, p.164. See also In-Won Hwang, ‘Malaysia’s ‘Presidential Premier’: 
Explaining Mahathir’s Dominance’ in Reflections, p.71.
14 Non-attributable interviews with a few Cabinet Ministers.
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in business was only privy to a few people at the top of the party structure and UMNO’s 
proxies. It was said to be probable that 99 percent of its members had no knowledge of 
the arrangement.16 Recognising Mahathir’s crucial role in this process, Lee observed 
that, “the mode of governance of the Mahathir era has impacted on the inclination and 
implementation of a broader Malaysian development project. The agenda of capitalist 
development and wealth accumulation has become the norm, one that is centralised in the 
ruling party and that has increasingly been centred on one person.”17 The involvement of 
UMNO in business and the system of reward and patronage that it afforded under direct 
supervision of the party president cum prime minister also provided a means for the 
control and marginalisation of political rivals.18
Linked to the ‘iron grip’ that Mahathir exercised on Barisan Nasional (BN) 
and UMNO was his effective control of the Cabinet. The composition of the Cabinet was 
the prerogative of the prime minister, although certain factors were always taken into 
consideration, for example fair representations of BN composite parties, states and 
gender. The Ministry of Finance (the Treasury) and MITI were seen as highly influential 
in terms of their ability for patronage. Similarly, many dreaded being given dead-end 
posts with little ability to provide patronage, and perceived it as a sign of Mahathir’s 
unfavourable impressions of them. Thus, Ho claimed that the Cabinet became a mere 
‘rubber stamp’ rather than a real forum to legitimise government policies, and that any 
meaningful bargaining actually took place behind closed doors.19
15 See Edmund Terence Gomez and K.S. Jomo, Malaysia’s Political Economy: Politics Patronage and 
Profits, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
16 Milne and Mauzy, Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir, p.59.
17 Lee Hwok Aun, ‘The NEP, Vision 2020, and Dr Mahathir: Continuing Dilemmas’ in Reflections, pp. 
278-9. See also Edmund Terence Gomez and K.S. Jomo, Malaysia’s Political Economy: Politics 
Patronage and Profits, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp.25-6.
18 Hwang, Personalized Politics, p.222.
19 Ho, ‘ The Political and Administrative Frames . . . ’ in Mahathir’s Administration, p. 12.
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Similarly, Mahathir and his government absolutely controlled the parliament 
and the legislative process. Mahathir had managed to mould a parliament which was 
more “deferential to executive privileges”, and the prime minister’s supremacy in the 
parliament was “without question.”20 This was achieved through the effective control by 
Mahathir of UMNO and BN, guaranteeing party discipline, and assisted by the two-third 
majority that the BN never failed to achieve in every election.
Mahathir’s centralisation of power into the hands of the executive was also 
achieved through curtailment of the bureaucracy’s autonomy. Indeed, the bureaucracy 
was whipped into discipline and towed the government’s line. Mahathir took a personal 
interest in the appointments of senior civil servants and, as in the appointment of Cabinet 
ministers, would favour those who understood his mission.21
Mahathir’s attacks on the judiciary represent the clearest example of how he 
reined in the government structure. It started with the suspension in May 1988 and 
eventual removal in August of the Lord President Tun Salleh Abbas because of his
77alleged bias towards the ‘UMNO Eleven’ (Razaleigh’s group), and the following 
suspension of five High Court judges who showed support for the Lord President. 
Mahathir further clipped the authority of the judiciary by introducing a constitutional 
amendment to provide a broader ground for removing judges.24 In another move, the 
Mahathir government amended the Internal Security Act (ISA), on 26 June 1989, by 
making the executive decision of detention without trial final without any judicial or legal 
recourse. This removal of judicial review gave the prime minister exceptional power
20 Ho, ‘The Political and Administrative Frames . . . ’ in Mahathir's Administration p.13.
21 Conversations in confidence with some senior civil servants in Kuala Lumpur, July 2007.
22 John Hilley, Malaysia: Mahathirism, Hegemony and the New Opposition, p.89 and In-Won Hwang, 
Personalized Politics, p. 165.
23 Ho, ‘The Political and Administrative Frames . . . ’ in Mahathir’s Administration, pp. 13-4.
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with almost no safeguard.25 Malaysia’s judicial process also came under great scrutiny 
and criticisms during the trial of Anwar Ibrahim following his sacking and arrest for 
corruption in 1998. No other prime minister had mounted such a challenge and eventual 
control over the Judiciary. This might be because all of the previous prime ministers had 
legal backgrounds and had been members of the bureaucracy. This had possibly made 
them more respectful and understanding of the checks and balances provided by the 
bureaucracy and the judiciary.26 Milne and Mauzy argue that, “By far, the most far- 
reaching and devastating attack by Mahathir on the checks and balances system in 
Malaysia was his destruction of the independence judiciary in 1987-8.”27
Mahathir’s government also undertook an unprecedented attack on the 
monarchy. This again illustrates his unfavourable views on the feudalistic Malay society, 
especially the special position of Malay royals. During Mahathir’s period, unprecedented 
tension arose between the executive and the monarchy. The first crisis erupted in 1983 
when Mahathir initiated changes in 22 clauses in a constitutional amendment bill. 
Mahathir asserted the changes were only administrative. However, the rulers at their 
annual conference had unanimously decided not to sign. Mahathir compromised and a 
large part of the original constitution was retained.28 However, in May 1994, his 
government proceeded to finish the job and amended the constitution, making the royal 
assent no longer necessary to complete the legislative process.29
24 Hwang, Personalized Politics, p.241.
25 Hwang, Personalized Politics, p.242.
26 Ho, ‘The Political and Administrative Frames . . . ’ in Mahathir’s Administration, pp. 13-4.
27 Milne and Mauzy, Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir, p.46.
28 Ho, ‘The Political and Administrative Frames . . . ’ in Mahathir's Administration, pp. 15-6.
29 Hwang, Personalized Politics, pp.240-1\
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4.2. THE PUBLIC SPHERE - CONTROL OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE 
THROUGH THE MEDIA
Under Mahathir, the centralisation of power into the hands of the prime minister was 
accompanied by the control of mainstream media. His government had been criticised 
for controlling the press through ‘overt’ and ‘covert’ ways, resulting with the newspaper 
becoming “subservient to state authority and servile towards governmental power.”30 
This was achieved firstly, through direct ownership. Since December 1963, the 
government had owned the main television and radio networks through the Department 
of Broadcasting (Radio Televisyen Malaysia - RTM). They operated under the purview 
of the Ministry of Information whose minister had always been an UMNO stalwart. 
“What is apparent is that television -  and more generally, broadcasting -  in Malaysia was 
from its inception closely aligned to the government.”31 In addition, BN component 
parties, through their business arms had established a monopoly over the major daily 
newspapers. The political ownership of Malaysian media is a long established 
phenomenon.32 In fact, media ownership had become a field for contest between 
Mahathir and his deputy Anwar Ibrahim through UMNO’s holding company, Fleet 
Group and later UMNO linked companies, Realmild and Malaysian Resources 
Corporation Berhad (MRCB).33 Similarly, the MCA also had ownership of major 
English and Chinese newspapers and the MIC, Tamil newspapers.34 In fact, at the end of 
Mahathir’s premiership in 2003, all the major print and electronic media were under the
30 Chandra MuzafFar, Freedom In Fetters, Penang: ALIRAN, June 1986, p.44.
31 Zaharom Nain & Mustafa K Anuar, ‘Ownership and Control o f the Malaysian Media’, p.l 1. Text 
available on www.wacc.org.uk.
32 Edmund Terence Gomez, ‘Politics of the Media Business: The Press under Mahathir’ in Reflections, 
p.475. See also Said Zahari, Meniti Lautan Gelora, Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications, 2001.
See Gomez, ‘Politics o f the Media Business . . . ’ in Reflections, p.476.
34 See Gomez, ‘Politics of the Media Business . . . ’ in Reflections, pp.480-1.
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control of politically linked companies or BN connected businessmen. Utusan Melayu 
was under the direct control of UMNO. The New Straits Times Press (NSTP) and Sistem 
Televisyen Malaysia Berhad (TV3) were majority-owned by Realmild / MRCB with 
strong links to UMNO. Star Publications and Nanyang Press were under direct control of 
MCA’s Huaren Holdings. Sarawak businessman and BN stalwart Tiong Hiew King 
owned Sin Chiew Jit Poh. Another Sarawak businessman and UMNO cabinet minister 
owned NTV7, a private television broadcaster. Ananda Krishnan, a close ally of 
Mahathir owned Astro, a Malaysian satellite broadcaster, which operated Bloomberg 
Malaysia. In addition, the major Tamil newspapers remained under direct and indirect 
control of MIC.
It would appear that control of the media was also achieved through ‘coercive 
legislation’. For example, Muzaffar has alleged that the Printing and Publication Bill, 
when presented in 1984, was “in some respects far more restrictive and retrogressive than 
the Printing Presses Ordinance promulgated in 1948 by a colonial regime pursuing its 
own imperial interests” and added that it “removed the minor safeguards that now exist in 
checking the exercise of executive authority.”35 These so-called ‘coercive’ legislations 
included the Sedition Act (amended 1971) and the Official Secrets Act (OSA -  amended 
in 1986), which had been argued to have encouraged a climate of ‘self-censorship’ 
among journalists.36 Although the ownership of the media by political parties existed 
since before Mahathir’s time as prime minister, it was observed that the quality of 
journalism, especially investigative journalism of the major papers were commendable in 
the period between the 1960s to mid-1980s. After that, as has been argued elsewhere,
35 Chandra, Freedom In Fetters, pp. 1 -2.
36 Munro-Kua, Authoritarian Populism in Malaysia, p.121.
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they deteriorated to take the form of “govemment-say-so journalism.”37 An illustration of 
the government’s stem action to curb ‘irresponsible’ journalism was its move in 1988 to 
amend the Printing Presses and Publication Act, with a view to disallow judicial review 
of Home Affairs Ministry’s decisions to revoke or suspend a publishing permit. This 
followed ‘Operasi Lalang’ and the banning of two daily newspapers and a Malay 
magazine in October 1987.38 Further, in late 1991, the government ruled that the 
publishing permit for opposition parties’ newspapers did not grant them the right to 
distribute their newspapers to people outside their parties’ memberships. This was 
targeted towards DAP’s The Rocket and PAS’ Harakah.39 Consistently, the government 
had argued that it did not control the press, but was only making sure that the press did 
not exploit communal interests.40
The triumph of BN against Razaleigh-led Barisan Altematif in the 1990 
General Election was attributed to the government’s effective manipulation of the 
media.41 Throughout Mahathir’s era, the media played a vital role in asserting 
Mahathir’s populist image. “In the process of cultivating Dr Mahathir’s ‘charismatic 
populism’, the media has consumed unprecedented importance as a direct form of 
mediation between the executive and the rakyat.”42
37 Gomez, ‘Politics o f the Media Business...’ in Reflections, p.483.
38 Hwang, Personalized Politics, pp.241-2.
39 Hwang, Personalized Politics, pp.241-2.
40 Chandra, Freedom In Fetters, p.50.
41 See Hwang, Personalized Politics.
42 The term ‘rakyat ’ means the people. Munro-Kua, Authoritarian Populism in Malaysia, p. 123.
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4.3. MALAYSIA’S DOMESTIC POLICIES UNDER MAHATHIR
It has therefore been established that the centralisation of the power in the executive 
under Mahathir was unprecedented. Although Mahathir had already inherited a fairly 
centralised form of government when he came into power, he took further measures to 
enhance it. He also controlled public discourse and dissemination of information through 
effective control of all mainstream electronic and print media.
Undoubtedly, Mahathir took all these measures in order to assert a strong 
leadership to enable him to effectively push his agenda for the nation. The goal of 
achieving growth with equity as spelled out in the NEP, and later the NDP (New 
Development Policy) was the cornerstone of Malaysian domestic policies during the 
Mahathir era. In addition, Mahathir introduced a heavy industry component in the 
national development agenda and started a drive to make Malaysia a newly industrialised 
country (NIC). Thus, as Hilley put it, “under Mahathir, the imperatives of ethnic 
redistribution were to be linked more specifically to a drive for NIC status.”43 In 
addition, Mahathir also initiated a national blueprint for economic and social 
development in the form of Vision 2020. It is in the context of these policies that we can 
observe recognition motives rooted in Mahathir’s preoccupation with the fate of the 
Malays. These are consistent with Mahathir’s belief system explicated in the previous 
chapter.
43 Hilley, Malaysia: Mahathirism..., p.51.
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4.3.1. NEP / NDP and the Drive for NIC Status
Since the Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975), the creation of a bumiputera Commercial 
and Industrial Community (BCIC) had been an important long term objective as part of 
the NEP strategy to achieve a more equal distribution of wealth among ethnic groups.44 
The NEP which ended in 1990 was replaced by the NDP in 1991. As a continuation of 
the NEP, it laid the foundation for the Malaysian economy for the next 20 years. Instead 
of setting a specific target for bumiputera equity ownership, the NDP emphasised growth 
creation and privatisation with the view of reducing the role of the public sector.45 The 
period of economic recovery that helped to ease tension between ethnic groups coincided 
with the announcement of the NDP, making it easily accepted without much controversy.
Privatisation became an important aspect of the government’s economic 
strategy under the NDP. It was used to assist a number of successful bumiputeras to 
move directly to big business.46 “At the end of 1996, it was estimated that the 
government had privatised 360 projects. Of these, 204 were implemented during the 
Sixth Malaysia Plan period (1991-95). It has been reported that savings in capital and 
annual operating expenditures arising from this exercise totalled RM72.8 billion and 
RM6.9 billion respectively. Proceeds from the sale of equity amounted to RM21.5 
billion 47 The Economic Planning Unit (EPU) under the Prime Minister’s Department 
and the Finance Ministry were tasked to oversee privatisation programmes, putting them
44 Lee Hwok Aun, ‘The NEP, Vision 2020, and Dr. Mahathir: Continuing Dilemmas’ in Reflections, p.275.
45 Hwang, Personalized Politics, p.246.
46 Mahathir Mohamad, The Way Forward, London: Weidenfield & Nicolson,1998, p.26.
47 Hng Hung Yong, CEO Malaysia: Strategy In Nation Building, Subang Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 
1998, pp.32-3.
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under direct control of Mahathir and his close ally Finance Minister Daim Zainuddin 48 
The sell-off plan under privatisation provided the opportunity to rapidly increase the 
bumiputera share of corporate ownership 49 Through privatisation, Mahathir and Daim 
also basically created a kind of UMNO-proxy corporate control by disbursement of state 
resources to these UMNO or government linked companies. Privatisation was therefore 
also a means for Mahathir to assert a challenge to ‘old money and traditional elites’ that 
Mahathir so despised, and to assert in their place ‘the new stature of a Malay business 
class’.50 Mahathir created an UMNO patronage, which enmeshed politics and business 
and produced high profile new Malay corporate figures like Halim Saad of Hatibudi- 
Renong, Tajudin Ramli of Technology Resources Industries (TRI), Wan Azmi Wan 
Hamzah of Land and General, and Daim Zainuddin himself, to name a few. In the true 
spirit of the coalition ‘bargain’, MCA and MIC and their respective corporate 
functionaries were also given their shares under privatisation and played their roles 
according to NEP/NDP objectives.51
The close connection between the government and the corporate sector was 
encapsulated in Mahathir’s philosophy of Malaysia Incorporated - Malaysia Inc. Based 
on Japan Inc., it presupposed that the efficacy in relations between the state and 
corporations would enhance national competitiveness.52 Due to the fact that the private 
sector was regarded by Mahathir to be vital to the nation’s competitiveness, he was also 
of the view that the government must do all it could to support the private sector with the
48 Milne and Mauzy, Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir, pp.51-3, and Hilley, Malaysia: Mahathirism ...,, 
pp.59-60.
49 Hng, CEO Malaysia, p.33.
50 Hilley, Malaysia: Mahathirism..., pp.59-60.
51 Hilley, Malaysia: Mahathirism..., pp.97-8.
52 Hng, CEO Malaysia, p.32.
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aim of increasing the level of economic activities. This was supposed to lead to the 
creation of wealth and the further expansion of the economy, which in turn would enlarge 
the national coffer.53 With Malaysia Inc. providing the intellectual philosophy, 
Mahathir’s government became a strong and active supporter of the Malaysian private 
sector, especially big business -  many with direct links or proxies of the ruling UMNO 
and its coalition alliances. The business-friendly government held numerous dialogues 
and consultations with the private sector and Mahathir himself was not ashamed to admit 
that he was ‘pro-business’.54 In this regard, Mahathir’s support had always been 
predominantly in the business and entrepreneurial community.55
In the drive towards NIC status, Mahathir initiated Malaysia’s heavy industry 
policy, launched in 1980 when he was still at MITI. Under the Industrial Master Plan, 
the Heavy Industry Corporation (HICOM Holdings) was set up to plan, identify, initiate, 
invest and manage heavy industry projects.56 HICOM was transferred to the Prime 
Minister Department upon Mahathir’s appointment to the premiership. It thus came 
under the direct purview of the prime minister. Under this programme some high profile 
projects were launched, most notably two steel mills -  PERWAJA in Kedah and 
Trengganu, and the national car project, PROTON. Allegedly, these projects were 
undertaken without proper Cabinet consultation (which was one o f the major grouses of 
Team B led by Razaleigh in 1987 UMNO crisis).57 One of the important rationales for 
the projects was that they would lead to high technology transfer from their foreign
53 Hng, CEO Malaysia, p.31.
54 Hng, CEO Malaysia, p.31.
55 Zainuddin Maidin, The Other Side o f  Mahathir, Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications, 1994, p.229.
56 Milne and Mauzy, Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir, p.64; and Aziz Zariza Ahmad, Mahathir:
Triumph after Trials, Kuala Lumpur, S.Majid & Co, 1990, p.56.
57 Munro-Kua, Authoritarian Populism in Malaysia, p .l 15; and Milne and Mauzy, Malaysian Politics 
Under Mahathir, p.42.
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partners (mostly Japanese). Moreover, “such activities were an expression of nationalism 
and would show that Malays could advance beyond the economic limits portrayed in the 
early Malaysia Plans.”58 In an interview with the author, Mahathir asserted the 
importance of PROTON’S success for Malaysian national pride.59 It remains unclear to 
what extent Malaysians really identified such projects as symbols of progress and were 
sources of national pride. Nevertheless, Mahathir seemed to assume that ‘group pride’ 
was felt by the people when they saw some of their own kind becoming millionaires, as 
he frequently highlighted in successive UMNO General Assemblies.60 In addition, 
projects like PROTON were identified as ‘national’ projects. By deliberately increasing 
the stakes to the national level in this way, the project could not be allowed to fail.61
The Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) was another of ‘Mahathir’s projects’ 
and he personally participated in its development. Mahathir himself oversaw the 
activities of the Multimedia Development Corporation (MDC), which was established to 
manage and market the MSC.62 The project was basically an attempt to create a replica 
of the Silicon Valley in California, by allotting a 15-by-50km corridor from the heart of 
Kuala Lumpur City Centre (KLCC) to the south, until the Kuala Lumpur International 
Airport (KLIA), containing in it a purpose built city Cybeijaya. According to Mahathir, 
through the MSC the Malaysian government offered “a region with the infrastructure, 
laws, policies and practices that will enable companies to explore the Information Age 
without the usual constraints which frustrate them.”63 The MSC was identified as
58 Milne and Mauzy, Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir, p.64.
59 Author interview with Mahathir Mohamad, 16 January 2007, London.
60 Munro-Kua, Authoritarian Populism in Malaysia, p.l 15.
61 Milne R.S. and Mauzy, Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir, p. 175.
62 Hng, CEO Malaysia, p.206.
63 Hng, CEO Malaysia, p.204.
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another ‘national project’64 and in April 1997, Mahathir took part in a nation-wide 
teleconferencing dialogue, linking him with about 13,000 Malaysians in 28 locations 
across the national territories. The high profile media event which was telecast live was 
aimed to illustrate to and impress upon the wider Malaysian public, especially those who 
live far away from the MSC, multimedia technologies and the government’s aspirations 
relating to these technologies. Bunnell highlighted salient recognition motives behind the 
MSC in that the push to embrace high technology during the Mahathir years “was a result 
not only of a post-colonial wariness of “neo-colonial” technological domination but also 
of intensifying regional economic competition.”65
Economic growth, wealth and high technology all contributed towards 
recognition symbols in Mahathir’s Malaysia. Impressive high tech edifices were 
constructed and became physical symbols around which national pride was being rallied. 
Mahathir was a ‘builder’, more than any of his predecessors. His projects were designed 
not just to be functional, but “to impress or even embody some aesthetic aspirations.”66 
These include the North-South Expressway, Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA), 
Putrajaya, the MSC, Kuala Lumpur Tower and the Penang Bridge. The Kuala Lumpur 
City Centre (KLCC) known for its twin towers and the imposing new administrative 
capital Putrajaya, might have served certain practical needs, but were definitely built to 
impress primarily. Clearly, prestige was an important motivation for the transformation 
of the Malaysian landscape. It was obvious that Mahathir aspired for Malaysia to 
physically transform in ways befitting its economic achievements and industrial
64 Tim Bunnell, ‘Re-Viewing MSC: Critical Geographies o f Mahathir’s High-Tech Push’ in Reflections, 
p.411.
65 Bunnell, ‘Re-Viewing M SC ...’ in Reflections, p.407.
66 Milne and Mauzy, Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir, p.67.
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ambitions, and for Kuala Lumpur to be at par with any other great cities in the world.67 
More importantly, the impressive landscape of Malaysia proved the effectiveness of 
NEP/NDP strategies in transforming the Malay character.
Symbols were important in Mahathir’s Malaysia. Similar to the statement he 
made by being the only non-royal Malay who owned a big car in sleepy Alor Setar town 
in the early 1960s, Mahathir personally oversaw mega-projects that drastically changed 
Malaysia’s landscape. The Penang bridge, Kuala Lumpur International Airport, 
Putrajaya, Cybeijaya, North South Expressway, the MSC and the myriad of gleaming 
glass and steel towers epitomised by the once tallest in the world - Petronas twin towers 
that radically transformed Kuala Lumpur’s skyline were not only designed to be 
functional, but also to impress. Clearly, Mahathir felt that there was a need to create an 
impression of modem, dynamic Malaysia that thrived on its economic success and 
modem technology. Thus, the ‘old’ Malay character, which shunned non-religious 
knowledge, wealth and worldly accomplishments had been revolutionised. The success 
symbols were therefore important to gamer recognition for the capabilities of the ‘new’ 
Malays. This would bring prestige and esteem and embolden their newly found self- 
confidence further.
There was, undeniably an underlying competitive streak with Singapore, 
though underplayed but one that remained quite influential. Jeshurun highlights this 
possibility of Mahathir being provoked by the modernisation of Singapore, in the 
formation of Mahathir’s “nationalistic vision” to transform the cityscape of Kuala 
Lumpur.68 This is understandable considering the significance of Singapore and its 
Chinese identity in Mahathir’s perception. Here, it is important to remember the impact
67 Chandran Jeshurun, ‘ Kuala Lumpur: The City that Mahathir Built’ in Reflections, p.393.
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of Singapore in the formation of Mahathir’s belief system, especially in his conception of 
what should be the just social arrangement between the Malays and the Chinese. 
Mahathir’s preconceived notion of fair relations between the two ethnic groups was 
especially challenged during his stay in Singapore as a student. It is arguable that 
Singapore presented the significant ‘other’ along with the ‘West’ in Mahathir’s 
perception, which influenced the process of Malaysia’s national identity building.69 
However, a more precise interpretation can possibly be in terms of Mahathir searching 
for recognition of Malaysia’s achievements from the predominantly Chinese Singaporean 
leaders. To Mahathir, Malaysia’s achievements proved the success of rehabilitating the 
Malays, achieved through special privileges for the Malays as enshrined in the Malaysian 
Constitution, which was the focal point of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew tirades and 
invectives against Malay leaders.
Indeed, the imposing physical landscape came to symbolise the confident 
identity of the nation. The predominant Malay identity undeniably became the base upon 
which this new national identity was being constructed.70 The twin towers, which once 
were the tallest buildings in the world, could be seen as the epitome of record-breaking 
feats that became an obsession amongst Malaysians during Mahathir’s period. This new 
national confidence and ‘can do spirit’ of the people were widely expressed in the slogan 
1 Malaysia BolehV (‘Malaysia can’) which was prodded by the government through 
media publicity. Amongst the celebrated record breakers were Azhar Mansor, the first
68 Jeshurun, ‘Kuala Lum pur...’ in Reflections, pp.391-2.
69 For a discussion o f ‘other-ing’ process in national identity formation, see Alexander Wendt, Social 
Theory o f  International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. See also Benedict 
Anderson, Imagined Communities, London, New York: Verso, 1983, 1991 (revised).
70 Hng argues that the pursuit for the recognition of the Malay identity as the foundation for the 
Malaya/Malaysian national identity had began even before the political independence of Malaya, 
predominantly through UMNO under the leadership on Onn Ja’afar. See Hng Hung.Yong, 5 Men & 5 
Ideas, Subang Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 2004, p .148.
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Malaysian to sail solo around the world in 1999 and Abdul Malek Maidin, the first 
Malaysian to swim non-stop across the English Channel in 2003. The record breaking 
frenzy spurred by the ‘Malaysia Boleh’ spirit led to some bizarre feats and ‘some rather 
peculiar forms of hubris’.71 Whether truly remarkable or simply outlandish, these 
‘Malaysia Boleh’ feats were expressions of not only the nation’s newly acquired 
confidence but also of national pride. “Economic indicators alone would not have 
captured the pride that Malaysians had discovered, perhaps for the first time, in being 
Malaysian”.72
Mahathir believed that the inculcation of a ‘can do’ attitude had brought about 
a successful change in the bumiputera culture to one which exuded self-confidence.73 
Mahathir, blaming the colonial rule for the low self confidence of the bumiputeras in 
their own abilities, felt that there was a need to introduce bumiputera role models to 
provide an image of success amongst the bumiputeras. To Mahathir, “nothing would be 
more persuasive than seeing other bumiputeras succeeding in life.” The success of these 
role models became pivotal to the progress of the bumiputeras because they “helped 
convince them that cultural change was possible and by implication that the NEP could 
be a success.”74
71 Jeshurun, ‘ Kuala Lumpur ... ’ in Reflections p.393.
72 Hilley, Malaysia: Mahathir ism..., p.65.
73 Author interview with Mahathir Mohamad, London, 16 January 2007. See also Mahathir, The Way 
Forward, p. 122.
74 Mahathir, The Way Forward, p. 122.
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4.3.2. Vision 2020
The drive to achieve the NIC status was enshrined in Vision 2020, announced 
by Mahathir in February 1991. Mahathir considered his greatest achievement as prime 
minister was his ability to focus the entire nation on the future through Vision 2020. On 
this, he wrote:
“My government and I created a long-term vision in which everyone knew his role and which 
mobilised everyone, from the man on the street to top leaders in business and politics, to work 
harder, for their country and for themselves. The actual results achieved gradually fostered a 
sense of self-confidence and belief in the future .. .”75
Vision 2020 set out a series of policy measures for growth and social development to be 
attained through the NDP, specifically the Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-1995) and its 
broader blueprint, the Second Outline Perspective Plan (OPP2) (1991-2000), with the aim 
of Malaysia attaining developed nation status by 2020. It set a target of 7 percent annual 
growth in real terms during the OPP2 period.76 Economics might be the foundation of 
Vision 2020, but what counted more were the social outcomes.77 More importantly, 
beyond the economic growth target, the Vision encapsulated social objectives defined in 
the context of nine challenges that the nation had to counter in order to become a 
developed nation ‘of its own mould’ by 2020.
The Vision was effectively a nation-building project on an unprecedented 
scale, covering the nation’s economic, social and cultural imperatives. As a hegemonic 
discourse, it “sought to galvanise the public imagination through ideas of shared 
prosperity.”78 As an ideological blueprint, it was meant to “seize the imagination and
75 Mahathir Mohamad, A New Deal fo r  Asia, Subang Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1999. p.23.
76 Hilley, Malaysia: Mahathirism..., p.5.
77 Hng, CEO Malaysia, p.47.
78 Hilley, Malaysia: Mahathirism, p.4.
138
inspire” Malaysians.79 Looking at the listed challenges, undoubtedly the Vision was an 
articulation of the Malaysian national identity as defined and aspired by Mahathir.80 In 
this regard, the projection of the national identity was concerned primarily with the place 
and status of the nation. Firstly, it explains that Malaysians faced the challenge of 
establishing “a united Malaysian nation, with a sense of common and shared destiny.”81 
Other listed challenges in Vision 2020 expose Mahathir’s recognition struggle for the 
nation. The second challenge listed in Vision 2020 was the challenge to develop a 
Malaysian society that would be “psychologically liberated” with “faith and confidence 
in itself’ and “justifiably proud” of what it was.82 Further, it contended that “the 
Malaysian society must be distinguished by the pursuit of excellence, fully aware of its 
potentials, psychologically subservient to none and respected by the peoples of other 
nations.”83
The challenges listed in Vision 2020 touched on all the issues regularly raised 
by Mahathir since The Malay Dilemma. They were problems relating to Malay values 
and character -  low self confidence, religion, education, scientific knowledge, inter­
ethnic relations and democracy. Therefore, Malay concerns remained the key. Although 
the Vision talked about the challenge to forge a united Malaysian society, it was to be 
achieved by taking into account the needs and constraints of the Malays. Hence, while 
aspiring for a united Malaysian nation (that would be confident, justifiably proud in itself 
and gamer world respect), it also highlighted challenges in fostering a “mature,
79 Milne and Mauzy, Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir, p. 165, and Liow, ‘Personality, Exigencies and 
Contingencies . . . ’ in Mahathir's Administration, p. 149.
80 The full document o f Vision 2020 is attached as Appendix 2. Full version of Vision 2020 is also 
included in Mahathir, A New Deal fo r  Asia, pp.41-2.
81 See Appendix 2, Vision 2020.
82 See Appendix 2, Vision 2020.
83 See Appendix 2, Vision 2020.
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consensual, community-oriented Malaysian democracy that would be a model for many 
developing countries.”84
4.3.3. ‘Islamisation’
The threat of fundamentalist Islam and political rivalry from PAS, which was energised 
by the global Islamic revivalism in the 1970s, became a permanent feature of Malaysian 
politics during Mahathir’s reign as prime minister.85 The conflation of Islamic and Malay 
identity had been deployed effectively by Mahathir in the drive to achieve NEP/NDP 
objectives and the NIC status. Mahathir not only emphasised the compatibility of Islam 
with business and progress, but also stressed the obligation of Muslims to strive for 
worldly success by referring to the past glory of Islamic civilisation. This will be 
discussed further in Chapter Six in the analysis of the underpinning recognition motives 
of Mahathir’s foreign policy towards the Islamic ummah. Here, it is relevant to show 
how Mahathir deployed Islam, in terms of specific strategies in the context of his 
management of the Malaysian state.
Mahathir’s resolve to uplift the economic and social status of the Muslims, 
particularly the Malays was apparent when he personally initiated the establishment of 
the International Islamic University in Kuala Lumpur as soon as he assumed prime-
• • RAministership in 1981. It was only the beginning. He then went on to set up an array of 
Islamic agencies, especially to counter the reservations traditionally felt by Malay
84 See Appendix 2, Vision 2020.
85 See J. Funston, Malay Politics in Malaysia ( A Study o f  UMNO and PAS), Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann 
Educational Books, 1980, especially pp.75 -  96. See also, Kamarulnizam Abdullah, The Politics o f  Islam in 
Contemporary Malaysia, Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2002.
140
Muslims towards business and conventional banking for example the Islamic Bank the 
Islamic insurance company, Takaful.87 Perhaps the most significant of all was the 
Institute of Islamic Understanding (IKIM), set up in 1991. It became “[t]he government 
institution for promoting an understanding of Islam that is defined by the Mahathir 
administration.”88 Towards this end, it convened conferences on the topics of Islam and 
progress, business, management and finance, among others. It also produced 
publications, maintained columns in mainstream newspapers and had a radio station. 
IKIM’s personalities became regulars in the electronic media to talk about related
89issues.
In the civil service, Mahathir made use of Islam to transform its culture. 
Increasing Islamisation of the civil service was apparent in many forms, for example the 
reciting of *doa’ or Islamic prayers and banning of alcoholic drinks at government 
functions. Interestingly, the assimilation of Islamic values in the civil service was carried 
out along with the adoption of Japanese management philosophy and work culture since 
the launch of the Look East Policy in the early 1980s. Thus, ‘doa’ was recited at 
Japanese style assemblies, when they would be singing their corporate song in their 
corporate uniforms. Thus, Islamic values were also referred to as positive and universal 
values, to show their cross cultural adaptability and commonalities. The core values 
stressed to be part of the work culture were purity, integrity, accountability, dedication, 
honesty, discipline, co-operation, moderation, responsibility, willingness to sacrifice,
86 For the background of Mahathir’s role in the setting up of the International Islamic University, Malaysia, 
see Ismail Ibrahim, Pemikiran Dr.MahathirTentang Islam, Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications, 2002, p. 13.
87 Aziz Zariza Ahmad, Mahathir's Paradigm Shift: The Man behind the Vision, Taiping: Firma, 1997, p.67.
88 Patricia Martinez, ‘Mahathir, Islam, and the New Malay Dilemma’ in Mahathir Administration, p.234-5.
89 Jeshurun observed that IKIM had been crucial in “stage-manage” conferences to promote Mahathir’s 
positions. See Chandran Jeshurun, Malaysia: Fifty Years o f  Diplomacy, 1957-2007, Kuala Lumpur The 
Other Press, p.311.
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courteousness, patience, gratitude and timeliness.90 IKIM, together with the National 
Institute of Public Administration (INTAN) played key roles in providing the relevant 
training and knowledge by organising conferences and publishing relevant materials.91
Thus far, we have established the centrality of Mahathir in the Malaysian state 
achieved through measures he undertook vis-a-vis the political parties - UMNO and BN, 
the Cabinet, the civil service, the judiciary, the monarchy and the media. The 
centralisation of power in the executive under Mahathir was a clear indication of his 
personality and ‘iron-grip’ style of leadership. Moreover, it enabled Mahathir to push 
through policies without much opposition and assure support, compliance and 
deliverance from related organs and agencies. In other words, to Mahathir the 
centralisation of authority in the executive was vital for him to ensure that his vision 
would be translated into reality. Clearly, the personalised nature of Malaysian politics 
makes the study of the man at its centre imperative in trying to understand the policies of 
the Malaysian government.
Surely even Mahathir was subjected to certain structural constraints operating 
within the country’s regime, but he managed in the 23 years that he was in power to alter 
and mould the party and government structures to support rather than balance his 
executive role. However, the moves that so blatantly portrayed his ‘authoritarian’ 
leadership style were only means to a very specific end. Mahathir came into power with a 
specific mission to transform the Malays - their value system and character, while 
uplifting their economic status. Therefore, the Malay identity had always been at the core
90 Ahmad Sarji Abdul Hamid, The Civil Service o f  Malaysia: Towards Efficiency and Effectiveness, Kuala 
Lumpur: Government of Malaysia, 1996, p.208.
91 Sarji, The Civil Service o f  Malaysia: Towards Efficiency and Effectiveness, p.206. See also Ahmad Sarji 
Abdul Hamid, The Civil Service o f  Malaysia: A Paradigm Shift, Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Nasional,
1994, p.594.
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of his motivation. In the Mahathir era, the transformation of the Malay identity became 
the basis for the creation of a new Malaysian identity.92 Through these transformations, 
he hoped the Malays would be better equipped to compete with the non-Malays in the 
Malaysian economy. Ultimately, he believed that the Malays’ economic success would 
earn them the dignity and respect, not only from other ethnic communities, but also from 
the international community. The NEP and NDP had the goals of creating wealth with 
equity amongst the races and were underpinned by the motivation to elevate the Malays’ 
economic status. This personal mission of Mahathir was consistent with his belief system 
explained in the previous chapter. The fact that policies towards this central objective 
were actually implemented -  for example, the promotion of a ‘can do’ attitude in the 
slogan ‘Malaysia Boleh’ and the inclusion of recognition aspirations like confidence, 
pride and respect in Vision 2020, were clear indications of Mahathir’s solid authority 
over the government.
Recognition then, underpinned the project o f transforming the Malay identity, 
which formed the basis of the national Malaysian identity. According to Hng, “his 
[Mahathir’s] whole political career reflects an unending obsession with questions of 
identity, firstly with that of the Malays as a race, and later that of Malaysia as a nation.”93 
Crucially, the construction of identity also involves the identification of oneself in 
relation to others and outside one’s immediate political constituency. In other words, the 
recognition of this national identity was sought also in the international realm. In this 
context, Hng observes:
“Mahathir differed from his predecessors in that he extended the process o f identity building to the
international level. He took the position that nations, like citizens, do not live in isolation. They
92 “So, to all intents and purposes, the national culture o f the country today is Malay culture.” Hng Hung 
Yong, 5 Men & 5 Ideas: Building National Identity, Subang Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 2004, p.7.
93 Hng, 5 Men & 5 Ideas, p. 135.
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are not neutral players in the global arena. They have goals and aspirations. They identify with 
causes and they take positions. They are part o f a larger community, and they, too, need to know 
their place in it. The role of a nation’s foreign policy, therefore, is to articulate a nation’s 
positioning to reflect its identity.”94
4.4. MAHATHIR AND FOREIGN POLICY
Syed Hamid Albar, one of Malaysia’s foreign ministers during Mahathir’s era, believes 
that Mahathir shaped Malaysia’s foreign policy.95 This view is shared by all senior 
officials of the Wisma Putra interviewed for this thesis. Mahathir himself felt that in 
general, Wisma Putra understood and had carried out his vision and ideas, although he 
conceded that it was not that easy in the beginning.96 He might have been referring to the 
difficult relationship he had with Ghazali Shafie when the latter was foreign minister in 
the early 1980s. Ghazali Shafie, like Mahathir, was himself a contender for the deputy 
prime minister post when Hussein Onn assumed the premiership in 1976. A Wisma 
Putra source reveals that Mahathir almost completely ignored Ghazali and never 
responded to Wisma Putra’s minutes to the prime minister during Ghazali’s time.97 An 
equally bad relationship existed between Mahathir and Rais Yatim (1986 -  1987), who 
lost the job as foreign minister after only nine months because he aligned himself with 
Razaleigh in 1987.98 Other foreign ministers, Tengku Ahmad Rithaudeen (1984 -  1986), 
Abu Hassan Omar (1987 -  1991), Abdullah Badawi (1991 -  1999) and Syed Hamid
94 Hng, 5 Men & 5 Ideas, p. 135.
95 Author interview with Syed Hamid Albar, Minister o f Foreign Affairs (1999 until time of writing), 
London, 16 March 2007.
96 Author interview with Mahathir Mohamad, London, 16 January 2007.
97 Ghazali Shafie was foreign minister until 1984. Non-attributable interview with a senior official of 
Malaysia’s Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, Kuala Lumpur, July 2007.
98 Non-attributable interview with a senior official o f Malaysia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kuala 
Lumpur, July 2007.
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Albar (1999 -  2003) showed deference and were respectful of Mahathir. They all 
managed to establish a more or less harmonious relationship with the prime minister."
Under Mahathir, foreign policy-making had a top-down approach. Although 
Wisma Putra was always expected to come up with drafts for his speeches, officials 
learnt to be prepared to see substantial amendments made by Mahathir in the final texts. 
Ultimately, the bureaucracy understood his ideas and style so well that they consciously 
tailored their drafts to suit him. A senior official confesses that he adopted a different 
style when drafting for the Prime Minister Mahathir, from his normal style used when he 
was writing for his own use.100 Further, many o f Mahathir’s well-known policy 
pronouncements, for example, the Antarctica, the Look East Policy and the East Asia 
Economic Group (EAEG) were announced without prior consultations with Wisma 
Putra.101 His top-down approach reflected his impatient nature. He was sceptical of the 
normal diplomatic channels whereby an idea would be broached firstly at the senior 
officials level, then the ministerial, before being finally raised at the level of heads of 
government. To ensure that his ideas would be addressed in the way that he 
conceptualised them, he himself had to articulate them first. Yet, while Mahathir had a 
knack for generating great ideas, it was the bureaucracy who had to ‘operationalise’ his 
ideas and turn them into reality.102
How did the recognition-motivated national identity building-process in the 
domestic setting translate into a recognition struggle in foreign policy? This thesis argues
99 Non-attributable interview with a senior official o f Malaysia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kuala 
Lumpur, July 2007.
100 Author interview with Hasmy Agam, former Malaysian Permanent Representative to the UN, 12 July 
2007.
101 Author interview with Ahmad Fuzi Abdul Razak, former Secretary General o f Malaysia’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 13 July 2007.
102 Non-attributable interview with a senior official o f Malaysia’s Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, Kuala 
Lumpur, July 2007.
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that Mahathir’s search for recognition underpinned a significant number of foreign policy 
fields, especially those relating to the South countries, the Muslim ummah and the East 
Asian nations. While Mahathir’s agency proved pivotal, he was of course influenced and 
constrained by the international structure in formulating Malaysia’s foreign policy. An 
overview of Malaysian foreign policy under Mahathir will illustrate the interplay 
between the domestic and the international, before we proceed with the specific case 
studies in the following chapters.
4.4.1. The End of the Cold W ar
The end of the Cold War and the end of the Communist threat since the complete 
surrender of the Malaysian Communist Party (MCP) in December 1989 lifted significant 
security constraints on Mahathir. It enabled him to prioritise foreign policy issues more 
according to his own personal convictions and aspirations.103 In the early period of his 
premiership, the continued existence of the MCP left the government wary of the 
Malaysian Chinese community and also of the PRC. It was observed at the time that 
“foreign policies, particularly policies pertaining to defence and security, were largely 
focused on maintaining ties with Western powers in order to buffer Malaysian security 
and augment the Malaysian armed forces’ counterinsurgency capabilities.”104 Mahathir 
had been circumspect with China, particularly with its overseas Chinese policy, which 
was perceived to offer encouragement for Malaysian Chinese to visit the mainland and 
circumvent Malaysia’s strict regulations on visits to China.105
103 Liow, ‘Personality, Exigencies and Contingencies...’ in Mahathir's Administration, p. 150.
104 Liow, ‘Personality, Exigencies and Contingencies...’ in Mahathir's Administration, p. 132.
105 Liow, ‘Personality, Exigencies and Contingencies...’ in Mahathir’s Administration, p.l 32.
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Mahathir also had to consider regional security issues in the context of the 
broader Cold War rivalry. In this regard, Malaysia continued to work within the ASEAN 
framework to tackle the conflict in Indochina, which it perceived not only to prove the 
ambition of communist Vietnam, but also that of the PRC. For Malaysia, the most 
striking result of the end of the Cold War was the withdrawal of US military presence in 
Southeast Asia with the closure of its bases in the Philippines - Clark Air Base in 1991 
and Subic Naval Base in 1992, although the US did enter into bilateral arrangements with 
Singapore for logistic facilities.106 Such a move was no doubt due to the withdrawal of 
the Russian military presence in Cam Ranh and Danang in Vietnam.107 Nevertheless, 
Malaysia under Mahathir continued to take a pragmatic approach towards the 
involvement of the US in the Asia Pacific region, most notably in the ASEAN regional 
Forum (ARF) framework.108
Mahathir chose to be defence minister upon assuming office as the prime 
minister in 1981, and retained the portfolio until 1986. He took the opportunity to 
restructure the Malaysian armed forces, preparing them for conventional warfare 
capabilities. This involved the strengthening of the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) and 
the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF), which had traditionally received less attention 
compared to the army.109 The restructuring has been linked to Mahathir’s overseas 
military initiatives, that is, UN peacekeeping missions.110 Although Malaysia’s
106 Alan Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues, Boulder, London: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, p. 168.
10 K.S. Nathan, ‘The Major Powers and Malaysian Foreign Policy: Facing the Challenge of Change 
Towards 2020’ in Malaysia's Defence and Foreign Policies, Abdul Razak Abdullah Baginda and Rohana 
Mahmood (eds.), Subang Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1995, p.31.
108 Hilley, Malaysia: Mahathirism ..., p.100.
109 Chandran Jeshurun, ‘Malaysian Defense Policy under Mahathir: What Has Changed?’ in Reflections, 
d.333.
10 Jeshurun, ‘Malaysian Defense Policy under Mahathir . .. ,’ in Reflections p.334.
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peacekeeping missions had begun during the Belgian Congo crisis in 1962, they became 
a major focus of the Malaysian military during the Mahathir era. The Malaysian military 
participated in UN peacekeeping operations in Namibia, Cambodia, Somalia, Kuwait, 
Iran-Iraq border, Bosnia and East Timor. In January 1996, the Malaysian government 
even set up a peacekeeping training centre.111 Such contributions brought international 
prestige and esteem for the nation. In addition, Malaysia assumed greater prominence 
within the structures of international organisations relating to political and security issues. 
Malaysia became a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council twice under 
Mahathir, in 1988 and 1999. Mahathir himself was elected President of the International 
Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking in Vienna in June 1987. A Malaysian 
diplomat, Razali Ismail, became the Chairman of the 51st session of UN General 
Assembly (1996-1997) and was also appointed as the Special Envoy of the UN 
Secretary-General for Myanmar. Musa Hitam, the former deputy prime minister became 
the Chairman of the 52nd session of the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) 
(1996-1997) and Malaysia was elected to serve a second term in UNCHR (1996-1998). 
Another Malaysian diplomat, N. Parameswaran became the Chief of Staff for the UN 
Transitional Administration for East Timor.112
Defence spending rose steadily during Mahathir premiership, especially under 
the Sixth (1991-1995), Seventh (1996-2000) and Eighth (2001-2005) Malaysia Plans, 
despite the end of the Cold War. This rise had been linked to the need to modernise the 
armed forces, especially to equip them in their peacekeeping roles abroad. Also, there 
might have been a rivalry in terms of defence procurement between Malaysia and
1,1 Liow, ‘Personality, Exigencies and Contingencies...’ in Mahathir's Administration, p .151.
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Singapore. A Malaysian official admits that although Malaysia never intended to match 
Singapore’s military capability, the understanding was that Malaysia should never fall too 
far behind. However, this did not mean that Malaysia perceived any immediate military 
threat from Singapore.113
Modernisation of the armed forces was also linked to the overall national 
strategy of economic growth and the drive for NIC. Thus, technology transfer became a 
vital condition in military procurement contracts. Moreover, decisions on procurement 
became political and highly centralised, with the prime minister having the final say, in 
some cases against the preferences of the military top brass.114
4.4.2. The Increasing Significance of Economics and the Dichotomous Relations 
with the ‘West’
The demise of the ideologically based Cold War resulted in global economic issues 
assuming centre stage.115 This enabled Mahathir to extend into foreign policy his 
preoccupation with the NEP/NDP strategies to achieve economic growth with equity and 
the aspirations for NIC status. Consequently, in outlining Vision 2020 in 1991, Mahathir 
emphasised economic imperatives over political and ideological ones, in Malaysia’s 
international relations.116 He rationalised this in terms of the Malaysian industries’ 
dependency on export markets. He highlighted the perils of trading blocs formed by
112 Rostam Affendi Bin Salleh, Malaysia's Multilateral Diplomacy under Dr.Mahathir Mohamad, project 
paper submitted in partial fulfilment for the Degree of Master in Strategy and Diplomacy, Faculty o f Social 
Sciences and Humanities, Malaysian National University, 2002, pp.38-9.
113 Author interview with Dr Kogila Balakrishnan, Principal Assistant Secretary, Defence Industry 
Division, Malaysia’s Ministry of Defence, London, 1 June 2007.
114 For example, the decision to buy Sukhoi fighter jets from Russian instead of the American Hornets. 
Author interview with Dr Kogila Balakrishnan, Principal Assistant Secretary, Defence Industry Division, 
Malaysia’s Ministry of Defence, London, 1 June 2007.
115 Nathan, ‘The Major Powers and Malaysian Foreign Policy . . . ’ in Malaysian Defence and Foreign 
Policies, p.28.
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powerful nations and the need for Malaysia to play its part and ‘not passively accept the 
dictates of those powerful nations.”117 In the previous year, then foreign minister Abu 
Hassan Omar had already underscored the role of Wisma Putra in tackling economic 
issues. The foreign minister remarked that under Mahathir, Malaysia’s active 
international role, which was regarded as a necessity, had also brought the country 
unprecedented higher image and prestige.118
Economic concerns of NIC-aspired Mahathir’s Malaysia were predominantly 
juxtaposed against the interests of the West. In this regard, Mahathir often articulated the 
unipolar post-Cold War order for example, as manifested in the globalisation of world 
economy to solely representing Western interests.119 Mahathir saw Western hegemony 
akin to neo-colonialism, in how free trade and globalisation were promoted with little 
regard for and to the detriment of developing economies.120 This filled him with a moral 
indignation that triggered a resistance against Western domination, which had become 
Mahathir’s crusade.
The Asian financial crisis in 1997 was a classic case of confrontation between 
Mahathir and the Western dominated international structures beyond his control. 
Malaysia came under immense pressure and was severely criticised for its decision to
116 Mahathir Mohamad, ‘Malaysia: The Way Forward’, an Address at the Inaugural Meeting of the 
Malaysian Business Council on February 28,1991, in Malaysian Defence and Foreign Policies, p.88.
117 Mahathir, ‘Malaysia: The Way Forward’, in Malaysian Defence and Foreign Policies, pp.88-9.
118 Abu Hassan Omar, ‘Malaysia’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s’, an address at the Malaysian International 
Affairs Forum in Kuala Lumpur, May 3 1990 in Malaysian Defence and Foreign Policies, pp. 130-4.
119 For example, Mahathir said that the “uniform rules, regulations, laws and policies” pursued under 
globalisation “disregard” developing countries’ “weaknesses and problems.” Mahathir Mohamad, 
‘Globalisation: Challenges and Impact on Asia, speech delivered at the World Economic Forum (WEF), 
New York, 3 February, 2002, in Globalisation and the New Realities : Selected Speeches o f  Mahathir 
Mohamad, Hashim Makaruddin (ed.), Subang Jaya: Pelanduk publications, 2002, p. 14. ,
120 For example, see Mahathir’s Speech at the 12th Conference o f the Heads of State or Government of the 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Countries in Durban, South Africa, on September 2,1998 in Mahathir 
Mohamad, Globalisation and the New Realities, pp. 169-177.
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adopt selective capital controls by the international financial community.121 To Mahathir, 
the devaluation of the Malaysian Ringgit was the result of the greed of currency 
speculators and had nothing to do with the fundamentals of the Malaysian economy, or 
its governance.122 During this crisis, the widely reported clash between Mahathir and the 
financier George Soros left Mahathir with a feeling that he was personally targeted by the 
powerful speculators to the point of making other Asian leaders shunning him and 
Malaysia becoming a ‘pariah’ country.123 Finally, in order to protect the Malaysian 
currency from further speculative attacks, the government put in place selective capital 
controls. Despite widespread criticisms, some noted that Malaysia was reluctant to 
follow the IMF programme partly because “the officials there did not want to be dictated 
by outsiders” and “also because they had little confidence in the IMF.”124 The decision 
was in fact pushed by Mahathir despite being opposed by his deputy, Anwar Ibrahim, 
who favoured the restrictive measures prescribed by the IMF.125
The sacking of Anwar led to one of the toughest political crises Mahathir had 
to face. Anwar was a popular politician with massive support inside and outside 
Malaysia. Most importantly, Anwar had been cultivated by the US as Mahathir’s 
alternative. Anwar had established close friendships with powerful and influential 
Americans including Paul Wolfowitz (Undersecretary for Defence), Robert Zoelick 
(chief US trade negotiator and Deputy Secretary of State), Madeline Albright (Secretary 
of State), William Cohen (Secretary of Defence) and A1 Gore (Vice President). The 
sacking and imprisonment of Anwar Ibrahim strained bilateral relations with the US to
121 Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontent, London: Penguin Books, 2002, p. 122.
122 Mahathir Mohamad, The Malaysian Currency Crisis: How and Why It Happened, Subang Jaya: 
Pelanduk Publications, 2000, p. 18.
123 Mahathir, The Malaysian Currency Crisis, p. 19.
124 Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontent, p. 122.
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the point that for the next few years until around 2001, the Malaysian Embassy in 
Washington was almost entirely preoccupied with the Anwar issue.126
Malaysia’s NEP/NDP agenda became Mahathir’s rationale for resisting the 
IMF route. According to Mahathir, recovery was not imperative only for recovery’s 
sake, but “must be accompanied by the equitable distribution of the economic pie 
between the Bumiputeras and non-Bumiputeras.”]27 Clearly, Mahathir was concerned 
that the IMF remedy would force Malaysia to abandon its NEP/NDP strategies, although 
his critics argued that he was actually only trying to save his cronies. Bearing in mind the 
enmeshing of state and private sector especially via the UMNO patronage network in 
Mahathir’s privatisation scheme, it became clear that Malay, UMNO and Malaysia’s 
interests became one and the same in Mahathir’s definition. Whatever the case may be, 
Mahathir’s boldness to defy the Washington consensus and his refusal to embrace the 
IMF’s assistance gave him and Malaysia further respect and prestige, particularly in the 
developing world.
Basically, the difficult bilateral relations with the US revolved around the 
personality of Mahathir. The US was uncomfortable with Mahathir’s articulations of his 
political philosophy concerning international crises. His critical views on Israel and 
strong support for the Palestinians touched a very sensitive nerve in Washington. His 
views were seen as adding to the already rampant anti-Semitic and anti-American 
feelings around the world.128 Mahathir, on the other hand, felt that as a leader of a 
country not constrained by its dependency on Western aid, he had the obligation to point
125 Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontent, p. 123.
126 Author interview with Ghazzali S.A.Khalid, former Malaysian Ambassador to the US (1999 -  2006), 
Putrajaya, 5 July 2007.
127 Mahathir, The Malaysian Currency Crisis, p.20.
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to the injustices and double standards of the West. He also courted confrontation with his 
critical views of Western hegemony of international structures.129 To him, it was unfair 
that international structures, which were mostly formed during colonial time, continued 
to exclude the values, needs and constraints of non-Western developing countries. These 
structures had not only encapsulated the assumption of the inferiority of non-Western 
cultures, but also could prolong the ‘colonised mindset’ of the developing world.130 For 
example, Malaysia under Mahathir consistently called for UN reform, which it perceived 
as being necessary, because according to his perspective, the UN was ineffective due to 
the US dominance.131 Mahathir was also sceptical of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), fearing that it would be answerable to the world’s wealthiest powers only. 
Malaysia thus played a significant role in the WTO in opposing the West’s attempt to 
link social clauses and labour standards to trade agreements.132
However, despite Mahathir’s diatribes against the West in the articulation of 
his political philosophy, Malaysia under Mahathir actually maintained fruitful relations 
with Western countries in terms of investment and trade. As regards economic relations 
with the US, Mahathir said all the right things concerning foreign direct investment, high 
technology, emphasis on manufacturing, building of infrastructure and liberalisation of 
education, just to name a few.133 In the broader picture, Malaysia’s trade with the West
128 Author interview with Ghazzali S.A.Khalid, former Malaysian Ambassador to the US (1999-2006), 
Putrajaya, 5 July 2007.
129 Milne and Mauzy, Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir, p. 132. ,
130 Author interview with Mahathir Mohamad, London, 16 January 2007.
131 K.S. Nathan, ‘Political and Security Relations’, in The Malaysian -  American Partnership, Subang Jaya: 
Pelanduk Publications for the Malaysian Strategic Research Centre (MSRC) and the American Malaysian 
Chamber o f Commerce, 2001, p.27.
132 Milne and Mauzy, Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir, pp. 131 & 138.
133 Author interview with Ghazzali S.A.Khalid, former Malaysian Ambassador to the US (1999-2006), 
Putrajaya, 5 July 2007.
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more or less remained stable during his premiership.134 Specifically, total bilateral trade 
with the US remained around 20 percent of Malaysia’s total trade during Mahathir’s 
premiership. In addition, American foreign direct investment was vital in the growth of 
Malaysia’s manufacturing sector. For example, Malaysia became a major manufacturer 
of the semiconductor chip in the 1980s due to American investment. By 1994, US 
companies had invested RM 983 million out of RM 7.5 billion, that is 15.4 percent of the 
total foreign direct investment in electronics, which was more than Japan.135 
Furthermore, in the mid-1990s, Mahathir actually went out of his way to court American 
investors to participate in his MSC project. It was also observed that despite Mahathir’s 
strong objection towards the US role in Asia Pacific, there was an increase in the number 
of US warships visiting Malaysian ports, including a first ever by an aircraft carrier in 
1996.136 This reflects Mahathir’s pragmatist nature. As apparent in the previous chapter 
on Mahathir’s belief system, at the core was his drive to uplift the economic status of the 
Malays. In this regard, Mahathir applied all necessary measures to encourage foreign 
direct investment, which would not only spur economic growth, but also accelerate 
Malaysia’s mastery of high technology. He adopted a ‘compartmentalised’ approach to 
bilateral relations with the US -  disagreements on global political issues did not hinder 
the two countries doing business for mutual benefits. According to Mahathir, bilateral 
relations with ‘Western’ countries, which could have been good, could be distinguished 
from ‘issues’ that formed their disagreements. His criticisms of the ‘West’ mostly related
134 Liow, ‘Personality, Exigencies and Contingencies...’ in M ahathir’s Administration, p. 155.
135 Shakila Parween Yacob, ‘Economic and Trade Relations’ in The Malaysian -  American Partnership, 
p.37.
36 Milne and Mauzy, Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir, p. 133.
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to different cultural perspectives when looking at specific issues. In this sense, the ‘West’ 
did not refer to geographical or racial characteristics, but was actually a cultural entity.137
Perhaps, it is more the UK, Malaysia’s former colonial master that one should 
look at when analysing Mahathir’s preoccupation with the West in the other-ing process 
of Malaysian national identity formation. The UK’s economic interests continued to be 
protected after Malaya’s independence, until Mahathir came into power. Mahathir, who 
had been critical of the Tunku’s economic policy, saw the need to regain control of 
powerful British multinationals that dominated the Malaysian economy, in order to 
enlarge the bumiputera's share in the economy. The first step engineered by Mahathir 
was the take-over of Guthrie, the first British trading company set up in Southeast Asia, 
by the Permodalan Nasional Berhad in 1981. The take-over enabled the return of about 
200 000 acres of agricultural land to Malaysian ownership. However, in the UK it led to 
the tightening of take-over rules by the London Stock Exchange. More astonishingly to 
Malaysians, the UK press labelled the take-over as a process of “repatriation” or 
“backdoor nationalisation”.138 To the Malaysians, it portrayed a lack of understanding of 
the ‘statist’ rather than socialist nature of the Malaysian political economy and the 
reasons for the Malaysian state having to set up itself as the proxy for the Malay entry 
into business in order to achieve the NEP targets.139 The Guthrie take-over crisis 
coincided with the UK government’s decision to increase university tuition fees for 
overseas students, affecting a big number of Malaysian scholars in the UK but not 
students from the European Union (EU). In retaliation, Mahathir announced the ‘Buy
137 Author interview with Mahathir Mohamad, London, 16 January 2007.
138 Roger Kershaw, ‘Brown Humanity Strikes Back: Confronting Britain in a Good Cause?’ in Reflections, 
d.346.
39 Kershaw, ‘Brown Humanity Strikes Back...’ in Reflections, p.346.
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British Last’ policy until the British showed a ‘change of attitude’. The policy made it 
compulsory for any tender from a British company for a government contract to be 
referred to the Prime Minister’s Department for clearance, together with its non-British 
alternatives.140
In an interview with the author, Mahathir admits that the Buy British Last 
campaign was launched by him more to make a point to the British than anything else. 
He said that the issue was a minor one and could have easily been solved through 
negotiations (curiously he quoted the over flight clearance for the British Concorde 
aeroplanes as the issue, although this was not documented anywhere and could not be 
verified by officials).141 His point was clearly noted because a ‘change of attitude’ was 
demonstrated by the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher who hosted Mahathir to a 
sumptuous ‘peace meal’ at her residence, in ‘the presence of assorted nabobs’.142 In fact, 
Thatcher’s respect for Mahathir was lucid in her memoir. Reminiscing on her trip to 
Malaysia in April 1985, she believed that UK -  Malaysia relations had suffered because 
Mahathir had felt that the British had not treated Malaysia “with sufficient respect as an 
independent nation”.143
However, another crisis in bilateral relations with the UK broke out in 1994. 
It came about when the British Sunday Times alleged ‘high level corruption’ in the 
contract for a British firm to build Pergau hydroelectric dam in the Malaysian north­
eastern state of Kelantan. The deal was implicated with a separate and very significant 
arms deal. Mahathir interpreted this as an accusation of corruption against himself and
140 Kershaw, ‘Brown Humanity Strikes Back...’ in Reflections, p.347.
141 Author interview with Mahathir Mohamad, London, 16 January 2007.
142 Kershaw, ‘Brown Humanity Strikes B ack...’ in Reflections, p.347. A ‘nabob’ is a person of wealth and 
prominence.
43 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993, p.502.
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launched a new boycott of British commerce, including cancellation of contracts already 
awarded to British companies. Thus, domestically, this second crisis was interpreted in 
the manner that the dignity of the leader was portrayed to be under attack. In a system of 
government of personalised power, the “nation may be moved to feel emphatically under 
attack too.”144 Thus, when Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim announced the boycott 
on Mahathir’s behalf, “he echoed Mahathir’s obsession about white racism and tried to 
generalise The Sunday Times' misdemeanour as a slight on all Malaysians, because it 
signified a refusal to acknowledge the ability of a ‘brown-skinned people’ to operate a 
modem economy with probity and efficiency.”145 In this regard, Mahathir seemed to 
personify Malaysia’s national interest and the two interests became almost 
indistinguishable.146
Therefore, Mahathir undeniably played a central role in foreign policy­
making, as he did in domestic policies. It is also evident that recognition motives were 
influential, existing amongst and at times overlapping with security and economic 
motives. In fact, the economic goals pushed by Mahathir actually served specific 
recognition objectives. In this sense, Mahathir was consistently driven by his motivation 
to uplift the status of the Malays, to bring them self confidence and self esteem. 
However, in terms of foreign policy, Mahathir had to operate within the constraints of the 
international structures. Thus, the end of the Cold War was pivotal in opening an 
unprecedented opportunity for Mahathir’s Malaysia to focus on economic and trade 
relations, as an extension of the domestic developmental agenda according to the
144 Kershaw, ‘Brown Humanity Strikes Back...’ in Reflections, p.349.
145 Kershaw, ‘Brown Humanity Strikes Back...’ in Reflections, p.349.
146 Kershaw, ‘Brown Humanity Strikes Back...’ in Reflections, p.349.
157
NEP/NDP. Nevertheless, in the process, to Mahathir it was important for Malaysia to be 
treated as an equal partner in business and not to be patronised and dictated too.
In this connection, one aspect in which recognition motives can be observed 
in foreign policy articulation is in the process of identifying the ‘other’. It is in this 
process that Mahathir’s Malay nationalism can be detected as the root of his recognition 
struggles for the nation. The Malaysian identity was consistently defined as opposing the 
imperialist ‘West’. It is undoubtedly problematic to define precisely the terminology of 
the ‘West’. However, this term was used by Mahathir repeatedly to denote a specific 
component of the international community and as such needs to be analysed.
In this regard, Huntington notes that in the ‘Western’ media, the more 
restricted “civilisational term” o f ‘the West’ has been used extensively since the 1990s, to 
replace the term ‘the Free World’ that was widely used in the 1960s.147 He also 
elaborates that “[t]he West, includes Europe, North America, plus other European settler 
countries such as Australia and New Zealand.”148 For the purpose of this analysis, it is 
convenient to replace the ‘West’ with the US, UK or Australia, but that would grossly 
misjudge Mahathir’s idea of the West as representing a specific set of values and culture 
rather than specific ‘actors’, although in most instances, these actors were the 
embodiment and ‘personified’ Western values and culture in the international society. 
More precisely, Mahathir’s actions can be understood in terms of him struggling for 
recognition and respect for Malaysia, befitting its status as an independent and 
economically successful newly-industrialised country. Such an understanding would
147 Huntington illustrated a comparison in the use of the terms ‘Free World’ and ‘The West’ in the New 
York Times, Washington Post and Congressional Record in 1988 and 1993. Samuel P. Huntington, The 
Clash o f  Civilizations and the Remaking o f  World Order, London: The Free Press, 1996, pp.54-5. See also 
map depicting ‘The World of Civilizations: Post-1990’ in the same book, pp.26-7.
148 Huntington, The Clash o f  Civilizations, p.46.
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enable us to understand Mahathir’s pragmatic relations with these ‘Western’ countries. 
Mahathir welcomed Western businesses, but their relationships had to be on an equal 
footing. Thus, Hng rightly observes that Mahathir wanted Malaysia’s international 
“personality” to reflect, firstly, its commitment to justice and equity for all nations; 
secondly, a Muslim country that is recognised as an example of Islamic achievements in 
nation-building and, thirdly, a recognition of Malaysia’s status as a modem economy and 
a developed society.149 Bearing this in mind, it is unsurprising that specific forms of 
recognition struggles, particularly in the context of equality in relationships and 
recognition of Malaysia’s achievements were sought from the ‘West’, or more 
specifically, the developed countries of former colonisers that can be considered as the 
‘other’ in Malaysia’s identity formation process.
In contrast, different forms of recognition were sought from the groups of 
countries or global community that Mahathir identified Malaysia (and Malaysians) with. 
They constituted the developing countries of the ‘South’, the Islamic ummah and the East 
Asian countries. They became important addressees of Malaysia’s foreign policy under 
Mahathir and share certain common identities with regard to their colonial past, 
developmental economies and non-Westem cultural values. Malaysia under Mahathir 
became recognised significantly because of its leadership in issues related to these 
respective foreign policy addressees, which bore crucial significance to the Malaysian 
national identity that Mahathir aspired to build.
149 Hng, 5 Men and 5 Ideas, p. 145.
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4.5. CONCLUSION
This chapter has illustrated the centrality of Mahathir as the prime minister in the set-up 
of the Malaysian state during his rule. It has been shown that the centrality of Mahathir 
covered almost all aspects of the government and its decision-making process. It 
therefore gives credence to the argument that to understand Malaysian policies during 
Mahathir’s period, it is vital to understand the man himself. It is in this context that the 
‘belief system’, which has been traced and set up in the previous chapter becomes an 
essential guide in our understanding of Malaysia’s policies under Mahathir. Particularly, 
Mahathir’s conceptions of justice, which have been captured in the analysis of his belief 
system have been fundamental in understanding the motives of the quest for recognition 
that underpinned Mahathir’s political actions, especially with regard to lifting the status 
of the Malays and Malaysia.
The measures that Mahathir took to concentrate power in executive hands can 
be understood in terms of the means, necessary in his view, to be taken in order to press 
on with his agenda for Malaysia. His tenacity and unflinching focus on achieving the 
goals he himself set up for the nation illustrate his strong beliefs, not only about the 
predicaments of the nation and the ways to counter them, but also the correctness of his 
diagnosis. Mahathir’s leadership style clearly confirmed his personality traits, which had 
also been highlighted in the previous chapter. Mahathir was predominantly guided by his 
desire to affect change in the Malays and uplift their social status through primarily 
economic and social engineering processes. Ultimately, this desire was motivated by 
recognition factors that were to bring respect, esteem and confidence in the Malays.
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In the domestic setting, Mahathir’s recognition struggle for the Malays was 
translated in the goal of uplifting the economic status of the Malays through the creation 
of growth with equity under the NEP and NDP. In this connection, it is important to 
realise that the economic goals widely highlighted in the literature focussing on changes 
in Malaysian foreign policy, actually served recognition motives. To illustrate, the 
NEP’s goal was to change the status of the bumiputera community “from a farming , 
petty trading and civil service community to one that was commercial and industrial, 
comparable in size and wealth to the commercial and industrial non-bumiputera 
community.”150 Moreover, Mahathir emphasised the “cultural transformation, or 
revolution” with regard to the bumiputeras ’ psychology and self-confidence in the 
process.151
Economic growth was to be achieved through the creation of export oriented 
industrial based economy. In addition, Mahathir launched Malaysia’s heavy industry 
blueprint towards realising his dream of achieving the NIC status. In this process, 
Mahathir’s Malaysia was distinguishable by the close links between the government and
152the corporate sector. The civil service was impressed to support ‘Malaysia Inc.’ 
UMNO became directly involved in Malaysian businesses through proxies closely linked 
to its top leaders. While it was a strategy to tackle the slow increment of bumiputera’s 
share in the economy, this economic objective itself served a recognition purpose. New 
Malay corporate leaders like Halim Saad, Tajuddin Ramli, Wan Azmi Wan Hamzah, 
Yahaya Ahmad and Daim Zainuddin were flaunted to symbolise the confident, dynamic 
and business savvy characters of the ‘new Malays’. It was all a part of Mahathir’s plan to
150 Mahathir, The Way Forward, p.l 19.
151 Mahathir, The Way Forward, p.l 19.
152 See Sarji, The Civil Service o f  Malaysia: Towards Efficiency and Effectiveness, p. 136.
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revolutionise the Malay character -  to imbue the Malays with self-confidence, self- 
respect and self-esteem.
Undeniably, foreign policy became an important arena for Mahathir to mould 
the Malaysian identity as being a truly independent, economically successful and modem 
Muslim nation.153 The process involved seeking recognition from the important members 
of the international community, particularly those representing similar identities that 
Mahathir identified Malaysia with. It is this aspect of the struggle for recognition in 
Malaysia’s foreign policy under Mahathir that this thesis now aims to analyse. The 
following chapters will proceed with the case studies, organised thematically on South- 
South co-operation, ties with the Muslim ummah, and relations with the countries of East 
Asia.
153 Hng, 5 Men and 5 Ideas, p. 145.
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CHAPTER 5 MAHATHIR, MALAYSIA AND SOUTH -  SOUTH 
CO-OPERATION
South -  South co-operation was a fundamental component of Malaysia’s foreign policy 
pursued during the Mahathir era.1 Countries of the ‘South’ can be identified by their 
memberships in multilateral groupings of developing countries most notably the Group of 
77 (G-77)2 and NAM.3 During Mahathir’s premiership, Malaysia’s high-profile role 
within the organisations of the South countries was evident by the description of 
Mahathir as the “spokesman” for the South.4 It has also been argued that Mahathir 
succeeded in “bringing Malaysia to the fore” amongst the developing countries through 
his forceful expressions of the aspirations of the developing South.5
As Chapter One has illustrated, most literature attributes the significant 
increase in Malaysia’s identification with the developing countries of the South to
1 Jeshurun observes that its commitment to principles o f neutrality, as well as South -  South policy were 
the “non-negotiable” fundamentals o f Malaysia’s foreign policy under Mahathir. Chandran Jeshurun, 
Malaysia: Fifty Years o f  Diplomacy, 1957-2007, Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press, 2007, p.202.
2 G-77 was founded by 77 developing countries at the first UN Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) in Geneva in 1964 when they first co-ordinated their position and co-sponsored a Joint 
Declaration on their common goal to reform international trade. See Ahmad Faiz Abdul Hamid, Malaysia 
and South -  South Co-operation During the Mahathir Era: Determining Factors and Implications, Subang 
Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 2005, p.75.
3 The origin of the NAM can be traced to the first meeting of newly independent Asian and African nations 
in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955. Shortly after, the first NAM Summit was held in Belgrade, Yugoslavia on
1 -  6 September 1961. Issues of world peace and colonialism were the major focus of the Conference. See 
Geir Lundestad, East, West, North, South: Major Developments in International Politics, 1945 -  1990, 
Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1991, pp.281-2.
4 Sivamurugan Pandian, Legasi Mahathir, Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications, 2005, p.261.
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economic motivations. For instance, Savaranamuttu defines Mahathir’s “Southern 
stance” mainly in terms of “Malaysia’s external economic orientation.”6 Similarly, 
Yusof explains Malaysia’s move into “the Third World camp” under Mahathir’s 
leadership primarily in order to protect its economic interests.7 Similarly, Liow argues 
that a major motivation for Mahathir to pursue the policy of South -  South Co-operation 
was because, “the upsurge in protectionism in the industrialised West meant that 
Mahathir had to search for new markets.”8 However, not all scholars have been 
convinced that economic or business considerations formed the sole motivation 
underpinning Malaysia’s policy towards the South, under Mahathir. For example, to 
Milne and Mauzy, it was “not easy to see why Mahathir took up the cause of the 
‘South’.”9 Moreover, the assumption that economic motives alone were responsible for 
South -  South co-operation policy seemed rather flawed as its economic gains seemed 
inconclusive. To illustrate, Jeshurun observes that not all Malaysian investments pursued 
under the banner of South -  South co-operation in Africa met with resounding success. 
He highlights in particular the unpleasant row that Telekom Malaysia (Malaysia’s biggest 
telecommunication company - a Government Linked Company (GLC)) was embroiled in,
5 Aziz Zariza Ahmad, Mahathir’s Paradigm Shift: The Man Behind the Vision, Taiping: Firma Malaysia 
Publishing, 1997, p. 136.
6 Johan Savaranamuttu, ‘Iconoclasm and Foreign Policy -  The Mahathir Years’ in Reflections: The 
Mahathir Years, Bridget Welsh (ed.), Washington D.C.: SAIS, 2004, p.307.
7 See Mohd. Yusof Ahmad, Continuity and Change in Malaysia’s Foreign Policy, 1981 -  1986, a 
dissertation presented to the Faculty of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy impartial fulfilment of 
the requirements for the degree of Doctor o f Philosophy, May 1990, esp. pp.228-34.
8 Joseph Liow, ‘Personality, Exigencies and Contingencies: Determinants o f Malaysia’s Foreign Policy in 
the Mahathir Administration’, in Mahathir’s Administration: Performance and Crisis in Governance, 
Singapore, Kuala Lumpur: Times Books, 2001, p. 143.
9 R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir, London and New York, Routledge, 
1999, p.133.
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in Ghana that led to its decision to finally withdraw all of its investments in Africa in 
2006.10
To address this disjunctive between the economic rationale cited by most 
scholars and the inconclusive economic benefits of South -  South co-operation, this 
chapter will attempt to illustrate that the struggle for recognition was also a significant 
motivation underpinning this policy. In proceeding to do this, it will firstly outline the 
history of Malaysia’s involvement in the multilateral organisations of the South countries, 
particularly NAM, G-15 and the Commonwealth. Secondly, it will demonstrate 
Malaysia’s more prominent role in these organisations under Mahathir by illustrating the 
policy initiatives towards the South taken during Mahathir’s premiership. Thirdly, the 
chapter will analyse Mahathir’s political philosophy concerning the situation of 
developing countries of the South. Lastly, it will conclude by providing an analysis of 
the influence of recognition motives as one of the driving forces behind the increased 
importance of the South in Mahathir’s foreign policy. In this regard, it will again be 
argued that struggles for recognition as significant motivations were based on Mahathir’s 
preoccupation with the status of the Malays, which (as has been argued in the previous 
chapter) also became the basis of the national identity building process in Malaysia under 
Mahathir. Thus, our understanding of Mahathir’s policy of South -  South co-operation 
has to be linked to the overarching goal of uplifting the Malay social status, particularly 
through economic means, as provided by the NEP and NDP. This chapter will employ 
Honneth’s modes of practical relations-to-self (self-confidence, self respect and self 
esteem) in its analysis to identify and discuss factors related to the search for recognition 
that motivated Mahathir’s attitude towards the South countries.
10 Jeshurun, Malaysia: Fifty Years o f  Diplomacy, p.310.
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5.1. MAHATHIR AND THE HISTORY OF MALAYSIA’S INVOLVEMENT 
IN ORGANISATIONS OF THE SOUTH COUNTRIES
As shown in Chapter Three, the South became a contentious policy issue between 
Mahathir and the Tunku, particularly during the Indonesian ‘Confrontation’. To 
Mahathir, formal acceptance into organisations of the South, such as the non-aligned 
countries of the Afro -  Asia Peoples’ Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) would validate 
Malaysia’s independent status. Mahathir was critical of the Tunku’s close association 
with the British and his English ways. He was outraged by the fact that the British had 
manipulated the Malay monarchies to colonise the Malay states, a process that he felt had 
inflicted harmful effects on the character of the entire Malay people. In addition, 
Sukarno’s ‘Konfrontasi' , which aimed to question Malaysia’s legitimacy outraged 
Mahathir further because it degraded the honour, dignity and pride of the Malay race. 
Chapter Three has illustrated how all these factors, which are mired in Mahathir’s 
experience of colonialism, influenced his belief system and his conceptions of justice, 
particularly concerning the position of the Malays in society.
Under the staunchly pro-West Tunku, Malaysia had a difficult relationship 
with members of organisations for South countries like the AAPSO and NAM. 
Indonesia, which was a founding member 11 was using these organisations to denounce 
Malaysia as a neo-colonial entity created by the British. However, some young UMNO 
‘radicals’, widely referred to as the ‘young Turks’ including Mahathir believed that 
Malaysia should participate and engage the developing countries of the non-aligned 
world to counter Indonesia’s propaganda. Clearly, they were also driven by their 
disapproval of the Tunku’s pro-Westem stance and their desire to see Malaya/Malaysia
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exhibit a truly independent foreign policy, accepted by other proud newly independent 
nations. Malaysia could not participate at the 1955 Bandung Conference because it was 
still under British colonial rule (until 1957). However, its non-participation at the first 
NAM Summit in Belgrade in 1961 was a consequence of Indonesia’s blockade. 
Nonetheless in July 1962, Malaya was successful in participating in the NAM 
Conference on the Problems of Economic Development in Cairo. In 1964, Malaysia 
joined other developing countries in UNCTAD12 and became a founding member of the 
G77. All this while Indonesia’s ‘Confrontation’ campaign had forced Malaysia to defend 
its non-alignment and independent status in the international community, especially 
amongst the newly independent countries of NAM. It proved to be a tremendous 
challenge. Malaysia again failed to secure a seat at the Cairo NAM Summit Conference 
in 1964. Malaysia’s first official participation in NAM was at its Foreign Ministers’ 
meeting in New York on 27 September 1969. Then, Malaysia took part at the 3rd NAM 
Summit Conference in Lusaka, Zambia on 8-10 September 1970.13
Malaysia’s persistence in securing acceptance and recognition of NAM 
members could be attributed to Tun Abdul Razak, who was influenced by young UMNO 
radicals including Mahathir. The affinity between Razak and Mahathir has also been 
shown in Chapter Three. In fact, according to Jeshurun, Razak “had given a free rein to 
the then ‘young Turks’ including Mahathir to start exploration of the ‘other’ side -
11 Indonesia under Sukarno organised the first meeting among newly independent Asian and African 
nations in Bandung in 1955.
12 UNCTAD became the de-facto secretariat for the movement o f developing countries at the UN in their 
fight for reform of the international trade and development policy, culminating in the idea of the New 
International Economic Order (NIEO). See James Mayall, ‘The Institutional Basis of Post-War Economic 
Co-operation’ in International Institutions at Work, Paul Taylor and A.J.R. Groom, (eds.), London: Pinter 
Publishers, 1998, p.27.
13 Rozalah Katan (ed.), Ke Arah NAM  Yang Lebih Dinamik Dan Bersepadu: Peranan Malaysia Selaku 
Pengerusi NAM, Kuala Lumpur: Sekretariat Nasional NAM, Kementerian Luar Negeri, 2006, p.2.
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meaning the Afro -  Asian world.”14 Razak oversaw Malaysia’s moves to lead 
negotiations for a higher price for tin under the 1965 Tin Agreement after UNCTAD I. 
Although this foreign policy initiative bore an economic goal, it successfully earned 
Malaysia the recognition from other developing countries. Thus, Malaysia’s strong stand 
on the issue caught the attention of other Third World tin producing countries, which led 
to Malaysia being subsequently selected to serve on the Trade and Development Board 
during UNCTAD II in 1968 and again at UNCTAD III in 1971. The leader of the 
Malaysian delegation also served as the Vice President of the Conference at UNCTAD 
III. Thus within a few years, Malaysia “had become increasingly recognised as a 
champion of the South causes.”15
5.2. MALAYSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES TOWARDS THE 
SOUTH UNDER MAHATHIR
Mahathir’s long standing belief that Malaysia should identify itself more with the South 
was effectively translated into foreign policy that thereafter, prioritised relations with the 
countries of the South, either bilaterally or through specific multilateral frameworks. To 
Mahathir, these countries were deemed important because they shared Malaysia’s 
experience of colonialism. Thus, they also shared Malaysia’s problems, specifically in 
achieving economic development while maintaining stable and effective liberal 
democratic systems as expected of them by their former colonial masters.
14 Jeshurun, Malaysia: Fifty Years o f  Diplomacy, p. 177.
15 Faiz, Malaysia and South -  South Co-operation, p.77.
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5.2.1. Multilateral Frameworks of the South
The first aspect of increasing foreign policy focus on the countries of the South under 
Mahathir was Malaysia’s intensified participation in the related multilateral frameworks. 
Mahathir made use of the organisations belonging to the South countries, particularly 
NAM and G-15 as the platforms on which to project Malaysia’s stronger South identity. 
Mahathir also played a crucial role in promoting a South agenda in the Commonwealth.
Malaysia’s prominent role under Mahathir was illustrated by initiatives to 
galvanise the intellectual philosophy underpinning the collaboration of South countries 
into more practical strategies for co-operation. The first significant initiative by Malaysia 
was the hosting of the Second Summit Meeting of Third World Scholars in May 1986. 
Malaysia was given the honour because of “Mahathir’s earnest and genuine involvement 
in problems faced by Third World countries and the practical strategies he had put 
forward towards overcoming them.”16 According to the Secretary General of the Third 
World Foundation, Altaf Gauhar, Mahathir was “the motivating force of the foundation” 
since its inception.17 Furthermore, Malaysia was also chosen because it was considered a 
good model to illustrate the importance of inter-racial relations in the political and
* |fieconomic development of a Third World country that practised liberal democracy. At 
the meeting, Mahathir proposed the establishment of an independent international 
commission to examine the problems of the ‘Economic South’.19 Mahathir himself was 
selected to become the chairman of the Steering Committee on the South Commission 
with the responsibility to identify a Third World leader who could lead the Commission.
16 Faiz, Malaysia and South -  South Co-operation, p.89.
17 Aziz, Mahathir’s Paradigm Shift, p. 147.
18 Aziz, Mahathir's Paradigm Shift, p. 138. See also Faiz, Malaysia and South -  South Co-operation, p.89.
19 Foreign Affairs Malaysia, June 1986, vol. 19, no.2, quoted in Faiz, Malaysia and South -  South Co­
operation, p.89.
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The Steering Committee chose Dr Julius Nyerere of Tanzania to lead the Commission.20 
Mahathir’s commitment towards the founding of the South Commission was proven 
when he personally wrote to heads of states of 127 Third World countries requesting their 
support. The Kuala Lumpur Declaration spelled out the objectives of the Commission, 
which were: to assess the problems facing developing countries; to find solutions and 
suggest ways of increasing co-operation within the South; to strengthen organisations 
already working for greater co-operation, and to consider the creation of a ‘South 
Secretariat’; and to raise awareness in developing countries about their circumstances and 
the challenges facing them.21 Furthermore, Mahathir was also appointed to the Advisory 
Committee of the South, which assisted Chairman Nyerere in guiding the work of the 
South Centre.
An illustration of how Mahathir had spearheaded the South movement 
towards a united voice is on the topic of the environment. The Second Ministerial 
Conference of Developing Countries on the Environment and Development held in Kuala 
Lumpur on 27 April 1992 was said to be ‘a reunion of non-aligned countries’22 to prepare 
a common position before the UN Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) ‘Earth Summit’ in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. Mahathir highlighted the 
requirement of the South to extract their natural resources in order to develop. Thus, the 
South would require substantial material assistance to enable them to develop in an 
environmentally sustainable manner. He criticised the North because, “having destroyed
20 See also the address by Mwalimu Julius K.Nyerere, Chairman of the South Commission at the 
Commission’s Inauguration Ceremony in Geneva on 2 October 1987, which is available at 
www.southcentre.org
21 Faiz, Malaysia and South -  South Co-operation, pp.91-92.
22 David Camroux, ‘Looking East’ and Inwards: Internal Factors in Malaysian Foreign Relations During 
the Mahathir Era, 1981-1994, Asia Paper no.72, October 1994, Queensland: Centre for the Study of 
Australia -  Asia Relations, Griffith University, Australia, p.24.
170
their heritage”, now “wanting to declare what is left intact in the developing countries 
also belongs to them.”23 Mahathir also chastised the North for being unwilling to bear the 
financial costs of a cleaner earth. This clearly reflects the moral undertone, beyond 
economic rationalisations embedded in Mahathir’s beliefs concerning North -  South 
relationship. This moral undertone can also be detected in Mahathir calls for the South to 
have one strong voice, because “when the North speak, the voice of the individual 
developing countries will be drowned.”24
NAM
NAM has always been essentially a political organisation and functions to co-ordinate 
positions of the Third World on global peace and security issues.25 On a day-to-day 
basis, Malaysia co-ordinates its position on international and political issues with other 
NAM countries through the office of its Permanent Mission to the UN in New York. 
Mahathir attended all NAM Summits when he was prime minister. At the summits, the 
issues he raised included the Antarctica, environment, Palestine, apartheid in South 
Africa, Cambodia, Bosnia, UN reform, and disarmament. When he first attended the 
NAM Summit in 1983 in New Delhi, Mahathir apparently made a huge impact because 
of his ‘straight talking’.26 He used the occasion to highlight the Antarctica issue. 
Antarctica had become a major foreign policy preoccupation of Malaysia since he raised
23 Mahathir Mohamad, speech at the official opening of the Second Ministerial Conference of Developing 
Countries on Environment and Development, Kuala Lumpur, 27 April 1992, http://www.pmo.gov.my 
(accessed on 20 April 2005).
24 Mahathir Mohamad, speech at the official opening of the Second Ministerial Conference of Developing 
Countries on Environment and Development, Kuala Lumpur, 27 April 1992. See also Milne and Mauzy, 
Malaysian Politics under Mahathir, p. 135.
25 Author interview with Hasmy Agam, Head of the Secretariat for NAM during Malaysia’s chairmanship 
(2003-2006) and former Malaysia’s Permanent Representative to the UN, New York, Kuala Lumpur, 12 
July 2007.
26 Zainah Anwar; ‘Dr Mahathir’s ‘Straight Talk’ Makes an Impression’, New Straits Times', 10 March 1983.
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it at the 38th session of the UN General Assembly in 1982. Mahathir opposed the move 
to let only the exclusive members of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCP) 
decide on the fate of Antarctica. He called for Antarctica to be declared a common 
heritage for mankind and suggested that it be placed under a UN administration. Perhaps 
as a result of Mahathir’s ‘straight talking’, NAM endorsed Malaysia’s position at the 
summit for Antarctica to be declared a common heritage for mankind.27
Mahathir also raised economic and trade problems repeatedly within the NAM 
framework, particularly the lack of progress towards achieving a New International 
Economic Order (NIEO). At the Summit in Harare in 1986, Malaysia informed other 
NAM leaders of the Second Summit Meeting of Third World Scholars and the 
establishment of the international commission to look specifically into the problems of 
the South.28 At the subsequent Jakarta Summit in 1992, Mahathir stressed the need for 
members of NAM to consider tangible economic and trade co-operation to ensure the 
movement’s relevance after the Cold War.29
In addition, Malaysia’s initiatives in relation to the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 
also testifies to Mahathir’s vision for NAM.30 Mahathir felt that the NAM, which 
encompasses countries of Latin America, Africa, Asia and parts of Europe could have a 
“loud and clear” voice, which could become a “moral power” based on its principles.31
27 Murugesu Pathmanaban and David Lazarus, Winds o f  Change: The Mahathir Impact on Malaysia's 
Foreign Policy, Kuala Lumpur: Eastview Productions, 1984, p.54. Mahathir’s speech at New Delhi’s 
NAM Summit is on pp.207-8. See also Yusof, Continuity and Change in Malaysia's Foreign Policy, pp. 
358-9, and Aziz, Mahathir’s Paradigm Shift, p.142.
28 See speech of Mahathir Mohamad at the 8th NAM Summit in Harare, 1 September 1986 at 
www.perdana.org.my
29 See speech of Mahathir Mohamad at the 10th NAM Summit in Jakarta, 1 September 1992 at 
www.perdana.org.my
30 Camroux, ‘Looking East' and Inwards, p.24.
31 Aziz, Mahathir’s Paradigm Shift, p. 159.
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This moral power refers to the South’s plea based on their emphasis on the principles of 
justice and fairness in international relations.
In recognition of Mahathir’s leading role in NAM, Malaysia was requested to 
host the 13 th NAM Summit in Kuala Lumpur on 20 -  25 February 2003. It was actually 
Jordan’s turn to host it but the outbreak of the Iraq war raised security concerns for world 
leaders to congregate in the Middle East. Bangladesh offered to host but an unexpected 
change in its government made it problematic. Malaysia was approached subsequently to 
take over the chair, which was to begin in February 2003. With barely seven months to 
prepare, the Malaysian bureaucracy was initially reluctant to shoulder the responsibility. 
In addition, Malaysia was already committed to host the OIC Summit in October the 
same year. However, Mahathir and Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar were convinced 
that Malaysia should host the 13th NAM Summit and assume chairmanship from 2003 
onward. The hosting would be an acknowledgement of Malaysia’s diplomatic and moral 
stature. Indeed, Malaysia had become a popular member amongst NAM countries due to 
Mahathir’s commitment to their cause and the perception that Malaysia had the 
wherewithal for leadership.32
The Kuala Lumpur Summit produced a declaration to revitalise NAM. 
Although Mahathir retired in October 2003, the revitalisation of NAM was consistent 
with his desire to see NAM retain its relevance. Related initiatives included increasing 
North-South dialogue in the form of consultations between NAM and G8, as well as the 
EU. With regard to the latter, meetings were participated by the ‘Troikas’ (past, current 
and future chairs) from both sides. Malaysia’s chairmanship also pressed the importance
32 Author interview with Hasmy Agam, Head of the Secretariat for NAM during Malaysia’s chairmanship 
(2003-2006) and former Malaysia’s Permanent Representative to the UN, New York, Kuala Lumpur, 12 
July 2007.
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of UN reforms through the NAM Co-ordination Bureau based in New York. In addition, 
under Malaysia’s leadership of both organisations, positions of NAM and OIC were co­
ordinated more coherently. Further initiatives taken during Malaysia’s chairmanship 
included branches of NAM being set up to co-ordinate its strategies in Geneva (UN 
Commission for Human Rights, International Labour Organisation and disarmament 
issues), Vienna (International Atomic Energy Agency -  IAEA), and The Hague 
(Chemical Weapons Conference -  CWC).
A NAM Business Forum was organised for the first time in conjunction with 
the summit in Malaysia, consistent with Mahathir’s idea to include more practical 
economic and trade programmes as part of NAM’s agenda. In accordance with the 
notion of Malaysia Inc., the event was led by the private sector (Asian Strategy and 
Leadership Institute, ASLI and Malaysia South-South Association, MASSA). The aim 
was to establish a private sector network in the context of South-South co-operation.33 
The initiative resulted in the establishment of NAM Business Council in June 2004.
The status of Malaysia as an important member of the South countries and the 
reputation of Mahathir as its prominent leader can be inferred from the invitation that 
Mahathir received, as chairman of NAM to participate in the Enlarged Dialogue Meeting 
at the sidelines of the G8 Summit in Evian, France in June 2003. This was significant 
because previous NAM chairs had never received such an invitation. Mahathir said that 
he was honoured to be invited because “it showed that developed countries recognised 
and respected Malaysia’s economic achievements.”34
33 Rozilah, Ke Arah NAM  Yang Lebih Dinamik Dan Bersepadu, p. 16.
34 ‘ West-bashing Mahathir Joins G8 Dialogue Before Retiring\ AFP, 28 May 2003 at 
http://wwwgeocities.com (accessed on 20 April 2005).
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G-15
Another grouping of South countries in which Malaysia under Mahathir had played a 
leadership role was G-15.35 This South -  South framework was established at the ninth 
NAM Summit in Belgrade in September 1989. Malaysia was ‘the motivating force’ in its 
founding36 and the first G-15 Summit was held in Kuala Lumpur in June 1990. Mahathir 
took the decision to host the first summit after the proposal was made by the Chairman of 
the South Commission, Dr Julius Nyerere who visited Malaysia in November 1989.37 
The proposal was understood as an expression of recognition of Mahathir’s able 
leadership and an honour for Malaysia.38 Moreover, the proposal was also supported by 
the Malaysian foreign policy bureaucrats because of their understanding that the first G- 
15 summit would take place in a Latin American country had Malaysia not agreed to host 
it, and this would embroil G-15 in radical ideological issues rather than practical 
economic and trade co-operation.39 As Chairman of the first summit, Mahathir said that 
the objectives of G-15 were “to consult, to exchange views and to explore the potential, 
which is largely untapped, for South-South co-operation. We would also like the group 
to foster dialogue with the North, the absence of which caused the economic gap between 
North and South to widen further since the first North-South dialogue failed.”40 
Therefore, Malaysia’s role in G-15 seemed to be driven by Mahathir’s desire to 
strengthen South -  South co-operation and also to bolster the position of the South in 
their dialogues with the North.
35 G-15 member countries are; Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.
36 Camroux, 'Looking East' and Inwards, p.24.
37 Notes of Discussion between Dr Mahathir and Dr Julius Nyerere, Kuala Lumpur, 27 November 1989. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia.
38 M. Rajendran, Mahathir Mohamad: Prime Minister o f  Malaysia, Petaling Jaya: IBS Buku, 2003, p.l 53.
39 Document o f Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, November 1989.
40 Faiz, Malaysia and South -  South Co-operation, pp.95-96.
175
The commitment of the G-15 leaders is illustrated by the fact that its summit 
is held every year. This has led to increased high level contacts between member 
countries, enabling its leaders to forge close personal ties. Mahathir for example, had 
established very close rapport with Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Carlos Menem of 
Argentina, Alberto Fujimori of Peru, Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and Suharto of 
Indonesia.41 Also, as the venue for the summit meeting is rotated every year, these 
leaders have the opportunities to visit a different member country every year, thus 
exposing them to the real needs and resources of the countries. Mahathir attended all G- 
15 Summit meetings since its inaugural session in Kuala Lumpur in 1990.
The economic objectives of South -  South co-operation can be identified in 
some o f the G-15 projects. For example, as a measure to overcome the lack of 
information about trade and investments opportunities amongst countries of the South, 
Mahathir proposed the setting up of the South Investment, Trade and Technology Data 
Exchange Centre (SITTDEC). The proposal was adopted as a G-15 project at the Second 
G-15 Summit in Caracas, Venezuela in November 1991. However, the fact that Malaysia 
was chosen to host the project was a recognition of Malaysia’s economic achievements 
and the belief amongst member countries that Malaysia had the resources to provide 
leadership. In January 1992, SITTDEC was established in Kuala Lumpur with a start up 
grant from Malaysia of US$ 4 million. SITTDEC had the mission to foster and promote 
investments, trade and technology flow among developing countries. Its objectives were 
to generate investments and trade, and to contribute towards the acquisition, transfer and 
utilisation of technology among developing countries and to enhance South-South co­
41 Faiz, Malaysia and South — South Co-operation, p.95.
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operation, especially in trade, investments and technology transfer.42 Other than 
SITTDEC, Malaysia undertook various other G-15 projects, for example, the Business 
Investment Forum and the Bilateral Payment Agreement (BPA). Malaysia’s commitment 
to G-15 was further translated into its participation in the G-15 Commission for the 
Improvement of Efficiency in the implementation of the group’s decisions (G-15 
Commission) and its co-ordinating role of the G-15 ICT Task Force on information and 
communication technology. Also, Malaysia hosted the G-15 Experts’ Group Meeting on 
the International Financial Architecture in February 2002.43 All these further illustrate 
Malaysia’s leadership of South countries, which was achieved due to the recognition it 
garnered for its economic success.
In promoting South-South co-operation, Mahathir introduced to the G-15 
certain mechanisms which Malaysia had been adopting bilaterally. The BPA is one 
example. It overcomes the reluctance of businesses to accept credit risks by arranging for 
the Central Banks to contra payments on each side and settle the balance between them.44 
BPA was endorsed by the G-15 at its Summit in Kuala Lumpur in 1990 as a project for 
Malaysia to spearhead, with the goal to further easing barriers to trade between South 
countries. Since its adoption by the G-15, the BPA has managed to substantially enhance 
Malaysia’s trade with South countries. Since 1989, Malaysia’s trade to non-traditional 
markets had grown four-fold, making Malaysia the 19th largest trading nation in the 
world.45 Thus, strengthening South -  South co-operation undeniably had an economic 
rationale. However, Malaysia’s status was also hugely improved by its initiatives to take
42 Faiz, Malaysia and South -  South Co-operation, pp.97-98.
43 Brief on South-South Co-operation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, July 2005.
44 Faiz, Malaysia and South -  South Co-operation, p. 100.
45 Salil Tripathi, ‘Malaysian Investment Overseas’ in Ugly Malaysians? South -  South Investments Abused, 
Jomo, K.S. (ed.), Durban: Institute for Black Research, 2002, p.l 1.
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leadership amongst South countries and promote itself as an example through the 
mechanisms that it had employed bilaterally like the BPA, in order to attain economic 
success.
The Commonwealth
Mahathir was initially critical of the Commonwealth, which he perceived as an 
“Anglophilic club for countries colonised by Britain.”46 He was especially dissatisfied 
with the Commonwealth’s failure to bear pressure on the apartheid regime of South 
Africa47 and refused to attend the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings 
(CHOGM) in Melbourne in 1981, and again in New Delhi in 1983. Mahathir’s first 
participation at CHOGM was in 1985, in Nassau Bahamas. There, he chided the 
Commonwealth for not being able to solve many problems of its members who were 
mostly developing countries.48 Mahathir’s deep-seated disenchantment with the 
Commonwealth drove him to request Wisma Putra and ISIS to review Malaysia’s 
membership. Both institutions argued for continuing membership, as it actually gave 
Malaysia “the voice” that it deserved in international circles and provided access to 
“certain types of co-operation.”49
Mahathir then considered the Commonwealth as another platform where he 
could air his Third World concerns and network with other Third World leaders.50 
Mahathir’s changed attitude towards the Commonwealth was demonstrated when he
46 Aziz, Mahathir's Paradigm Shift, p. 156.
47 Sharifah Rozita, ‘Fresh Impetus Against Apartheid’, New Straits Times, 11 October 1985.
48 Aziz, Mahathir’s Paradigm Shift, p. 156.
49 Camroux, ‘Looking E ast’ and Inwards, p.26.
50 Muhammad Muda, ‘Malaysia’s Foreign Policy and the Commonwealth’, Round Table, no. 320 (1991), 
p.466, quoted in Camroux ,‘ Looking East' and Inwards, p.28.
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offered to host the 1989 CHOGM in Kuala Lumpur, to the surprise of many,51 It was 
said that Malaysia spent lavishly for the meeting,52 which like the hosting of the 
Commonwealth Games later in 1998, was used “to showcase Malaysia’s entry into the 
ranks of the industrializing countries” and “rounding out the Malaysian international 
image.”53 In the local papers, the hosting of CHOGM was built up as an opportunity to 
prove the nation’s capabilities and to enhance its image.54 Arguably, the strategy worked. 
For instance, Thatcher said that it was the best CHOGM she ever attended.55 Significant 
outcomes of the Kuala Lumpur CHOGM were, firstly, the Langkawi Declaration on the 
Environment, which could be seen as part of Mahathir’s efforts to galvanise the South to 
form a coherent position at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, and secondly, the Kuala Lumpur 
Declaration entitled ‘Southern Africa: The Way Ahead’, which increased pressure on the 
Pretoria apartheid regime.56
In short, the Commonwealth thus became another important avenue for 
Mahathir to advance his philosophy of South-South co-operation. This was undertaken 
specifically through the Commonwealth Partnership for Technology Management 
(CPTM). CPTM’s members comprised Commonwealth governments, private and public 
sector companies, ‘networkers’ (private individuals) and Commonwealth Secretary 
General’s nominees. Its funding comes from member governments in the form of annual
51 Suhaini Aznam; ‘Staying on the Inside’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 November 1987. Also, 
Thatcher believed she had influenced Mahathir in his decision concerning the Commonwealth. See 
Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, London: HarperCollins, 1993, p.502.
52 ‘Modal CHOGM RM39 Juta Akan Dapat Balik Melalui Iklan -  PM’, Utusan Malaysia, 2 November 
1989.
53 Camroux, ‘ Looking East’ and Inwards, p.27.
54 For examples, see ‘CHOGM Berjaya Kenalkan Malaysia Kepada Dunia Luar: Mahathir’, Bernama, 24 
October 1989; ‘Feather in the Cap for Country and PM’, New Straits Times, 25 October 1989; ‘Mahathir 
Yakin Rakyat Malaysia Dapat Pelihara Imej Negara’, Bernama, 26 September 1989; and ‘Bukti 
Kemampuan Pimpinan Islam -  Dr M ’, Berita Harian, 26 October 1989.
55 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p.502.
56 http://www.thecommonwealth.org, accessed on 13 October 2005.
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contributions and private and public sector companies. CPTM’s role is to enhance 
public/private sector co-operation by encouraging Smart Partnerships or a win-win 
philosophy in trade and investment, as well as technology management.57 Again, at a 
glance, economic goals seem to dominate Malaysia’s policy on CPTM. However, it will 
be illustrated below that the promotion of Smart Partnerships in South -  South co­
operation was motivated substantially by a struggle for recognition. CPTM’s activities 
are backed by a small full-time staff in its London ‘hub’, which is connected to an 
increasing number of national hubs. During Mahathir’s time, the Malaysian hub was 
based at the Malaysian Industry-Govemment Group for High Technology (MIGHT), 
located at the Office of the Science Advisor to the Prime Minister at the Prime Minister’s 
Department, illustrating further the priority that Mahathir attached to CPTM.
As mentioned, CPTM became a framework for Malaysia to promote its 
philosophy of Smart Partnerships and ‘prosper thy neighbour’, which underpinned its 
approach towards South-South co-operation. The modus operandi were international 
dialogues. Malaysia’s LID, started in 1995 paved the way for a series of international 
dialogues on Smart Partnerships to take place which eventually came under the co­
ordination of CPTM. According to Wisma Putra, LID has been successful in forging 
Smart Partnerships between governments and private sectors of the South.58 Since it 
started, LID has been held biennially with the aim to foster Smart Partnerships at all 
levels of society, engaging the political leadership, civil service, business, labour, media 
and the population at large. The success of this initiative prompted other South countries 
to hold similar dialogues. Thus, Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe started the South
57 http://www.cptm.org, accessed on 13 October 2005.
58 Brief on South-South Co-operation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, July 2005,
180
Africa International Dialogue (SAID)59 while Barbados initiated another dialogue series 
in the Caribbean region.60
5.2.2. Bilateral Initiatives
Increasing its focus on the South impacted Malaysia’s bilateral relations most evidently 
in terms of a strengthening of ties with African, Latin American and the Pacific Islands 
countries. This is illustrated by the increasing number of bilateral visits, as well as 
opening of Malaysia’s diplomatic missions and level of trade and investment flows. 
Clearly, multilateral and bilateral modes of diplomacy have been complementary and 
both were harnessed by Mahathir to operationalise his ideas on South-South co-operation, 
particularly in promoting Smart Partnerships.
59 1st SAID was held in Kasane, Botswana in 1997.
60http://www.might.org.my, accessed on 31 October 2005.
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Diplomatic Representations and Visits
As prime minister, Mahathir visited near and far flung South countries which were not on 
the radar of previous prime ministers.61 In addition, Malaysia during Mahathir’s era 
opened its embassies in some important South countries.62 Both the high level visits and 
the establishment of diplomatic missions signalled Mahathir’s seriousness in 
strengthening Malaysia’s relations with the countries of the South. Similar to decisions 
to host meetings and conferences on the South and making contributions to the funding of 
South institutions, bilateral visits as well as the establishment of diplomatic missions 
entailed financial expenditures, which were not insignificant. However, they provided 
the necessary mechanisms to translate the philosophy into real co-operation between 
Malaysia and other South countries.
When conducting trips abroad, Mahathir was always accompanied by a huge 
business delegation and a function with the business community in the host country 
would normally be included in the programme. Again, this illustrates the workings of 
Malaysia Inc. More importantly, it exemplifies the preoccupation with achieving the 
economic goals of the NEP/NDP. In this context, Mahathir’s recognition motives linked 
to the economic status of the Malays remained at the core, as explicated in Mahathir’s 
belief system in Chapter 3. Towards achieving these economic goals through South-
61 Mahathir visited Fiji (1982), Tonga (1982), Western Samoa (1982), Papua New Guinea (1982 & 1984), 
Yugoslavia (1983 &1989), Maldives (1984), Libya (1984), Egypt (1984), Mali (1984), the Bahamas 
(1985), Zimbabwe (1986, 1991-CHOGM, 1994,1996, 1999), Mauritius (1988), Zambia (1990),
Venezuela (1990), South Africa (1991, 1995, 1997, 1999-CHOGM), Tanzania (1991), Namibia (1995), 
Peru (1995), Colombia (1995), Argentina (1995), Uruguay (1995), Malawi (1997), Botswana (1997),
Cuba (2000), Mozambique (SAID 2000), Uganda (SAID 2001), among others (not including private visits). 
Source - Office of Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad (Perdana Leadership Foundation), July 2005.
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South co-operation, bilateral agreements like the Partial Visa Abolition Agreement, the 
Investment Guarantee Agreement and the Economic, Scientific and Technical Co­
operation Agreement were signed during most of these visits to facilitate economic and 
technical co-operation. In addition, the adoption of the BPA was also a significant coup 
in boosting Malaysia’s economy, as well as a recognition of Malaysia’s economic 
achievement and leadership.
True to his Malaysia Inc. philosophy, Mahathir strongly supported the private 
sector and pushed them to be pro-active in South-South co-operation. In this regard, with 
the patronage of Mahathir, the Malaysian private sector formed two investment oriented 
South-South bodies, namely the Malaysian South-South Association (MASSA) and the 
Malaysian South-South Corporation (MASSCORP). MASSA’s main objective was to 
promote economic and trade relations between Malaysia and other developing countries. 
MASSCORP was the investment arm under MASSA’s umbrella, to develop investment 
linkages with South countries. In addition, the National Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (NCCIM) had also been active in promoting a South agenda.63
MTCP
The Malaysian Technical Co-operation Programme (MTCP) was launched on 7 
September 1980. The programme was consistent with Mahathir’s belief that one of the 
most important aspects of South-South co-operation was the sharing of experience and 
expertise. Hence, MTCP as a bilateral mechanism was different from multilateral
62 Argentina (1989), Cuba (2001), Chile (1991), Fiji (1982), Ghana (1997), Guinea (1997), Jordan (1995), 
Mexico (1992), Namibia (1996), Papua New Guinea (1982), Peru (1996), Senegal (1992), South Africa 
(1991), Sudan (1999), Venezuela (1990) and Zimbabwe (1989). Source -  Inspectorate Division, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Wisma Putra, June 2005. See also Chandran Jeshurun, Malaysia: Fifty Years 
o f  Diplomacy, p. 177.
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frameworks such as NAM, which were more dialogical in nature. Under MTCP, 
Malaysia’s leading role amongst the countries of the South was promoted more directly 
in terms of its achievements, or a model that could be emulated by other developing 
countries. In other words, as a bilateral technical cooperation programme, MTCP 
provided a mechanism for Malaysia to share its development experiences with other 
developing countries. It had as its basis a “prosper-thy-neighbour” philosophy. Focusing 
on human resource development, MTCP’s programmes covered various areas where 
Malaysia had the experience and expertise, such as public administration, agriculture, 
poverty alleviation, investment promotion, ICT, banking and the English language.64
As of 2005, 131 countries had benefited from the MTCP since its inception. It 
continued to offer about 50 short term courses which were conducted at 22 Malaysian 
institutions yearly.65 The allocation for MTCP was RM45 million (US$ 20.45 million) 
for the first five years when it was launched in 1980. It rose steadily to the amount of 
RM 145.8 million (US$ 38.37 million) under the 8th Malaysia Plan (2001-2005).66
A Case Study of Bilateral Initiatives: South Africa
Certain bilateral relations can be used to illustrate the ethos of South-South co-operation 
being put into practice. This was especially the case with the African countries that did 
not enjoy much attention in Malaysia’s foreign policy before Mahathir. Moreover, Africa 
became one of the primary targets of South-South co-operation under Mahathir, 
evidenced by* the launching of LID and SAID. Other than the training provided by
63 Brief on South-South Co-operation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, July 2005.
64 http://www.epu.jpm.my/New%20Folder/mtcp2.htm, accessed on 20 May 2005.
65 Brief on South-South Co-operation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Wisma Putra, July 2005.
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Malaysia to officials of African countries through the MTCP, increased co-operation 
could also be seen in increasing trade and investments flows.
Mahathir’s mission vis-a-vis Africa was given recognition at the Third Tokyo 
International Conference on African Development (TICAD III) held in Tokyo from 3-4 
December 2001. At the conference, Mahathir was given the honour to deliver two 
statements, firstly at the opening session and secondly, at a session on ‘South-South Co­
operation’. The Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) has 
become a base for Malaysia to co-operate with Japan and France to assist developments 
of African countries.67
Amongst the African countries, South Africa presents an interesting case in 
which Mahathir had shown tremendous interests. Mahathir had continued Malaysia’s 
strong disapproval of the apartheid regime, which was evident in his speeches at the 
CHOGM and NAM meetings.68 Evidently, Prime Minister Mahathir has long-standing 
ties with the ANC and consistently supported the fight against apartheid69 and Kuala 
Lumpur became known as a foremost crusader against apartheid.70 In 1985, the Third 
World Foundation (TWF) organised its Third World Awards ceremony in Kuala Lumpur 
and bestowed an award to Nelson Mandela.71 Mahathir was one of the first foreign 
statesmen who made a private one-day visit to South Africa in April 1994 to congratulate
66 Author interview with Shazelina Zainal Abidin, Principal Assistant Secretary, Global Economics & 
Development Division, Wisma Putra, 10 July 2007. The average rate of exchange was RM2.20 = US$1 in 
1980, and RM3.8 = US$1 in 2001.
67 Brief on South-South Co-operation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, July 2005.
68 For example, see Mahathir’s speeches at the 1985 CHOGM, 1983 NAM Summit in New Delhi and 1986 
NAM Summit in Harare. See also Aziz, Paradigm Shifts, pp. 144-5 & 158.
69 According to South African Government Information website -
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2003/03082910461002.htm (accessed on 30 August 2007).
70 Aziz, Paradigm Shifts, p. 137.
71 Aziz, Paradigm Shifts, p. 137. See also Karminder Singh Dhillon, Malaysian Foreign Policy in the 
Mahathir Era, 1981 -  2003, dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree 
o f Doctor o f Philosophy, University o f Boston, 2005, p.293.
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Mandela on his release.72 Then he made an official visit in August 1995, and Mandela 
reciprocated with a state visit in March 1997.
Malaysia’s Malay based ruling party - UMNO - had begun to intensify its 
contacts with South Africa’s ANC after the apartheid government’s ban on the latter was 
lifted in 1990. By then, ANC’s activists and economists had begun to speak admirably of 
the Malaysian development model.73 However, links between the two countries had to 
begin unofficially with co-operation in the private sector, particularly of companies 
linked to the Malay ruling party, UMNO, before Malaysia established diplomatic 
relations with South Africa on 6 November 1993. Apparently, Malaysia’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs stood firm on its principle not to rush establishing bilateral relations 
before a transition to black African majority was completed, although pressured by 
Malaysia’s MITI and Ministry of Primary Industries.74 However, in early 1993 Renong’s 
Halim Saad and the head of Landmark Group, Dato’ Samsudin were sent to South Africa 
as the Malaysian government’s advance team to gauge investment possibilities. 
Malaysia’s state-linked companies became major supporters to the ANC campaign, 
contributing o f about SAR6 million (US$ 2 million)75 just before the elections.76 Lim 
Kok Wing, an influential Malaysian academic who was close to Mahathir and then 
Malaysian Economic Advisor Daim Zainuddin, became an important figure in organising 
both the funds and the ANC’s election campaign. Malaysia also became a channel 
through which other Asian countries provided their financial contributions in the early
72 According to South African Government Information website -
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2003/03082910461002.htm, accessed on 30 August 2007.
73 Vishnu Padayachee and Imraan Valodia, ‘Developing South-South Links? Malaysian Investment in Post- 
Apartheid South Africa’ in Jomo.K.S. (ed.), Ugly Malaysians?, p.36.
74 Jeshurun, Malaysia: Fifty Years o f  Diplomacy, p.245.
75 Based on SAR3 = 1US$ (1993).
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1990s.77 Thus, Malaysia’s involvement in South Africa was operationalised through the 
close links between UMNO and the ANC, or in other words, Mahathir and Nelson 
Mandela.78 Malaysia’s strong position against apartheid was clearly recognised by South 
Africa’s new government and Mahathir’s image as the defender of justice and equality 
was greatly enhanced through his association with Mandela.
The networking between dominant political parties -  UMNO and the ANC 
spurred collaborations in the business sector. “Malaysians, investing in mainly 
petrochemicals, telecommunications, and the hospitality and property markets, have been 
among the largest new investors in South Africa.”79 In the 1990s, Malaysia contributed 
18 percent of FDI in post-apartheid South Africa, and was the second biggest after the 
US. The most significant Malaysian investments in South Africa were by Telekom 
Malaysia in Telkon SA and Petronas in Engen.80
The elaboration above could easily lead to the conclusion that there was a 
predominance of economic or acquisition of wealth motivation in this drive by Malaysian 
companies to invest in South Africa. However, these economic initiatives were pushed 
by the very top Malaysian leadership, Mahathir himself, and arguably underpinned by the 
belief that the countries shared similar social and political imperatives. At the same time, 
Malaysia was already touted by South African new leaders as a successful model to 
overcome the challenge of empowering the economically disadvantaged ethnic majority
76 Padayachee and Valodia, ‘Developing South-South Links?...’ in Ugly Malaysians?, p.36. See also Chris 
Alden and Garth le Pere, South A frica’s Post Apartheid Foreign Policy - fro m  Reconciliation to Revival?, 
Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press for IISS, Adelphi Paper 362,2003, p.20.
77 Padayachee and Valodia, ‘Developing South-South Links?...’ in Ugly Malaysians?, pp.36-7.
78 “Nelson Mandela himself has been appreciative of Maahthir’s position on South Africa. He personally 
conveyed his appreciation and visited Malaysia to be honoured.” Rajendran, Mahathir Mohamad: Prime 
Minister o f  Malaysia, p. 148.
79 According to South African Government Information website,
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2003/03082910461002.htm, accessed on 30 August 2007. See also 
Padayachee and Valodia, ‘Developing South-South Links? . . . ’ in Ugly Malaysians?, pp. 31-2.
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in their society. The experience of denigration that was shared by the indigenous 
majorities of both countries provided the foundation for co-operation and “pushed the 
level of intensity of Malaysian investment and other economic relations in post-apartheid 
South Africa, beyond what can be explained by conventional economic and risk-based 
considerations alone”.81 The role of Mahathir in this drive was pivotal. As one South 
African businessmen who has had extensive dealings with Malaysians explained, “if Dr 
Mahathir says, ‘Go to South Africa’... you go, no matter what the risks.”82 Moreover, 
Padayachee and Volodia observe that ‘Unless there are other, hidden motivations for 
Malaysian investment in South Africa the political injunction appears to be a strong 
factor.”55
Therefore, Malaysia indeed increased its focus on the South during Mahathir’s 
premiership. Its policy initiatives covered both multilateral and bilateral frameworks. It 
is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the effectiveness of the implementation of 
this policy. However, Malaysia’s South initiatives were not without challenge. For 
example, Malaysia’s investments became an election issue in Ghana’s Presidential 
Election in 2000. Malaysia Telekom and TV3 decided to withdraw their investments in 
2002, alleging unfair treatment by the new government under Kufour. Mahathir himself 
admitted that it had been difficult to invest in African countries because their policies 
towards Malaysian investments tended to change after changes in governments.84 This 
raised the question as to why Mahathir was so determined to pursue South-South co­
80 Padayachee and Valodia, ‘Developing South-South Links?...’ in Ugly Malaysians?, p.32.
81 Padayachee and Valodia, ‘Developing South-South Links?...’ in Ugly Malaysians?, p.38.
82 Sunday Independent, 20 April 1997 quoted in Padayachee and Valodia, ‘Developing South-South Links?
... ’ in Ugly Malaysians, p.38.
83 Padayachee and Valodia, ‘Developing South-South Links?...’ in Ugly Malaysians, p.38.
84 Summary of Meeting with Prime Minister on TM’s Investment in Ghana, 1 September 2002, and Brief 
on Malaysia -  Ghana Bilateral Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, November 2002.
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operation? Certainly, the economic motive cannot be discounted, that is to find new 
markets for Malaysian products and investments. However, this alone does not present a 
complete picture. It is therefore essential to understand Mahathir’s thinking On the South 
to understand the motives behind these moves. This is the aim of the following section.
5.3. MAHATHIR’S THINKING ON THE SOUTH
The experience of colonialism was a crucial factor that had influenced Mahathir’s 
thinking on the South. To Mahathir, “The North and South divide is the perpetuation of 
the old relations between the imperial powers of the West and their colonies.”85 Mahathir 
resented colonialism, the very experience which had triggered the strong sense of Malay 
nationalism at the core of his recognition struggle. He believed that colonialism was 
partly driven by the strong conviction of cultural superiority by the Europeans. 
According to Mahathir;
“ I am not a racist; neither am I anti-White nor anti-European, but I cannot help but notice that 
ethnic Europeans have an infinite capacity to convince themselves that, whatever it is that they are 
doing at the moment, it is right, proper and just. Thus, when they were colonising us, exploiting 
our wealth in Asia, Africa and the Americas, even warring and killing us, they were able to 
convince themselves that it was a burden imposed on them by God, a cross that they must bear for 
what they were doing was to civilise the natives and to bring culture and religion to them. They 
called it the White Man’s Burden. If  in the process the natives were oppressed it was incidental 
and quite unavoidable.” 86
To Mahathir, although the process of decolonisation had brought the countries 
of the South political freedom, it had not amounted to much in reality. To him, the
85 Mahathir Mohamad, ‘North-South Relations: Problems and Prospects’, speech at the International 
Conference on Human Resources Development within the Framework of International Partnership in 
Jakarta, Indonesia on 16 September, in Globalisation, Smart Partnership and Government: Selected 
Speeches By Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister o f  Malaysia (Vol. 2), Hashim Makaruddin (ed.), 
Subang Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 2000, p.207.
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unequal relationship between South countries and their former colonisers had persisted.
Thus, Mahathir was outraged at the continuing subjugation of the South countries to the
former colonial North. Mahathir observed:
“Having gained independence, the former colonies expected to have a relationship as between 
equals with their former colonial masters. But they soon realised that this was not to be. All that 
has happened is a name change from being colonies to being the South and the ex-colonial masters 
are now called the North. Oppressive pressures are now less direct and are applied in the name of 
democracy and human rights instead. But the effect is the same. The ex-colonies or the South 
must submit to the North, to rules and regulations and policies devised in the North for the 
North.”87
Clearly then, to Mahathir, countries of the South were trapped in an unequal 
relationship defined by the North and governed by international structures controlled by 
the North. Although the states of the South formed the majority in world society, they 
were too weak politically and economically to effectively influence international 
structures.
Nevertheless, Mahathir admitted that during the period of the Cold War, when 
the two ideologies of capitalism and communism were in contention, the ‘weak’ South 
managed to exert some leverage on international issues. At the 12th NAM Summit in 
Durban, South Africa in 1998, Mahathir reminisced the constant fear suffered by the 
Third World amidst the instability of the arms race between NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
during the Cold War, leading to the NAM’s founding in 1961. To a certain extent, they 
succeeded in asserting their rights as sovereign nations because in many instances, they
86 Mahathir, ‘Governance, Smart Partnerships and Unfettered Globalisation’, speech at the Second South 
International African Dialogue (SAID) in Namibia, 28 July 1998, in Globalisation, Smart Partnership and 
Government, pp.69-70.
87 Mahathir, ‘North-South Relations: Problems and Prospects’, speech at International Conference on 
Human Resources Development Within the Framework of International Partnership in Jakarta, Indonesia 
on 16 September 1994 in Globalisation, Smart Partnership and Government, p.207.
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were ‘being wooed by both East and West’.88 Mahathir believed that the end of the Cold 
War had revived the North’s ambition for a total dominance because ‘“[mjere political 
dominance in a unipolar world is apparently not enough for the North.”89 It had not 
improved the prospects for the South because the North was considered “unwilling to 
change their attitude” and seemed keen to “want to perpetuate colonialism in other forms 
and names.” To Mahathir, this insistence of the North to perpetuate their domination 
over the South was especially evident in the phenomenon of globalisation. In this regard, 
Mahathir’s discourse on globalisation is important because it also sheds light on his 
motivation to pursue South -  South co-operation.
5.3.1. Unipolar World, Globalisation and (Neo)Colonialism
Globalisation became the focus in Mahathir’s criticisms of the North-South relationship. 
Mahathir equated globalisation with colonialism numerous times, for example, by seeing 
it as ‘the Second Great Age of Colonialism’.90 At the 1st SAID in Botswana in 1997, he 
warned:
“Now that colonisation is over, we have globalisation. The borders which define countries will be 
erased and economic competition on so-called level-playing field must reign supreme.”91
He further said that even after independence, developing countries’ “politics, 
economy, social and behavioural systems are all under the control, directly or indirectly,
88 Mahathir, ‘Globalisation: Colonialism Revisited’, speech at the 12th Conference of the Heads of State or 
Heads of Government o f the Non-Aligned Members (NAM) in Durban, South Africa on 2 September 1998, 
in Globalisation, Smart Partnership and Government, p.61.
89 Mahathir, ‘North-South Relations: Problems and Prospects’, speech at the International Conference on 
Human Resources Development within the Framework of International Partnership, Jakarta, 16 September 
1994, in Globalisation, Smart Partnership and Government, p.211.
90 Mahathir Mohamad, ‘Globalisation and its Impact on Developing Economies’, speech at the 10th World 
Economic Development Congress, Kuala Lumpur, 27 June 2001, in Globalisation and the New Realities 
(Selected Speeches by o f  Dr Mahathir Mohamad), Subang Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 2002, p.51.
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of the old colonial masters and the great powers.” Hence, globalisation and colonialism
was equated because they diluted the sovereignty of nation-states.
At the 12th NAM Summit in Durban, South Africa in 1998, he reiterated the
threat posed by globalisation to national sovereignty. Mahathir said:
“When we achieved independence, the world believed in the sovereignty of nation-states. Proudly 
we maintained that our internal affairs and policies are ours to determine. Our former colonial 
masters should leave us alone. While the Cold War lasted, they did. But once the Cold War was 
over, the triumphant victors began to enunciate new concepts o f international relations which 
could give them back their dominant imperial role.” 92
Thus to Mahathir, under globalisation, developing countries had to face 
challenges similar to those of imperialism - that is of “independent” thinking, of 
identifying “the truth”, of ensuring “fairness and justice”, of forging relationships to 
“mutual benefit” and of “creating a more compassionate and caring world, where the 
winner does not take all.” 93
At the 4th Langkawi International Dialogue in 1999, he reminded other leaders 
of the countries of the South:
“Many of us still remember the days of colonial subjugation, the pain and the humility. Many still 
bear the scars o f the unequal battles for our independence. We fought for hundreds of years. We 
have only just won. We have hardly tasted the fruits of our sacrifices. We cannot now be forced 
to submit to foreign domination once again. It may not be the raw colonisation that we knew but 
it is not too far different.”94
Mahathir’s perception of colonialism was clearly fundamental in his thinking 
on the North-South relationship. In this sense, it was colonialism’s inherent inequalities 
and injustices and the experiences of humiliation and denigration that it entailed that
91 Mahathir, ‘Smart Partnerships’, speech at the 1st Southern Africa International Dialogue in Kasane, 
Botswana, May 5 1997 in Globalisation, Smart Partnership and Government, p. 163.
92 Mahathir, ‘Globalisation: Colonialism Revisited’, speech at the 12th NAM Conference, Durban, South 
Africa, 2 September 1998 in Globalisation, Smart Partnership and Government, p.63.
93 Mahathir, ‘Globalisation and its Impact on Developing Economies’, speech at the 10th World Economic 
Development Congress, Kuala Lumpur, 27 June 2001, in Globalisation and the New Realities, pp.40-2.
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motivated Mahathir to identify Malaysia with the countries of the South. To him, they 
shared similar experience of having been disrespected. He was outraged by the fact that 
the North, which he equated with former colonisers, could continue dictating the 
countries of the South how to conduct their political and economic affairs. This was the 
root o f his feeling of having been disrespected -  he took exception at the sense of cultural 
superiority he believed to underpin the North’s attitudes and practices towards global 
superiority. Furthermore, he also believed that the domination of the North was 
entrenched in their control of international structures. For this reason, he detested 
colonialism and was very weary of unfettered globalisation. To him, the patronising 
attitude of the North - that they knew better, that their systems always worked best, 
amounted to disrespecting the South. It stripped the countries of the South of their 
dignity and was the source of the continued injustices besetting the relationship between 
North and South.
5.3.2. Democracy, Free Market Capitalism and the South
As noted, Mahathir perceived that the North dominated the South in both political and 
economic affairs. In this sense, Mahathir seemed alarmed by the conviction held by 
some people in the North that their values of Liberal Democracy and free market 
capitalism had triumphed since the end of the Cold War.95 At the same time, Mahathir 
observed that with the advent of globalisation, the powers of the international structures 
which advance these values, for example the WTO, had strengthened at the expense of
94 Mahathir, ‘Globalisation, and Smart Partnership’, speech at 4th Langkawi International Dialogue, 
Langkawi, 25 July 1999, in Globalisation, Smart Partnership and Government, pp.29-30.
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the powers of the states and their national sovereignties. Mahathir was sceptical of 
organisations like the WTO, which he believed would only become answerable to the 
world’s wealthiest economies.96 He feared that organisations like the WTO would be 
used to exert pressures on developing countries in the areas of democracy, human rights 
and trade liberalisation, which had increasingly become linked.
In relation to democracy, Mahathir time and again highlighted the challenges 
faced by developing countries in adopting a political system which had its origin in a 
specific European culture and history. Moreover, most of the new countries were carved 
out by colonial powers and most of them were not natural nation-states. Mahathir thus 
stressed the challenges faced by newly independent countries in their nation-building 
efforts. Moreover, Mahathir highlighted the irony that for a long time, these societies did 
not know any democracy when they were under colonial rule. Thus, Mahathir remarked 
that “since as colonies they were all governed autocratically by their colonial masters, it 
is not surprising that they found democracy unmanageable.”97
Therefore, the struggle for recognition was aroused within Mahathir based on 
his resentment of the North’s attempts to dictate the countries of the South on how to 
govern themselves. He appealed for acceptance of the limitations faced by the countries 
of the South and a more flexible and understanding approach from the North. Moreover, 
he believed that the difficulties faced by the countries of the South in adopting the
95 For example, Francis Fukuyama argues that after the Cold War ended, we might be witnessing “the end 
of history” in the sense that it would be “the end point o f mankind’s ideological evolution and the 
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” Francis 
Fukuyama, ‘The End of History’ in The National Interest, No. 16, Summer 1989, pp.4 & 18.
96 Milne, and Mauzy, Malaysian Politics under Mahathir, p.131.
97 Mahathir, ‘North-South Relations: Problems and Prospects’, speech at the International Conference on 
Human Resources Development Within the Framework of International Partnership, Jakarta, Indonesia, 16 
September 1991, in Globalisation, Smart Partnership and Government, pp.207-8.
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democratic political system were partly responsible for their slow economic progress.98 
In this regard, Mahathir felt that Malaysia could be a model for countries of the South 
because its economic achievements proved the effectiveness of its form of democratic 
system, which was able to bring political stability in the country. To further illustrate 
Mahathir’s thinking on democracy and the South, at SAID 1, he made this remark:
“ We should go for democracy of course. But we should be tolerant of the fumbling attempts, the 
failures and the mismanagement. The world must help in the training of government in the 
management of the economy. We should not expect the ultimate. We should not tolerate the 
dictators who emerge o f course. But we should understand why they emerged. They emerge 
because we impose a system on people who do not understand or had no experience o f working 
the system.”99
It has been noted that Liberal democratic values had been linked by Mahathir 
to free market capitalism. In a unipolar, globalised world, Mahathir saw that “baleful, 
unmitigated capitalism, is free to do what it likes”.100 In the age of instant global 
telecommunications and high-speed travel, the North to him, pressured the South to open 
up their economies for the freer flow of capital. Mahathir observed that the North 
preached their capitalist liberal economic principles according to which a free flow of 
capital, goods and services was necessary for free competition, which would guarantee 
economic efficiency. In this regard, Mahathir was especially sceptical about the 
simplistic notion justifying free market capitalism on the basis of the argument that,
98 See for example, ‘North-South Relations: Problems and Prospects’, Mahathir’s speech at the 
International Conference on Human Resources Development within the Framework of International 
Partnership, Jakarta, 16 September 1994, in Globalisation, Smart Partnership and Government, p.213.
99 Mahathir, ‘Globalisation, Smart Partnership and Government’, speech at the 1st Southern Africa 
International Dialogue in Kasane, Botswana, 5 May 1997, in Globalisation, Smart Partnership and 
Government, p. 167.
100 Mahathir, ‘Governance, Smart Partnerships and Unfettered Globalisation’, a speech delivered at the 2nd 
SAID in Swakopmund, Namibia, on 28 July 1998 in Globalisation, Smart Partnership and Government, 
p.71.
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“[t]he efficiency of the developed world would flow into the developing world, to create 
a better and richer society.” 101
Mahathir’s scepticism stemmed from his observation that industries from the 
South were too weak and small to compete with the giants from the North in the context 
of liberalised markets. To Mahathir, the 1997 Asian financial crisis was a clear example 
of the harshness of unfettered globalisation. In the case of Malaysia, attacks on the 
Malaysian ringgit forced it to devalue by 70 per cent, thus effectively reducing 
Malaysia’s per capita income from US$ 5,000 before the crisis to US$ 1,500. In other 
affected East Asian countries, Mahathir observed that governments that depended on 
corporate taxes to fund administration and development suddenly became bereft of funds. 
This eventually led to social and political unrest and governments became ineffective or 
completely overthrown.102 Concerning Mahathir’s decision not to accept the austerity 
solution offered by the IMF, Stiglitz remarked that, “Mahathir knew that all gains in 
building a multiracial society could be lost, had he let the IMF dictate its policies to him
i mand his country and then riots broken out.”
Speaking at the 2nd SAID in Namibia in 1998, Mahathir expressed his 
frustration that instead of recognising the inequalities of the system, countries of the 
South were blamed for not being transparent and for practising crony capitalism and 
nepotism. This argument was used by the North to justify the “discipline” enforced by 
the market forces on these economies in order, “to teach us how to manage our countries
101 Mahathir, ‘Governance, Smart Partnerships and Unfettered Globalisation’, a speech delivered at the 2nd 
SAID in Swakopmund, Namibia, on 28 July 1998 in Globalisation, Smart Partnership and Government, 
pp.71-2.
Mahathir, ‘Governance, Smart Partnerships and Unfettered Globalisation’, in a speech delivered at the 
2nd SAID in Swakopmund, Namibia, on 28 July 1998 in Globalisation, Smart Partnership and 
Government, p.72.
103 Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontent, London: Penguin, 2002, p. 120.
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properly.”104 He refused to accept the so-called liberalisation principle as gospel truth,
and that unhindered market forces would improve governance.
He further said:
“We are told that this is how the globalised world functions. The media tells us that this turmoil, 
all this impoverisation of our people and our countries, is good for us because they will help us to 
get good government, help us attract foreign investments.
I am sorry, but I think it is a gross injustice. We believe it is inhuman to impoverish millions of 
people in order that capital should flow freely. We think it is unjust to destroy the prosperity o f 
countries in order to realise a globalised, borderless world. We believe there must be a better way 
to discipline governments, a way which does not cause misery for innocent people.” 105
Mahathir reiterated this criticism of unfettered globalisation several times. 
One of such occasions was at the Tokyo International Conference on African
Development (TICAD II) in Tokyo, on 19 October 1998.106 He noted with concerns the
quasi religious fervour with which globalisation and free market capitalism were being 
advocated.
“Globalisation, deregulation, liberalisation, borderless world -  these are the fundamentals o f the 
new theology. The high priests are the people with capital, unlimited capital. Their handmaidens 
are the great writers, journalists and economists, the media practitioners who propagate the
religion with fervour. And like all religious fanatics they tolerate no recalcitrance.” 1 7
Again, Mahathir drew parallels between the justification for unfettered free 
market capitalism under conditions of globalisation and the arguments which initially 
underlined the moral basis for imperialism.108 To him, it patently portrayed the self 
righteous and patronising attitude of the North based on their conviction of inherent
104 Mahathir, ‘Governance, Smart partnerships and Unfettered Globalisation’, speech at the 2nd SAID in 
Swakopmund, Namibia, 28 July 1998, in Globalisation, Smart Partnership and Government, p.73.
105 Mahathir, ‘Governance, Smart Partnerships and Unfettered Globalisation’, speech at the 2nd SAID in 
Swakopmund, Namibia, 28 July 1998, in Globalisation, Smart Partnership and Government, pp.73-4.
106 Mahathir, ‘African Development’, speech at the Tokyo International Conference on African 
Development (TICAD II), Tokyo, Japan, 19 October 1998, in Globalisation, Smart Partnership and 
Government, pp.46-7.
107 Mahathir, ‘Governance, Smart Partnerships and Unfettered Globalisation’, speech at the 2nd SAID in 
Swakopmund, Namibia, 18 July 1998 in Globalisation, Smart Partnership and Government, p.74.
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superiority. Hence, he argued that even with globalisation’s harsh impacts clearly 
proven, still “[t]he developed ethnic European countries were convinced that they were 
actually doing the developing Asian and African countries a favour. It was the White 
Man’s Burden all over again, only this time there were no gunboats. Money does a better 
job.” I<w
In addition, Mahathir saw a double-standard in the manner globalisation was 
being pursued by the North, which he considered to be unjust. While the South was 
pressured into opening their economies to capital, goods and services from the North, the 
North was increasingly protective of their territories and borders to the free flow of 
people from the South. Similarly, while the North preached liberal democratic values, 
they had resisted from making the United Nations, where the South held the majority, 
more democratic.110
5.3.3. The Way Forward for the South
Mahathir equated globalisation with colonialism because “it was the West’s ideas, not 
ours, based on their philosophy of zero-sum game, and we don’t play a part in conceiving 
it.”111 However, Mahathir maintained that he was not entirely opposed to globalisation. 
Even Malaysia had benefited from some aspects of it.112 However, he argued for
108 Mahathir, ‘Governance, Smart Partnerships and Unfettered Globalisation’, speech at the 2nd SAID in 
Swakopmund, Namibia, 18 July 1998 in Globalisation, Smart Partnership and Government, p.69-70.
109 Mahathir, ‘Governance, Smart Partnerships and Unfettered Globalisation’, speech at the 2nd SAID, 
Namibia, 18 July 1998, in Globalisation, Smart Partnership and Government, p.72.
110 Mahathir, ‘Globalisation: Colonialism Revisited’, speech at the 12th NAM Conference in Durban, South 
Africa, 2 September 1998, in Globalisation, Smart Partnership and Government, pp.64-5.
111 Author interview with Mahathir Mohamad, 16 January 2007, London.
112 Mahathir, ‘Globalisation and its Impact on Developing Economies’, speech at the 10th World Economic 
Development Congress, Kuala Lumpur, 27 June 2001, in Globalisation and the New Realities, p.46.
198
globalisation to be more democratic, so that developing countries could voice their 
concerns and take part in shaping the emerging globalised norms. Mahathir lamented,
“It is not defensible for the rich to discuss amongst themselves in the marbled negotiating rooms 
in Geneva and then to present it as fa it accompli to the developing world. We should make it 
absolutely clear: No liberalisation, no globalisation without representation.” 1,3
Hence, Mahathir wanted recognition in the form of a voice and participatory 
role for the South to influence the emerging norms under globalisation. To him, 
globalisation should consider the South’s constraints and vulnerabilities, many of which 
were due to difficulties with nation-building following long periods of colonialism. In 
addition, Mahathir in his speeches at various international meetings called for the unity 
amongst the developing countries. He did this for example, at the Inaugural Plenary of 
the Sixth G-15 Summit in Harare, Zimbabwe in 1996114 and at Durban NAM Summit in 
1998.115 At the Fourth Langkawi International Dialogue in Malaysia, he was hopeful that 
the intellectual and moral arguments voiced by leaders of the countries of the South 
might resonate with some policy-makers and academics in the North. He hoped the 
academics and intelligentsia would join the South “in our new struggle to preserve our 
self-respect and our rights,”116 like they did in ending colonialism. In short, an aspect of 
the recognition struggle encapsulated in Malaysia’s foreign policy concerning the South 
centred on claiming equal rights for the South, which Mahathir deemed essential for their 
self-respect.
113 Mahathir, ‘Globalisation and its Impact on Developing Economies’, speech at the 10th World Economic 
Development Congress, Kuala Lumpur, 27 June 2001, in Globalisation and the New Realities, p.50.
114 Mahathir, ‘South-South Cooperation’, speech at the Inaugural Plenary o f the 6th G15 Summit on Behalf 
o f Asian Members of the G15 in Harare, Zimbabwe, on 3 April 1996, in Globalisation, Smart Partnership 
and Government, p. 176.
115 Mahathir, ‘Globalisation: Colonialism Revisited’, speech at the 12th NAM Conference in Durban, South 
Africa, 2 September 1998, in Globalisation, Smart Partnership and Government, p.66.
116 Mahathir, ‘Globalisation and Smart Partnership’, speech at the 4th Langkawi International Dialogue 
(LID), in Langkawi, Malaysia, 25 July 1999, in Globalisation, Smart Partnership and Government, p.30.
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Related to this goal, is Mahathir’s support for the setting-up of the ‘South 
Secretariat’. According to Mahathir, a ‘Think South’ policy must be developed among 
developing countries of the South. He said that the basic problem with the countries of 
the South was that they continued to look up to the North even though they were rich in 
population, culture, natural resources, and in other fields.117 This clearly shows 
Mahathir’s perception of the South’s low self-confidence, which he attributed to their 
experiences of colonial rule.
Further, Mahathir argued that countries of the South should forge new trade 
and investment linkages as a way to extricate themselves from traditional dependencies 
on the North. Hence, Mahathir promoted the concept of Smart Partnerships. From the 
first LID in 1995 onwards, Mahathir began to promote this concept as the core of 
Malaysia’s South - South co-operation policy. With reference to Malaysia’s economic 
co-operation with Japan, Mahathir explained that trade between nations should not be 
viewed as a zero-sum game. Japanese investments had contributed to Malaysia’s 
prosperity and a prosperous Malaysia had become a bigger market for Japanese goods 
and services. Their co-operation thus was of a win-win nature. Malaysia had continued 
to practise this win-win formula according to ‘prosper thy neighbour’ policy with the less 
developed economies of Indochinese countries of Southeast Asia and it had proven to be 
effective.118 He reiterated the benefits of ‘Smart Partnerships’ at the first SAID in 
Botswana in May 1997, and said that it was an important mechanism for the South to 
present a united front, and to “strengthen each other”. Because the South were not
117 Asean Digest, no. 12, November-December 1992, p .I l ,  quoted in Faiz, Malaysia and South -  South Co­
operation, p.96.
Mahathir, ‘Smart Partnerships for Global Co-operative Security’, speech at the Inaugural International 
Dialogue on Smart Partnerships in Langkawi, Malaysia, on 26 July 1995, in Globalisation, Smart 
Partnership and Government, p.202.
200
without assets and experience, “[b]y exchanging our experiences in economic 
management, we can learn to do what is right and avoid the mistakes that any one of us 
may have made.”119
5.4. THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION IN MAHATHIR’S FOREIGN 
POLICY TOWARDS THE SOUTH
Therefore, some forms of struggle for recognition can clearly be detected in Mahathir’s 
foreign policy towards the South. The policy was greatly influenced by Mahathir’s 
perception of inequality pervading in North-South relationship. This unequal 
relationship, Mahathir believed, was a continuation of the imperialist era. As we have 
seen in Chapter Three, colonialism was pivotal in prompting the struggles for recognition 
in Mahathir’s belief system, which had Malay nationalism at its core. The end of the 
Cold War had spurred his fear of colonialism’s revival, when ideas would be defined and 
imposed unilaterally.120
Honneth’s three modes of ‘practical relations-to-self provides a useful 
framework for us to detect elements of recognition struggles. In this context, recognition 
struggles in Mahathir’s foreign policy towards the South can be studied according to the 
modes of self-confidence, self respect and self esteem, as elaborated in Chapter 2.
Firstly, in terms of self-confidence, according to Mahathir’s belief system, 
colonialism was partly responsible for the low self-confidence of the Malays. Mahathir 
claimed that they continued to look up to their European former colonial masters even
119 Mahathir, ‘Smart Partnerships’, speech at the l sl Southern Africa International Dialogue (SAID),
Kasane, Botswana, 5 May 1997, in Globalisation, Smart Partnership and Government, pp. 169-170.
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after independence. Mahathir identified strongly the plight of the Malays with those of 
other nations of the South that had also experienced colonialism. Mahathir made it a 
point to speak up and stand up for the interests of the developing South, in opposition to 
the former colonial North partly to illustrate on the world stage a confident image of a 
Malay leader and thereby instilling national confidence back home. His rhetoric was 
always strongly critical. This could also be seen as intentional. His ability to express 
scathing criticisms of the North was to Mahathir, a proof of Malaysia’s true 
independence. According to Mahathir, the reason why Malaysia could voice its views 
unhindered was because its hands were not tied. Unlike most developing countries, 
Malaysia was not dependent on the North for aid and trade.121 Therefore, Malaysia was 
also able to showcase its success. Both rationales were motivated by the desire to boost 
the confidence of the Malaysian nation. Hng says that one of Mahathir’s ten golden rules 
for managing a multi-racial society was to produce results and showcase them. This is 
because, “success builds confidence and generates momentum.” Bearing in mind 
Mahathir’s articulation in The Malay Dilemma of the Malays’ low self-confidence (as 
being partly due to their colonial mindset), his continued preoccupation with the issue of 
self-confidence proves that the Malays had remained Mahathir’s focus throughout in this 
context of nation-building agenda.
Secondly, Honneth explained self respect in terms of equal rights. In this 
regard, the struggle for recognition relates to Mahathir’s appeals for the South to be given 
its rightful voice in influencing international political and economic norms. Mahathir’s 
motivation on the Antarctica policy for example, was based on his outrage by the fact that
,20Camroux, 'Looking E ast’ and Inwards, p.24.
,21 Author interview with Mahathir Mohamad, 16 January 2007, London.
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decisions were taken exclusively by the North without consulting countries of the South. 
Mahathir saw this tendency of the North to exclude the countries of the South to be 
particularly acute with the advent of globalisation. Hence, Mahathir emphasised the 
necessity for international structures like the UN and WTO to be more democratic and 
fought for a bigger voice for the South within these organisations. Towards this end, 
Mahathir called for the unity of the South through their various multilateral frameworks 
so that their “moral voice” would be stronger and heard loud and clear.122 To him, it was 
only by taking into account the concerns and needs of the countries of the South that 
justice in the international society could be achieved.
The third mode of practical relation to self according to Honneth is self 
esteem. To Mahathir, the uniqueness of Malaysia was its success story as a developing 
country. In this context, the struggle for recognition can be detected in Mahathir’s drive 
to make Malaysia a role model for other South countries. However, Mahathir believed 
that, “to be a model, you need to be successful. You need to develop first.”123 To 
Mahathir, economic development was an important indicator of success. To be taken as a 
model by other developing countries meant a recognition of Malaysia’s method of 
development and nation building. The centrality of his recognition struggle for the 
Malays in the context of the NEP/NDP agenda had thus been crucial. Esteem as a form 
of recognition struggle was evident in Malaysia’s relationship with the African countries, 
especially in the context of Smart Partnerships, which was about sharing experiences and 
resources. Mahathir wanted Malaysia to be recognised as special to other multi-ethnic 
developing countries because of the success of the NEP/NDP in overcoming inter-ethnic
122 ‘PM: United NAM Can have Big Say in WTO’, New Straits Times, 19 February 2003, quoted in 
Pandian, Legasi Mahathir, Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications, 2005, p.262.
123 Author interview with Mahathir Mohamad, 16 January 2007, London.
203
divisions.124 In the case of relations with South Africa for example, Mahathir promoted 
Malaysia as the perfect model of moulding a multi-ethnic nation, achieved through a 
programme that had empowered its previously economically disadvantaged ethnic 
majority. According to Camroux, Malaysian leaders were not only ‘flattered to find their 
advice eagerly sought by South Africa’s new leaders’, furthermore, the interest 
“strengthens the legitimacy within Malaysia o f the NEP and NDP programs in favor of 
the bumiputras”]25
5.5. CONCLUSION
Hence, while it is difficult to deny that the drive to acquire wealth and to 
prosper was significant, it does not entirely explain the motivation that underpinned 
Malaysia’s policy of South -  South co-operation pursued during the Mahathir era. It has 
been shown that motivations related to struggles for recognition were also crucial. The 
significance of the struggle for recognition underpinning South-South co-operation can 
be inferred most evidently from the promotion of the Smart Partnerships concept. This 
concept was about the sharing of expertise, resources and experiences. It was not limited 
to trade and investments but also covered social and political development. Thus, more 
than just promoting trade and investment, Mahathir also promoted Malaysia as an 
example of how a newly independent country could successfully manage a precarious 
multi-racial nation to concentrate on economic development.
124 J.V. Morais, Mahathir: A Profile in Courage, Kuala Lumpur: Eastern University Press, 1982, pp. 165-6.
125 Camroux, ‘Looking E ast' ... and Inwards, p.25.
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Considering the lack of enthusiasm of some of Mahathir’s own Cabinet 
colleagues126 and the complaints voiced by some members of the Malaysian private 
sector, it is arguable that in fact, the quest for recognition was actually the more 
significant factor in driving Malaysia’s policy towards the South under Mahathir. 
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of Mahathir’s ‘South’ policy initiatives is difficult to 
gauge. Undoubtedly, South-South co-operation has contributed immensely to the 
Malaysian economy. For example, Malaysia’s total trade with NAM countries was 
RM 61 billion (about US$ 23.46 billion) in 1992. In 2002, the figure had jumped to 
RM 194.7 billion (about US$ 51.24 billion).127 However, it had not been easy for 
Malaysia under Mahathir to realise its ‘South’ vision. Although Malaysia has been 
recognised as a leading country within the South groupings and Mahathir was considered 
one of their prominent leaders, the government encountered many challenges in realising 
this vision of Mahathir,128 Firstly, Malaysia’s struggles were not always recognised 
especially by other countries that also felt entitled to lead the South specifically due to 
their role in founding the group. Indonesia, India, Ghana and Yugoslavia were at the 
forefront of the movement when Malaysia under the Tunku was obliged to keep its 
distance by its association with the West. Secondly, Malaysia’s ventures into Africa, the 
South Pacific and Latin America also were perceived with suspicions by certain countries 
that felt entitled to regional leadership.129 In addition, due to the top-down process of 
implementation, practical co-operation was often hinged on the longevity of leaders’
126 See Jeshurun, Malaysia: Fifty Years o f  Diplomacy, p.311.
127 ‘PM: United NAM Can Have a Big Say in WTO’, New Straits Times, 19 February 2003; quoted in 
Pandian, Legasi Mahathir, p.262. Average rate of exchange in 1992 was RM2.6 =US$1 and in 2002,
RM3.8 = US$1.
128 Camroux for example highlighted a leadership competition between Mahathir and Indonesia’s Suharto. 
Camroux, ‘Looking East'... and Inwards, p.24.
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political careers, especially in the African and South Pacific countries. Moreover, there 
were problems of different work cultures and ethics. At the UNDP -  MASSCORP 
Dialogue held on 28 July 2005, a number of representatives of Malaysian companies 
raised such problems with regard to their investments in Africa.130 It was obvious that 
most companies were there mainly because of the encouragement and push from the 
Malaysian government, particularly by Mahathir himself.
To reiterate, the effectiveness of the policy is a question beyond the scope of 
this thesis insofar as it concerned with exploring the motivations underpinning foreign 
policy-making rather than the implementation process. As far as motivation for South- 
South co-operation goes, Mahathir was indeed crucial in initiating the policy and 
“without his influence and push” South-South co-operation “would not have been 
possible.”131 The chapter has also illustrated that economic factors were undeniably
important in providing the motivation to pursue South -  South co-operation. However, 
economic imperatives alone cannot provide a full picture behind Malaysia’s foreign 
policy focus on the South under Mahathir. Recognition motives have proven to be 
equally, if not more important. In this context, an understanding of Mahathir’s belief 
system, especially his conceptions of justice in the relations between the countries of the 
developed North and developing South has helped to make sense of recognition struggles 
as motivations. Colonialism, which had generated a strong sense of Malay nationalism in 
Mahathir was the source of his quest for international recognition for Malaysia. As has
129 This can be said to be the case in relation to Australia’s response to Malaysia’s involvement in the 
economies of South Pacific island states under the banner o f South-South co-operation, which is not 
discussed in this thesis. See Faiz, Malaysia and South -  South Co-operation, pp.262-9.
130 The Dialogue was organised by MASSCORP and was attended by author. Among Malaysian 
companies that were represented were Lam Soon, Pharma Niaga, Business Focus and Bina Puri.
Malaysian government investment agency MIDA also attended, together with a representative of 
government owned Bank Industri.
31 Rajendran, Mahathir Mohamad; Prime Minister o f  Malaysia, p. 154.
206
been highlighted in Chapter Three and widely observed, “The intellectual and 
psychological impact of colonialism had a strong influence on his worldview, and he was 
a natural sympathiser of the independence movement which swept through much of Asia 
and Africa in the 1940s and 1950s.”132 The fact that recognition of Malaysia’s 
independent status was contested by this group of countries during Indonesia’s 
‘KonfrontasV had definitely intensified within Mahathir the drive to seek recognition. 
Also, this chapter has illustrated how these recognition factors can be detected in terms of 
Honneth’s theory of the struggle for recognition, that is, by employing his modes of 
practical relation to self. Thus, recognition factors in Mahathir’s foreign policy 
concerning the South can be understood in terms of the struggle to attribute self- 
confidence, self respect and self esteem to the Malays, whose identity had become the 
foundation for the Malaysian national identity.
To conclude, the ‘South’ dimension was important in Mahathir’s foreign 
policy because it is the bigger identity reference group under which other important 
Malaysian identities are subsumed, namely ‘Islam’ and the ‘East’. It will be seen in the 
following chapters that Malaysia under Mahathir had employed the same methods of co­
operation, particularly South-South co-operation and the MTCP, in its relations with 
Islamic and East Asian countries. This is due to most Islamic and East Asian countries 
were also developing countries that faced similar ‘South’ problems highlighted in this 
chapter, particularly in regard to economic development and liberal democracy.
132 Hng Hung Yong, CEO Malaysia: Strategy in Nation-Building; Subang Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 
1998, p.62.
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CHAPTER 6 MAHATHIR, MALAYSIA AND THE ISLAMIC
UMMAH
There was a prominent Islamic focus in Malaysia’s foreign policy during Mahathir’s era.1 
As Nair observes, the Mahathir Administration “promoted an Islamic image of the 
country over and beyond any of its predecessors.”2 An illustration of the increased 
priority given to Islamic issues in foreign policy is Mahathir’s founding of IKIM in 1992. 
One of IKIM’s briefs was “the study of Islamic principles in relation to foreign relations 
issues.”3 The central argument of this chapter is that recognition motives also 
underpinned this greater Islamic focus. As in the previous chapter on the South, it will be 
illustrated that other motives, namely security (in this case, the survival of UMNO 
regime) and economic motives also played a role. However, it will be argued here that a 
complete understanding of the prominent Islamic focus in Malaysia’s foreign policy 
under Mahathir will reveal that the quest for recognition was the more influential 
motivation.
In discussing the Islamic focus in Malaysia’s foreign policy, this chapter will 
analyse the relevant foreign policy initiatives, statements and stances that concerned the
1 R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Malaysian Politics under Mahathir, London and New York: Routledge, 
1999, p. 135.
2 Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, London and New York: Routledge, 1997, p.269.
3 David Camroux, 'Looking East’ ... And Inwards: Internal Factors in Malaysian Foreign Relations 
During the Mahathir Era, 1981-1994, Australia-Asia Paper No.72, Centre for Study of Australia-Asia 
Relations, Griffith University, Australia, 1994, p. 12
208
Islamic, or Muslim community -  the ummah4 In terms of research methodology, this is 
an important point. Although foreign policy is the state’s prerogative, the target of 
foreign policy may not necessarily be other states, although issues relating to them might 
be raised and discussed within the framework of the community o f states. This is 
particularly true with regard to issues concerning the Muslim ummah, which transcend 
political boundaries of states. In the case of the Muslim communities of Palestine and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, both were not yet recognised as states at the stage when they began 
to become subjects of Malaysia’s foreign policy.
In examining recognition factors as motivations underpinning the Islamic 
focus in Mahathir’s foreign policy, this chapter will firstly highlight the importance of 
Islam in Malay and Malaysian identity. This will provide us with the understanding of 
the significance of the Islamic link between Malaysia and the global Islamic community 
-  the ummah. In this regard, the chapter will revisit the discussion on the centrality of 
Islam for Malay identity and nationalist struggle, and how this impacted Mahathir’s 
understanding of the situation of the Malays and the ummah in general. This has been 
analysed at length in Chapter Three. However, it will be highlighted again here how 
Mahathir held similar views on the fate of the Muslim Malays in the multi-ethnic and 
multi-religious Malaysian society as he did in relation to the fate of the Muslim ummah in 
the global community. Mahathir’s understanding of the role of Islam in determining the 
well-being and status of the ummah is vital. Secondly, this chapter will illustrate
4 The ummah refers to “[t]he community comprising all adherents of the Islamic religion. The ummah is a 
supra-national notion and extends beyond national boundaries and political borders to encompass all 
Muslims, regardless of political affiliation.” Hng Hung Yong, CEO Malaysia: Strategy in Nation-Building, 
Subang Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1998, p.223. On the other hand, Kepel defines ummah as simply, “the 
Muslim world.” See Gilles Kepel, The War fo r  Muslim Minds: Islam and the West, translated by Pascale 
Ghazaleh, Cambridge, Mass. and London, England: Belknap Harvard, 2004, p.36.
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Malaysia’s foreign policy initiatives both in multilateral and bilateral frameworks, 
towards the Islamic ummah in order to highlight the growing emphasis on Islam and the 
ummah in Malaysia’s foreign policy under Mahathir. As regards multilateral contexts, 
the OIC will be the main focus. This chapter will then proceed to analyse specific issues 
concerning the Muslim ummah that induced strong feelings of moral indignation within 
Mahathir, and thus, became important preoccupations of his government. The important 
issues to be discussed here are Palestine and Bosnia Herzegovina. Thirdly, the chapter 
will expound Mahathir’s views on terrorism, which will illuminate further Mahathir’s 
thinking on the plight of the ummah and reveal the moral undertone of his discourse. 
Fourthly, Mahathir’s understanding of the situation of the Muslim ummah and his 
arguments on how best to deal with the related problems are contextualised in terms of 
the moral grammar embedded in his discourse. The moral grammar, which stemmed 
from Mahathir’s conceptions of justice, forms the basis of his struggles for recognition as 
regards the Islamic ummah. Further, it will be illustrated that notions of self-respect and 
self-esteem were key in driving Mahathir to heighten the focus on Islam in Malaysia’s 
foreign policy.
6.1. MAHATHIR. THE MALAYS. MALAYSIA AND THE UMMAH: THE 
TIES THAT ISLAM BINDS
In charting Mahathir’s belief system and conceptions of justice, Chapter Three has 
illustrated how Mahathir from very early on in his political awareness appreciated the 
central role Islam played in influencing Malay values and character. The centrality of 
Islam in Malay identity makes Islam the dominant factor in the Malay political
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discourse.5 Islamic issues are critical to the discourse of Malay politics.6 More than any 
of his predecessors, Mahathir dealt directly with the issue of Islam in articulating his 
political philosophy concerning the Malays, as documented in his writings, most notably 
The Malay Dilemma and The Challenge. Islam continued to be a defining factor in his 
Malay and Malaysian nationalism after he assumed the country’s premiership. As 
Martinez observed, “Mahathir was a very articulate and dominant prime minister, never 
more so than in expressing his views on Islam and trying to effect them. It is therefore 
imperative to examine his vision of Islam for his people -  the ummah at home and 
abroad.”7
The centrality of Islam for the Malaysian national identity was emphasised by 
Mahathir in January 1981, a few months before he assumed the premiership, when he 
represented Malaysia at the OIC Summit Conference in Taif, Saudi Arabia. There he 
declared that, “Despite the fact that about half the population of Malaysia is not Muslim, 
Malaysia and all its citizens accept Islam as the religion of the country. Working with all 
the Muslims wherever they are is natural to us. So we have come to this Conference to 
be with and a part of the Muslim world.”8 After winning a land-slide victory in the first 
general elections of his administration in 1982, he insisted on what he believed, that 
Islam was “a pragmatic and flexible religion” which in fact formed “the basis of our 
every action.” In his first address to the UMNO General Assembly as President in July 
of the same year, Mahathir declared that Malaysia, as an Islamic nation, was inseparable
5 See Hussin Mutalib, Islam and Ethnicity in Malay Politics, Singapore, Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990.
6 See Kamarulnizam Abdullah, The Politics o f  Islam in Contemporary Malaysia, Bangi: Universiti 
Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2002, especially pp.29-79.
7 Patricia Martinez, ‘Perhaps He Deserved Better: The Disjuncture Between Vision and Reality in 
Mahathir’s Islam’ in Bridget Welsh (ed) Reflections: The Mahathir Years, Washington D.C.: The Paul H. 
Nitze School o f Advanced International Studies (SAIS), 2004, p.28.
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from the rest of the Islamic world.9 Thus, Mahathir sought to identify Malaysia as a 
member of the community of Islamic nations from the beginning of his premiership.
The significance of Islam in Malaysia’s foreign policy can be explained in two 
ways. Firstly, in terms of the contest for legitimacy between UMNO and PAS, at the 
heart of which were their different visions of the Malaysian state and the role of Islam in 
it.10 From this perspective, Mahathir’s actions might be interpreted as cunning political 
manoeuvring that served to outwit PAS. For example, when the PAS government in 
Trengganu proposed to implement hudud,11 Mahathir remarked that his “political 
legitimacy” was already strong by virtue of the Islamisation process that his government 
had undertaken domestically and the recognition thereof by other Muslim countries.12 In 
other words, Mahathir’s move to co-opt Islam can be interpreted as a way to marginalise 
PAS in Malay politics by adopting “an Islamic vocabulary for his own ends.”13
Many authors have concentrated on this regime security motivation in 
explaining Malaysia’s increasing identification with the Islamic ummah. More 
specifically, they believe that the UMNO -  PAS rivalry was the crucial factor and that 
Mahathir was primarily motivated to maintain the survival of the UMNO regime in 
domestic politics. For example, Nair in her book Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy 
concludes that the “overriding Malaysian concern... is with security, not so much in
8 Murugesu Pathmanaban and David Lazarus, Winds o f  Change: The Mahathir Impact on Malaysia's 
Foreign Policy, Kuala Lumpur: Eastview, 1984, p.66.
9 Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p.92.
10 Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p.270.
11 An area of Islamic Shariah law that describes fixed punishments for certain crimes considered ‘claims of 
God’ for example drinking alcohol, theft, highway robbery, illegal sexual intercourse and false accusation 
o f illegal sexual intercourse. See K.S. Nathan and Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Islam in Southeast Asia: 
Political, Social and Strategic Challenges fo r  the 21st Century, Singapore: I SEAS, 2005.
12 Sivamurugan Pandian, Legasi Mahathir, Kuala Lumpur: Utusan, 2005, p.205.
13 Amrita Malhi, ‘The PAS - BN Conflict in the 1990s: Islamism and Modernity’, in Malaysia: Islam, 
Society and Politics, Virginia Hooker and Norani Othman (eds), Institute o f Southeast Asian Studies, 
Singapore, 2003, p.245.
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physical terms but by means of reducing the vulnerabilities of its political structures.”14 
Camroux echoes this point and argues that the Mahathir government “felt obliged” to 
take the initiative for Islamisation process in order to reduce the electoral appeal of 
PAS.15 Milne and Mauzy similarly attribute the growing prominence of Islam in 
Malaysia’s foreign policy as “the consequence of the Islamic resurgence and of the 
reactions that it aroused in Mahathir.”16 This position is shared by Liow who connects 
the Islamic resurgence in Malaysia to the rising challenge of PAS and therefore, 
“Mahathir’s foreign policy towards the Muslim states has been particularly important and 
effective tool in advancing his domestic interests in the sense that it legitimised his 
government as one which championed the cause of the ummah.”17 In addition, Yusof 
argues that the primary objective of Malaysia’s Islamic policy is “the containment or 
defusion of the fundamentalist-extremist threats within” and “maintaining the legitimacy 
of UMNO in the eyes of the Malay-Muslim populace.”18 Dhillon also explains the rising 
foreign policy focus in Islam in the light of the domestic challenge of PAS, which made 
“spectacular political inroads” during Mahathir’s time,19 which is also a view shared by 
Rajmah.20
14 Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, London and New York: Routledge, 1997, p.269.
15 Camroux, ‘Looking E ast’ ... and Inwards, p. 20.
16 Milne and Mauzy, Malaysian Politics under Mahathir, London and New York: Routledge, 1999, p.135.
17 Joseph Liow, ‘Personality, Exigencies and Contingencies: Determinants o f Malaysia’s Foreign Policy in 
the Mahathir Administration’, in Mahathir's Administration: Performance and Crisis in Governance, Ho 
Khai Leong and James Chin (eds.), Singapore and Kuala Lumpur: Times Books International, 2001, p. 136.
18 Mohd Yusof Ahmad, Continuity and Change in Malaysia’s Foreign Policy, 1981-1986, a dissertation 
presented to the Faculty o f the Fletcher School o f Law and Diplomacy in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, May 1990, p.271.
19 Karminder Singh Dhillon, Malaysia's Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era, 1981-2003, a dissertation 
submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Boston 
University, 1995, p.350.
20 Rajmah opines that the increasing Islamisation of foreign policy under Mahathir was conducted in the 
hope “to win over the support o f Islamic fundamentalists” and thus, “counteract the political influence of 
PA S...” Rajmah Hussain, Malaysia at the United Nations: A Study o f  Foreign Pollicy Priorities, 1957- 
1987, a thesis submitted to the University of London in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree 
o f Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations, London School o f Economics, July 1988, p.79.
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On the other hand, the significance attached to Islam can also be understood in 
terms of Mahathir’s own personal mission underpinned by his particular understanding of 
the religion and the role that Malaysia could and should play in the global community of 
Muslims. In this regard, Mahathir’s emphasis on Islam has to be seen as more than mere 
political strategy in relation to PAS, namely as a culmination of deeper personal beliefs 
and the exercise of responsibility as a leader of a Muslim country. After all, for Mahathir 
Islam was at the core of Malay identity, and as such he believed that he had specific 
obligations as a leader of a subset of the Muslim ummah as enshrined in the Islamic 
doctrines. Because all Malays are Muslims, Malay leaders are also bestowed with the 
responsibility of protecting their faith. “So, while Mahathir is first and foremost a 
political leader, he also has a presumptive role as a leader of the Islamic faith.”21 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that although Islam has always been pivotal in Malay 
political discourse, there is little evidence that any of Mahathir’s predecessors felt the 
need to portray themselves as Islamists. In contrast, Mahathir as the prime minister can 
be considered as a Muslim modernist who transformed UMNO into a “religion- 
nationalist” party.22 This actually underscores that Mahathir’s actions stemmed from his 
particular belief system whereby Islam is the defining characteristic of Malayness. 
Chapter Three has highlighted Mahathir’s criticisms of the lifestyles of the Tunku and his 
cabinet ministers as Western and un-Islamic. To Mahathir, Malay nationalism was 
Muslim nationalism. At the 40th UMNO General Assembly in September 1997, Mahathir 
made this link between the Malay race and Islam explicit and said that “a true nationalist 
is one who works hard to develop his race” in order to “redeem the honour” of his “race
21 Hng Hung Yong, CEO Malaysia: Strategy in nation-Building, Subang Jaya: Pelanduk, 1998, p.76.
22 Kamarulnizam, The Politics o f  Islam in Contemporary Malaysia, pp. 121-2.
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and religion.”23 Therefore, in this context, Mahathir’s actions pertaining to Islam in 
foreign policy have to be understood in terms of his belief system concerning Islam and 
the role that the religion plays in influencing the worldview and consequently, the well 
being of the ummah, which includes the Malays.
While Malaysia’s Muslim identity is “self-evident”,24 Mahathir was 
determined to project Malaysia as representing a particular form of Islam.25 This 
particular form of Islam that he promoted was rooted in his own thinking about the 
religion and its role in Malay society in particular, and the wider Muslim ummah more 
generally. Mahathir’s particular understanding underpinned a correlation between his 
agenda for the Malays in the Malaysian society and the Muslim ummah in general. The 
following section will illustrate the promotion o f this particular brand of Islam in the 
international context, in the tangible form of Malaysia’s foreign policy initiatives.
6.2. MALAYSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES TOWARDS THE 
ISLAMIC UMMAH  UNDER MAHATHIR
As far as foreign policy is concerned, a heightened Islamic focus by Malaysia under 
Mahathir could be observed in both the multilateral and bilateral frameworks. In the 
multilateral framework, the OIC became the main body in which issues concerning the 
Muslim ummah were being pursued.
23 Mahathir Mohamad, speech at the 40th UMNO General Assembly, Kuala Lumpur, 5 September 1997, in 
Hng, CEO Malaysia, pp. 145-50.
24 Hng Hung Yong, 5 Men & 5 Ideas: Building National Identity, Subang Jaya: Pelanduk, 2004, p. 139.
25 Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p.91.
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6.2.1. Multilateral Framework: The OIC
The OIC, which was established in 1969, is the most important organisation for Islamic 
countries. Its founding was triggered by an arson attack on the Al-Aqsa mosque in 
Palestine.26 Thus, OIC has always been a political organisation with a primary concern in 
the fate of the Palestinians. Malaysia considers its membership in the OIC as significant 
because it signifies the recognition of its Islamic nation status by the community of 
Muslim countries.27 To illustrate Malaysia’s identification with the Islamic countries, at 
the UN, Malaysia’s positions on issues concerning the ummah are always guided by the 
OIC.28 With regard to Palestine, Malaysia conforms to the OIC’s position, which is 
normally in line with the position of the Arab League.29 Under Mahathir, Malaysia 
played a prominent role in the OIC. In the early 1980s, Malaysia was appointed to the 
International Islamic Peace Committee, which was set up by the OIC to help resolve 
another political issue that preoccupied the OIC at the time, the Iran-Iraq conflict.30 
Furthermore, Malaysia was pivotal in facilitating the re-admission of Egypt into the OIC 
in 1986. Egypt had been expelled after it signed the Camp David Accords with Israel in 
1978.31 Malaysia’s high profile role in the OIC culminated in Malaysia assuming the 
chairmanship of the OIC at the beginning of October 2003, just before Mahathir himself 
went into retirement.
26 The OIC was set up in Rabat, Morocco on September 25 1969 in reaction to an arson attack against the 
Al-Aqsa mosque on August 21, 1969. See Abdullah A1 Ahsan, OIC: The Organisation o f the Islamic 
Conference: An Introduction to an Islamic Political Institution, Herndon, Virginia: International Institute of 
Islamic Thought, 1988.
27 Rajmah, 1988, p.206 in Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p.93
28 Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p.93.
29 Author interview with Ambassador Hasmy Agam, former Malaysian Permanent Representative to the 
UN in New York, Kuala Lumpur, July 2007.
30 Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p.93. See also Aziz Zariza Ahmad, Mahathir’s Paradigm Shift, 
Taiping: Firma, p.148.
31 Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p.93.
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Before chairing the 10th Session of the Islamic Summit Conference in 
Putrajaya in October 2003, Malaysia under Mahathir was already active in hosting a 
number of OIC meetings. These included the 27th OIC Foreign Ministers Conference 
(ICFM) on 27-30 June 2000, the Seminar on the Impacts of Globalisation on OIC 
Countries on 11-13 June 2001, the 2nd OIC Tourism Ministers Conference on 12-13 
October 2002 and the Special OIC Foreign Ministers Conference (ICFM) on Terrorism 
on 1-4 April 2002. Malaysia was also member of the following OIC committees; the 
Committee on Commerce and Economic Co-operation (COMCEC); the Committee on 
Science and Technical Co-operation (COMSTECH); the Committee on Information and 
Arts Co-operation (COMIAC); the Committee of Six on Palestine; OIC Contact Group 
on Sierra Leone; Eight Member Committee on the Southern Philippines; OIC Contact 
Group on Somalia and the Committee for Solidarity with the People of African Sahel. In 
terms of financial support, Malaysia has been contributing about US$ 396,000 annually 
towards the upkeep of the OIC Secretariat. In addition, other OIC related bodies that 
enjoyed Malaysia’s contributions included the Islamic Fiqh Academy (based in Saudi 
Arabia, around US$ 57,000), the Statistics, Economics and Social Research Training 
Centre for Islamic Countries (based in Turkey, around US$ 70,000), the Islamic 
University of Technology (in Bangladesh, US$ 77,000), the Islamic Cultural Centre (in 
Turkey, US$ 78,000) and the OIC Centre for Trade Development (ICDT, based in 
Morocco, US$ 41,000). In total, Malaysia contributed around US$ 719,000 annually to 
the OIC and its related bodies.32 All these illustrations prove Malaysia’s commitments
32 Author interview with Agus Salim Yusof, Principal Assistant Secretary (OIC), Ministry o f Foreign 
Affairs Malaysia, Putrajaya, 5 June 2007.
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towards the causes pursued by the OIC and its related bodies under the Mahathir’s 
leadership.
In terms of policy substance, there were similarities in Malaysia’s approach 
towards the OIC countries and its approach towards the countries of the South. This is 
because all OIC members are formerly colonised Third World countries, and therefore 
face similar problems to those encountered by the global South. Hence, Mahathir also 
promoted the South agenda within the OIC framework. In this regard, Malaysia played a 
pivotal role in co-ordinating positions of OIC countries with those of the NAM at the 
UN.33 For example, Malaysia managed to include Antarctica on the OIC agenda.34 
Malaysia also raised the issues of Palestine and Bosnia-Herzegovina at NAM summits. 
At the 13th NAM Conference in Kuala Lumpur, Declarations on Iraq and the Palestine 
were adopted. Malaysia’s initiatives to increase co-ordination between Islamic and South 
organisations were not limited to political issues. Under Mahathir, Malaysia also actively 
promoted economic and technical collaboration under the South-South co-operation 
banner within the OIC.
In fact, under Mahathir, Malaysia took a pro-active role in championing 
economic and trade co-operation among OIC members. As one observer noted, “[n]o one 
has been as vociferous and passionate about die desire of increased OIC economic 
interaction than the former prime minister of the most progressive OIC members 
Malaysia, Dr Mahathir Mohamad.”35 During his first attendance of the OIC Summit 
Conference in Taif, Saudi Arabia in January 1981, Mahathir underlined the importance of
33 Author interview with Ambassador Hasmy Agam former Malaysian Permanent Representative to the UN 
in New York, Kuala Lumpur, July 2007. See also Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p.9.
34 Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p.95.
35 Rafiuddin Shikoh, Is Intra-OIC Trade Finally Taking Off?, 15 April 2005, 
http://www.dinarstandard.com.current/intraoic041505.htm, accessed on 10 August 2007.
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economic co-operation, as much as Islamic unity, to be achieved through the OIC. This 
was because, ‘Muslims must strive to be self-dependent to the highest possible level. 
Then and then only can we protect and promote the interest of the ummah and of 
Islam.”36 The dire economic condition of most OIC countries was palpable by the fact 
that the gross domestic product (GDP) of all OIC countries accounted for only US$ 1,461 
billion, or 4.7 percent of total world GDP.37 In addition, 23 OIC members were listed as 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and hugely in debt to the World Bank. The potential 
for trade expansion was huge, as intra-OIC trade amounted to only about US$ 800 
billion, which was about seven percent of global trade as a whole,38 and 12 percent of 
members’ total global trade.39
One of the most significant proposals by Mahathir towards enhancing OIC’s 
economic co-operation was the introduction of the Islamic gold Dinar as the currency for 
trade among Muslim countries. Mahathir advocated the idea in the aftermath of 
Malaysia’s experience during the 1997 Asian financial crisis. At the 20th A1 Baraka 
Symposium for Islamic Economies held in Kuala Lumpur on 25 June 2001, Mahathir 
emphasised the need for Muslim countries to create their own single currency. He 
foresaw that not only could the currency - the Islamic Dinar, make Islamic economies 
less reliant on US dollars, its effective use could also lead to an Islamic trading bloc, 
which would be “a powerful voice in international trading regimes and the shaping of the
36 Pathmanaban and Lazarus, Winds o f  Change, p.65.
37 2001 figure provided by Agus Salim Yusof, Principal Assistant Secretary (OIC), Ministry o f Foreign 
Affairs Malaysia, Putrajaya, June 2007.
38 ‘Muslims Urge Islamic Free Trade’, BBC News, 3 October 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/r/- 
/l/hi/business/4303992.stm (accessed on 6 October 2005).
39 2002 figure. See Rafiuddin Shikoh, Is Intra-OIC Trade Finally Taking Off?, 15 April 2005, 
http://www.dinarstandard.com.current/intraoic041505.htm, accessed on lOAugust 2007.
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new financial architecture.”40 The Dinar would be tied to the price of gold and he 
believed that this would make it more stable compared to the volatile and overly-traded 
American dollars, which had been traditionally used to determine the rate of exchange 
between currencies in international trade. To promote this idea, Mahathir conducted talks 
bilaterally with several Islamic countries, including Bahrain, Libya, Morocco and Iran in 
2002.41
At the international seminar on ‘Gold Dinar in Multilateral Trade’ organised 
by IKIM in Kuala Lumpur on 23 October 2002, in his keynote address, Mahathir 
highlighted what he perceived as the humiliation and the oppression of the Muslims as 
could be observed in Palestine, and the increasing discrimination suffered by Muslims 
since 11 September 2001, due to distorted views on Islam and the Muslims. He reiterated 
the importance that Muslims increase their capacities in terms of wealth and technology. 
He believed that the adoption of the gold Dinar would contribute towards this goal 
because it would help Muslim countries to protect themselves from the volatility of the 
exchange rate based on the US dollars. According to Mahathir, the US dollar, like any 
other currency, was a paper currency with no intrinsic value and was susceptible towards 
manipulative and speculative activities, as experienced by the Malaysian Ringgit, Thai 
Baht and other Asian currencies during the financial crisis of 1997.42 Mahathir also 
raised the proposal of using gold Dinar in trade between Islamic countries at various 
other occasions, for example in his speech at the official opening of the International
40 Speech at the 20th A1 Baraka Symposium for Islamic Economies, the Sheraton Imperial Hotel, Kuala 
Lumpur, 25 June 2001, www.pmo.gov.my, accessed on 23 April 2005.
41 Khaled Hanafi, Islamic Gold Dinar Will Minimize Dependency on U.S. Dollar,; 
http://www.islamonline.net/english/news/2003-01/08/article08.shtml, accessed on 5 August 2007.
However, according to sources from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, the proposal did not gamer 
much support from these countries.
42 Mahathir Mohamad, keynote address at The Gold Dinar in Multilateral Trade Seminar, Kuala Lumpur,
23 October 2002, www.pmo.gov.my, accessed on 10 August 2007.
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Islamic Capital Market Conference and the Launching of the International Islamic 
Capital Market at the Malaysian Securities Commission in Kuala Lumpur on 26 March 
2002.43 In addition, an International Convention on Gold Dinar was held in Malaysia on 
1 July 2003, where Mahathir declared Malaysia’s offer to set up a secretariat to co­
ordinate the necessary follow-up activities.44
Malaysia’s initiatives towards enhancing OIC economic co-operation further 
increased during its chairmanship of the OIC in 2003-2006. During its chairmanship, 
Malaysia launched the programme to eliminate poverty through capacity building to 
stimulate growth in poorer member countries. Towards this end the Islamic Development 
Bank, the investment arm of the OIC was tasked to draw up IDB’s Vision 2020 (or ‘1440 
Hijrah Vision -  according to the Islamic calendar). Although Mahathir retired soon after 
Malaysia assumed the chairmanship of OIC in October 2003, the agenda for Malaysia’s 
chairmanship of the OIC was consistent with Mahathir’s aspirations for the grouping. 
Moreover, Mahathir himself was elected Chairman of IDB Vision 2020 (1440H) 
Commission. The Commission was tasked to formulate the vision that would guide the 
group to embark upon strategic initiatives and to bring prosperity and development to the 
Muslim world.45 It is modelled after Malaysia’s own Vision 2020, which Mahathir had a 
vital role in conceptualising. Again, it is worth noting that this new economic and 
development agenda within the OIC framework was pursued by Malaysia, along with its 
advocacy of the original raison d ’etre of the Organisation, which was the support for the
43 See speech by Mahathir Mohamad at the official opening of The International Islamic Capital Market 
Conference and the launching o f The International Islamic Capital Market Week at the Securities 
Commission, Kuala Lumpur, 26 March 2002, at www.pmo.gov.my, accessed on 10 August 2007.
44 See speech by Mahathir Mohamad at The Gold Dinar Convention, Kuala Lumpur, 1 July 2003, 
www.pmo.gov.my; See also Sivamurugan Pandian, Legasi Mahathir:; p.255.
45 Mahathir Appointed as Chairman o f  ID B ’s Vision 2020 Commission, 23 June 2005, www.bemama.com, 
accessed on 10 August 2007.
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Palestinian cause. Malaysia, and specifically Mahathir remained vocal throughout, at 
every opportunity, in defending the rights of the Palestinian people.
6.2.2. Bilateral Initiatives towards Islamic Countries
This thesis has noted Mahathir’s preference for bilateral diplomacy because it allowed for 
greater “intimacy, understanding and results.”46 Further, Nair observed that Malaysia 
under Mahathir had at least initially exhibited greater vigour and ambition in its bilateral 
relations with Islamic countries of West Asia, compared to its overall efforts within the 
OIC.47 This heightened emphasis in bilateral relations can be illustrated by the fact that 
Mahathir led a high level delegation including ministers and corporate figures to Bahrain, 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman as early as February 1982, barely months after 
assuming office and a few months before he led his party to a triumph in the General 
Election. Arguably, these visits were important in strengthening the Islamic credential of 
the new Mahathir Administration and the Malaysian media reported the praise and 
recognition bestowed by these countries to Malaysia for its contributions to Islam and the 
Islamic community.48 Similar to the way he promoted South-South co-operation by 
visiting far flung South countries, visits to various Islamic countries were also high on
46 Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p.95. Also noted in Rajmah, Malaysia at the United Nations, 
p .13.
1 Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p.95.
48 Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p.95. See also Pandian, Legasi Mahathir, p.251.
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Mahathir’s agenda.49 During these visits, he consistently called for the solidarity of the 
Muslim ummah and their empowerment through the mastery of knowledge, technology 
and the economy. Beyond undertaking bilateral visits, 14 diplomatic missions were 
established in OIC member countries, nearly half of the 38 new Malaysian diplomatic 
missions set up around the world between 1981-2003.50 As in the case of foreign policy 
towards the countries of the South, personal rapport between Mahathir and leaders of 
Islamic countries proved to be pivotal. For example, Mahathir enjoyed close personal 
friendships with the former Pakistani President Zia ul Haq,51 the former President of the 
Kyrgyz Republic, Askar Akayev52 and the Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat.
Although Mahathir raised the need to realise greater ‘South-South Islamic 
economic co-operation’ within the OIC framework,53 it is within the bilateral context that 
Malaysia’s efforts towards this purpose were mostly undertaken. The rationale 
underpinning South-South co-operation with Islamic countries remained the sharing of 
Malaysia’s experiences in development and economic progress. As with the countries of
49 OIC member countries that Mahathir visited during his premiership included the following: Indonesia 
(August 1981); Bahrain, UAE, Oman (Feb. 1982); Bangladesh (March 1983); Turkey (May 1983); 
Pakistan (March 1984); Indonesia (March 1985); OIC Summit Conference, Jeddah (September 1985); 
Indonesia (October 1985); Indonesia (March 1991); Bangladesh and Pakistan (February 1993); Uzbekistan 
and Iran (March -  April 1993); Brunei (August 1993); Indonesia (September 1994); Turkey, Jordan and 
Turkmenistan (September -  October 1994); Morocco (December 1994); Bosnia (April 1996); Brunei 
(April-May 1996); Saudi Arabia (March 1997); Kyrgyz Republic (September 1997); OIC Summit 
Conference in Tehran, Iran (December 1997); Brunei (February 1998); UAE (March 1998); Egypt (May 
1998); Sudan (May 1998); Jordan (February 1999); Bangladesh (D8 Summit) (February-March 1999); 
Indonesia (March 2000); Bosnia (October 2000); Brunei (October 2000); Qatar (OIC Summit Conference) 
(November 2000); Abu Dhabi (April 2001); Yemen (August 2001); Libya and Bahrain (April 2002); 
Algeria (August 2002); Brunei (October 2002); Saudi Arabia (October 2002); Beirut and Cairo (January 
2003); Syria (August 2003). Source: Office of Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, Perdana Leadership 
Foundation, Kuala Lumpur.
50 Bosnia (1996), Brunei (1982), Jordan (1995),Kazakhstan (1996), Oman (1983), Saudi Arabia (1985), 
Sudan (1999), United Arab Emirates (1983), Uzbekistan (1993), Yemen (1999),Algeria (2001), Syria 
(2002), and Bahrain (2003). In addition, a Malaysian embassy was also set up in Qatar in 2004, after 
Mahathir’s retirement but the process had already started during his time. The total number does not 
include Consulate offices. Source: Inspectorate Division, Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, Malaysia.
51 Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p.97. See also Sivamurugan Pandian, Legasi Mahathir, p.250.
52 Pandian, Legasi Mahathir, p.254.
223
the South generally, the MTCP again became the most important tool towards this end. 
According to the EPU of the Prime Minister’s Department, Malaysia has provided 
technical assistance to 55 OIC countries, that is, all but one -  Chad, since the 
commencement of the MTCP in 1981. Up until 2004, 4860 foreign participants from 
OIC countries had benefited from short and long term programmes arranged under 
MTCP.54 Moreover, the Malaysian Government provided full-sponsorship to all 
participants from OIC countries under MTCP.
It can be concluded that Mahathir’s emphasis on sharing Malaysia’s 
experience with other Islamic countries stemmed from his belief that the problems of the 
Malays were similar to those faced by the whole of the Muslim ummah. Their low 
economic status was partly responsible for their hapless and disrespectful situations. 
Thus, Mahathir’s message to the broader Islamic ummah was consistent with that which 
he sent out domestically.55 He stressed the importance of acquiring knowledge and 
technology, and making economic progress. He reminded fellow Muslims of how Islam 
had brought progress to pagan ‘jahiliyah' Arabs, to the extent that Muslims achieved a 
great civilisation. By promoting Malaysia as an example, Mahathir also sought 
recognition for the success of the Malay Muslims for their ability to create a nation that is 
modem, progressive, with a successful economy and working democracy. As Nair 
explained Mahathir’s thinking, “[s]o, in Malaysia, Islam works, and successfully too. It 
is an example that deserves the attention of other members of the ummah.”56 The success
53 See for example, Mahathir’s speech at the OIC Summit Conference in Taif, Saudi Arabia, on 27 January 
1981 in Pathmanaban and Lazarus, Winds o f  Change, p.67.
54 Notes on the Proposal o f Assistance to be Offered for the Capacity Building in OIC Countries by the 
External Assistance Section of the Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister’s Department of Malaysia, 7 
December 2004. File Document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia.
55 Milne and Mauzy, Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir, p. 135.
56 Hng Hung Yong, 5 Men & 5 Ideas, Subang Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 2004, p. 142.
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of the MTCP programme therefore can be seen as a form of validation of Mahathir’s 
diagnosis o f the problems facing the Muslim ummah and his prescriptions on how to 
overcome them. However, it is important to note that economic objectives were the tools 
that were employed to uplift the status of the ummah to a respectable position. The 
underlying motivation was therefore a quest for recognition in terms of respect and status. 
In the following section, it will be revealed more clearly why recognition struggles 
became important motivations underpinning the policies that have been illustrated above. 
It will be shown that recognition struggles were aroused due to Mahathir’s strong sense 
of moral indignation relating to the deprived conditions of the global Muslim ummah.
6.3. PALESTINE AND BOSNIA: MAHATHIR’S MORAL INDIGNATION
Mahathir raised the issues of Palestine and Bosnia-Herzegovina repeatedly in multilateral 
and bilateral meetings and conferences and his government also dealt with these 
communities directly even before they were officially recognised as nation-states. These 
two issues were very important to Mahathir’s government and at one point became its 
preoccupations. To Mahathir these issues epitomised the kind of negative perceptions of 
Islam, as well as the oppression and injustices inflicted upon Muslims around the world. 
It can be argued that the moral indignation felt by Mahathir on the sufferings of the 
Palestinians and Bosnians even surpassed that which he felt relating to the economic 
misery experienced by the ummah more broadly.
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6.3.1. Palestine
Although Malaysia was always a strong supporter of the rights of the Palestinian people 
to self-determination, Mahathir made Palestine a key issue of his administration.57 This 
can be understood in terms of Mahathir’s “track record of personal commitment to the 
Palestinian cause, underlined by his strong opposition to Zionism and his record in 
lobbying for nationalist movements and for a more independent Third World -  oriented 
foreign policy.”58 In addition to his support for the Palestinians through the OIC, 
Mahathir also persistently highlighted their plights in other international fora that 
Malaysia was active in, namely the UN, NAM and ASEAN.59
Bilaterally, Malaysia under Mahathir had taken various bold measures to 
show its unequivocal support for Palestine. Most significantly, Mahathir announced that 
his administration would accord the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) 
diplomatic status in 1981, shortly after he assumed prime- ministership, making Malaysia 
the only country in Southeast Asia and the second in the world, after Pakistan, to do so at 
the time.60 In 1989, the PLO Representative Office in Kuala Lumpur was upgraded and 
accorded full diplomatic status, equal to other diplomatic missions in Kuala Lumpur.61 
The nation considered this a daring move. Other countries were reluctant to do so even if 
they sympathised with the Palestinians “for fear of incurring the wrath of America.”62
Mahathir’s commitment to the Palestinian cause can be further illustrated by 
the close personal friendship he formed with the leader of the PLO, Yasser Arafat.
57 Pathmanaban and Lazarus, Winds o f  Change, p.49.
58 Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p.206.
59 Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p.207.
60 Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, pp.206-7. See also Aziz, Mahathir’s Paradigm Shift, p.143.
61 Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p.207.
62 Aziz, Mahathir's Paradigm Shift, p. 143.
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Arafat visited Malaysia three times -  in July 1984, August 2000 and August 2001.63 
Moreover, Arafat himself gave Mahathir and Malaysia his personal recognition by 
praising “the long history of excellent relations and friendship between Malaysian and 
Palestinian peoples” and stating that “compared with some Arab countries, Malaysia is 
even closer to us.”64
Malaysia also contributed a significant amount of aid to assist the Palestinian 
people. One example is its contribution to the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) 
that worked with Palestinian refugees in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.65 The Malaysian 
government also contributed RM 100,000 in 1982 towards the relief work at the 
Palestinian refugee camps after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.66 Another form of aid 
was in the form of scholarships for Palestinian students at Malaysian universities and 
training centres.67 In addition, Malaysia launched ‘Tabung Rakyat Palestin’ or the 
Special Fund for Palestinians in the Occupied Territories at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs ( Wisma Putra) in 1988, to which Malaysians were encouraged to donate 
generously. In 1983, Malaysia spent about RM1.5 million in hosting the Asian Regional 
Conference of the UN on the Question of Palestine.68 In his speech, Mahathir highlighted 
the central issue concerning Palestine, which was ‘an entire people being driven out of 
their homeland, humiliated and harassed’ and the ‘injustices and indignities’ that had 
been perpetrated on the Palestinians by the Israeli state.69 Mahathir also expressed his 
regret that ‘certain quarters’ tried to undermine the ‘efforts in the cause for justice of the
63 Pandian, Legasi Mahathir, p.291.
64 Quoted in Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p.206.
65 Cited as US $5000 in 1981. Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p.207.
66 Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p.207.
67 Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p. 207. See also Pandian, Legasi Mahathir, p.247.
68 Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p.207.
69 Mahathir’s speech at the opening o f the Asian Conference on the Question of Palestine, 3 May 1983 in
Pathmanaban and Lazarus, Winds o f  Change, p.217.
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Palestinian struggle’.70 He berated the ‘supporters of Israel’ who claimed to champion 
human rights but clearly applied ‘double standards’, which exposed their hypocrisy.71
Malaysia’s strong identification with the cause of the Palestinians strained its 
relations with its neighbour Singapore in 1986, due to the visit of Israeli President Chaim 
Herzog in November to the city-state. This is thus a clear example of how important the 
issue of Palestine had become in Malaysian politics. However, in this bilateral tiff with 
Singapore, Mahathir and the Malaysian government abided by the ASEAN policy of non­
interference although faced with growing pressure from the media and the public to take 
drastic actions against Singapore. Nevertheless, for the Malaysian government, the 
Herzog visit portrayed “Singapore’s insensitivity to its neighbours’ interests and 
policy”.72
Malaysia was always against Zionism.73 However, Mahathir projected anti- 
Zionist inclinations more strongly than his predecessors. For example, Mahathir, on 
more than one occasion, expressed his belief that Malaysia could fall victim to a Zionist 
conspiracy.74 According to Aziz, Mahathir believed that “certain quarters” had “no 
desire to see Islamic nations achieve respectable status” and that “the Zionists and their 
allies” were “uneasy” because “Malaysia’s authority” was “on the increase amongst 
Islamic nations and the Third World.”75 In this sense, Malaysia’s achievements and 
increased authority were portrayed as bearing a significant positive impact on the ummah
70 Mahathir’s speech at the opening of the Asian Conference on the Question of Palestine, 3 May 1983 in 
Pathmanaban and Lazarus, Winds o f  Change, p.217.
71 Mahathir’s speech at the opening of the Asian Conference on the Question of Palestine, 3 May 1983 in 
Pathmanaban and Lazarus, Winds o f  Change, p.217.
72 Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p.229.
73 “Malaysia was one of 73 countries that voted, in 1975, in favour of the controversial LIN resolution that 
determined Zionism to be a form of racism and its exercise of a policy o f racial discrimination.” Nair, Islam 
in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p.223.
74 Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p.223.
75 Aziz, Mahathir’s Paradigm Shifts, p. 142.
228
as a whole because they were deemed threatening to the Zionists who were widely 
viewed as the enemy by many Muslims. According to a Malaysian senior official, 
Mahathir’s strong support for the Palestinians and his anti-Zionism were the most 
significant factors that contributed towards the deterioration of Malaysia -  US bilateral 
relations during his premiership.76
6.3.2. Bosnia-Herzegovina
Mahathir was the pivotal force behind Malaysia’s high profile role in raising the plight of 
the Bosnians during the civil war in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. According to a 
Wisma Putra senior official, policy decisions on Bosnia-Herzegovina were discussed and 
decided only by a small group of advisers, with Mahathir at the core,77 Mahathir’s 
crucial role was recognised by the former Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic when he 
included Mahathir as among the five statesmen who had aided Bosnia the most during the 
war.78 Mahathir and Alija Izetbegovic formed a very close personal friendship through 
the course of the Bosnian struggle.79
Mahathir persistently raised the Bosnian issue at various occasions - in the 
multilateral fora, bilateral functions and public speaking engagements. From the early 
stages of the war in 1992, Malaysia was very active in pressuring the UN Security 
Council to mobilise an intervention. Malaysia utilised all international organs that it 
played influential roles in, including the OIC, NAM, and the Commonwealth to highlight
76 Interview with Ambassador Sheikh Ghazzali Abdul Khalid, former Malaysian Ambassador in 
Washington D.C., 5 July 2007, Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, Malaysia.
77 Non-attributable interview with a senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Kuala Lumpur, July 2007.
78 The five statesmen or friends of Bosnia he distinguished were: US former president, Bill Clinton; Saudi 
royal house; Iranian leaders; Turkish former president Demirel and Malaysian former prime minister,
Mahathir Mohamad. Hajrudin Somun, Mahathir: The Secret o f  the Malaysian Success, translated from 
Bosnian by Lejla Somun-Krupalija, Subang Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 2003, p. 189.
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the plight of the Bosnians.80 Mahathir also emphasised the issue in his bilateral meetings 
with various leaders, especially influential Western ones. For instance, at a dinner he 
hosted for the British Prime Minister John Major in September 1993, he appealed to
Britain to reconsider the decision not to mount a military intervention to protect the 
Bosnians.81
Malaysia provided assistance in various forms to Bosnia. In December 1992, 
due to the deteriorating security condition, Malaysia decided to provide refuge to over 
300 Bosnians in Malaysia.82 Furthermore, scholarships were awarded to Bosnian 
students to pursue their education at the International Islamic University in Kuala 
Lumpur.83 The Bosnian Fund was set up by a major Malay daily with links to the 
government, Utusan Malaysia, which by 1994 was able to raise about RM3 million.84 
According to Somun, it is difficult to find exact figures in official documents relating to 
Malaysia’s assistance to Bosnia but he estimated that it could amount to about US$ 400 
million.85 Malaysia’s commitment towards the Bosnian cause was further illustrated by 
its action to participate in the UN peacekeeping operation, which itself was proposed and 
promoted by Mahathir in various international fora. In September 1993, about 1,500 
Malaysian military personnel were despatched to join the UN Protection Force
79 Somun, Mahathir: The Secret o f  the Malaysian Success, 2003, p.l 89.
80 Malaysia played a crucial role in lobbying for a NAM resolution against the recognition of Serbia and 
Montenegro after their unilateral declaration of independence and strongly support the UN General 
Assembly’s decision in October 1992 to expel Yugoslavia. Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy,
F,-253-Somun, Mahathir: The Secret o f  the Malaysian Success, p. 186.
82 Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p.254.
83 Somun, Mahathir: The Secret o f  the Malaysian Success, p. 193
84 Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, 254.
85 Somun, Mahathir: The Secret o f  the Malaysian Success, p. 191
86 Camroux, 'Looking E ast’ ... And Inwards, p.23.
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(UNPROFOR).87 Malaysia pledged to continue maintaining its troop in Bosnia for as 
long as it was ‘necessary’.88
To Mahathir, Palestine and Bosnia-Herzegovina epitomised the dire situation
of the Muslim ummah. Mahathir was moved to act so prominently on these two issues 
because he was outraged at the haplessness of Muslim countries and their inability to 
defend the ummah and their faith. According to him, Muslims were “no longer the 
masters of themselves.”89 Mahathir incessantly vented his frustration about the condition 
of the Muslim ummah at various fora. His offered vivid observations and consistent 
analysis on the situation of the ummah, especially in relation to the above-mentioned 
issues -  Palestine and Bosnia. Mahathir perceived Muslim countries as being “weak”.90 
This is because they were “disunited”, “unstable”, suffered from “ignorance”, 
“backward”, “not developed”, “poor” or “in poverty”.91 To Mahathir, “the most 
oppressed people in the world are Muslims.”92 The tragedies in Bosnia and Palestine 
glaringly exposed the “injustices” suffered by Muslims “in a world dominated by big
87 Milne and Mauzy, Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir, p .l36. See also Camroux, 'Looking E ast’ ... And  
Inwards, p.23 and Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p.254
88 Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p.255.
89 Speech at the opening of the 4th International Seminar on al-Quran in Kuala Lumpur, 2 February 1994, in 
Islam and the Islamic Ummah: Selected Speeches by Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Vol. 2, Hashim Makaruddin 
(ed), Subang Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 2000, p. 162.
90 See for example Mahathir’s speeches at the regional conference on ‘Towards the 21st Century: 
Reformation and Challenges for Muslims in the Region’, in Kuala Lumpur on 22 August 1997, the 
symposium on ‘The Islamic World and Global Co-operation: Preparing for the 21st Century’ in Petaling 
Jaya, Malaysia on 25 April 1997, the 10th Session of the Coordination Committee of Joint Islamic Action in 
the Field of Dakwah in Kuala Lumpur on 12 January 1996 and at the opening of the 4th International 
Seminar on the al-Quran in Kuala Lumpur, on 2 February 1994, in Islam and the Muslim Ummah, p.78, 
pp.91-2, p.144 and p .162.
1 See for example Mahathir’s speeches at the regional conference on ‘Towards the 21s' Century: 
Reformation and Challenges for Muslims in Kuala Lumpur on 22 August 1997, the symposium on ‘The 
Islamic World and Global Co-operation: Preparing for the 21st Century’ in Petaling Jaya, Malaysia on 25 
April 1997, the 10th Session of the Coordination Committee of Joint Islamic Action in the Field o f Dakwah 
in Kuala Lumpur on 12 January 1996 and the opening of the 4th International Seminar on the al-Quran in 
Kuala Lumpur on 2 February 1994, in Islam and the Muslim Ummah, p.78, pp.91-2, p. 144 and p. 162.
92 Mahathir, speech at the international seminar on ‘The Role of Islamic Civilisation in Fostering Inter­
religious Understanding’ in Kuala Lumpur on 25 May 1999, in Islam and the Muslim Ummah, p. 19.
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powers where none is Islamic”.93 Muslim countries were “hapless”,94 “powerless”95 and 
“defenceless”96 even when “their independence and their rights as members of the human 
race have been ignored and violated over and over again”97 to the extent that, “whatever
little respect and honour that they had is also gone.”98 Thus, Mahathir’s strong moral 
indignation and outrage at the haplessness of the Muslims to come to the defence of their 
brother Muslims in Palestine and Bosnia are patently clear.
To Mahathir, the dire condition of the Muslim ummah was the consequence of 
the fact that no Muslim nation could be classified as a developed country and was 
powerful enough to defend the rights of the ummah.
“Today, there is not a single Muslim nation that can be classified as developed, although a number 
o f them are very wealthy, endowed with natural resources. But almost all are lagging behind in 
modem knowledge, technical skills and, in many instances, effective government. In fact, a state 
o f near-anarchy prevails in quite a number of countries. By no criteria can any of these countries 
be classified as developed. Poverty, ignorance and instability have become such common features 
in Muslim nations that it is assumed that these are natural consequences o f following the teachings 
of Islam. It is not surprising that today the world associates Islam with backwardness. This 
angers many Muslims. They think that it is an unfair judgement. They are right, o f course. It is 
unfair. It is not due to the teachings of Islam. But the fact remains that Muslim nations are poor, 
backward, weak, disunited and dependent on non-Muslims for all kinds o f things, including their 
own security and the continued existence of Islam itself.”99
93 Mahathir, speech at the regional conference on ‘Towards the 21st Century: Reformation and Challenges 
for Muslims in the Region’, in Kuala Lumpur on 22 August 1997, in Islam and the Muslim Ummah, pp.77- 
8 .
94 Mahathir, speech at the regional conference on ‘Towards the 21st Century: Reformation and Challenges 
for Muslims in the Region’, in Kuala Lumpur on 22 August 1997, in Islam and the Muslim Ummah, p.80.
95 See Mahathir’s speech at the 8th Summit o f the OIC Conference in Tehran, Iran, on 9 December 1997, 
and his keynote address at the symposium on “The Islamic World and Global Cooperation: Preparing for 
the 21st Century’ in Petaling Jaya, Malaysia on 25 April 1997, in Islam and the Muslim Ummah, p.72 and
p.".
6 See Mahathir’s keynote address at the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies in Oxford, on 16 April 1996, the 
10th Session of the Coordination Committee of Joint Islamic Action in the Field of Dakwah in Kuala 
Lumpur, on 12 January 1996 and the opening o f the 4th International Seminar on the al-Quran in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia on 2 February 1994, in Islam and the Muslim Ummah, p. 132, p. 144 and p. 162.
97 Mahathir, speech at the international seminar on ‘The Role of Islam In Fostering Inter-religious 
Understanding’, in Kuala Lumpur on 25 May 1999 in Islam and the Islamic Ummah, p. 19.
98 Mahathir, keynote address at the symposium on ‘The Islamic World and Global Cooperation: Preparing 
for the 21st Century’, in Petaling Jaya, Malaysia on 25 April 1997, in Islam and the Islamic Ummah, p. 100.
99 Mahathir, keynote address at the symposium on ‘The Islamic World and Global Cooperation: Preparing 
for the 21s' Century’, in Petaling Jaya, Malaysia on 25 April 1997, in Islam and the Islamic Ummah, pp.91- 
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In other words, Mahathir linked the weakness of Muslim countries to their 
underdevelopment. Mahathir believed that there were a few fundamental factors that led 
to the Muslims’ underdevelopment. The first was their less than stable governments. 
Muslim countries “have not yet found or developed a system of determining how our 
government should govern.”100 Some Muslim countries were monarchies, while others 
were theocracies and the rest, democratic, to varying degrees. Mahathir believed that, 
“Despite all the West’s claims about the efficacy and fairness of democracy, it is still far 
from being a perfect system or even a good system for them or anyone.”101 Moreover, 
the most important factor in ensuring good government is not the system, but “the quality 
of the people who are entrusted with ruling the nation.”102 He believed quality leaders 
could be achieved if Muslim leaders return to the true teachings and interpretations of 
Islam. Good governance with quality leaders was thus seen as a prerequisite for a stable 
nation, which would be conducive for development and progress. Mahathir berated 
Muslim leaders who spurred fratricidal wars in order to realise their own personal 
ambitions, leaving their nations unstable and governments impotent. He observed that 
these were the common reasons that made “Muslim nations remain largely 
underdeveloped and the Muslim ummah poor, unskilled, uneducated and incapable of 
contributing positively towards the well being of Muslims, their faith and their 
nations.”103 It is within this context that recognition struggles underpinning Mahathir’s 
promotion of the Malaysian model can be understood. Mahathir wanted Malaysia to be
100 Mahathir, keynote address at the 8th OIC Summit in Teheran, Iran on 9 December 1997, in Islam and the 
Islamic Ummah, p.70.
101 Mahathir, keynote address at the 8th OIC Summit in Teheran, Iran on 9 December 1997, in Islam and the 
Islamic Ummah, p.70.
102 Mahathir, keynote address at the 8th OIC Summit in Teheran, Iran on 9 December 1997, in Islam and the 
Islamic Ummah, p.71.
103 Mahathir, keynote address at the 8th OIC Summit in Teheran, Iran on 9 December 1997, in Islam and the 
Islamic Ummah, pp.69-70.
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recognised as a Muslim country that had managed to attain political stability, racial 
harmony, modernity and economic progress, which put it in a strong and respectable 
position to defend the honour of Islam and its ummah.
6.4. TERRORISM
Mahathir unequivocally condemned terrorism. However, he also impressed on the need 
to tackle the root causes of terrorist acts that are being committed by some Muslims all 
around the world. Mahathir believed that the Palestinian issue was crucial in influencing 
some Muslims to resort to such heinous crimes. In this sense, Mahathir understood the 
moral grammar at the heart o f the conflict or at least appreciated that there was such a 
moral grammar framing the issue.
Even before the tragedy of 9/11 in 2001, Mahathir was already concerned 
with the image of Islam being tarnished by some terrorist acts committed by Muslims.104 
To illustrate, at the seminar on ‘The Role of Islamic Civilisation in Fostering 
Interreligious Understanding’ in Kuala Lumpur in May 1999, Mahathir had already 
voiced his frustration with the tendency of the West to stereotype terrorist acts by 
Muslims as Islamic terrorism, whereas acts of terrorism by other religious groups, like 
Buddhist, Hindu, Christian or Jewish were never linked to their religions. Mahathir’s 
concerns heightened after the 9/11 attacks. This led to the organising of the International 
Conference on Terrorism in Kuala Lumpur on 16 November 2001. Furthermore, 
Malaysia also organised an extraordinary session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign 
Ministers (ICFM) on Terrorism in Kuala Lumpur on 1 April 2002.
104 Ismail, Pemikiran Dr.Mahathir Tentang Islam, Kuala Lumpur: Utusan, 2002, p.59.
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With regard to terrorism, there were a few salient points that Mahathir 
consistently argued. The first was his belief that “Islam does not promote terrorism.”105 
Secondly, he stressed the need for acts of terrorism to be defined. At the extraordinary
session of the ICFM in Kuala Lumpur, he opined that “armed attacks or other forms of 
attack against civilians must be regarded as acts of terror and the perpetrators regarded as 
terrorists.”106 According to his definition, terrorist acts must not be linked to any specific 
religion or ethnic group, hence “the attack on the World Trade Centre on September 11, 
the human bomb attacks by Palestinians and the Tamil Tigers, the attacks against 
civilians by Israeli forces, the killings of the Bosnian Muslims and others must be 
considered as acts of terror and the perpetrators must be condemned as terrorists.”107 
This created controversy at the conference. Some participants disagreed with him on 
equating Palestinian suicide bombings with other terrorist acts. At the conference, 
Mahathir argued that a clear definition was necessary for a convention to be set up to deal 
with terrorism issues. In addition, he maintained that no other authority would be more 
competent to deal with the perpetrators of terrorism than the UN.108 Thirdly, as 
highlighted earlier in the section, while Mahathir believed in the need to be tough on 
perpetrators of terrorism, he also emphasised the importance to tackle the root causes of 
terrorism.109 He believed that Muslims who were involved in acts of terrorism were
105 Mahathir Mohamad, speech at the Asia Society Dinner in New York, United States, on 4 February 2002, 
in Terrorism and the Real Issues: Selected Speeches o f  Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Hashim Makaruddin (ed.), 
Subang Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 2003, p.42.
106 Mahathir, speech delivered at the Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Conference o f Foreign Ministers 
on Terrorism in Kuala Lumpur, on April 1 2002, in Terrorism and the Real Issues, p.64.
107 Mahathir, speech delivered at the Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Conference o f Foreign Ministers 
on Terrorism in Kuala Lumpur, on April 1 2002, in Terrorism and the Real Issue, p.64.
108 Mahathir, speech delivered at the Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Conference o f Foreign Ministers 
on Terrorism in Kuala Lumpur, on April 1 2002, in Terrorism and the Real Issue, p.65.
109 See Mahathir’s speeches at the Conference on Terrorism, Kuala Lumpur, 16 November 2001, the Asia 
Society Dinner in New York, 4 February, 2002, and the Extraordinary Session of ICFM on Terrorism in 
Kuala Lumpur, on 1 April 2002, in Terrorism and the Real Issues, p.39, p. 43 and pp.65-7.
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misguided and misinterpreted Islam. However, he also highlighted existing gross 
injustices perpetrated on Muslims, which pushed these Muslims to desperation and, 
ultimately, the resort to terrorism.
In a seminar organised by IKIM and the Goethe Institute in Kuala Lumpur in 
1993, Mahathir had already illustrated the moral grammar manifested in the issue of 
terrorism by pointing that the desperate conditions experienced by the Muslim ummah 
were partly to blame for their acts of terrorism:
“Weak and oppressed, suffering from all kinds o f psychological ailments, many [Muslims] seek 
solace and escape in esoteric religious practices. In so doing, they interpret Islam in ways which 
are un-Islamic. Because of this, Islam and the Muslim have acquired a bad name. It is regarded 
as a millstone around the neck of the followers, retarding their development. It has become 
associated with the unprincipled practices such as terrorism and injustices to their co-religionists 
and the followers of other religions. It has split them into warring factions, causing untold misery 
and carnage among them. And it has brought this noble humanising religion to disrepute. They 
are being made the tools and proxies for the conflicts o f others. And they suffer this willingly, 
blaming others and blaming fate.”110
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Mahathir many times reiterated his calls 
for the root causes of terrorism to be given more attention. At the Conference on 
Terrorism in Kuala Lumpur in November 2001, he said, “In the Muslim world, there is a 
great deal of anger which the West cannot understand.”111 According to him, most of this 
anger stemmed from the Muslims’ frustration due to their inability to stop what they 
perceived as the injustices and humiliation suffered by their co-religionists. He believed 
that the principal cause of the Muslims’ anger was Palestine.112 To Mahathir, “if there is 
no Palestinian issue, if the Palestinians are not being oppressed and children not being 
killed, the anger of the Arabs and Muslims would not be there or would be much less.
110 Mahathir, speech at the seminar organised by IKIM and Goethe Institute, Kuala Lumpur, 14 September 
1993 in Islam and the Muslim Ummah: Selected Speeches by Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Vol. 1, Subang Jaya: 
Pelanduk Publications, 2000, p.22.
111 Mahathir, speech at the Conference on Terrorism in Kuala Lumpur, November 16,2001, in Terrorism 
and the Real Issues, p.36.
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Certainly there would not be those who would be willing to kill themselves in that 
horrible fashion on September l l . ”113 Thus, “the Muslim world, weak and unable to be 
of any help to the Palestinians, see the unwillingness of the West to stop the Israelis as a
sign that the West is anti-Palestine, anti-Arab and anti-Muslim.”114 While he was against 
glorifying the terrorists, he felt that it was crucial to understand their minds and mentality 
in order to understand the reason why they committed those acts. Failing that, he 
believed that the root causes of terrorism would never be eradicated and such horrible 
acts could never be stopped.115 Mahathir again raised the widespread feeling of many 
Muslims as being oppressed at the Asia Society dinner in New York on 4 February 2002. 
He cited Bosnia, Palestine, Iraq, India and Chechnya, among others, as illustrations of 
cases where Muslims were the injured parties. He reiterated his belief that some Muslims 
resorted to acts of terrorism as reactions to what they perceived as acts of terror against 
them."6
The moral grammar in Mahathir’s discourse on terrorism was clear when he 
repeated his call to identify the bitterness and anger of the Muslims in order to prevent 
the tendency of some of them to resort to terrorism at the extraordinary session of the 
ICFM in Kuala Lumpur in April 2002.117 Again, reflecting his beliefs in the economic 
causes of the plight of the Muslims, he highlighted the “injustices” and the “oppression”
112 Mahathir, speech at the Conference on Terrorism in Kuala Lumpur, November 16, 2001, in Terrorism 
and the Real Issues, 2003, p.35.
113 Mahathir, speech at the Conference on Terrorism in Kuala Lumpur, November 16, 2001, in Terrorism 
and the Real Issues, 2003, p.37.
1HMahathir, speech at the Conference on Terrorism in Kuala Lumpur, November 16, 2001, in Terrorism 
and the Real Issues, 2003, p.36.
115 Mahathir, speech at the Conference on Terrorism in Kuala Lumpur, November 16, 2001, in Terrorism 
and the Real Issues, 2003, p.37.
116 Mahathir, speech at the Asia Society Dinner, New York, February 4 2002, in Terrorism and the Real 
Issues, 2003, p.43.
117 Mahathir, speech at the Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers on 
Terrorism, Kuala Lumpur, 1 April 2002, Terrorism and the Real Issues, p.65.
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of the rich against the poor, in the current “glaringly inequitable world”.118 He also 
highlighted the “oppression” and “humiliation” of the Palestinians in the occupied 
territory, and of the Bosnians who were massacred in full view of television viewers that
went on for a long time before anyone intervened.119 He believed that, “[t]he impotence 
of Muslim countries to do anything to remedy the situation adds to this frustration and 
anger.”120 Although most Muslims would resign to their fate, some would feel that they 
had to vent their anger in some way. According to Mahathir, “[t]he world must deal with 
these misguided people not just by hunting them down but also by removing the causes 
of their anger and frustration.”121 At all of these events, Mahathir related the Malaysian 
experience in tackling terrorist acts o f the MCP.122 Tough measures were taken to hunt 
and fight them down. However, the root cause of their grievances was also tackled. In 
this case, the Malayan Communists were mainly supported by the country’s Chinese. It 
was found that the Chinese felt alienated because they were not accorded citizenship 
status by the British. Thus, upon independence, the Malayan government decided to give 
them citizenship, provided them land, and protected them so that they could carry out 
their businesses and participate in the government peacefully and effectively. These 
efforts had won over their hearts and minds and they slowly ceased to assist the terrorists.
118 Mahathir, speech at the Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers on 
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Secondly, and in relation to Mahathir’s emphasis on development as a tool for 
empowerment of Muslim nations, Mahathir exhorted the value of education, scientific 
and technological progress, industry, business and the economy. This is similar to the 
message he delivered to the Malay community. Mahathir reminded the world Islamic 
ummah of their glorious past when they were the most knowledgeable and advanced 
people in the world. However, they had regressed to being underdeveloped, poor, weak 
and oppressed because of their “narrow interpretation” of Islam and discarding “the so- 
called worldly knowledge”.123 Therefore, Mahathir felt that Islam had been 
misinterpreted and misunderstood not only by non-Muslims, but also by the Muslims 
themselves.124 A great deal of these misinterpretations were purported by different 
Muslim groups to serve their own self-interest. This resulted in different factions and 
sects amongst Muslims. Their stubbornness and greed for power led to hostilities, 
rebellions and disorder. “Because of activities of such groups, many Muslim nations 
cannot establish strong governments, and are thus chaotic, weak and looked down upon. 
That is why Islam is often ridiculed by others.”125 Without strong governments, it would 
remain difficult for progress and development to be brought to the Muslim ummah.
To surmise, to Mahathir, the disrespect suffered by the Muslim ummah was 
mainly caused by their economic underdevelopment. Due to the fact that they were also 
once colonised, Muslim nations were also South nations and their basic problems were 
those of the countries of the South. These were problems relating to good governance, 
nation-building and economic development. However, the situation of Muslim nations
523 Mahathir, speech at the international seminar on ‘The Role of Islamic Civilisation in Fostering Inter­
religious Understanding’ on 25 May 1999, in Islam and the Islamic Ummah, Vol.2, p.21.
124 Mahathir, keynote address at the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies in Oxford, UK on 16 April 1996, in 
Islam and the Islamic Ummah, Vol.2, p. 127.
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was made more acute because of the history of religious rivalry and warfare between 
Christians and Muslims. To this day, Mahathir believed that there continued to be a 
strong resentment and negative misperception about Islam. Due to this, he believed, 
Muslims continued to be attacked, humiliated and ridiculed, which was intolerable to 
him. Since the end of Islamic civilisation, no single Islamic nation was in a position to 
uphold the honour and dignity of the ummah This analysis triggered a strong 
motivational force within Mahathir to steer Malaysia towards taking a prominent role in 
the community of Islamic nations. At the 40th UMNO General Assembly in September 
1997, in Kuala Lumpur, Mahathir said,
“Is it not possible for the Malays to evolve a culture that will enable them to achieve the kind of 
success that the Muslims once had? We have no desire to build an empire. Our ambition is 
moderate. We want to be just as equally developed as other races which have progressed. With 
that, we can redeem the honour of our race and religion, and also of the bumiputras in this 
country.”126
Thus, it was clear that given the moral denigration suffered by the Muslim 
ummah, Mahathir yearned for the Malays to become an exemplary Muslim community 
that would change the negative widespread perception of Islam and Muslims in general.
6.5. THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION IN THE CASE OF ISLAM
In his desire to spearhead the Malays to redeem the honour of their race and religion, 
Mahathir aspired for Malaysia to be a model Muslim nation.127 In this regard, Mahathir’s 
strong sense of moral indignation and outrage aroused in him the motivation to change
125 Mahathir, keynote address at the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies in Oxford, UK on 16 April 1996, in 
Islam and the Islamic Ummah, Vol.2, p. 132.
126 Mahathir, speech delivered at the 40th General Assembly o f UMNO in Kuala Lumpur on 5 September 
1997, in Hng, CEO Malaysia, p. 145.
127 Author interview with Mahathir Mohamad, 16 January 2007, London.
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the dire condition of the ummah by putting forward the achievements of the Muslim 
Malays. In this regard, Mahathir’s articulations of the problems faced by the Malays in 
their practice of Islam as encapsulated in The Malay Dilemma and The Challenge were 
constantly reiterated by Mahathir in the wider Islamic ummah. Thus, the moral 
indignation that made Mahathir struggle to redeem the honour and dignity of the Muslim 
Malays in the Malaysian multi-ethnic and multi-religious society, was also responsible 
for his struggle for the redemption of pride and honour of the Muslim ummah in the 
international community.
In this context, the quest for recognition that motivated Mahathir was in the 
form of esteem. This was sought on the basis that Malaysia presented a unique example 
of a country that had managed to overcome the problems of the Malays, which in the 
process had made Malaysia a respectable, progressive, modem and economically 
successful Muslim nation. According to Honneth, recognition struggles in terms of self­
esteem can be understood in terms of what makes a community particular and enables it 
to contribute positively to the wider community. The progress and economic success of 
the Muslim Malays not only made it a model to be followed by other Muslim nations, but 
also made it possible for Malaysia to stand up on behalf of other Muslim communities 
and take the leadership in assisting oppressed Muslims for example in Palestine and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the context of the wider international community, Mahathir 
wanted Malaysia to be recognised as a model because of its moderate Islam, which 
contributed towards its stability and progress. Certainly the form of Islam that is 
moderate and compatible with economic progress and modernity that Malaysia was 
deemed to epitomise is directly attributed to Mahathir’s own understanding. Mahathir’s
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progressive interpretation of Islam underpinned the government’s Islamisation discourse 
and programmes during the Mahathir era.
The analysis of Mahathir’s many speeches has also revealed his long-standing 
sense of moral indignation at what he perceived to amount to oppression and injustices 
experienced by Muslims. There is an important moral grammar that was present in 
Mahathir’s discourse on the plight of the Muslim ummah. He found the hapless situation 
of the Muslims to be humiliating. He believed that the reason for such disrespectful 
treatment of Muslims was because no Muslim nation could be considered a developed 
nation and strong enough to defend the rights of Muslims. In this sense, Mahathir 
believed that the injustices suffered by Muslims were due to the inequality in the world, 
where Muslim nations should but not have any say or influence. As regards recognition 
struggles, the context of Mahathir’s moral discourse can be understood in terms of 
Honneth’s explanation of the struggle for self-respect. According to Honneth, to have 
self-respect is to have the equal rights to participate in what is termed as the social 
“discursive will formation.” Certainly, Mahathir perceived that the Muslims had no such 
right in the international society because they could not even stand up to the defence of 
their oppressed Muslim brothers in Palestine and Bosnia -  Hergezovina. Relating to this, 
Mahathir emphasised economic development and technological progress as the 
requirement for Muslim nations to be taken seriously and acquire their rightful role in 
international relations. Only by acquiring the developed status, he thought, can Muslim 
nations protect the interest of the Muslim ummah.
Furthermore, in the face of the challenges posed by an unequal world, 
Mahathir emphasised the unity of Muslim nations. In this regard, he appealed for 
Muslims to practice moderation and tolerance, and discard their feuds based on historical
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tribal disagreements and differing interpretations of Islam. This also relates to 
Mahathir’s emphasis on political stability in Muslim nations. To Mahathir, a correct 
interpretation of Islam would make all Muslims practice moderation in their own 
domestic political setting. This would produce internal stability that would enable 
Muslim nations to concentrate on economic development. Emphasising progress, 
Mahathir called for Muslims to embrace knowledge, especially science and technology 
and also business and economics. He reminded Muslims of the glorious past of the 
Islamic civilisation to make them realise that true Islamic teachings extol the virtues of 
all kinds of knowledge, and that worldly success is actually not discouraged, but in fact 
required in Islam to protect the well being of its ummah. Thus, similar to his thinking 
about the Malay dilemma, Mahathir believed that a way out of the Muslim dilemma was 
through economic empowerment. Due to this, Mahathir introduced significant new 
economic initiatives amongst Muslim countries, within both multilateral and bilateral 
frameworks. These can be illustrated by Malaysia’s efforts to strengthen economic co­
operation among Muslim nations through various proposals, for example Islamic gold 
dinar, training in Islamic banking and finance, sharing of Malaysia’s experience in 
development through the MTCP and easing bilateral trade and investments by adopting 
agreements such as the BPA and the Investments Guarantee Agreement (IGA).
Mahathir’s sense of mission underpinned by his struggle for recognition was 
vividly captured in the theme for the 10th Session of the Islamic Summit Conference that 
he chaired in Putrajaya, Malaysia on 11-18 October 2003, that is ‘Knowledge and 
Morality For the Unity, Dignity and Progress of the Ummah'. Indeed, Mahathir’s 
thinking was prominent in the Putrajaya Summit’s Declaration. With regard to the 
situation of the ummah, the Putrajaya Summit Conference took “note with concern the
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situation and resolve to make every effort to enhance our role and influence in 
international affairs, commensurate with our strength in numbers, vast human and natural 
resources and our important contributions to international peace and security.”128 With 
regard to knowledge and morality, the Conference was “inspired by the outstanding 
contribution made by Muslim scholars in the past who were leaders, pioneers and 
contributors in many field of science, such as astronomy, medicine, physics, chemistry, 
engineering and navigation and several other areas of learning.”129 The participants 
affirmed their belief in “the essential importance of knowledge for the progress of human 
society and underscore its pivotal role in the restoration of the status, well being and 
dignity of the ummah in our contemporary world”. In addition, the Declaration mentions 
that Conference “recognise[s] the leading role of science and technology for the 
advancement of the ummah and the need to bridge the gap within the OIC member states 
and between Muslim and industrialised countries.”130
6.6. CONCLUSION
This chapter has illustrated that recognition motives were significant in motivating 
Mahathir to pursue a more active foreign policy vis-a-vis issues related to the Muslim 
ummah. Mahathir identified Malaysia as an integral member of the Muslim ummah, and 
Islam as the integral and inseparable part of the Malay identity. Recognition motivations 
were triggered by the perception of the backwardness, powerlessness and destitution of
128 Putrajaya Declaration on Knowledge And Morality For The Unity, Dignity And Progress o f The 
Ummah, The 10th Session of the Islamic Summit Conference, Putrajaya, Malaysia, 11-18 October 2003. 
File Document of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia.
129 Putrajaya Declaration.
130 Putrajaya Declaration.
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the ummah which planted them in a position of misunderstood, oppressed, disrespected 
and even ridiculed.
Mahathir’s strong sense of identification with the Muslims can be explained 
by his understanding of Muslim and Malay identity, which overlapped. To him, and 
indeed by the Malaysian Constitution, a Malay has to be a Muslim. Mahathir believed 
that Islam could not be separated from the Muslims’ and the Malays’ daily lives. His 
books, The Malay Dilemma and The Challenge both illustrate his sense of mission to 
uplift the status of the Malays and also the ummah. He believed that in order to tackle the 
backwardness of the Malays and the Muslim ummah, it was vital to correct their 
misinterpretation of Islam, particularly with regard to their values towards economic 
success and attitude towards worldly knowledge like science and technology. To him, 
knowledge was the prerequisite for a powerful ummah, and a powerful ummah would be 
respected, just like the Islamic ummah during the great Islamic civilisation.
Therefore, the significance of Islam in Malaysia’s foreign policy under 
Mahathir has to be understood in terms of Mahathir’s understanding of the significant 
role that Islam plays in the mindset and values of the Malays. To Mahathir, the problems 
of Muslim Malays are not unique to them, but typical of the Muslim ummah as a whole. 
In other words, there are clear similarities in Mahathir’s understanding of the situation 
besetting the Malay Muslims in the Malaysian domestic society, and that of the Muslim 
ummah in the world. When he wrote The Malay Dilemma, Muslim Malays were 
perceived by Mahathir as occupying a humiliating position. They were poor and hapless 
and suffered disrespect from other races in their society. To Mahathir, the Muslims of 
the world suffered the same fate in the eye of the international community. They were 
clearly being humiliated, disrespected and hapless. However, the Malaysian success
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story has proven that the Muslims are able to escape this perceived quandary between 
their religion and progress. Recognition motives insofar as Islam in Malaysia’s foreign 
policy is concerned were rooted in Mahathir’s search for self-esteem through the 
recognition of Malaysia as a model Muslim nation, and, the recognition motives were 
based on a struggle to regain self-respect for the Muslim ummah by making Malaysia a 
developed Muslim nation strong enough to take equal part in international relations in 
order to protect the interests and dignity of the Muslim ummah.
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CHAPTER 7 MAHATHIR, MALAYSIA AND THE NATIONS OF 
EAST ASIA
This chapter will examine the motivations behind Malaysia’s heightened identification 
with the nations of East Asia during the Mahathir era. Central to the analysis is 
Mahathir’s idea of the ‘East’, which he constantly juxtaposed with his understanding of 
the ‘West’.1 The ‘East’ is itself a debatable concept.2 It will be shown that in Mahathir’s 
discourse, it relates to the region of East Asia. East Asian communities are recognisably 
diverse, in terms of political system, language, ethnicity and religion, for instance. 
However, the concept is still meaningful as a region,3 and increasingly Northeast Asia 
and Southeast Asia are coming to recognise their commonalities. Therefore, as regards 
Mahathir’s discourse on the East, this concept refers to the peoples, cultures, 
governments and the economies of the countries of Northeast and Southeast Asia. In 
other words, the geographic focus of this chapter is directed primarily on Malaysia’s 
relations with China, Japan, South Korea and members of ASEAN, namely Brunei, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand,
1 This is reflected in his speeches and writings, for example, a chapter in The Challenge entitled ‘West and 
East’. See Mahathir Mohamad, The Challenge, Subang Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1986, pp.44-55.
2 For example, Khoo recognised that, “One could further quarrel with Mahathir’s views on the ‘East’ but 
that might only miss the unusual nationalistic impulses behind his ‘Look East’ policy.” Khoo Boo Teik, 
Paradoxes o f  Mahathirism: An Intellectual Biography o f  Mahathir Mohamad, Shah Alam: Oxford 
University Press, 1995, p.70.
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and Vietnam. In terms of specific foreign policies, this chapter will focus on ASEAN, 
East Asia regionalism, Malaysia’s ‘Look East’ policy and the Asian values debate.
Firstly, this chapter will identify Mahathir’s perceptions of violations of 
justice in the unequal relationships between East Asian countries and Western ones, in 
particular the US. The chapter will then, secondly, look at specific policy areas with a 
geographical focus on East Asia. In this context, four important components of foreign 
policy will be covered. The first is Malaysia’s policy towards ASEAN. It will then, 
secondly, examine the policy of the Mahathir government to initiate a multilateral 
framework for an East Asian regionalism. Thirdly, the chapter will also discuss 
Malaysia’s strengthened bilateral ties with Japan as the foundation of Mahathir’s ‘Look 
East’ policy. Fourthly, it will examine Mahathir’s discourse ,on ‘Asian values’. The 
main thrust of the argument here is that the quest for respect and status, in short, 
recognition, was the key motivation for Mahathir to pursue the specific policies outlined 
above in Malaysia’s relations with East Asian countries.
7.1. MAHATHIR. MALAYSIA AND THE EAST
Chapter Three has illustrated Mahathir’s strong identification with the peoples and 
culture of the East. For example, it has been shown that Mahathir admired the work 
ethics and discipline of the Japanese people that he observed during their occupation of 
Malaya. However, while strongly convinced of the positive aspects of the Eastern 
cultural values, Mahathir also considered that East Asian nations occupied a lower status
3 Greg Sheridan, Asian Values Western Dreams, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1999, pp.5-7. See also Samuel 
P. Huntington, The Clash o f  Civilizations and the Remaking o f  World Order. London: The Free Press, 
pp.103-109.
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in the international society compared to the Western nations. Mahathir noticed that most 
East Asian nations, for example Japan and South Korea continued to be dictated to by the 
West (specifically, the US) despite their economic achievements and were mere
“subjects” to decisions taken elsewhere.4 The subjugated status of the East Asian nations 
triggered a sense of moral indignation in Mahathir. At the Third Pacific Dialogue in 
Kuala Lumpur held in 1996, Mahathir asserted:
“Asia can no longer sit down and take injury and insult in stoic silence ... [and it had] a right to 
demand a little maturity and sophistication on the part o f those who wish to analyse and 
proselytise; who so easily slip into the role of policeman, prosecutor, judge and jury; who so 
habitually try, judge, punish and persecute without even giving a hearing.”5
In this regard, Mahathir’s moral outrage was based on the prevalent unequal relationship 
between East Asian nations and the West, in particular with the US.6 It will be shown in 
the course of the analysis in this chapter that the quest for what Mahathir considered to be 
more legitimate forms of relationships between East Asian nations and Western nations, 
especially the US, was the crux of his recognition struggles that underpinned Malaysia’s 
policy towards East Asian countries. The search for recognition in Mahathir motivations 
were plainly demonstrated by the many articulations of his aspirations for the East Asian 
nations. For example, at the Regional Conference of the Harvard Clubs of Asia in Kuala 
Lumpur in 1996, he insisted that;
“Asia must rise. It must take a greater contribution to the global Commonwealth of man. It must 
contribute to greater justice in the world, to greater mutual respect in the world, to greater 
egalitarianism in the world, to greater fraternity in the world, to much greater peace in the world 
and much greater prosperity in the world” 7
4 Mahathir Mohamad, ‘Asia’s Role in the Commonwealth of the 21st Century’, speech made in London on 
21 October 1997, in Politics, Democracy and the New Asia: Selected Speeches by Mahathir Mohamad, 
Vol.2, Hashim Makaruddin (ed.), Subang Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 2000, pp.61-2.
5 Mahathir Mohamad, ‘Building a Single Global Commonwealth’, a paper delivered at the 3rd Pacific 
Dialogue, Kuala Lumpur, 21 November 1996, in Politics, Democracy and the New Asia, p. 106.
6 On US’ role in A sia-Pacific, see for example, Roger Buckley, The United States in the Asia -  Pacific 
since 1945, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. See also Thomas J. Christensen, ‘China, the 
US -  Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia’ in International Security, 22:4, Spring 1999.
7 Mahathir Mohamad, speech delivered at the 1996 Regional Conference of Harvard Clubs of Asia, Kuala 
Lumpur, 15 August 1996, in Politics, Democracy and the New Asia, p. 136.
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It is therefore obvious that Mahathir desired for East Asian nations to possess a higher 
status whereby they can make a positive contribution towards the international society. 
Importantly, it would also mean an equal status for East Asian nations in its relations with 
Western countries, particularly the US. The legitimate relations that Mahathir wanted to 
see between East Asia and the US particularly would be free from dictation, control and 
pressures. The quest for legitimate relations will be illustrated as the dominant struggle 
for Mahathir, in influencing Malaysia’s policies towards ASEAN and the wider East 
Asian region.
7.2. MALAYSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES FOCUSING ON EAST 
ASIA UNDER MAHATHIR
The shifting focus towards East Asia in Malaysia’s foreign policy under Mahathir 
manifested itself in two distinctive sets of policy initiatives. The first concerns 
Mahathir’s efforts towards promoting an East Asia community. In this regard, ASEAN is 
relevant because it became the model that Mahathir promoted for founding an East Asian 
community that would uphold legitimate relations. In other words, Mahathir promoted 
the example of ASEAN as a regional community especially because to him, ASEAN had 
managed to establish a form of legitimate relations amongst its members, as well as 
between its members and outside powers. The relevant policy initiatives concerning 
Mahathir’s proposal for an East Asian community is the East Asian Economic Caucus 
(EAEC) and ASEAN+3 (APT). In terms of bilateral initiatives, Mahathir’s ‘Look East’ 
policy impacted foreign policy because it resulted in strengthened bilateral relations with
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East Asian countries especially with Japan. In addition, Mahathir’s vision o f Japan’s 
central role in the proposed East Asian regional community will also be studied.
7.2.1. Multilateral Initiatives: Establishing Legitimate Relations through a 
Regional Community
The cornerstone of Mahathir’s foreign policy on the East was the institutionalisation of 
East Asian regional community. Arguably, there are many rationales for this including 
security and economic, which will be highlighted in the course of this chapter. However, 
as highlighted, Mahathir was also motivated by the struggle to establish a more equal 
relationship between East Asian nations and the US, befitting the economic achievements 
of East Asian nations. Moreover, to Mahathir, ASEAN showed how a regional process 
could encapsulate, protect and promote local values and norms in the process of 
enhancing regional peace and understanding.8 Therefore, analysis of Mahathir’s efforts 
to institutionalise East Asia regionalism must begin with ASEAN. Mahathir’s EAEC 
(East Asia Economic Caucus) was the culmination of his aspiration for the regionalism of 
East Asia to be institutionalised. Malaysia later continued to pursue the idea of East Asia 
regionalism via the ASEAN Mekong Basin Development Co-operation and ASEAN + 3 
(APT) frameworks when the EAEC proposal was rebuffed by some of its prospective
8 Mahathir Mohamad, speech at The First East Asian Young Leaders Congress on “East Asian Peace 
Stability and Prosperity, Kuala Lumpur, 5 August 1994, in Regional Development and the Pacific 
Community: Selected Speeches by Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Vol.l, Hashim Makaruddin (ed), Subang Jaya: 
Pelanduk Publications, 1995, p.30.
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members upon strong objections from the US and Australia.9 Ultimately, some kind of 
East Asian regionalism materialised, albeit in slightly different form and name as the East 
Asia Summit after Mahathir retired, in 2005.
ASEAN: A Regional Arrangement for Legitimate Relations
Upon assuming office in 1981, Mahathir declared that ASEAN was to be his top foreign 
policy priority.10 This was exactly what he did, judging by the glowing tribute paid to 
him at the ASEAN Summit in Bali, his final participation in October 2003. Indonesia’s 
President Megawati said, Mahathir “was one of those who worked the hardest to 
articulate ASEAN’s vision of itself,” and that “[t]he reach of his mind is so far and wide 
that on every issue before us we will always try to recall what Dr Mahathir said about 
it.”11 High praise indeed, especially coming from the Indonesian President. Although 
Mahathir was the more senior statesman, Indonesian leaders had always felt entitled to 
ASEAN leadership.
The fact that Indonesia feels entitled to regional leadership can be traced back 
to the events that led to the formation of ASEAN. Although the Communist threat in the 
region made apparent by the fall of Vietnam and the prevalent belief in the Domino effect 
theory in the mid-1960s were important factors leading to the creation of ASEAN, the
99 Mahathir claimed that Australia enlisted the US to found APEC in order to spike the formation of EAEC. 
Mahathir Mohamad, Reflections on Asia, Subang Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 2002, p.63. Jeshurun also 
witnessed Autralia’s and US’s hands in sinking the EAEC proposal. See Chandran Jeshurun, Malaysia: 
Fijity Years o f  Diplomacy, 1957 -  2007, Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press, 2007, p.235. Note also the 
Japanese different attitudes towards the proposal to form EAEC in 1991, and the Asian Monetary Fund 
(AMF) in 1997. See Richard Higgot, ‘The International Relations of the Asian Economic Crisis: A Study in 
Politics of Resentment’ in Politics and Markets in the Wake o f  the Asian Crisis, Richard Robinson, Mark 
Beeson, Kanishka Jayasuriya and Hyuk-Rae Kim (eds.), London and New York, Routledge, 2000, p.268.
10 Author interview with Mahathir Mohamad, London, 16 January 2007. Also noted in Mohd. Yusof 
Ahmad, Continuity and Change in Malaysia’s Foreign Policy, 1981-1986, PhD Dissertation, The Fletcher 
School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, May 1990, p. 158, and Murugesu Pathmanathan and 
David Lazarus, Winds o f  Change, Kuala Lumpur: Eastview, p.41.
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founding was actually made possible by the political accommodation between Indonesia 
and Malaysia. Importantly, Malaysia was willing to recognise Indonesia’s “sense of 
entitlement” to a leadership role in Southeast Asia within ASEAN.12 In the process of
post-‘Conffontation’ rapprochement, both learnt the value of respecting hierarchy, 
consultations and sovereignty in regional diplomacy.13 This gave birth to the particular 
‘ASEAN way’ of managing conflicts, which became the hallmark of ASEAN.14 In short, 
ASEAN was founded due to member states’ realisation that they had to respect one 
another’s sovereignty in order to maintain regional resilience. This is because, it is only 
by mutually respecting one another’s sovereignty and territorial integrity that members 
can demand outside powers to respect the same legitimate relationships with them.
Thus, the principles of mutually respecting members’ sovereignty and non­
interventionism were enshrined in ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Co-operation (TAC) 
signed in Bali in 1976 and became the cornerstones of the ‘ASEAN way’.15 They are 
actually modem concepts that have been adopted by the region’s leaders to legitimise 
their inter-state relations. Most Southeast Asian leaders began to embrace these concepts 
during their nationalist struggles for independence against Western colonialists. 
Therefore, the early genesis of the ‘ASEAN way’ is closely linked to the struggles for
11 Quoted in ‘Foreword’ by Ajit Singh, in Mahathir Mohamad, Reflections on ASEAN, Subang Jaya: 
Pelanduk, 2004, p.xiv.
12 Michael Antolik, ASEAN and the Diplomacy o f  Accommodation, New York and London: East Gate, 
1990, p.21.
13 Michael Antolik, ASEAN and the Diplomacy o f  Accommodation, p.22.
14 For the elaboration of the ‘ASEAN way’, see Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in 
Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem o f  Regional Order, London and New Y ork: Routledge, 2001, 
p.64.
For a discussion on TAC and the ‘ASEAN way’, see Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security 
Community in Southeast Asia, p.47. See also, Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security o f  South-East Asia, 
London and New York: Routledge, 1989, p.69; Jiirgen Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture: 
Origins, Development and Prospects, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, p.50 and Alan 
Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional and Global Issues, Boulder, London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2003, p. 130.
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respect and rights.16 The collective experience of having been colonised17 actually made 
Southeast Asian leaders understand the paramount importance of respecting one 
another’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. To protect their sovereignty, they also
became determined to achieve “regional solutions to regional problems”.18
Malaysia under Mahathir exhibited a solid support for the continuing 
adherence to the ‘ASEAN way’. However, this does not mean that the norms were never 
tested. Mahathir accepted that there were occasionally strains on ASEAN’s principles of 
respect for sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of fellow members.19 
Its bilateral relations with Singapore were probably the most prone to testing Malaysia’s 
ASEAN spirit.20 The visit of Israeli President Chaim Herzog to Singapore in 1986 for 
example, created uproar in Malaysia.21 In the 1990s, there were also spats concerning the 
package of issues covering the water agreement, the use of the Malayan Railway land in 
Singapore, the relocation of the Immigration, Customs and Quarantine (ICQ) centre, 
flight clearance for Singapore’s air force jets, Singapore’s reclamation project and the 
building of a bridge to replace the causeway.22 In addition, there was the issue of 
overlapping claim on Pulau Batu Putih (Pedra Branca). These issues continued to 
dominate Malaysia -  Singapore bilateral relations in the late 1990s until Mahathir retired 
in 2003. Relations also went sour when Singapore’s Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew
16 Jurgen Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, p.20.
17 Although Thailand was never colonised, Mahathir believed that it also suffered threats and bullying 
tactics of Western powers. See Mahathir Mohamad, ‘Towards a Stable Asia’, paper delivered at Nihon 
Keizai Shimban International Conference on the Future of Asia, Tokyo, 17 May 1996, in Politics, 
Democracy and the New Asia, pp. 150-151.
18 Michael Leifer, ‘Regional Solutions to Regional Problems?’ in Michael Leifer: Selected Works on 
Southeast Asia, Chin Kin Wah and Leo Suryadinata (eds), Singapore: ISEAS, p. 145.
19 Author interview with Mahathir Mohamad, London, 16 January 2007.
20 Jurgen Haacke, ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture, p. 169.
21 See Michael Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability, London and New York, 
Routledge, 2000, p.92.
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remarked that Malaysia did not practise meritocracy and the neighbouring Malaysian 
state of Johor to be known as a place for shootings, assaults and car-jackings.23 Thus, Lee 
Kuan Yew’s arrogant tirades against Malaysia, which led to countless heated debates 
with Mahathir in the parliament when Singapore was a part of Malaysia continued to 
complicate the relationship between the two leaders. Moreover, at the height o f the Asian 
financial crisis, Malaysia was disappointed with Singapore’s leadership, which was seen 
to be taking advantage of the situation by offering better interest for Malaysian ringgit, 
thus encouraging the exodus of the currency into Singapore. However, none of these 
issues were brought to bear on ASEAN and Malaysia continued to pursue bilateral 
avenues in managing conflictual issues with Singapore.
Similarly, Malaysia’s bilateral relations with other ASEAN members were 
also strained at times. In the case of Indonesia, Mahathir was content to support Jakarta’s 
leading role, which to him was a recognition of Indonesia’s status as the biggest country 
in the grouping. However, he insisted that Indonesia never dictated to other members on 
what they should do.24 However, some Malaysian officials felt that Indonesia viewed 
Malaysia under Mahathir as “the little brother that went overboard.” This simply means 
that they sometimes viewed Malaysia under Mahathir to act beyond its size and status in 
the region. Although it felt entitled to ASEAN leadership, Indonesia after Suharto was 
crippled by economic and political crises as in Acheh and Irian. Malaysia -  Indonesia 
bilateral diplomatic skirmishes usually concerned the treatment of Indonesian workers -
22 See discussions on ‘Points o f Agreement between Malaysia and Singapore in Chandran Jeshurun, 
Malaysia: Fifty Years o f  Diplomacy, pp.226-9.
23 ‘Does Singapore Appreciate Malaysia’s Neighbourliness?’, Berita Harian, 24 February 1998
24 Interview with Mahathir Mohamad, Londoni,16 January 2007.
25 Interview with Ahmad Fuzi Abdul Razak, Secretary General of Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, Malaysia 
(2001-2006), Putrajaya, 13 July 2007.
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some of whom were illegal immigrants in Malaysia.26 An overlapping claim on Sipadan 
and Ligitan islands off the coast of Sabah was settled when the ICJ decided in December 
2002 in Malaysia’s favour. Issues of territorial claims between Malaysia and its 
neighbours, namely Brunei, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam, in addition to 
Indonesia and Singapore, were all being dealt with bilaterally. In addition, there were 
also continuing instabilities in the Indonesian Aceh province, southern Thailand and 
Mindanao island in the Philippines, due to separatist movements. However, regardless of 
the intermittent acrid media reports on all sides, these issues were to a large extent 
managed quite successfully through adherence of the family-like ‘ASEAN way’.27 Thus, 
by and large, Malaysia under Mahathir abided by the principles of the ‘ASEAN way’, 
which ascribed the forms of legitimate relations between ASEAN members.
Perhaps the strongest challenge to the ‘ASEAN way’ vis-a-vis Malaysia under 
Mahathir came in the aftermath of the sacking of the deputy prime minister, Anwar 
Ibrahim in September 1998 and the ensuing reform { ‘reformasV) movement. Mahathir 
came under strong criticisms not only from Western governments but also his ASEAN 
colleagues, especially after Anwar emerged from detention with a bruised eye. While 
there were moves then to intrQduce ‘enhanced interaction’ in ASEAN’s practice by 
Thailand especially, the Mahathir Administration signalled its stance very clearly by 
exhorting the value of quiet diplomacy.28 In the event, the ‘ASEAN way’ was challenged 
particularly by the Philippines and Indonesia. The Philippines’ President Joseph Estrada 
and Indonesia’s B.J. Habibie expressed support for Anwar and met with Anwar’s
26 For example, the crisis surrounding the death of eight Indonesian illegal immigrants in a Malaysian 
detention centre in 1998. See Jurgen Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, p. 178.
27 Michael Richardson, ‘Negotiating A Dispute in ‘The Spirit’ o f ASEAN’, International Herald Tribune,
24 September 1996. See also Jiirgen Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, p.219.
28 Jurgen Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, p. 183.
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daughter Nurul Izzah at the sidelines of Kuala Lumpur APEC in November 1998, much 
to Mahathir’s displeasure. In its initial response, Malaysia despatched official and 
unofficial envoys to influence opinions in Jakarta but to no avail. After that, Malaysia 
adopted a sterner language with both Indonesia and the Philippines. For example, 
Mahathir threatened to also flout the ‘ASEAN way’ if other members would not stop 
infringing its core norms in their relations to Malaysia.29 This brinkmanship seemed to 
work because both leaders resisted from making more public comments thereafter. This 
episode not only proves Mahathir’s appreciation of the arrangement for legitimate 
relations between ASEAN members, but also how central it is in the set-up of the 
ASEAN regionalism.
Arguably, the ‘ASEAN way’ was actually ‘saved’ ultimately by A1 Gore’s 
performance at the pre-APEC Business Summit dinner in Kuala Lumpur.30 In his speech 
which took place in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, A1 Gore made a direct 
connection between liberal economics, democratic politics and successful management of 
the crisis.31 Gore’s blatant support for ‘reformasV at a dinner hosted by Mahathir (who 
was the very target of the movement) and leaving without waiting for the meal, was 
considered a gross insult, displaying “an air of pompous superiority”, which only 
“reinforced every negative thing about the West that any Malaysian ever thought”.32 
Understandably, Gore’s performance was received with “outrage, even fury, by 
Malaysian leaders” and actually led to the rallying around the ‘ASEAN way’ by ASEAN
29 Jiirgen Haacke, ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture, p. 187.
30 Jurgen Haacke, ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture, pp. 187-8.
31 Mark T Berger, The Battle fo r  Asia: From Decolonization to Globalization, London and New York: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2004, p. 188.
32 Greg Sheridan, Asian Values Western Dreams, Australia: Allen & Unwin, p. 108.
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leaders.33 Haacke argues that this was because Gore had “overstepped an important 
psychological benchmark” that ASEAN leaders set “to distinguish acceptable from 
unacceptable behaviour” by an outsider towards anyone of them, and reminded them that 
the US remained intent on exporting “a particular model of democracy” to Southeast 
Asia.34 In the process, ASEAN leaders realised that ‘enhanced interaction’ as practised 
by some of its members began to impact on the interactions of outside powers with them 
and might actually increase their insecurity. This made them revert their practice to 
conform again to the traditional notions of the ‘ASEAN way’.35
To reiterate, the above elaborations not only illustrate the efficacy of the 
‘ASEAN way’, albeit occasionally tested, but also Mahathir’s strong belief and 
commitment towards ASEAN’s arrangement for intra-mural relations. A further 
illustration relates to the admission of Myanmar into ASEAN in 1997. Although the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand attempted to make Myanmar’s domestic politics as a 
condition for admission, all ASEAN members displayed solidarity with Indonesia and 
Malaysia to accept Myanmar into the grouping at the Kuala Lumpur Summit. Mahathir 
played a pivotal role in this decision and maintained that ASEAN’s norm of non­
intervention should apply. His motives can be understood in recognition terms in the 
following contexts: Firstly, his anger about the US or'Western pressure as an unjustified 
interference and his adamant refusal to give in to Washington’s demand. Thus, it was a 
demonstration of sub-regional nationalism, in the sense that ASEAN could not be told 
what to do. Related to this is Mahathir’s drive to promote the uniqueness of ASEAN as a 
regional organisation that had been successful in fostering regional understanding and
33 Jilrgen Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, p. 188.
34 Jurgen Haacke, ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture, p. 188.
35 Jurgen Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, p.l 88.
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stability according to its own way, that is, by finding ‘regional solutions for regional 
problems’. Hence, according to Mahathir, within ASEAN, he strove for Malaysia to 
show that even as developing countries, they could still maintain an independent stance 
and not be dictated by any big power.36 One of his Foreign Ministers, Syed Hamid Albar 
attested to this and remarked that Malaysia under Mahathir always tried to promote 
independence in ASEAN decision making.37
Secondly, it was based on Mahathir’s motivation to complete and thereby, win 
acclaim for his success in furthering the community of ten Southeast Asian nations under 
ASEAN. In this context, Mahathir’s recognition struggles can be understood in his desire 
to raise his own and Malaysia’s profile by realising ‘ASEAN 10’ at the Kuala Lumpur 
Summit in conjunction with the 30th anniversary of ASEAN.38 Thus, status, either 
personal or national, cannot be discounted as an important motivation.
East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEQ
Mahathir believed that ASEAN was the most relevant model for the wider East Asia 
because it was an arrangement that had evolved according to the unique Asian 
experience, based on local cultures and values. Thus, in arguing for an East Asian 
regionalism, Mahathir opined;
“We should certainly not turn away from the experience of ASEAN, which I believe is even more
directly relevant  It goes without saying that we must not turn away from the wisdom of the
East. We must not forget our special circumstances, our unique history, our particular priorities 
and our distinctive needs. One shoe does not fit all.”39
36 Interview with Mahathir Mohamad, London, 16 January 2007.
37 Interview with Syed Hamid Albar, Malaysian Foreign Minister (1998-currently), London, 16 March 
2007.
38 Jurgen Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, pp. 146-148.
39 Mahathir Mohamad, speech at the First Asia Congress, Kuala Lumpur, 4 August 2003, 
www.pmo.gov.my, accessed on 2 July 2006.
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Therefore, the crux of Mahathir’s policy on East Asia regionalism had been to transfer 
the ASEAN experience to the wider East Asia. In this regard, Mahathir believed that 
ASEAN had validated the efficacy of Asian cultural values in its arrangement for 
legitimate relations, both amongst its members and with outside powers. This 
arrangement resulted in enhanced regional security and co-operation, which had made it 
possible for Southeast Asia to concentrate on development and achieving economic 
growth. Notwithstanding internal tensions having resulted from competing struggles for 
recognition within ASEAN, Mahathir believed that an East Asian community could be 
modelled on the ASEAN experience, thus paving the way for improvement of security 
and economic co-operation in Northeast Asia too, and the whole of East Asia in 
general.40 Clearly, there were important security and economic rationales underpinning 
this process of Southeast Asia regionalism. However, security and economic factors 
were linked to the equally important factors relating to a struggle for recognition, mainly 
in the form of the quest to establish legitimate relations. Thus, in aspiring for East Asia 
to be respected, Mahathir wanted the wider East Asia regionalism to embody the 
independent ethos of ASEAN.
The idea of an East Asia Economic Group (EAEG) was first mooted by 
Mahathir during the visit of the Chinese Premier Li Peng to Malaysia in December 1990. 
According to Mahathir, the EAEG was proposed not as a trade bloc, but “a consultative 
forum to identify common problems” so that when East Asian countries “negotiate with 
the Europeans and Americans, because of Asia’s size, they will have to listen to us.”41
40 “Another reason for the EAEC is derived from our experience in ASEAN.” Mahathir Mohamad, The 
Voice o f  Asia; Two Leaders Discuss the Coming Century, Mahathir Mohamad and Shintaro Ishihara, 
translated by Frank Baldwin, Tokyo, New York: Kodansha International, p.44.
41 Mahathir Mohamad, The Voice o f  Asia, p.43.
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Thus, it has been observed that the EAEC was aimed at “combating the political power of 
the US and Europe.”42
The EAEG proposal created controversy almost instantly. Firstly, the EAEG 
was seen as an economic and trade bloc, against liberalisation policies of the WTO and 
the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC). Secondly, Mahathir’s insistence for 
the EAEG’s membership to follow a narrow geographical definition would exclude the 
Pacific countries of the US, Australia and New Zealand, leading to criticisms that it 
belied an anti-West agenda.43 Thirdly, the proposal called upon Japan’s leadership. 
However, the idea’s similarity to Japan’s Co-Prosperity Sphere promoted during the 
Pacific War made it uncomfortable for some Japanese. Japan was also reluctant to 
assume leadership amidst strong US objection. Finally, some ASEAN members, 
especially Indonesia and Singapore feared that by excluding the US, Chinese hegemony 
in the region would go unchallenged. Indonesia was also concerned that EAEG would 
overshadow ASEAN and along with it, its traditional leadership in Southeast Asia. 
Furthermore, Mahathir’s announcement of the proposal without consulting Indonesia was 
seen as disrespecting Indonesia’s leadership status in Southeast Asia.
The name was quickly changed to EAEC to impress that the idea was a loose 
consultative forum rather than any kind of economic or trade union. In this regard, 
economic factors were undeniably influential in countering emerging Western economic
42 Richard Higgott and R. Stubbs, ‘Competing Conceptions of Economic Regionalism: APEC versus the 
EAEC in the Asia Pacific’ in The Review o f  International Political Economy, Vol.2, N o .3 ,1995, p.523.
43 According to Langdon, the EAEC concept was potentially an anti-Western coalition. See F. Langdon, 
Japan’s Regional and Global Coalition Participation: Political and Economic Aspects, Working Paper 
no. 14, June 1997, Institute of International Relations, University o f British Columbia, pp.27-8.
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blocs, namely the North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the EU.44 Underscoring 
the economic benefits of integration, Mahathir said;
“We have all done well if  not very well. An East Asian regional economy, integrating at a 
remarkable rate, is increasing at breathtaking speed. The integration has been private sector- 
driven, a source o f real strength. In purchasing power parity terms,'East Asia is already the largest 
regional economy in the world, bigger than the Western European or NAFTA regional economy. 
In US dollar terms, we will enter the 21s* Century being the largest economy in the world.” 45
Mahathir believed that the EAEC would be a logical follow-up for East Asian 
governments to take because it would ensure the continuing economic well-being of their 
countries. Mahathir hoped that the East Asia’s co-operation based on the ‘Prosper Thy 
Neighbour’ philosophy, which would bring a ‘win -  win’ solutions to all parties would 
make the EAEC a model for North-South co-operation. In this regard, the experience of 
Japanese investment in Southeast Asia, which in turn transformed the region into 
becoming good markets for Japanese products, could be emulated to create a wider 
regional growth.46
While admitting that there were many models of economic development in 
East Asia, Mahathir highlighted that many economists still talked about the ‘East Asian 
model’. To him, it is characterised by a high savings rate and an emphasis on education. 
Furthermore, East Asian governments shared a sense of national pragmatism. “We all did 
it our way. And the most important element was not the international system, or the 
regional system but the national pragmatism sans ideology,” he asserted.47
44 Author interview with Mahathir Mohamad, London, 16 January 2007.
45 Mahathir Mohamad, speech at The First East Asian Young Leaders Congress on ‘East Asian Peace 
Stability and Prosperity’, Kuala Lumpur, 5 August 1994, in Regional Development and the Pacific 
Community, p. 27.
46 Mahathir Mohamad, speech at The Pacific Rim Business Collaboration Symposium, Kuala Lumpur, 5 
December 1994, in Regional Development and the Pacific Community, p.53.
47 Mahathir Mohamad, speech at the ASEAN-India Business Luncheon, New Delhi, 17 October 2002, in 
Reflections on ASEAN: Selected Speeches by Mahathir Mohamad, Hashim Makaruddin (ed.), Subang Jaya: 
Pelanduk, 2004, pp.288-289.
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Beyond economics, this particularity of the East Asian model resonates in the 
political and security rationales as well. Despite the absence of large scale military 
conflicts, Mahathir was aware of the underlying tension between countries of Northeast
Asia. A regional community, in Mahathir’s mind, would help establish a regional code 
of conduct, engender common values, and ultimately create a communal identity. As 
emphasised, he believed that ASEAN provided a suitable example for Northeast Asia, 
due to its grounding in indigenous Asian culture. Mahathir attributed ASEAN for 
transforming conflict-ridden Southeast Asia in 1967 into “a zone of true peace, a 
community of warm, co-operation and enduring peace.”48
Mahathir believed that Northeast Asia, and East Asia more generally, would 
forever be divided and weak unless they overcome their mutual distrust. To him, the 
situation was dangerous because it made the countries vulnerable to exploitation by the 
West. Hence, Mahathir appealed:
“We need to escape the mindset dictated in capitals in other continents, many of whom may not 
have a similar interest in our peace and our friendship. It is touching how so many of us in Asia 
seem to assume that others can have a greater interest in the welfare of Asia than Asians do. It is 
remarkable how much we borrow from others in terms of what we think about, how to think about 
the things we think about, even what to think about the things we think about. Colonialism is 
dead. But it is amazing how vigorous is our intellectual subservience and how deep is our 
psychological servitude.” 49
Mahathir did not argue for a new hegemony of neither Japan nor China when 
he argued for East Asia regionalism. However, he did believe that because of the 
different sizes of their economies, East Asian countries had to expect some of them to 
play bigger roles than others. Here, he used the analogy of a family, in the sense that
48 Mahathir Mohamad, ‘Towards a Stable Asia’, paper delivered at the Nihon Keizai Shimbun International 
Conference on ‘The Future of Asia’, Tokyo, May 17 1996, in Politics, Democracy and the New Asia, 
pp.l 50-151.
9 Mahathir Mohamad, speech at the 1996 Regional Conference of Harvard Clubs o f Asia, Kuala Lumpur,
15 August 1996, in Politics, Democracy and the New Asia, p. 134.
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older siblings would always have to carry more responsibilities befitting their sizes and 
abilities.50 Mahathir envisioned a regional organisation whose members would be bound 
by principles of “mutual benefit, mutual respect, egalitarianism, consensus and 
democracy”.51
“As an East Asian, I am committed to the building of an East Asian community in which our 
common peace is cooperatively built, an East Asian community in which the giants of our region -  
China, Japan, Indonesia -  shall have their rightful responsibilities, all o f us living in harmony in an 
egalitarian community o f mutual respect and mutual benefit.”52
To Mahathir, an exclusively East Asian regional institution was pivotal if East 
Asian countries were to achieve independence of thoughts and actions. He believed that 
it would be the only way for them to manage the security dilemma they had been facing 
for a long time, which could have been perpetuated by outside influences.53 Therefore, 
Mahathir wanted the EAEC to be a framework for East Asia to find ‘regional solutions to 
regional problems’, like what ASEAN has achieved for Southeast Asia.
In addition, Mahathir felt that East Asian countries should have a bigger voice 
befitting its economic prowess. Clearly, Mahathir perceived some East Asian countries, 
in particular Japan, continued to be subordinated to the West. Due to this, East Asian 
countries were not able to contribute and play any effective role in the international 
society. In this regard, Mahathir lamented,
“Will we enter 21st Century as the object of international economic relations or as a full subject of 
international economic relations? Will we be ‘the prize’, the victim, the economic battlefield of 
the 21st Century, with no say in the wider world, whose rules will be decided elsewhere? Or will
50 Mahathir Mohamad, speech at the 27th International General Meeting o f the Pacific Basin Economic 
Council, Kuala Lumpur in Regional Development and the Pacific Community, p.36.
51 Mahathir Mohamad, speech at The First East Asian Young Leaders Congress on ‘East Asian Peace 
Stability and Prosperity’, Kuala Lumpur on 5 August 1994, in Regional Development and the Pacific 
Community, pp. 28-29.
52 Mahathir Mohamad, speech at the Opening o f the Tenth International General Meeting of the Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Council (PECC X), Kuala Lumpur, 22 March 1994 in Regional Development and 
the Pacific Community, p.41.
53 For discussion on the security dilemma in Northeast Asia, see Thomas J. Christensen, ‘China, the US -  
Japan Alliance and the Security Dilemma in East Asia’ in International Security, 22.4. Spring 1999.
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we be full-fledged actors, able to play our rightful role in global economies, and able to make the 
contribution we must to the healthiest development of the Commonwealth of man?” 54
In reiterating this call at the Pacific Dialogue in November 1994 in Penang 
Malaysia, Mahathir quoted a policy paper issued by the European Commission entitled 
‘Towards a New Asia Strategy’. The paper argued that Asia’s growing economic weight 
was inevitably generating increasing pressures for a greater role in world affairs. The 
paper concluded that the EU should “seek to develop its political dialogue with Asia and 
should look for ways to associate Asia more and more with the management of 
international affairs, working towards a partnership of equals, capable of playing a 
constructive and stabilising role in the world”. 55 In commenting on the paper, Mahathir 
said that East Asia at that point could not even think of ‘equality’ but certainly demand 
some ‘respect’.56
Therefore, along with the economic and security rationales, it was apparent 
that the quest for respect also underpinned Mahathir’s efforts to promote East Asia 
regionalism. Mahathir believed that an exclusively East Asian regional organisation was 
vital to give the community its voice so that their interests could be promoted. The 
proposed organisation would elevate the status of East Asia, befitting the economic 
contribution of the community. To Mahathir, equal status is important in terms of the 
rights that it confers, that is,equal participation in the international order. Mahathir 
regarded this as being increasingly important due to globalisation. It was important for
54 Mahathir Mohamad, speech at The First East Asian Young Leaders Congress on ‘East Asian Peace 
Stability and Prosperity’, Kuala Lumpur, 5 August 1994, in Regional Development and the Pacific 
Community, 2000, p. 27.
55 Mahathir Mohamad, speech at The Pacific Dialogue in Penang, Malaysia, 13 November 1994, in 
Regional Development and the Pacific Community, p. 14.
56 Mahathir Mohamad, speech at The Pacific Dialogue in Penang, Malaysia on 13 November 1994, in 
Regional Development and the Pacific Community, p. 14.
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East Asia to participate in setting the emerging norms of globalisation to ensure that they 
would be more inclusive and not only based on the interests of the powerful West.
Mahathir’s EAEC vision did not materialise due to strong US objections,
making some countries including Japan (whose leadership Mahathir deemed crucial), 
reluctant to pursue the idea.57 At the time, the Americans along with the Australians 
were pursuing a wider regional co-operation framework in the form of the Asia -  Pacific 
Economic Co-operation (APEC).58 Mahathir was not supportive of APEC because he 
believed that it would likely be dominated by the US and institutionalise Western 
economic control in Asia.59 To express his disapproval, Mahathir chose not to attend the 
first APEC Summit in Seattle in November 1993. His dissatisfaction clearly stemmed 
from his perception that East Asian nations had little say in the proposed organisation. 
Rationalising his non-attendance, he said that “perhaps you have to thumb your nose at 
people before they notice you.”60 The pressure faced by Mahathir to comply was obvious 
when the Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating called him a ‘recalcitrant’ for failing to 
attend the Seattle Summit.61
To Mahathir, the lack of support for the EAEC and the reluctance of East 
Asian countries to contradict the wishes of the Americans further proved the subjugation 
of East Asia by the West. Mahathir claimed that by rejecting the proposal, East Asian
57 Charles Harvie and Hyun-Hoon Lee, ‘New Regionalism in East Asia: How Does It Relate to the East 
Asian Economic Development Model?’ in New Asian Regionalism: Responses to Globalisation and Crises, 
Tran Van Hoa and Charles Harvie, Australia: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p.42. See also Richard Higgott 
and R. Stubbs, ‘Competing Conceptions of Economic Regionalism...’ in The Review o f  International 
Political Economy.
58 See R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Malaysian Politics under Mahathir, pp. 128-30. See also Chandran 
Jeshurun, Malaysia: Fifty Years o f  Diplomacy, p.231.
59 R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Malaysian Politics under Mahathir, p. 129.
60 R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Malaysian Politics under Mahathir, p. 130.
61 This incident led to a ‘war’ between the Malaysian and Australian media. See Chandran Jeshurun, Fifty 
Years o f  Diplomacy, p.249.
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countries did not display “loyalty to Asia” and berated their still “colonised mentality”.62 
As for the West, Mahathir felt that by effectively denying East Asia the right to form a 
regional organisation, they had shown yet again their hegemonic tendency and double
standard. Mahathir observed that while Western countries were free to form NAFTA and 
the EU, East Asian countries did not enjoy the same freedom. According to Mahathir:
“ ... some East Asian countries were actually instructed by Western countries, which had already 
formed their own trade blocs, that they should reject this forum. Clearly what is right for the 
Western countries is not right for Eastern countries. Equality is not the great principle that the 
Western countries make it out to be. Equality is only good if it results in economic and other 
gains for the West, but if it is perceived to be a threat to them, then equality should not be 
advocated.” 63
Mahathir’s aspiration for East Asian regionalism remained consistent 
throughout his premiership. Two months before he retired, he reiterated the hope that an 
East Asia regional organisation could be realised based on:
“Mutual benefit. Mutual respect. Egalitarianism. Consensus. Democracy. No self-centred 
selfishness that is interested only in squeezing our neighbours dry. Prosper thy neighbour, not 
beggar thy neighbour. No self-centred, self righteous egotism that justifies sermonising, 
hectoring, bullying and coercion. No hegemony. No imperialism. No commands. No decrees. 
No edicts. No diktats. No bulldozing. No unequal treaties. No forced agreement. No 
intimidation. No empty Cartesian contracts not worth the paper on which they are printed. 
Instead advancement on the basis of true consensus and real agreement. Democratic decision­
making. No unilateralism. The governance of East Asia, by East Asia, for East Asia.” 64
At that point, he noticed that the idea of East Asia co-operation had become 
conventional wisdom. However, Mahathir believed that it would only transpire if East 
Asians seized their future into their own hands. While not denying the US contribution 
towards the prosperity of the region, he could not condone the Washington’s patronising 
attitude. Mahathir asserted:
62 Mahathir Mohamad, an address at the 2nd Malaysia-China Forum, Beijing, 26 August 1996, in Politics, 
Democracy and the New Asia, p. 123.
63 Mahathir Mohamad, ‘An Equal Asia-Europe Partnership for A Better World’, a paper delivered at the 
Asia Business Leaders’ Bangkok Dialogue, Bangkok, 3 March 1996, in Politics, Democracy and the New 
Asia, pp. 168-169.
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“I very strongly believe it is we, the nations of East Asia, who should build our East Asian 
Community o f cooperative peace and prosperity. We are not cows to be led by the nose. We are 
not children to be led by the hand.”65
Thus, it is clear that beyond economic and security rationales, there were 
influential recognition factors that motivated Mahathir to pursue a policy of East Asian 
regionalism. The issue of respect was imperative. In this sense, Mahathir aspired for 
East Asia to be truly independent by taking charge of their own affairs. EAEC would 
provide recognition o f the values of East Asia, which Mahathir believed were the bedrock 
of their economic success. The proposed regional institution would enhance the status of 
East Asian nations, providing them with their rightful voice and make them counted as 
equals by the West.
ASEAN+3 (APT)
Malaysia under Mahathir continued to pursue the idea of East Asia regionalism within 
the ASEAN framework after the EAEC failed to launch. This paid off when ASEAN + 3 
(APT) was founded in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis that began in 1997. 
APT’s origin can be traced to the Second Informal ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur in 
December 1997. For the first time, ASEAN countries invited China, Japan and South 
Korea to join them as a group. APT clearly “represents a close approximation o fr 
Mahathir’s Pan-Asian vision,”66 and some observers even consider it as “in many ways a 
de facto realisation of EAEC.”67 Reflecting the importance Mahathir attached towards
64 Mahathir Mohamad, speech at the First East Asia Congress in Kuala Lumpur, 4 August 2003, 
www.pmo.gov.my, accessed on 2 July 2006.
65 Mahathir Mohamad, speech at the First East Asia Congress in Kuala Lumpur, 4 August 2003, 
www.pmo.gov.my, accessed on 2 July 2006.
66 Mark T Berger, The Battle fo r  Asia, p. 160.
67 Nicholas Tarling, Regionalism in Southeast Asia: To Foster the Political Will, London and New York: 
Routledge, 2006, p.203.
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enhancing confidence amongst the Northeast Asian countries, the first meeting of APT 
focused on promoting good neighbourly and friendly relations with China, increasing 
high level exchanges and strengthening various dialogue mechanisms.
An important step towards East Asia regionalism was taken with the initiation 
of the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) at the APT Summit in Hanoi in 1998. EAVG had 
the mandate to discuss long-term co-operation in the region, with the view of establishing 
an East Asia Summit. A further step towards strengthening East Asian co-operation was 
the initiative to include the foreign, finance and trade ministers, in addition to heads of 
governments of the 10+3 at the ASEAN Summit in 1999. These ministers had already 
started to meet at other points during the year. At the event, ASEAN, China, Japan and 
South Korea pledged to co-operate on economic and social development, as well as 
politics and security in an unprecedented joint declaration on the future of East Asia. The 
concept of East Asia regionalism was further strengthened at the ASEAN Summit in 
2000, when APT leaders decided to form an East Asia Study Group (EASG) that would 
assess the recommendations of the EAVG, and explore the idea and implications of
* AQorganising an East Asia Summit.
Towards institutionalising East Asian regional co-operation, Mahathir 
proposed the establishment of a permanent secretariat for APT in Kuala Lumpur to his 
Japanese counterpart during his visit to Tokyo in late May 2002. In part, this proposal 
reflected Mahathir’s desire to formally institutionalise the process of East Asia 
regionalism. Mahathir felt that it would be fitting for Malaysia to host the APT 
Secretariat because the idea was Malaysia’s from the beginning. Furthermore, Mahathir 
believed that Malaysia is the most neutral location for the secretariat because Malaysia’s
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‘independent’ policy would make it enjoy good relations with all countries.69 In this 
sense, the secretariat would not only recognise Malaysia’s leading role in forging an East 
Asian regionalism, but also give expression to its independent identity. Malaysia pledged 
US 10 million to fund the secretariat. The proposal was discussed at the July 2002 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting but no agreement was reached.70
East Asia Summit (EAS)
The EAVG report recommended “the evolution of the annual summit meetings of APT 
into an East Asian Summit (EAS).” However, at the APT Summit in Cambodia in 2002, 
in commenting on the EAVG’s report, the EASG, among others, raised the membership 
question.71 It was a very contentious issue, which contributed towards the slow 
discussions on EAS. For a long time, Malaysia wanted to limit the membership to APT 
countries only. Other countries, like Singapore for example, wanted the membership to 
be open to Pacific (like Australia) and Asia (like India) countries. Malaysia’s position 
was in line with Mahathir’s sentiments that Australia’s arrogance was “unmitigated” in 
its declaration that it was “the deputy to the US in policing Asia.”72 Such an attitude of 
Australia as the self-appointed deputy sheriff of the US was probably clear to Mahathir 
when he was accused of being a ‘recalcitrant’ by the Australian Prime Minister Paul 
Keating after Mahathir decided to boycott the first APEC Summit held in Seattle in 1993. 
According to Jeshurun, [p]eople have regarded Mahathir’s disdain for anyone pandering 
to the American as almost bordering on an obsession, and this was particularly noticeable
68 File document, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Wisma Putra, 2001.
69 Author interview with Mahathir Mohamad, London, 16 January 2007.
70 File document, Ministry o f Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Wisma Putra, 2001.
71 Final report o f the East Asia Study Group, ASEAN + 3 Summit on 4 November 2002 in Phnom Penh, 
Cambodia, http://www.aseansec.org, accessed on 2 July 2006.
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in his total rejection of the Aussies and the New Zealanders in any regional forum.”73 
Thus in Malaysia’s view, as the deputy sheriff of the US, there was no place for Australia 
in the regional organisation of East Asian nations. Mahathir believed that Australia 
would try to impose its views, which would be in line with the US, in the proposed 
organisation.74 While Malaysia, China and South Korea sought a quick decision, Japan, 
while favouring the idea in principle, stressed on the need for ASEAN to achieve 
consensus. Finding an ASEAN consensus was mostly hindered by Singapore. For 
example, Singapore argued that the EASG Working Group (WG) consisting of Directors 
General of ASEAN national secretariats, was not qualified to select concrete measures 
and recommendations because members of the EASG WG were not technical experts and 
that it needed time to consult its technical experts.75 In the end, the consensus was for the 
process to be ‘evolutionary’ due to the issues (for example, membership and its 
implication on ASEAN) remaining unresolved.76
Malaysia’s position on membership relaxed considerably after Mahathir 
retired in 2003. While Malaysia continued to push for the realisation of the East Asia 
Summit under Abdullah Badawi, it finally succumbed to the pressure to open the 
membership to non-APT countries with the condition that those countries accede to 
ASEAN’s TAC. Here it is important to note that the significance of TAC is in its 
provision of arrangement of legitimate relations on the basis of sovereign equality. In 
December 2005, after signing the APT, India, Australia and New Zealand joined the 
ASEAN and the ‘+3’ countries in the convening of the first EAS. Malaysian Prime
72 Mahathir Mohamad, Reflections on Asia, Subang Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 2002, p.63.
73 Chandran Jeshurun, Malaysia: Fifty Years o f  Diplomacy, p.233.
74 Chandran Jeshurun, Malaysia: Fifty Years o f  Diplomacy, p.335.
75 File document, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Wisma Putra, 2001.
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Minister Abdullah Badawi announced that EAS would continue to be an APT driven 
process and that the APT would continue to be the vehicle for realising the dreams of 
forming the East Asian community.77 Again, this is consistent with Mahathir’s desire, 
proving that his ideas about East Asia regionalism had to a certain extent been retained in 
the foreign policy bureaucracy.
Mahathir criticised Australia’s participation as corrupting his vision of East 
Asia integration. He said that Australia was Western and had made obvious to the world 
that it was the deputy sheriff o f the US.78 To him, Australia’s views would not represent 
the East but those of the US. He had always opposed the idea of Australia and New 
Zealand to be in the group because Australia and New Zealand were “neither East nor 
Asians.”79 In Mahathir’s perceptions, Australia had violated what he deemed to be the 
legitimate relations between it (Australia) and East Asian countries in the manner that 
Australia had tried to impose its Western values and standards on East Asian countries, 
similar to the US. Thus, Mahathir’s strong objection to Australia’s participation in East 
Asian regionalism can be understood in terms of his aspiration for the organisation to 
truly represent and validate Asian values, with complete independence in its decision­
making, and to ultimately be considered as equals in their interactions with the West.
76 Final report o f the East Asia Study Group, ASEAN + 3 Summit on 4 November 2002 in Phnom Penh, 
Cambodia, http://www.aseansec.org, (accessed on 2 July 2006).
77 http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=6645, (accessed on 5 July 2006).
78 Chandran Jeshurun, Malaysia: Fifty Years o f  Diplomacy, p.335.
79 Mahathir Blasts Australia Over Summit, AP, 7 December 2005:
http://news.ninemsn.com.au/article.aspx?id=76332 . See also Chandran Jeshurun, Malaysia: Fifty Years o f  
Diplomacy, p.335.
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7.2.2. Bilateral Initiatives towards East Asian Nations
The ‘Look East’ Policy
Mahathir’s ‘Look East’ campaign provided the rationalisation that underpinned the policy 
reorientation to the East. As highlighted in Chapter Four, the ‘Look East’ policy was 
introduced by Mahathir in the hope that the discipline, determination and hard work that 
he observed as character traits of the Japanese people would be emulated by Malaysians, 
especially the Malays. Although appreciating the significant difficulties in changing 
people’s character, Mahathir felt that it would be much easier for the Malays to adopt the 
Japanese ways than to copy the ethics and practices of the West.80 Thus, on one level, 
‘Look East’ encapsulated a call for a change of mindset within the Malaysian domestic 
society. In this regard, it was a strategy to change the Malay or Malaysian characteristics 
by targeting the psychology of the domestic population. Chapter Four has illustrated 
specific domestic policies that came under the ‘Look East’ umbrella. Domestically, it 
involves the adoption of Japanese work culture in Malaysian organisations and also the 
attempt to emulate Japan Incorporated in the form of Malaysia Incorporated.81 In this 
section, the impact of the ‘Look East’ policy on Malaysia’s foreign relations will be 
considered.
The practical implementation of the ‘Look East’ policy impacted most 
significantly on Malaysia’s relations with Japan. In order to cultivate Japanese work 
ethics, the Public Services Department set up a Look East Policy Division and started to 
send students and government officials to Japan and South Korea for training. By 2004,
80 Mahathir Mohamad, Reflections on Asia, p.37.
81 Mahathir Mohamad, The Voice o f  Asia, p. 131. See also Lee Poh Ping, ‘Japan Incorporated’ and Its 
Relevance to Malaysia’ in Mahathir’s Economic Policies, Jomo K.S (ed.), Kuala Lumpur: INSAN, 1989, 
pp.35-37.
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over 13,000 Malaysians had been sent to study in Japan since the adoption of the ‘Look 
East’ policy.82 Malaysia Inc., a direct copy of Japan Inc.,83 signified Mahathir’s 
idolisation of the Japanese model which underpinned the new special relations he carved
for the two countries. Under Mahathir, Japan replaced the UK as “Malaysia’s number 1 
bilateral partner.”84
Japan
Mahathir’s admiration of the work ethics of the Japanese people was already illustrated in 
Chapter Three. It has been established that Mahathir’s belief system was significantly 
affected by his positive observations of the discipline exhibited by the Japanese soldiers 
when they occupied Malaya during World War II. Although he admitted that the 
occupation “was not a pleasant experience,” he remembered that Japanese soldiers 
always paid a fair price for provisions at the market where he had a stall. Also, he 
himself was never mistreated by them.85 According to Mahathir, the Japanese occupation 
completely changed his view of the world. He believed that the occupation had a 
significant psychological impact on Malayans, in that it reinforced their self-confidence 
as an Asian race. As Mahathir argued:
“Before the war, when Malaya was under British rule, our entire world-view was that we had no 
capability to be independent. We thought that only Europeans could run our country, and felt we 
had to accept their superiority. But the success o f the Japanese invasion convinced us that there is 
nothing inherently superior in the Europeans.”86
82 Seminar on ‘Business Opportunities in Malaysia’, Kobe, Japan, 25 June 2005. http://www.miti.gov.my 
accessed on 22 October 2007.
83 Mahathir Mohamad, The Voice o f  Asia, p.l 31. See Lee Poh Ping, ‘Japan Incorporated’ and Its Relevance 
to Malaysia’ in Mahathir’s Economic Policies, Jomo, K.S. (ed.) pp.35-37.
84 Karminder Singh Dhillon, Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era, 1981-2003, Dissertation 
submitted in partial fulfilment o f the requirements for the degree of Doctor o f Philosophy, Boston 
University, 2005, p.211.
85 Mahathir Mohamad, ‘The Pacific Age’ in Mahathir Mohamad and Shintaro Ishihara, The Voice o f  Asia: 
Two Leaders Discuss The Coming Century, translated by Frank Baldwin, Tokyo, New York: Kondasha 
International, 1995, p. 17.
86 Mahathir Mohamad, A New Deal fo r  Asia, p. 16.
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Believing that the attitude of the Japanese was the key to their success, one 
particular lesson he leamt during the Japanese occupation of Malaya was that discipline 
was the only pre-requisite for success. Furthermore, it triggered an important political 
awakening within him that Malayans possessed the ability to govern their own country 
and “compete with the Europeans on an equal footing.”87 In the process, he became 
convinced of the merit of Asian culture, which was hitherto perceived as inferior to the 
European.
“Most Asians felt inferior to the European colonisers and rarely did we even consider
independence a viable option. Asia was a region without pride and self-confidence and our
economies were structured to secure the European demand for raw materials and natural 
>,88resources.
Mahathir’s positive image of the values and attitudes of the Japanese were 
confirmed when he visited Japan for the first time in 1961. Mahathir observed rapid 
recovery of the nation in the aftermath of the war. Most importantly, he observed that 
“the Japanese people were very determined, focused on working and were very polite to 
each other.”89 He thus attributed the impressive recovery of Japan to “the character of the 
Japanese people, their work ethics and their management methods.”90 According to 
Mahathir, this was the reason why he introduced the ‘Look East’ policy when he later 
assumed the premiership in 1981. He wanted the indigenous Malays to adopt the same 
work ethics, so that they would be able to reap the opportunities of the NEP and close the 
economic gap with the Chinese.91 Put differently, in Mahathir’s belief system, Japan 
became the embodiment of a successful nation that Mahathir believed was more suitable
87 Mahathir Mohamad, A New Deal fo r  Asia, pp. 16-7.
88 Mahathir Mohamad, A New Deal For Asia, p. 15.
89 Mahathir Mohamad, Reflections on Asia, p.36.
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for Malaysians to emulate compared to the European ones. It induced a re-orientation of 
foreign policy with an increased identification with East Asia, especially with Japan.
Mahathir paid his first visit as prime minister to Japan in May 1982. During 
his premiership, on average, he travelled to Japan almost every year, sometimes twice a 
year, whether on official or unofficial visits.92 Furthermore, from 1999, Mahathir made it 
a point to attend the annual Nikkei Shimbun Conference on ‘The Future of Asia’. This 
Conference aims to deepen the understanding between Japan and other Asian nations. Its 
participants include ministers and senior officials, as well as top corporate leaders of the 
region. Mahathir spoke every year at the conference, and without failure, always raised 
the issue of Japanese leadership in realising East Asia regionalism.93 It is obvious that 
Mahathir considered the conference to be vital in promoting his vision of East Asia co­
operation.
Certainly, there were significant economic rationales behind the strengthening 
relations with Japan. Beyond regarding Japan as its model for development, the 
implementation of ‘Look East’ also coincided with a significant rise in Japanese foreign 
direct investment (FDI) into Malaysia in the 1980s and 1990s.94 During this period, 
Japanese FDI into Malaysia cumulatively overtook that of the US and EU. Japan also 
advanced as the most generous bilateral donor of Overseas Development Aid (ODA) to
90 Mahathir Mohamad, Reflections on Asia, p.37.
91 Mahathir Mohamad, Reflections on Asia, pp.36-7.
92 Mahathir’s visited Japan in May 1982, January and November 1983, October 1984, July 1985, October 
1986, October 1987, December 1991, May 1993, October 1994, May 1995, February and May 1996,
March and November 1997, October 1998, May-June 1999, June 2000, January, June and October 2001,
May and December 2002 and June 2003. Source: Office of Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Perdana 
Leadership Foundation, Putrajaya.
93 For Mahathir’s speeches at the Nikkei Conferences, visit http://www.perdana.org.my.
94 Khadijah MD Khalid, ‘Malaysia-Japan Relations under Mahathir: “Turning Japanese?” ‘, in Reflections: 
The Mahathir Years, Bridget Welsh (ed.), Washington DC: Southeast Asia Studies Program, 2004, p.330.
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Malaysia.95 Thus, it has been observed that “[t]he most vibrant dimension of the Japan- 
Malaysia relationship has been economic, centred in the business community.”96 Some 
high-profile Malaysia-Japanese collaborations occurred including car manufacturing led 
by Mitsubishi and Perusahaan Otomobil Nasional (PROTON), and Daihatsu with 
Perusahaan Otomobil Kedua (PERODUA), as well as the Mitsui cement plant and the 
steel production between Nippon Steel and Perwaja. Therefore, the policy clearly 
brought economic benefits. In assuming the status of a willing pupil in relation to Japan, 
Mahathir hoped that Japan would grant more aid, increase the level of investment and 
offer better access for Malaysian products to the Japanese market.97
However, it cannot be definitely concluded that the ‘Look East’ policy was 
undertaken with the sole economic purpose of luring Japanese investment. The policy 
and the consequent strengthening of bilateral relations with Japan must be understood in 
the context of Mahathir’s deep admiration of Japan. It was this admiration that made 
Malaysia initiate the ‘Look East’ policy and push Japan to assume a leadership role in 
East Asia. Moreover, the special status that Mahathir accorded Japan was also due to 
some important recognition factors. Firstly, as an important economic partner, Mahathir 
felt that Japanese leaders never looked down on him, or Malaysia. Secondly, Mahathir 
believed that the Malaysia - Japan relationship was proper because Japan never interfered 
in the domestic affairs of Malaysia. Thirdly, due to the fact that Japan was a successful 
industrialised country, Mahathir must have believed that a special relationship between 
Malaysia and Japan would definitely impress other nations.
95 See table 2.4 in Hirohisa Kohama, ‘Japan’s Development Cooperation in East Asia: A Historical 
Overview o f Japan’s ODA and Its Impact’ in External Factors fo r  Asian Development, Hirohisa Kohama 
(ed), Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003, p. 18.
96 Khadijah Md. Khalid, ‘Malaysia-Japan Relations under Mahathir: “Turning Japanese?” ‘, in Reflections, 
Bridget Welsh (ed.), p.330.
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7.3. THE * ASIAN VALUES* DEBATE
An essential aspect of Mahathir’s recognition struggle in relation to East Asia is in the 
context of the suitable place for East Asian values. Mahathir is a notable proponent of
the ‘Asian values’ argument, which was popular and widely debated in the 1990s.98 
Basically, proponents of Asian values held that East Asian economic success was a 
product of Asian culture, which stresses the “collectivity” over the individual.99 While 
accepting the diversity of East Asian culture, the proponents of Asian values claimed that 
there were significant commonalities, for example, their emphasis on “thrift, family, 
work and discipline”, which according to Huntington, made it essential for them to found 
a new framework for intra-East Asian co-operation like the EAEC in order to protect 
their common interests vis-a-vis the West.100
While arguing the merits of Asian values, Mahathir realised that Asian or 
Western values are not monolithic sets of values. Moreover, he admitted that he should 
not identify ‘the West’ solely with the Anglo-Saxon world or way.101 Mahathir also noted 
that there had been a great convergence of values over the last few hundred years that
97 Lee Poh Ping, ‘The Look East Policy, the Japanese Model and Malaysia’ in Reflections, p.318.
98 Greg Sheridan, Asian Values, Western Dreams, p.2.
99 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash o f  Civilizations and the Remaking o f  World Order, London: Simon & 
Schuster, 1996, pp. 107-8. See also Kishore Mahbubani, Can Asians Think?, Singapore and Kuala Lumpur: 
Times Books International, 1998, and Diane K. Mauzy, ‘The Human Rights and ‘Asian Values’ Debate in 
Southeast Asia: Trying to Clarify the Key Issues’ in The Pacific Review, 10 (2) 1997, pp. 210-36. On the 
other hand, Langlois argued that a lot of the claims, whether from the proponents or critics of Asian values, 
were made on behalf of others in the region. Senior political leaders spoke as if  all under their leadership 
shared these values. Instead, critics suggested, on behalf of all human beings, that human rights were 
universal. See Anthony J. Langlois, The Politics o f  Justice and Human Rights: Southeast Asia and 
Universalist Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p.46.
100 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash o f  Civilizations and the Remaking o f  World Order, London: Simon & 
Schuster, 1996, p. 108.
101 Mahathir Mohamad, ‘Asians Versus Western Values’, speech at the Senate House, University of 
Cambridge, 15 March 1995 in Democracy, Human Rights, EAEC and Asian Values: Selected Speeches o f  
Mahathir Mohamad, Vol. 1, Hashim Makaruddin (ed.), Subang Jaya: Pelanduk, 2002, p. 14.
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some started talking about universal values and the ‘end of history’.102 Nevertheless, he 
argued that there remained a great diversity of values and attitudes worldwide. In many 
issue areas he felt that insistence on looking at them from only one cultural perspective 
would only lead to acute political discords. He warned of conflicts due to the aggressive 
nature of the proponents of ‘universal values’ and expressed bewilderment at the 
“ferocious cultural denial” of cultural pluralism that he considered to be obvious, and this 
made him rather suspicious of the motives of the West.103
According to Mahathir, East Asian societies were bound together by their 
shared prioritisation of community rights above individuals’ rights.104 In his seminal 
speech on ‘Asian versus Western Values’ at the University of Cambridge in 1995, 
Mahathir quoted a study conducted by David Hitchcock105 in 1994, in defining Asian 
values. The survey involved asking Americans and East Asians (Japanese, Chinese, 
Koreans, Malaysians, Singaporeans, Indonesians and Filipinos) to choose six ‘societal 
values’ and five ‘personal values’ which they regarded as central for them. It found that 
the six societal values most valued by East Asians were: firstly, having an orderly 
society; secondly, societal harmony; thirdly, ensuring the accountability of public 
officials; fourthly, being open to new ideas; fifthly, freedom of expression and sixthly, 
respect for authority. In contrast, the six most important societal values for the 
Americans were; freedom of expression, personal freedom, the rights of the individual,
102 See for example, Francis Fukuyama, The End o f  History and the Last Man, London: Hamish Hamilton, 
1992.
103 Mahathir Mohamad, ‘Asians Versus Western Values’, speech at the Senate House, University of 
Cambridge, 15 March 1995 in Democracy, Human Rights, EAEC and Asian Values, pp. 13 -14
104 Interview with Mahathir Mohamad, London, 16 January 2007.
105 The former Director for East Asian and the Pacific Affairs o f the US Information Agency.
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open debates, thinking for oneself and finally, the accountability of public officials.106 
Mahathir felt that the findings supported the intuitive assumptions of most East Asians 
and those who knew East Asia, on the salient elements of Asian values.
At the Cambridge event, Mahathir maintained that his argument on the 
plurality of values did not in any way represent a defence of dictatorship, 
authoritarianism, anti-democratic practices, the suppression of human-rights or the denial 
of democracy. He insisted that any atrocity, irrespective of where it occurs, must not be 
tolerated and that no perpetrator of atrocities should be allowed to hide behind the cloak 
of cultural relativism. Also, he conceded that Asian values included some negative 
practices that he believed Asians should discard. To illustrate, Mahathir had always 
criticised the Malays for their fatalism and feudalism. Furthermore, he argued that 
Western values should not be dismissed in full. ‘Western’ did not mean exclusively bad 
either. As he put it, “[t]here are many Western values, found in the best Western 
societies, which we should adopt and internalise more deeply”.107 Thus, what he appealed 
for was respect and tolerance for all cultures and appreciation of their particular merits. 
In this regard, Mahathir observed that there was more of a tendency for the West to be 
intolerant of other cultures. In his view, this was the consequence of a widespread 
arrogance in the West that led to disrespect of other cultures. Mahathir argued:
“Mutual respect demands an acceptance that those who have a different view are not necessarily 
misguided or evil. Mutual respect demands a minimum level o f humility on all sides. The 
countries o f the West have a right to their preferences. But they have no right to ram their 
preferences down anyone’s throat.”108
106 Mahathir Mohamad, ‘Asians versus Western Values’, speech at the Senate House, University of 
Cambridge, 15 March 1995 in Democracy, Human Rights, EAEC and Asian Values, pp. 14 -15. See also 
Greg Sheridan, Asian Values Western Dreams, 1999, p.9.
107 Mahathir Mohamad, ‘Asians Versus Western Values’, speech at the Senate House, University of 
Cambridge, 15 March 1995 in Democracy, Human Rights, EAEC and Asian Values, p. 17.
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A sense of deep nationalism underpinned the Asian values debate on both 
sides. For leaders like Mahathir, the central argument about accepting the plurality of 
cultures and values was driven by a strong indignation that “It is not up to the West -  the
US or any other part of the West -  to determine the political culture of nations in South 
East Asia.”109 The crux of Mahathir’s grievances was the way liberal democracy was 
being advocated by the West with little regard to local values and circumstances as if 
‘one size fits all’. Mahathir believed that the nature of democracy should be contingent 
on the societal mores and values. While accepting that democracy had contributed to 
Malaysia’s achievement, Mahathir asserted that the Malaysian democracy was not of the 
Western variety and that all types of democracy should be valued as long as its practices 
yielded positive results for the society.110 Mahathir believed that East Asian democracy 
is based on the understanding that freedom comes with responsibility.111 To Mahathir, 
Asian human rights need not be a direct copy of Western human rights. In particular, 
freedom for the individuals and minorities must not deprive the rights of the majority.112
Mahathir asserted that East Asian democracy produced ‘strong governments’ 
and the success of their economies proved the efficacy of their model. A typical 
characteristic of these strong governments were the close links between the governments 
and the private sector.113 They have also been accused o f authoritarianism because,
108 Mahathir Mohamad, ‘Asians Versus Western Values’, speech at the Senate House, University of 
Cambridge, 15 March 1995 in Democracy, Human Rights, EAEC and Asian Values, p. 19.
109 Greg Sheridan, Asian Values, Western Dreams, 1999, p. 13.
110 Mahathir Mohamad, speech at the International Conference on the Future o f Asia, Tokyo, 19 May 1995 
in Democracy, Human Rights, EAEC and Asian Values, p.7.
111 Mahathir Mohamad, speech at the International Conference on the Future o f Asia, Tokyo, 19 May 1995 
in Democracy, Human Rights, EAEC and Asian Values, p.6.
1,2 Mahathir Mohamad, speech at the International Conference on the Future o f Asia, Tokyo, 19 May 1995 
in Democracy, Human Rights, EAEC and Asian Values, p.8.
113 Refer the aspect of the Japanese model that Malaysia under Mahathir tried to emulate, in particular the 
relationship between the government and private sector, in Lee Poh Ping, ‘The Look East Policy, the 
Japanese Model, and Malaysia’ in Reflections, Bridget Welsh (ed.), Washington D.C: SAIS, pp.321-3.
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allegedly, “Asian values were widely used not only to cover tracks of cronyism but to 
direct attention away from political repression and ecological holocaust.”n4 
Nevertheless, Mahathir maintained that East Asia’s distinctive democratic system was
responsible for the political stability, which made East Asian nations attractive 
destinations for investments, generating economic growth and social development. He 
argued that East Asia proved the “strong correlation between rapid economic growth and 
strong stable governments.”115
Mahathir argued that this form of democracy concurs with Asian values 
because it suits the way East Asians relate to their leaders and their emphasis on social 
stability. He argued:
“In the West, democracy means many things to different people. To us in Asia, democracy 
means our citizens are entitled to free and fair elections. They can choose the governments of 
their liking. We also believe that once we have elected our governments, they should be allowed 
to govern and to formulate policies and act on them. Our democracy does not confer complete 
licence for citizens to go wild. We need political stability, predictability and consistency to 
provide the necessary environment for progress and economic development.” 1,6
Therefore, Mahathir challenged the Western notions of democracy and free 
market systems as being the economic and politic cure-alls.117 To him, the economic 
success of East Asia proved the efficacy of a different model that provides the stability 
needed for economic development. Mahathir’s moral indignation thus rooted in the fact 
that despite the success of the alternative East Asian model based on Asian values, East
114 William H. Thornton, Fire on the Rim: The Cultural Dynamics o f East/West Power Politics, Oxford: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2002, p. 13.
115 Mahathir Mohamad, speech at the Opening of the Pacific Rim Business Collaboration Symposium in 
Kuala Lumpur on 5 December 1994 in Regional Development and the Pacific Community, p.49.
116 Mahathir Mohamad, speech at the Opening o f the Pacific Rim Business Collaboration Symposium in 
Kuala Lumpur on 5 December 1994 in Regional Development and the Pacific Community, p.50. Chapter
Four has elaborated on the practice on elections in Malaysia. For an alternative brief account, see Bridget 
Welsh, ‘Shifting Terrain: Elections in the Mahathir Era’ in Reflections, Bridget Welsh (ed.), pp. 119-33.
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Asian societies were still demonised as backward and their governments as observing
inhumane practices. To illustrate, Mahathir remarked:
“We speak of Asian values: hard work, respect for authority, discipline, submission to the interest 
and the good of the majority and filial piety. We now find Asian values equated with authoritarian 
rule, disregard for'human and workers right,' political stability and economic'success at all costs: 
We must now discard Asian values and adopt the so-called universal values as conceived by the
Mahathir observed strong pressures from Western countries on East Asian 
nations to adopt the free market system fully and also the Western standards of labour 
rights in international economic institutions, for example GATT, WTO and the 
International Labour Office (ILO). These pressures were also exerted in the Western 
controlled international media. It became almost impossible for non-Westem nations to 
withstand the pressures to liberalise and open up their borders, even to the detriment of 
their home-grown industries and economies.119 According to Mahathir, “at the GATT, 
WTO, ILO and other fora, the stress of the powerful is an unqualified equality.”120 The 
pressure to liberalise was made more acute by attaching Western standards of democracy 
and human rights to issues of trade, investment and also the environment. Mahathir 
observed that, failure to subscribe to Western demands would make East Asian countries
1,7 On the Western notion of the free market economy and democratic system of government, Mahathir 
maintained that “[t]he mere adoption of these economic and political systems is no guarantee for success.” 
Mahathir Mohamad, speech at the Opening of the Pacific Rim Business Collaboration Symposium in Kuala 
Lumpur on 5 December 1994 in Regional Development and the Pacific, p.52.
118 Mahathir Mohamad, ‘Building a Single Global Commonwealth’, paper delivered at the 3rd Pacific 
Dialogue in Kuala Lumpur, 21 November 1996, in Politics, Democracy and the New Asia, p.105.
119 Mahathir Mohamad, ‘ An Equal Asia-Europe Partnership for a Better World’, paper delivered at the 
Asia Business Leaders’ Bangkok Dialogue, 3 March 1996, in Politics, Democracy and the New Asia, 
ppl67-8.
Mahathir Mohamad, ‘ An Equal Asia-Europe Partnership for a Better World’, paper delivered at the 
Asia Business Leaders’ Bangkok Dialogue, 3 March 1996, in Politics, Democracy and the New Asia,
p.168.
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susceptible to the West’s bullying tactics, which include “anti-dumping measures or 
countervailing duties or just plain economic arm-twisting.”121
The ‘Asian values’ debate took place against the backdrop of increasing 
globalisation, which to Mahathir, represented a West-driven process. Mahathir claimed 
that globalisation is underpinned by the belief in the West that the end of the Cold War 
had vindicated Western liberal democratic ideals. Mahathir was not isolated in his 
understanding. Stiglitz for example, while admitting the benefits of globalisation, 
observes that globalisation (“which typically is associated with accepting triumphant 
capitalism, American style”), to its proponents, “w progress: developing countries must 
accept it, if they are to grow and to fight poverty effectively.”122 Thus, there is a 
similarity in Mahathir’s and Stiglitz’s concerns of the dangerous manner in which 
globalisation was professed and spread, as if East Asian nations must adopt Western 
liberal values in order to be enlightened. This reminded Mahathir of colonisation because 
“[wjithout the restraining effect of the competition”, “the winners have begun to run wild 
... [with] the old ideas about the need to civilise the backward people [returning] with a 
vengeance.”123 In other words, Mahathir was morally aggrieved because the way 
globalisation was being promoted indicated the persistent belief of cultural supremacy on 
the part of the West.
Mahathir equated globalisation to neo-colonialism. Firstly, he observed that 
' universal standardisation and homogeneity were being pursued in almost all areas,
121 Mahathir Mohamad, ‘ An Equal Asia-Europe Partnership for a Better World’, paper delivered at the 
Asia Business Leaders’ Bangkok Dialogue, 3 March 1996, in Politics, Democracy and the New Asia, 
n.168.
Joseph Stiglitz, Globalisation and Its Discontents, London: Penguin, 2002, p.5.
123 Mahathir Mohamad, ‘Socialism, Communism, Capitalism and Liberal Democracy’, paper delivered at 
the 1998 Harvard Project for Asian and International Relations Conference, Kuala Lumpur, 28 May 1998, 
in Politics, Democracy and the New Asia, p.50.
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particularly political and economic standardisation, based solely on Western standards. 
These standards were defined with particular reference to the Anglo-Saxon ideas on 
laissez-faire market economies. In the words of Mahathir:
“In economic terms, there is a huge -  deliberate and non-deliberate, concerted and non-concerted 
-  efforts to turn all Asian economies, all economies in fact, into Anglo-Saxon, laissez-faire market 
economies. In political terms, there is a huge movement -  deliberate and non-deliberate, 
concerted and non-concerted -  to turn all Asian political systems everywhere, into Anglo-Saxon 
liberal democracies or what is imagined to be Anglo-Saxon liberal democracies. In the final 
analysis, if  we are sensible and enlightened, we must make sure that we are all democracies 
practising the market system.” 124
Secondly, Mahathir believed that there were similarities in how, colonialism 
then, and now, globalisation, were being justified. Under globalisation, the West 
propagated its values and standards as if they are intrinsically superior to the rest. While 
Western leaders argued that the adoption of a liberal democratic system and a laissez- 
faire economy would bring ‘enlightenment’ to East Asian and all developing nations, 
Mahathir observed that somehow, only Western companies seemed to be reaping all the 
benefits. The unequal relationship between Western countries and non-Westem countries 
in the age of globalisation is comparable to the colonial period. Speaking at a conference 
in 1998, Mahathir cynically described colonisation as an oligopolistic system that had 
also brought economic profits for the colonisers, which at one point was justified 
“because it was said to be civilising.”125
Mahathir’s moral indignation rooted in his perception of the subjugated status 
of Asian cultural values motivated him to champion solidarity within East Asia. He felt 
that Asia should stop “taking injury and insult in stoic silence” and had “a right to
124 Mahathir Mohamad, keynote address at the International Conference on ‘The Future of Asia’ organised 
by Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Tokyo, 3 June 1998, in Politics, Democracy and the New Asia, p.31.
125 Mahathir Mohamad, ‘Socialism, Communism, Capitalism and Liberal Democracy’, paper delivered at 
the 1998 Harvard Project for Asian and International Relations Conference, Kuala Lumpur, 28 May 1998 
in Politics, Democracy and the New Asia, p.49.
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demand a little maturity and sophistication” from those “ who so easily slip into the role 
of policeman, prosecutor, judge and jury ...”126 In appealing for support for the EAEC, 
Mahathir argued that East Asia must assert their “democratic rights , as nations, to be 
equal” and not to allow themselves to be “mentally, informationally and diplomatically 
bludgeoned.”127
7.4. THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION IN THE CASE OF THE EAST
As this chapter has demonstrated, Mahathir’s foreign policy towards the East Asian 
nations had been underpinned by a quest for recognition. Firstly, he strove for equality in 
the relations between nations in the region, as well as respect for this arrangement for 
legitimate relations. This is illustrated by his commitments towards ASEAN principles 
and his initiatives to establish a similar kind of arrangement in the wider East Asia 
region. The search for respect was an important motivational force. Secondly, 
Mahathir’s search for recognition was demonstrated by him championing Asian values. 
Mahathir wanted to see Asian values recognised as the contributory factors to the success 
of East Asian economies. In this sense, he was driven significantly by a quest for esteem.
It can be argued that Mahathir’s recognition struggles stemmed from his 
beliefs that Asians, including the Malays, suffered from a colonised mindset, which led to 
an imbedded inferiority complex and a perception of superiority on the part of the West. 
In addition, due to the lack of respect shown by the West for East Asian values and its 
particular ways of doing things, Mahathir felt that East Asian nations were not given the
126 Mahathir Mohamad, ‘Building a Single Global Commonwealth’, a paper delivered at the 3rd Pacific
Dialogue, Kuala Lumpur, 21 November 1996, in Politics, Democracy and the New Asia, p. 106.
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chance to play any major role in international affairs, even when their interests were 
directly affected. Mahathir resented the fact that the West, particularly the US, continued 
to play a decisive role in East Asia, thereby undermining the region’s political, security 
and economic well-being. According to Mahathir, the reason why he did not attend the 
first APEC Summit in Seattle in 1993 was precisely because he was against the US 
playing such an influential role in East Asia.128 In this sense, the crux of Mahathir’s 
moral indignation was the continued subjugated status of the East Asian nations, which 
deprived them of their due respect as nations. Even after they achieved political 
independence, Mahathir saw that East Asian nations were still being dictated to by the 
West, particularly the US.
There is a clear correlation between Mahathir’s rhetoric about the non- 
recognition of the status and rights of East Asia, and Malaysia’s foreign policy initiatives 
towards the region. For example, the discourse on ‘Asian values’ provides the 
intellectual argument pertinent to recognition struggles, beyond the economics and 
security rationales that underpinned Mahathir’s proposal for East Asian regionalism. In 
his discourse on ‘Asian values’, Mahathir sought recognition for East Asian culture, 
which he felt was instrumental in bringing economic development to the East Asian 
economies. Instead of arguing the supremacy of Asian over Western values, he argued 
for recognition and tolerance of plurality of values. He believed that non-Westem 
models could also be appropriate examples depending on circumstances. Mahathir felt 
that the non-recognition of Asian values exposed the ingrained feeling of superiority and 
arrogance of the West. To him, globalisation was akin to colonialism because both were
127 Mahathir Mohamad, speech at the New Asia Forum, Kuala Lumpur, 11 January 1996, in Politics, 
Democracy and the New Asia, p. 179.
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based on the deep-rooted superiority complex of the West and was being justified by 
some of its proponents in the same way as bringing progress. In addition, Mahathir 
observed that somehow only Western companies and countries seemed to benefit from 
globalisation, as they also did from colonialism. He was therefore suspicious of the 
West’s declared altruistic motives. Due to these feelings of moral indignation, Mahathir 
appealed for East Asian nations to overcome their disagreements and unify in a regional 
organisation to protect their interests. This was important so that they would be able to 
decide for themselves on issues that concerned them, and not be dictated to by anyone. 
Moreover, by establishing a regional institution, they would be able to balance the 
powerful West and thus, help ensure a more just and equitable international order. Thus, 
East Asian regionalism became the cornerstone of Mahathir’s policy towards East Asia. 
It is also in the context of this regionalism that Mahathir’s visions for the roles of 
ASEAN and Japan can be understood in recognition terms.
Mahathir’s foreign policy towards the countries of East Asia was therefore 
motivated significantly by the quest for self-respect and self-esteem. These motivations 
can be analysed in the context of Honneth’s insights on the struggle for recognition in the 
following way. Firstly, according to Honneth, the quest for self-respect can be in terms 
of possessing an equal participation in the society’s discursive will-formation. In this 
context, acts of disrespect can occur by way of being “structurally excluded from the 
possession of certain rights within a society”129 to participate in this process of will 
formation. Mahathir clearly believed that East Asian nations were excluded from the 
position of influencing international order. He constantly lamented that East Asia
128 Author interview with Mahathir Mohamad, 16 January 2007.
129 Axel Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition: The Moral Grammar o f  Social Conflicts, Massachusetts: 
Polity Press, 1995, p. 133.
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continued to be dictated to by the West, in particular the US, to the extent that East Asian 
nations could not even decide on issues relating to their own interests. Mahathir’s 
frustration concerning Japan’s reluctance to support the EAEC amidst the US’s objection 
is a clear example here. Mahathir believed that the West’s meddling in East Asia not 
only constituted a form of disrespect of their culture, but also perpetuated distrust 
amongst East Asian nations. For Mahathir, this hindered the latter’s unity - to the benefit 
of the West. Mahathir’s promotion of East Asia regionalism was bom out of the felt need 
to assert legitimacy in their relations, so that they would attain the equal status of full- 
fledged partners in the interaction between East and West. Mahathir thus aspired for East 
Asia to be able to influence international affairs, so that decisions would not be based 
only on Western interests and judged according to Western standards. In this sense, 
Mahathir’s moral claim relates to his quest for an equal role for East Asia in international 
society so that East Asian nations can contribute towards a more just and equal 
international order.
Honneth explains self esteem in terms of particular traits that make a 
community special due to its contribution towards the well-being of the bigger 
community. In this context, acts of disrespect would arise when a collective way of life 
is being denigrated.130 As regards esteem, Mahathir’s recognition struggles can be 
detected on two levels. Firstly, for ASEAN, Mahathir felt that its success provided the 
best example for East Asia in terms of how a regional organisation based on local 
cultures and values could contribute to a legitimate sub-regional order. To Mahathir, 
ASEAN had helped foster regional norms for managing regional relations. It had 
enhanced understanding and co-operation amongst members whilst reducing
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interventions of outside powers. Mahathir took pride in the fact that ASEAN has been 
able to assert its arrangement of legitimate relations by the respect that big powers 
showed in abiding ASEAN’s non-intervention policy. In relation to the bigger East Asia 
community, Mahathir was also proud of the economic success of most East Asian 
nations, which to him proved the effectiveness of East Asia’s style of governance, based 
on Asian values. Mahathir felt that East Asia is entitled to a bigger role in shaping 
international order. Mahathir believed that a role that was commensurate with East 
Asia’s economic contribution would be beneficial for the international society as whole 
because it would help achieve a more equal and just international order.
7.5. CONCLUSION
This chapter focused on factors of the struggle for recognition in Malaysia’s foreign 
policy towards East Asia under Mahathir. Specifically, this focus refers to policies on 
ASEAN, East Asia regionalism, ‘Look East’ (especially on the policy’s impact on 
bilateral relations with Japan) and Mahathir’s discourse on the Asian values debate.
As in the discussions on the South and Islam, the East provided another point 
of reference in relation to the national identity that Mahathir’s government actively 
cultivated for Malaysia. In this sense, the focus on East Asia must be understood also in 
the context of the social engineering that became part of the nation-building process in 
the domestic realm. The ‘Look East’ policy, for example, must be appreciated in the 
context of Mahathir’s crusade to revolutionise the bumiputra’s character and achieving 
NEP goals. In Mahathir’s mind, post-war Japan became a suitable template for Malaysia
130 Axel Honneth, The Struggle fo r  Recognition, p. 134.
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in its quest to achieve the NIC status while aspiring to maintain its unique Eastern and 
Islamic identity. As illustrated in Chapter Four, in the Malaysian domestic context, 
Mahathir’s discourse emphasised the Islamic and Confucian roots of the Asian values in 
extolling the virtues of hard work, thrift and respect for the family and authority. While 
Mahathir certainly felt that Islam was a crucial identity reference point for Malaysia, by 
virtue of its Muslim Malay majority, the East identity was cultivated through Mahathir’s 
calculated policy decisions rooted in his perceptions on Malaysia’s position in East Asia 
and East Asia’s position in the global order.
The case of the East highlights very lucidly Mahathir’s understanding of the 
conflict arising from non-recognition of other cultures by the West and its controls of 
important global structures like the WTO and the IMF.131 To Mahathir, this non- 
recognition effectively relegated non-Westem nations to subjugated status, where they 
would be unable to play any role in influencing international order. Mahathir argued that 
East Asia’s economic achievements had proven the efficacy of Asian values and that the 
Western model is not the only method for attaining economic progress. However, 
Mahathir felt that the West did not recognise East Asia’s achievements and did not give it 
equal rights and status in international society. For example, East Asia was not allowed 
to organise themselves in a regional organisation, unlike North America (NAFTA) and 
Europe (the EU). Moreover, the US continued to play a vital role in Northeast Asia. In 
this sense, Mahathir’s recognition struggles exemplified by Malaysia’s policy towards 
East Asia concerned the quest for self respect, by demanding non-interference and equal 
rights to participate in international norms formation.
131 For example, Higgot notes that, “[cjompeting IMF and Asian views of how to manage the regional 
economic order are delicately balanced.” Richard Higgot, ‘The International Relations o f the Asian 
Economic Crisis’ in Politics and Markets in the Wake o f  the Asian Crisis, p.279.
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In addition, Mahathir’s recognition struggle also concerned esteem motives. 
In this aspect, Mahathir aspired for East Asia to become the alternative model for 
economic development, in contrast to the Western one. He also hoped for East Asia to 
contribute towards a more equal global order by balancing Western hegemony and 
championing North -  South collaboration. At a more regional level, he believed that 
ASEAN could provide a suitable model for the greater East Asia regionalism process 
because ASEAN has successfully reduced conflicts amongst its members and enhanced 
their co-operation through its arrangement of legitimate relations.
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION
This thesis begins with the observation that security and economic factors are not 
sufficient in explaining the motivation underpinning Malaysia’s foreign policy under 
Mahathir. It proposes that the struggle for recognition, though it may not be the 
overarching factor at all times, was nevertheless a significant driving force that existed 
alongside the motivation for security and the motivation for acquiring wealth (the 
economic motive). In some instances, these three motives overlapped and interlinked, 
proving that they are not mutually exclusive. In exploring the struggle for recognition as 
a significant motivation in FPA, this thesis employs the insights provided by the theory of 
Axel Honneth. Furthermore, in the case of Malaysia under Mahathir, the thesis has 
illustrated that the search for recognition underpinning foreign policy motivations flowed 
directly from the conceptions of justice as perceived by Mahathir, because of the 
centrality of the prime minister in the government decision -  making process.
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8.1. MAIN RESEARCH FINDINGS
8.1.1* The Centrality of Mahathir in Foreign Policy-Making
This research agrees with the dominant observation made by the majority of works in the 
literature on Malaysia’s foreign policy during the Mahathir era, that Mahathir was central 
in the foreign policy formulation process. This was reaffirmed particularly by Chapter 
Four, which highlights the centrality of the prime minister’s executive powers in the 
Malaysian state system. Thus, Mahathir played a central role in foreign policy, as he did 
in domestic policies. Due to the common key motivations that drove domestic and 
foreign policies, the goals of these policies were clearly inter-related. This is also 
highlighted in Chapter Four. A clear example is the national blueprint of Vision 2020. 
While the goal of achieving a developed nation status by 2020 alludes to the economic or 
acquisition of wealth motivation, the Vision was conceived because of the continuous 
need to protect and maintain the interests of the Muslim Malay majority of the 
population. In fact, the protection of the Malays’ interests is crucial not only for the 
survival of the regime but also to the stability of the nation as a whole. In this context, it 
can be concluded that security remained a major motivation.
However, central to the discourse on Vision 2020 and its goal of achieving a 
developed nation status, is the desire to establish a nation that is “psychologically 
liberated” with “faith and confidence in itself’ and “justifiably proud” of what it is, that 
can develop “a form of mutually consensual, community-oriented Malaysian democracy 
that can be a model for many developing countries”, which in terms will be “respected by
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other peoples of other nations”.1 Such aspirations clearly point to the significance of the 
search for recognition as a further underpinning motivation. Indeed, Mahathir’s entire 
discourse on the position of the Malays in the Malaysian society centred on the struggle 
for recognition, in terms of attaining self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem. 
Chapter Three, in tracing Mahathir’s belief system and particularly his conceptions of 
justice, exposes such themes in Mahathir’s discourse, especially as encapsulated by his 
major works, The Malay Dilemma and The Challenge. Chapters Three and Four 
therefore established the important premises on which this study is set up. To reiterate, 
the first premise is that foreign policy direction flowed significantly from the leadership. 
Therefore in order to understand the motivation for these policies, it is essential to 
understand the leader’s interpretation of his environment and what made him tick. 
Secondly, all three major components of motivation; security, acquisition of wealth 
(economic) and recognition were present, and in fact, all inter-linked.
8.1.2. Analysis of Case Studies
As explained in Chapter Four, the empirical section of this thesis is organised 
thematically on the basis of the international communities that Mahathir identified with 
and sought recognition from. These communities are the developing countries of the 
South, the Islamic countries that share the concerns for the Muslim ummah, and the 
countries of East Asia, which include Malaysia’s immediate neighbours within ASEAN, 
China, Japan and South Korea. In all three case studies, the significance of recognition 
motives as defined by Mahathir was exposed. Honneth’s theory of the struggle for
1 Hng Hung Yong, CEO Malaysia, Subang Jaya: Pelanduk, 1998, pp.39-40.
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recognition has been utilised to identify the different modes of recognition struggles that 
were pertinent in each case. In this regard, Malaysia’s foreign policy was influenced by 
the sense of injustices that Mahathir felt were inflicted upon the communities that he 
identified himself and Malaysia with -  whether in the form of abuse, denial o f rights, or 
the denigration of values and ways of life.
Although Mahathir has been commonly described as being anti-West, these 
studies have illustrated that rather than being intrinsically anti-West, Mahathir was in fact 
driven by a strong sense of indignation, which was aroused due to his perception that the 
communities he identified with experienced disrespect from the powerful ‘West’, or the 
developed ‘North’. The motive of the struggle for recognition manifested itself in 
different forms, either in seeking self-confidence, self-respect or self-esteem,. The 
struggle for recognition to obtain self-confidence was relevant in the context of 
Mahathir’s perceptions on the impacts of the unjust relationships under colonialism. In 
other words, Mahathir blamed the inferiority complex of the Malays on the unequal 
nature of the colonial relationship. The struggle for recognition in order to feel self- 
respect was pertinent as a motivation in the context of Mahathir’s fight for the rightful 
voice of the developing countries of the South, the Muslim ummah and the nations of 
East Asia. It relates to Mahathir’s conception of justice, in the context of rights for these 
communities to participate in the process of will-formation in the international society. 
Finally, the struggle for recognition in order to gain self-esteem can be understood in 
relation to Mahathir’s desire to promote Malaysia as a model developing and Islamic 
country.
Furthermore, the quest for recognition was pursued from within the 
communities that he identified with (representing the ‘us’ identity) as well as externally
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(the ‘other’ identity). The ‘us’ identity refers to the communities that Mahathir identified 
Malaysia with, namely the developing countries of the South, the Muslim ummah and the 
nations of East Asia. While motivating factors in the forms of recognition are 
highlighted in the case studies, security and the acquisition of wealth, or economic factors 
have also been considered. As emphasised, the three components of motivation are not 
mutually exclusive and in fact, are all inter-related. The analyses of the ‘hard cases’ of 
the South and the Muslim ummah have shown that motivations underpinning Mahathir’s 
foreign policy concerning these two addressees were significantly influenced by his quest 
for recognition. In fact, it can be argued that in the case of foreign policy towards the 
countries of developing South, the search for recognition was arguably the overwhelming 
motivation. The ‘soft’ or most likely case of East Asia confirms the significance of 
recognition struggles as significant motivations. However, the case of East Asia also 
illustrates the existence of other components of foreign policy motivations, namely 
security and economic factors.
Foreign Policy towards the Developing Countries of the South
Chapter Five has illustrated that by employing Honneth’s theory of the struggle for 
recognition, Mahathir’s perceptions of the injustices suffered by the South countries can 
be understood in terms of forms of disrespect relating to abuse, denial of rights and 
denigration of their ways of life. The analysis starts from Mahathir’s identification with 
countries of the South due to their common experience of having been colonised. 
Mahathir resented colonialism because it involved physical abuse in terms of violent wars 
against the natives and the exploitation of the wealth of their lands. Moreover, he 
detested the rationale for imperialism on the basis of an assumed intrinsic superiority of
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Northerners, as described by the ‘White Man’s Burden’ philosophy.2 Further, Mahathir 
viewed that the prevailing world order and globalisation perpetuate the inequality similar 
to the colonial period, in the relationships of the North and South countries. This 
inequality is sustained through the effective control of international institutions, for 
example the WTO, the World Bank and the IMF by the developed countries of the North. 
Mahathir believed that it is unjust that poor developing South countries continued to be 
denied the equal rights to participate in the workings of the international society. He felt 
that this made them lack the voice to raise their concerns. Mahathir observed that even 
after independence, developing countries continued to be dictated to by the developed 
North, including on how to govern their countries and manage their economies. Mahathir 
detected a hint of the superiority complex akin to the ‘White Man’s Burden’ philosophy 
underlying the persistent patronising attitude of the ‘North’. He considered this a huge 
disrespect because it denigrated the values and cultures of the peoples of ‘South’ 
countries.
In connection with the different forms of disrespect identified above, different 
modes of recognition in terms of Honneth’s three aspects of practical relations-to-self can 
be discerned. In terms of self-confidence, Mahathir believed that colonialism was partly 
responsible for the low self-confidence of colonised peoples like the Malays. In 
Mahathir’s view, their long relationship of dependency with their colonial rulers made 
peoples of the South, including the Malays, internalise their inferiority complex and
2 For example, see Mahathir’s speech at the Second Southern Africa International Dialogue (SAID) on 
Smart Partnership in Swakopmund, Namibia, on 28 July 1998 in Globalisation, Smart Partnership and 
Government: Selected Speeches by Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Vol. 2, Hashim Makaruddin (ed.), Subang Jaya: 
Pelanduk, 2000, pp.69-70.
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continue to look up to the European Northerners for guidance.3 Mahathir believed that 
their low self-confidence contributed towards perpetuating their subjugated position.
The struggle for recognition in the mode of self-confidence can be identified 
firstly, in the content of foreign policy. In this regard, Mahathir was always keen to stand 
up for the rights of the South against the North. He regularly strove to illustrate a true 
sense of independence by resisting to be dictated to by the North. Secondly, the struggle 
for self-confidence can be identified in the style of foreign policy. In making his case for 
the South, Mahathir was known for his straight-talking, sometimes abrasive and un­
diplomatic manner. His bluntness in public stood apart from the sensitivity he always 
displayed in private.4 Thus, it can be inferred that the strong words and abrasive attitude 
that Mahathir regularly displayed in the international arena vis-a-vis the North were 
calculated moves to make the important point that leaders of the developing South could 
not be talked down to and would not cower under the intimidation of the North. In this 
sense, while seeking recognition from the North for the injustices and abuses that they 
had inflicted on the South, Mahathir was also making a point to the peoples of the South. 
Particularly important in this context is his own domestic audience in Malaysia. He 
sought to show that although Malaysia was once colonised and remained a developing 
country, as its leader, Mahathir was never afraid to stand up for its rights even if it would 
incur the wrath of the powerful North.
Another important point relating to the search for self-confidence relates to 
the economic goals of achieving the NEP objectives and the developed nation status of 
Vision 2020. In this regard, the struggle for recognition centres around Mahathir’s core
3 Mahathir Mohamad, The Way Forward, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998, pp.77-8.
4 See Aziz Zariza Ahmad, Mahathir's Paradigm Shift: The Man Behind the Vision, Taiping: Firma 
Malaysia Publishing, 1997, p.2.
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argument in The Malay Dilemma. In the book he argues that to ensure the stability of the 
Malaysian society, the special status of the indigenous bumiputra population (of whom 
the Malays are the significant majority) must be recognised not only in political, but also 
in the economic sphere. Mahathir’s belief system explicated in Chapter Three illustrates 
his understanding that it was essential to uplift the economic status of the Malays to 
alleviate their feelings of being marginalised in their own land. This is the argument that 
formed the basis of the NEP. Further, he also argued that the NEP would only be 
successful if a cultural revolution of the Malays was to accompany it. Such a cultural 
revolution would have an important objective of instilling within the bumiputras the vital 
sense of confidence to take advantage of the opportunities of the NEP, in order to 
compete with the economic astuteness of the non-Malays.
The efforts of the Mahathir government in pushing for South-South co­
operation and the Malaysian private sector to venture into new markets of the South 
countries can be deemed necessary in order to achieve the economic goals of the NEP 
and Vision 2020. The motive of wealth acquisition (or economic) is undeniably 
important. However, the motivation for NEP itself was to uplift the status of the 
bumiputras and to extricate them from their humiliating position in their native land. 
Mahathir believed that it was vital for the Malays to change their negative characteristics, 
which he considered consequences of an internalised inferiority complex as a result of 
being under a long spell of colonial rule. Evidence of this motivation can be found in the 
focus on the successes of the bumiputra corporate leaders, who attained prominence and 
exemplified the new Malays’ sense of self-confidence, although there were many non- 
bumiputra Malaysian companies that also benefited from South-South co-operation. It 
was important that the emergence of the new ‘Bumiputera Commercial and Industrialised
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Community’ be given prominence because to Mahathir, such success would generate 
confidence, and hence, engender even more success.5 Thus, Malay corporate leaders like 
Halim Saad, Tajuddin Ramli and Wan Azmi Wan Hamzah, to name but a few, were 
celebrated in the same way as all the Malaysians who achieved record-breaking 
accomplishments, exemplifying the can do spirit of ‘Malaysia BolehV
Another aspect of recognition motivation that is relevant in this case relates to 
the quest for self-esteem. Mahathir desired for Malaysia to play a stronger role amongst 
the developing countries of the South. Under Mahathir, Malaysia undertook a prominent 
and influential role in the organisations of the South. Malaysia was one of the founding 
members of the G-15. It also organised summit meetings of the Commonwealth, G-15 
and NAM, and chaired the respective organisations for a period of time. Under Mahathir, 
Malaysia co-sponsored CPTM, the programme for the South countries under the 
Commonwealth, and also the South Centre, which became the Secretariat for the South 
countries at the WTO in Geneva. Most importantly, within the frameworks of South- 
South co-operation, Mahathir promoted Malaysia as a model for other developing 
countries to follow in order to achieve political stability and economic success. 
Malaysia’s unique model, according to Mahathir, lies in the mutual recognition and 
respect of its different ethnic communities, which enabled them to form a stable 
government based on compromise and power-sharing, and also the pragmatic nature of 
the government in applying democracy. A good example of this thrust in Malaysia’s 
policy towards the countries of the South was shown to be Malaysia’s bilateral relations 
with South Africa after the end of Apartheid. The promotion of Malaysia’s success story
5 Mahathir Mohamad, The Way Forward, pp. 18-20.
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and its applicability as a model for other developing countries reflects a struggle for 
recognition motivation to gain self-esteem.
In addition, Mahathir also emphasised the solidarity of the South countries 
through their various organisations with the objective of fighting for a bigger voice in the 
international order. In this sense, Mahathir’s motivation was a recognition struggle for 
self-respect based on the perception of a denial of rights. This is exemplified by the role 
that Malaysia under Mahathir played in the institutions of the South. Mahathir’s 
speeches at these fora never failed to rally the countries of the South. This chapter also 
pointed to Malaysia’s initiatives in establishing ‘Smart Partnerships’ and dialogue series 
involving leaders of the countries of the South.
The policy towards the South countries illustrates the interplay of all three 
motivations, security, economic and recognition. On the domestic level, the security 
motivation was influential because South-South co-operation was imperative for the 
success of the NEP and Vision 2020. These objectives are considered crucial for the 
stability of the nation and the regime. In this context, security motivation is linked to the 
national stability based on the security of the ethnic Malays and the UMNO regime. 
Thus, the country’s economic agenda might be understood to be more of a goal than an 
underlying motivation for Mahathir. However, motivation in the form of the search for 
recognition permeated all levels of analysis. Firstly, at the domestic level, recognition 
struggles to obtain self-confidence was a major factor because the moral claim for NEP 
was triggered by Mahathir’s perceptions of the Malays’ feelings of abuse, first by the 
colonialists and then, by the Chinese immigrants who exploited the richness of their 
country, making the Malays perceive themselves as victims in their own land. This 
domestic struggle in the form of self-confidence permeated onto the international level in
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various aspects. Firstly, the successes of Malaysian companies abroad, particularly 
bumiputra companies and their corporate leaders were given prominence as examples of 
the new breed of confident and successful Malays. Secondly, Mahathir himself adopted 
a strong and straight-talking style of diplomacy vis-a-vis the North to illustrate a 
confident leader who would not tolerate being dictated to by the powerful North. At the 
international level, recognition struggles in the form of self-respect were also relevant. 
This can be deduced from Mahathir’s discourse appealing for the solidarity of the South 
countries in order to strengthen their voice. In terms of recognition struggles to gain self­
esteem, Mahathir aspired for Malaysia to be a model for other developing countries to 
emulate, particularly with regard to its racial harmony, political stability and economic 
progress.
Figure 8.1 illustrates the relationship between Mahathir’s beliefs of forms of 
disrespect, the modes of recognition as motivation, and the policies and their respective 
goals, with regard to Mahathir’s foreign policy towards the developing countries of the 
South. It shows that all three modes of recognition -  self-confidence, self-respect and 
self-esteem, were influential motivating factors. Furthermore, it also clarifies that the 
economic goals of South -  South co-operation were important to serve the recognition 
motives of building the self-confidence of the Malaysian nation, particularly of the 
Malays.
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Figure 8.1 Relationships between beliefs, motivation, goals and policy in the case of South -  South co­
operation.
Foreign Policy towards the Muslim Ummah
Islam is central to the Malay ethnic identity. This was a strong belief of Mahathir, as 
reflected in his writings in The Malay Dilemma and The Challenge. Mahathir clearly 
identified himself, and Malaysia with the global Muslim community, or the ummah. 
While Islam has always featured prominently in Malaysia’s foreign policy, Mahathir 
promoted the Islamic image of Malaysia much more than any of his predecessors.6 
Mahathir’s strong identification with the Muslim ummah made him share their common
6 Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, London and New York: Routledge, 1997, p.269.
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feelings of moral indignation due to perceived injustices and humiliation suffered by 
Muslims around the world, for example in Palestine and Bosnia.
To Mahathir, there are parallels that can be drawn concerning the fate of the 
Malay Muslims and that of the global Muslim ummah. Due to their misinterpretation of 
Islam, the Malays used to shun wealth and worldly achievements, and emphasised the 
virtues of piety instead. This made them economically backward compared to other races 
and consequently they suffered disrespect, humiliation and even ridicule. To Mahathir, 
this was also true in the case of the global Islamic ummah. He saw that the Muslim 
ummah was hapless, economically and militarily weak, disrespected and that their ways 
of life were denigrated as backward, barbaric, intolerant and violent. Such a perception 
was the foundation of Mahathir’s sense of moral indignation in relation to the position of 
the Muslim ummah, which arguably triggered the struggles for recognition.
Mahathir’s views on Palestine and Bosnia exemplify his feeling of moral 
indignation on the treatment of Muslims by the powerful nations in the international 
society. In the case of Palestine, Mahathir observed that “an entire people [was] being 
driven out of their homeland, humiliated and harassed.”7 He also felt angry at “the 
supporters of Israel” who constantly preached about human rights, but blatantly applied 
double standards where Israel was concerned, and took no measure to protect the 
Palestinians.8 Similarly in die Bosnian case, Mahathir chided the powerful West for 
failing for a long time to stop the molestations, abuse and massacre of the Bosnian 
Muslims by the Serbs. Thus, in Mahathir’s mind, the most oppressed people in the world
7 Mahathir’s speech at the opening of the Asian Conference on the Question of Palestine, 3 May 1983, in 
Murugesu Pathmanaban and David Lazarus, Winds o f  Change, p.217.
8 Mahathir’s speech at the opening of the Asian Conference on the Question of Palestine, 3 May 1983, in 
Winds o f  Change, p.217
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were Muslims. To him, Palestine and Bosnia plainly illustrated the injustices suffered by 
the Muslims in a world dominated by big powers where none are Islamic. According to 
Mahathir, the Muslims’ independence, and their rights as members of the human race 
were ignored and violated, to the extent that they lost whatever little honour and dignity 
they had left. In addition, Mahathir unequivocally condemned terrorism but felt that its 
root causes needed to be tackled if it was going to be successfully eliminated. He felt that 
terrorism was one of the desperate measures taken by misguided Muslims who believed 
that they had nothing to lose and there was no other recourse to escape from their 
oppressed position. Thus, in Mahathir’s view, the Muslim ummah suffered disrespect in 
the forms of abuse, exclusion and denial of rights, and also denigration and humiliation. 
There was a strong reference to the moral grammar in international society in Mahathir’s 
arguments for the just treatment o f the Muslim ummah.
Recognition struggles drove Mahathir to pursue policies that linked Malaysia 
closer to the ummah, for example in its bilateral relations with Palestine and Bosnia. 
Malaysia also played a more prominent role in the OIC, particularly by attempting to 
introduce its South-South co-operation approach to spur economic collaborations 
amongst Islamic countries. The underlying rationale for this was Mahathir’s belief that 
the reason for the degrading position of the Muslim ummah was their economic weakness 
and underdevelopment. In this regard, Mahathir reprimanded the Muslims for forgetting 
the glory of Islamic civilisation and urged them to embrace scientific knowledge and 
modem technology again.
Mahathir desired for Muslim countries to once again be strong, similar to the 
glorious days of the Islamic civilisation. To him, this was the only way for the Muslims 
to be heard. The problem with the prevailing international order according to Mahathir,
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was that there was no Muslim country amongst the big powers that controlled it. This 
exposes a motivation triggered by a perception of exclusion and denial of rights. While 
constantly criticising the West for their passivity in the Palestinian and Bosnian cases, 
Mahathir also incessantly urged the Muslims to be united, to embrace education, science 
and technology, so that their economic status could be improved. He believed that this 
was the only way for Muslim countries to be able to exert leverage and be heard in the 
international society. In this context, recognition in terms of self-respect for the Muslim 
ummah was sought from outside the ummah. Secondly, through South-South co­
operation programmes with Islamic countries, Mahathir was keen to show the world the 
success of the Malay Muslims. In connection to this, Hng writes that, “Mahathir believes 
Malaysia’s greatest contribution to the reformation of the ummah will be by way of 
example.”9 Thus, the quest for self-esteem was a significant motivation. Mahathir 
wanted Malaysia to be a model of a progressive, moderate and economically successful 
Muslim country for the rest of the ummah to follow. Here, recognition was sought from 
within the community of the ummah.
Undoubtedly, the recognition from within the Muslim ummah was also pivotal 
to the security of the UMNO regime led by Mahathir. Also, closer identification with 
other Muslim countries accrued economic benefits by providing Malaysian products new 
markets and its private sector new territories to invest in. Thus, foreign policy towards 
the Muslim ummah illustrates the significance of the struggle for recognition as a 
motivation too, but not at the expense of security and economic ones.
Figure 8.2 illustrates the relationships between Mahathir’s beliefs of forms of 
disrespect, the different modes of recognition motivation, and the goals and specific
9 Hng Hung Yong, 5 Men & 5 Ideas: Building National Identity, Subang Jaya: Pelanduk, 2004, p.141.
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policies that Malaysia pursued concerning the position of the Muslim ummah. It shows 
that in the case of the Muslim ummah, self-respect and self-esteem were the significant 
modes of recognition that were sought in Malaysia’s foreign policy. Similarly, the goal 
of uplifting the economic status of the ummah was deemed crucial by Mahathir in his 
quest to bring back respect and esteem that the Muslims enjoyed during the period of 
Islamic civilisation. As in the case of South -  South co-operation, Mahathir’s search for 
self-esteem was illustrated by his promotion of Malaysia as the model of a successful 
Muslim nation.
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Figure 8.2 Relationships between beliefs, motivation, goals and policy in the case of the Muslim ummah.
Foreign Policy towards East Asia
In the case of East Asia, Mahathir’s recognition struggles can be discerned in the contexts 
of self-respect and self-esteem. As regards self-respect, Mahathir’s foreign policy was 
driven by his desire to achieve legitimacy in the relations with the countries of Southeast 
Asia, as well as wider East Asia. This also points to the legitimate involvement of
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outside powers in the region, specifically the US. In the context of self-esteem, 
recognition struggles relate to what Mahathir believed to be the contribution that the East 
Asian community could make to attain a more just global order.
ASEAN was founded against the backdrop of conflicts between countries in 
Southeast Asia. The core of ASEAN’s philosophy of intra-mural relations is to mutually 
respect the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of one another and non­
interference in the internal affairs of one-another. These are some of the basic ASEAN 
norms that are enshrined in its TAC, signed in Bali in 1976.10 Mahathir displayed a 
strong commitment to these basic ASEAN principles, which are the foundations for 
legitimate arrangements of intra-ASEAN relations. The key motivation in the context of 
recognition here is mutual respect, which presupposes the recognition of one another’s 
equal status. In this sense, ASEAN prescribes the forms of legitimate relations between 
its members and outside powers. In this regard, respect is not only sought in the intra­
mural relations of ASEAN members, but also from outside powers, namely China, Japan 
and the US, in their dealings with ASEAN nations.
As Chapter Seven has illustrated, there were strains in the observation of 
ASEAN’s mutual respect and non-interventionist principles. During Mahathir’s 
premiership, Malaysia experienced tensions in its bilateral relations with other ASEAN 
members, particularly with Singapore. Although there are a host of complex issues that 
complicate Malaysia -  Singapore bilateral relations, the prickly personal relationship 
between Mahathir and Lee Kuan Yew undeniably contributed significantly towards their 
difficult bilateral relations. During the Mahathir era, Malaysia’s relations with Indonesia 
also became difficult at times. This was due to the relative weakness of Indonesia after
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the financial crisis and the toppling of Suharto, making it unable to provide the regional 
leadership it traditionally felt entitled to.
Mahathir’s support for ASEAN rules of legitimate relations was exhibited 
most strongly when he came under attacks from some of his ASEAN colleagues after he 
sacked his deputy, Anwar Ibrahim in 1998. During this crisis, Mahathir was obviously 
astonished to see both the Indonesian President Habibie and the Philippines’ President 
Estrada so openly voicing their support for Anwar and criticising Mahathir’s treatment of 
his former deputy.
In the case of East Asia, Mahathir was also driven by the desire to establish an 
arrangement of legitimate relations in the wider region. This is the basis of his proposal 
to institutionalise a community of East Asian countries. Indeed, Mahathir felt that 
ASEAN had been successful in ensuring legitimate relations in the Southeast Asian 
region and that it was a good model for the bigger East Asia region to emulate. 
Importantly, Mahathir felt strongly against the involvement of the US in Northeast Asia. 
Mahathir’s EAEC proposal can be interpreted as his effort to counter APEC, which was 
championed by the US and Australia. To Mahathir, the continuing influence of America 
in the region indicated the superiority of the West as embedded in the global order. 
Mahathir fought against such inequality in the global order because he felt that it was 
unjust to deny non-Westem countries, their rightful voice.
In addition, Mahathir believed that non-Westem cultures and values also had 
some positive contribution to make towards the well-being of the international society. 
Thus, Mahathir championed ‘Asian values’ and pointed to the economic successes of 
East Asian countries as proofs of their efficacy. What drove Mahathir in this sense was a
10 For the full document o f TAC, see http://www.aseansec.org/1654.htm, accessed on 20 January 2008.
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quest for recognition in the form of self-esteem for Asian values and the peoples of East 
Asian countries. In addition, he believed that due to its economic success, East Asian 
countries were entitled to a bigger voice in the international order. Moreover, he felt that 
the East Asian countries were obligated to fight for a bigger role in the international 
society because they could lead the change towards a more inclusive, equal and just 
global order. Thus, the struggle for recognition in this case was also based on the 
perception of disrespect in the form of denial of rights, which illustrates a struggle for 
self-respect.
Figure 8.3 summarises the relationship between Mahathir’s beliefs of the 
forms disrespect and the different modes of recognition, goals and specific policy 
concerning the nations of East Asia. Recognition struggles in the modes of self-respect 
and self-esteem are pertinent in this case. In terms of self-respect, Mahathir was 
motivated by a desire to establish and observe arrangements of legitimate relations 
between countries of the region, as well with outside powers, particularly the US. The 
search for self-respect was also a significant motivation underpinning Mahathir’s appeals 
for the solidarity of East Asian countries, to increase their rightful voice. In relation to 
the quest for self-esteem, the table shows that Mahathir’s discourse pertaining to Asian 
values and his initiatives towards establishing an East Asian regionalism were motivated 
by a desire to prove the utility of the Asian model for development, as an alternative to 
the Western one.
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Beliefs: Forms 
of Disrespect
Motivation: 
Modes of 
Recognition
Goals Policy
Denial of rights 
-  interference 
in internal 
affairs by 
neighbouring 
and outside 
powers.
Self-respect Legitimate 
arrangement of 
relationship.
ASEAN norms 
and principles.
Proposal for 
EAEC.
-  East Asian 
countries not 
having a voice 
that
commensurates 
their economic 
success.
Self-respect Solidarity of 
East Asian 
countries.
EAEC
APT
Denigration of 
East Asian 
values.
Self-esteem Economic 
success of 
East Asian 
countries as 
example for 
other
developing
countries.
Asian values
EAEC
APT
Figure 8.3 Relationships between beliefs, motivation, goals and policy in the case of East Asia.
8.2. THESIS CONTRIBUTION
The findings of this research contribute to two separate sets of literature, firstly the 
literature on Malaysia’s foreign policy under Mahathir, and secondly, the literature on 
FPA. With regard to the former, its findings show that a more meaningful and complete 
understanding of foreign policy motivation under Mahathir can only be achieved if 
recognition factors are also taken into account, along with security and economic
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rationales. In relation to the FPA literature, this thesis contributes by illustrating how 
motivation can be more systematically analysed by using Honneth’s theory of the 
struggle for recognition.
8.2.1. Literature on Malaysia’s Foreign Policy during the Mahathir Era
Chapter One has illustrated that writings on Malaysia’s foreign policy under Mahathir 
mostly concentrate on the issue of continuity and change and to what extent changes, if 
any, can be attributed to Prime Minister Mahathir. While there is no literature that 
focuses specifically on motivation, some kind of motivational assumption is made 
implicitly in all the works.
Yusof argues that there was more continuity than change in Malaysia’s 
foreign policy primarily because he argues that Malaysia’s national interests, defined 
mainly by security needs, remained unchanged during the Mahathir era.11 Other major 
works mostly concede that Malaysia’s foreign policy went through a transformation 
during the Mahathir era. However, they are not completely in consensus as to what 
extent these changes are attributable to the prime minister. Camroux, for example, 
explains the transformation by emphasizing Malaysia’s achievement of ‘middle-power’ 
status under Mahathir.12 Dhillon stresses the significance of internal and external 
exigencies, as well as Mahathir’s idiosyncrasy, as the important variables that determined 
foreign policy output.13 In terms of motivation, Dhillon emphasises factors of security 
and economic in particular, by saying that, “Malaysia’s foreign policy initiatives were
11 Mohd. Yusof Bin Ahmad, Continuity and Change in M alaysia’s Foreign Policy, 1981 -  1986, a 
dissertation presented to the Faculty of the Fletcher School o f Law and Diplomacy in partial fulfilment o f 
the requirements for the degree of Doctor o f Philosophy, May 1990.
12 David Camroux, 'Looing E a s t '... And Inwards, p .l.
13 Karminder Singh Dhillon, Malaysia Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era, p.5.
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deployed to ensure the stability, maintenance and promotion of the regime as well as to 
dilute fundamental challenges to it. Foreign policy serves to fuel the engine of economic 
growth and development through the external assistance in the form of FDI, technology, 
and markets for Malaysian goods and services.”14
Savaranamuttu attributes a bigger role to Mahathir by describing the prime 
minister as ‘iconoclastic’.15 In explaining the transformation brought by Mahathir, 
Savaranamuttu focuses on Malaysia’s quest for the NIC status,16 making him emphasise 
primarily economic motivation. Similarly, Rajmah accepts that the change that became 
the “hallmark” of Malaysia’s foreign policy was mostly attributed to Mahathir, in 
particular to the prime minister’s “personal experiences, his perception of world events 
and most of all by his personality.”17 However, as regards motivation, she overlooks 
recognition but argues that economic, rather than political motives were the thrusts of 
Mahathir’s foreign policy.18
Milne and Mauzy recognise that Mahathir “did effect changes”19 and 
highlight the importance of Mahathir’s personal experiences in influencing his foreign 
policy stances and priorities. Importantly, they conclude that in some aspects, for 
example the EAEC and the South, foreign policy motivations were difficult to assess. 
They allude to Mahathir’s motivations based on a struggle for recognition by saying that, 
“[p]erhaps he simply wanted to exercise his political talents in the wider field.”20
14 Karminder Singh Dhillon, Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era, p.6.
15 Johan Savaranamuttu, ‘Iconoclasm and Foreign Policy -  The Mahathir Years1, in Reflections, p.307. See 
also Johan Savaranamuttu, ‘Malaysia’s Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Period, 1981-1985: An Iconoclast 
come to Rule1, in Asian Journal o f  Political Science, June 1996, pp. 1-16.
16 Johan Savaranamuttu, ‘Iconoclasm and Foreign Policy -  The Mahathir Years1, in Reflections, p .315.
17 Rajmah Hussain, Malaysia at the United Nations, p J 3 .
18 Rajmah Hussain, Malaysia at the United Nations, p.77.
19 R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Malaysian Politics under Mahathir, p. 123.
20 R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Malaysian Politics under Mahathir, p. 133.
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Moreover, concerning Malaysia’s policies on the South and Mahathir’s seemingly anti- 
Westemism, they observe that Mahathir “was driven by a hatred of what he perceived as 
unjust.”21
In relation to all these major works in the literature, this thesis has come up 
with its own major arguments. Firstly, contra Yusof but in agreement with other 
significant works in the literature, this thesis illustrates that there were major changes in 
Malaysia’s foreign policy during the Mahathir period. These transformations manifested 
themselves not only in the style of Malaysia’s foreign policy, but also in its major 
components and emphasis. In terms of style, Mahathir was well known for his abrasive 
and aggressive diplomacy, particularly in criticising what he perceived to be the 
injustices in the international order perpetrated by the West. This is definitely in great 
contrast to the friendly attitude of all his predecessors to Western governments. 
Substance wise, there was indeed some continuity of priorities in some areas, for example 
the significance attached to ASEAN, which reflected the persistence of Malaysia’s 
structural constraints. However, Mahathir also introduced new priority areas of foreign 
policy, most notably the policies of ‘Look East’ and East Asia integration, which were 
unique to the Mahathir era. Moreover, while the previous governments before 
Mahathir’s had already engaged with issues relating to ASEAN, the developing countries 
of the ‘South’ and the Muslim ummah, Mahathir made these issues his top priorities. In 
addition, in relation to all these foreign policy addressees, Mahathir significantly 
increased the emphasis on the economic medium of development, trade and investment, 
making national prosperity an important goal in the process.
21 R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Malaysian Politics under Mahathir, p. 134.
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This thus leads to the second argument of this thesis, which relates to 
Mahathir’s leadership in foreign policy. Contra Yusof, Camroux and Dhillon, but similar 
to Rajmah, Savaranamuttu and Milne and Mauzy, this thesis attributes the major changes 
in Malaysia’s foreign policy predominantly to the prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad. 
In this regard, changes in foreign policy are correlated directly to the prime minister, 
specifically his personal motivations. In arguing the significance of Mahathir as the 
central source of foreign policy, this thesis does not underestimate the relevance of the 
structural constraints, such as Malaysia’s internal social and political structures, its 
geographical location, as well as global dynamics. However, unlike Dhillon, this thesis 
does not treat these structural constraints as independent variables that influenced the 
nature of the output (that is the foreign policy), in a deterministic manner. It focuses, 
rather, on the agency of Mahathir who acted within the structures of his environment, 
constantly perceiving and interpreting the constraints and opportunities facing him, and 
actively influencing these structures while being constricted by them at the same time. In 
this sense, structure and agency are not easily disentangled in the forms of independent 
and dependent variables, but are inter-linked and mutually constitutive. These 
environmental or structural constraints as regards Malaysia’s foreign policy manifested 
themselves firstly in Malaysia’s domestic setting, in the form of its bureaucratic structure, 
and its social, political and historical features, which constitute the Malaysian national 
identity. Secondly, external structural constraints existed in the form of regional and 
international political and economic institutions, like ASEAN, the UN or the WTO! In 
addition, Mahathir was also constrained by international ideational structures as 
manifested by the end of the Cold War, the resurgence of Islam, globalisation and the 
outbreak of the war on terror post 9/11.
The main argument and the unique contribution of this thesis in relation to the 
literature on Malaysia’s foreign policy under Mahathir, is its illumination of the 
significant role of the struggle for recognition as an important driver of Mahathir politics 
and foreign policy. As highlighted, those works that accept the fact that significant 
changes did occur either attribute them to nation-wide identity factors (as in Camroux’s 
middle power explanation), or to Mahathir’s personal preference to prioritise economics 
above security, as put forth by Rajmah and Savaranamuttu. More than the other major 
writers, Milne and Mauzy allude to recognition as one of the important motivational 
factors that influenced Mahathir’s foreign policy, but not in an explicit and systematic 
manner. This thesis has shown that recognition struggles were always significant, and in 
some instances, they were more influential than security and economic factors. However, 
this thesis does not argue that the quest for recognition was the over-arching, or the main 
motivation driving all of Mahathir’s foreign policy. Instead, it maintains that to have a 
more complete understanding, it is essential to take into account recognition motives, as 
well as security and economic ones.
A systematic analysis of recognition motivations in this thesis is achieved 
using the novel approach of employing Honneth’s theory of the struggle for recognition. 
In particular, Honneth’s forms of practical relations-to-self has been employed to identify 
the different modes of recognition struggles, in the form of self-confidence, self-respect 
and self-esteem. These analyses, and their findings as regards the three important foreign 
policy addressees of Malaysia’s foreign policy under Mahathir have already been 
summarised above. The preceding summary of the findings of the case studies primarily 
relate to the changing emphasis of foreign policy components. In addition, Malaysia’s 
foreign policy style was associated very closely with the style of Mahathir himself. In
318
this regard, his well-observed abrasive character was almost entirely directed to Western 
countries and leaders only, particularly the US, UK and Australia, and perhaps due to 
specific personal, although not entirely different reasons, also towards Singapore’s 
leader, Lee Kuan Yew. In relation to leaders and governments of other countries, 
Mahathir was known to be soft-spoken and polite, which can be said to be his true 
personal nature. This reflects a particular motivation underpinning his abrasive style or 
attitude towards the specific countries or leaders. The struggle for recognition as a 
motivation is definitely relevant here. In this context, recognition motivations concern 
Mahathir’s feeling of moral indignation based on his perception of colonialism as an act 
of abuse, which in Mahathir’s beliefs had impaired the Malays’ sense of self-confidence, 
and made them continue to look up to the ‘white Europeans’. Thus, his abrasive attitude 
towards the West and some Western leaders was aimed to illustrate especially to his 
people (and possibly to other formerly colonised peoples of the Third World as well), a 
Malay leader who was confident, capable of having an independent mind, and who 
refused to be dictated to by ‘former colonialists’. Moreover, his abrasiveness most of the 
times can be seen as a reaction to what he perceived as acts of disrespect, either because 
of the continuation of the denial of rights for developing countries in the international 
order even after decolonisation, or more personally, in the sense of humiliation inflicted 
upon him by specific leaders. Examples of the latter include when the Australian prime 
minister John Howard accused him of being a recalcitrant for not attending the Seattle 
APEC Summit, A1 Gore expressing support to Mahathir’s opponents at a dinner Mahathir 
himself hosted (after which Gore just stormed off without even staying for the meal), or 
Lee Kuan Yew branding him a Malay ultra and slamming all Malay leaders as feudal.
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In summary, within the literature on Malaysia’s foreign policy under 
Mahathir, the findings of this thesis contribute towards strengthening the argument that 
there were significant changes in policy and that these changes are attributable mainly to 
the Prime Minister Mahathir himself In addition, and more importantly, this thesis has 
the unique contribution of exposing the significance of the struggle for recognition as a 
motivation that existed alongside security and economic ones. With regard to recognition 
struggles as motivations, although writers like Milne and Mauzy, and to a certain extent 
Camroux and Rajmah have implicitly hinted at their relevance, this thesis has engaged 
with the struggle for recognition as a motivation in an explicit manner and illustrated a 
method of how to systematically analyse it.
8.2.2. Literature in FPA
In relation to the FPA literature, this thesis contributes in the area of research inquiries 
focussing on motivation for foreign policy. Chapter Two has illustrated that the lack of 
studies on motivation is due to the popularity of the Realist school of thought, which has 
also influenced studies in FPA. It has also been explained that Realism is based on the 
Hobbesian assumption of the human nature that overstates the motive of self-preservation 
or security. This is true in the case of all Realist writers, from Morgenthau and Carr to 
Waltz and Mearsheimer.22
Moreover, the pursuit of ‘scientific’ explanations and the application of the 
‘rational actor model’ in Neo-Realism simplify and underrate the complex desires that
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motivate behaviours of individuals. Instead, Neo-Realism focuses only on the structure 
of the international system in its quest to uncover external causal laws governing 
international relations. Under Neo-Realism, motivation is a given assumption defined 
purely on the quest for self-preservation or security.23 The ‘rational actor model’ is also 
adopted by Neo-Liberalism, although it stresses institutions (instead of states) as the 
actors, and economic, prosperity or wealth acquisition as the underlying motivation, 
instead of security.24 The application of this model makes it difficult to achieve an all- 
encompassing understanding of motivation underpinning foreign policy because it treats 
motivation as a singular assumption. Thus, the analysis is limited and flows directly from 
the choice of either security or wealth acquisition as the underlying motivation in the 
study. Recognition is overlooked because it is grounded in deep human psychology, 
which is deemed impeding rational choice to the advocates o f the model.25
This thesis illustrates that the quest for recognition can be a significant, and at 
times the dominant motivation in driving a country’s foreign policy. It contradicts the 
argument that motivations, in particular those which are concerned with the search for 
recognition are both irrelevant and difficult to study. For example, Morgenthau cast 
aside the quest for recognition as a motivation in foreign policy and asserts the power 
motive instead. He argues that recognition struggles are only disguises to the real
22 See Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle fo r  Power and Peace, Boston: McGraw 
Hill, 1985; E.H. Carr, The Twenty’s Years Crisis, 1919 -1939: An Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations, New York: Palgrave, 2001; Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1959 and John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’ in 
International Security, Vol. 19, No.3, Winter 1194-1995.
23 See Annette Freyberg-Inan, What Moves Man: The Realist Theory o f  International Relations and Its 
Judgment o f  Human Nature, USA: SUNY Press, 2004, p.95.
24 See Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, David Baldwin (ed.), New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1993, and Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (eds.) Transnational 
Relations and World Politics, Cambridge, Mass., 1971.
25 Valerie M. Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory, Lanham, Maryland and 
Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., p.45.
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motivation of enhancing power. According to him, in international, as well as domestic 
politics, “the element of power as the immediate goal of the policy pursued is explained 
and justified in ethical, legal, or biological terms.”26 To Morgenthau, to see through the 
“ideological disguises” behind the political phenomena is the most difficult task of 
students of international politics.27 However, this research has shown that to ignore the 
search for recognition as a motivation that underpins foreign policy leads to an 
incomplete understanding.
Chapter Two has also illustrated that the quest for recognition as a motivation 
has been considered in some FPA works but rather implicitly and in a haphazard and 
unsystematic manner. As examples, the chapter has highlighted motives relating to the 
search for recognition like esteem, prestige/growdeur, status, entitlement and face in the 
works of Welch, Janis, Cottam, Cemy, Vertzberger, Holsti, Schweller, Leifer, Drifte, 
Chen Jian and even the Realist Morgenthau himself. The main contribution of this thesis 
is that it illustrates that there is a common moral basis for all these motivational factors to 
be considered under the struggle for recognition. In this regard, this thesis also offers a 
systematic analysis of motivations based on the search for recognition, achieved by 
employing Honneth’s theoretical insights of the different modes of the recognition 
struggle.
In addition, the analysis in this thesis is based on the motivation as defined by 
the prime minister Mahathir Mohamad himself. In this regard, it adds, not only to the 
literature on motivation but also to our understanding of leadership in foreign policy. 
What is called the ‘great man’ approach was popular in FPA in the 1930s, but fell out of
26 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p.99.
27 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p.l 11.
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favour in the midst of the Cold War when analysts were inclined to concentrate on 
system level dynamics to explain behaviours of the superpowers. However, the post 
Cold War era dominated by crises in Iraq and North Korea has made analysts more 
interested to look at characteristics of leaders to understand the foreign policy of these
• I Q  # ,countries. In this regard, this thesis accepts that Mahathir’s ability to wield influence 
and effectively control Malaysia’s foreign policy was derived from his position as the 
prime minister, and the structure of the Malaysian state. In this connection, this thesis 
contributes towards the study of the motivation underpinning foreign policy of a country 
with a particularly centralised form of decision-making process.
This thesis proves the suitability of FPA as the IR sub-discipline that can 
accommodate inquiries on motivation without prejudicing any of the three major 
components of human motivation, which are security, acquisition of wealth and the 
struggle for recognition. In this connection, it provides an example of an integrative 
framework that can be utilised to study the motivation of international behaviour and a 
way to overcome the epistemological divisions within IR by employing FPA. In 
mainstream IR, the Realist, Liberalist and Constructivist schools each adhere to one of 
the three basic motivational assumptions, which is fear/security/power, 
economic/profit/prosperity/acquisition of wealth or affiliation/recognition.29 This 
research has shown that FPA can provide a new framework where the epistemological 
divisions in IR still persist. It is important that such a division is overcome because 
theoretical biases in studies actually influence the practical world of foreign policy 
making. Freyberg-Inan observes that the bias in Realist scholarly works based on their
28 Valerie M. Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory, Lanham, Maryland and 
Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., p.37.
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assumption on human nature as competitive and selfish has affected policy-making in the 
real world and consequently diminishes the chances for peaceful co-existence, 
international co-operation and transnational institution building.30
8.3. AFTER MAHATHIR: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE
STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION
Since Abdullah Ahmad Badawi took over as Malaysia’s prime minister on 30 October 
2003, there have been notable changes in the conduct of Malaysia’s foreign policy. The 
most significant change is found in the style of diplomacy of his leadership. Unlike 
Mahathir, Abdullah prefers a more low-key and quiet diplomacy.31 Also, he does not 
engage in hard-hitting rhetoric against the ‘West’, or anybody else for that matter.
When it comes to policy, there has actually been some continuity with the 
Mahathir era. Due to the fact that Abdullah spent a total of nine years in Mahathir’s 
government as the foreign minister, he is quite familiar with the policies and was for a 
long time responsible for implementing them. The OIC has become a major focus for 
Abdullah, particularly due to Malaysia’s chairmanship of the OIC at the beginning of his 
premiership. Moreover, it is logical that Abdullah would be interested in issues relating 
to Islam in foreign policy, being himself an Islamic Studies graduate. This is illustrated 
very clearly by the launching of ‘Islam Hadhari\ loosely translated as ‘civilisational 
Islam’ as “an approach for instituting national order ... that is fair and just to all
29 Annette Freyberg-Inan, What Moves Man, p. 155.
30 Annette Freyberg-Inan, What Moves Man, p. 13.
31 This is observed for example by Saw Swee-Hock and K. Kesavapany in Singapore -  Malaysia Relations 
under Abdullah Badawi, Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies, 2006, p.55.
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irrespective of race and religion..”32 In the context of foreign policy, Abdullah’s ‘Islam 
Hadhari1 approach is translated into a bigger role for Malaysia in the OIC to foster more 
unity amongst its members. Through its role in the OIC, Abdullah aspires to “shatter the 
increasing prejudices against Muslims worldwide,” and feels that “[t]he international 
community must stop equating Islam with violence, poverty and indignity.”33 This 
reflects a similarity in terms of the quest for recognition, as the motivation for policy 
concerning the Muslim ummah, in both Mahathir and Abdullah. In this context, the 
policy also continues to embody the same economic goal. Abdullah intends to “continue 
[to] raise the awareness and understanding of the world with regard to the importance of 
an international agenda to eradicate poverty.”34 Thus, Malaysia under Abdullah 
continues to co-ordinate the works of the OIC and NAM, especially in economic, trade, 
education and cultural areas.35 To Abdullah, Palestine still “remains a central issue that 
must be addressed by the ummah and the global community.”36
However, there are some policy areas where change can be unmistakably 
observed. The clearest examples are Malaysia’s bilateral relations with Singapore and 
Australia. During Mahathir’s time, Malaysia’s relations with both of these countries were 
difficult, to say the least. According to Saw and Kesavapany, the improved bilateral ties 
between Malaysia and Singapore is “one of Abdullah’s achievements in the area of 
international relations since he succeeded Mahathir.”37 The improved Malaysia -  
Singapore bilateral relations steered by Abdullah has in fact created tensions in the
32 Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, ‘Islam Hadhari and Good Governance’, speech at the Victoria University, 
Wellington, New Zealand on 31 March 3005. www.pmo.gov.my, accessed on 10 December 2007.
33 Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Islam Hadhari: A Model Approach fo r  Development and Progress, Petaling 
Jaya: MPH Group, 2006, p.8.
34 Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Islam Hadhari, p.9.
35 Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Islam Hadhari, p.9.
36 Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Islam Hadhari, p.9.
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relationship between Abdullah and his predecessor, Mahathir. The acrimony was 
especially obvious when the former prime minister criticised Abdullah’s decision to 
cancel the demolition of the Malaysian half of the causeway across the Straits of Johor, in 
order to build a ‘crooked scenic bridge’. Mahathir accused the Abdullah Government “of 
showing that Malaysia was a “country with no guts.””38 In the case of Australia, 
Abdullah made an official visit in April 2005 - the first in more than twenty years by a 
Malaysian prime minister. Malaysia and Australia started negotiations on a free trade 
agreement (FTA) during the visit.39 Mahathir himself felt that changes were made by 
Abdullah government to the policies that he put in place, especially by “getting closer to 
the US and Australia, and forgetting our responsibilities to the South.”40 Mahathir also 
criticised the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand in the East Asia Summit as against 
his original vision of the East Asia community.41
Thus, although there is some continuity in foreign policy pursued by the 
Abdullah government, there have also been notable differences. How can these changes 
be understood in terms of their motivations? In such a short period, the security and 
economic concerns of Malaysia certainly could not have transformed so drastically. 
What has changed is only the leadership. In this context, it can safely be concluded that 
motivations for changes in the identified areas of foreign policy originate from the leader 
himself, that is Abdullah Badawi. In this regard, the search for recognition is manifested
37 Saw Swee-Hock and K. Kesavapany in Singapore -  Malaysia Relations under Abdullah Badawi, p.59.
38 Saw Swee-Hock and K. Kesavapany in Singapore -  Malaysia Relations under Abdullah Badawi, p.9.
39 See ‘Australia, Malaysia to Negotiate Free Trade Agreement’, reported by Narda Gilmore on Lateline, 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 7 April 2004. TV transcript location: 
http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2005/sl340708.htm, accessed on 12 December 2007.
40 Author interview with Mahathir Mohamad, 16 January 2007, London.
41 ‘Mahathir Blasts Australia Over Summit’, AP, 7 December 2005. 
http://news.ninemsn.com.au/article.aspx?id=76332, accessed on 10 September 2007.
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differently in Abdullah’s foreign policy mainly because Abdullah holds different 
conceptions of justice, compared to Mahathir. As explained, Abdullah’s focus on the 
issues pertaining to the situation of the Muslim ummah can be understood in terms of his 
background as an Islamic scholar.
In sum, a brief comparative analysis of Malaysia’s foreign policy under 
Abdullah and Mahathir further confirms the central argument of this thesis that the search 
for recognition can be a significant motivation underpinning foreign policy. Under 
Mahathir, the search for recognition was an important driver that influenced Malaysia’s 
foreign policy. The failure of the major works on Malaysia’s foreign policy to consider 
motivational factors based on the struggle for recognition has resulted in an incomplete 
understanding. In systematically exploring recognition struggles as important foreign 
policy motivations, this thesis has employed Honneth’s theoretical insights on the 
different modes of recognition struggles, namely in the form of self-confidence, self- 
respect and self-esteem. While not claiming that the search for recognition was always 
the dominant motivational factor, this thesis makes the claim that recognition struggles 
were always present amongst the underlying motivations for foreign policy. 
Nevertheless, the analyses of Malaysia’s South -  South co-operation, policies towards the 
Muslim ummah and East Asian nations under Mahathir have shown that the quest for 
recognition, in certain circumstances, can indeed be the over-arching motivation, as 
compared to motivations based on security and economic concerns. In addition, the 
thesis has also elaborated on the significance of Mahathir’s conceptions of justice, which 
crucially influenced the modes of recognition that were sought in the context of foreign 
policy. Hence, Malaysia’s foreign policy under Mahathir’s successor, Abdullah Badawi 
displays identifiable changes, not because recognition struggles have become less
important, but due to the fact that Abdullah’s conceptions of justice are different to 
Mahathir’s. This has resulted in him searching for recognition in different ways 
compared to Mahathir.
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APPENDIX 1: LIST OF ATTRIBUTABLE INTERVIEWS
Agus Salim Yusof, Principal Assistant Secretary, OIC Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Malaysia, 5 June 2007, Putrajaya.
Ahmad Fuzi Abdul Razak, former Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 July 
2007j P u tra ja y a ..............................................................................................................................................
Badariah Arshad, Principal Private Secretary to Mahathir Mohamad, 28 June 2005, Putrajaya.
Ghazzali S.A. Khalid, former Malaysian Ambassador to the US, 5 July 2007, Putrajaya.
Hasmy Agam, former Malaysia’s Permanent Representative to the UN in New York, 12 July 2007, 
Kuala Lumpur.
Ibrahim Abdullah, Undersecretary, OIC Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, 9 July 
2007, Putrajaya.
Kogila Balakrishnan, Principal Assistant Secretary, Defence Industry Division, Ministry of Defence 
Malaysia, 1 June 2007, London.
Mahathir Mohamad, former Prime Minister of Malaysia, 16 January 2007, London.
Shazelina Zainal Abidin, Principal Assistant Secretary, Global Economics and Development 
Division, 10 July 2007, Putrajaya.
Syed Hamid Albar, Foreign Minister of Malaysia, 16 March 2007, London.
Taufik Md. Noor, former Special Officer to Malaysia’s Foreign Minister (Rais Yatim and Abu 
Hassan Omar), 12 July 2007, Kuala Lumpur.
Zainuddin Maidin, Minister of Information of Malaysia and Mahathir’s biographer, 22 April 2007, 
London.
(The list of non-attributable interviews may be obtained from the author or his supervisor, Dr 
Jurgen Haacke, International Relations Department, London School of Economics)
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APPENDIX 2: VISION 2020
MALAYSIA AS A FULLY DEVELOPED COUNTRY -  ONE DEFINITION
• By the year 2020, Malaysia can be a united nation, with a confident Malaysian 
society, infused by strong moral and ethical values, living in a society that is
....................democratic, liberal and tolerant,, caring, economicallyjust and equitable, progressive
and prosperous, and in full possession of an economy that is competitive, dynamic, 
robust and resilient.
• There can be no fully developed Malaysia until we have finally overcome the nine 
central strategic challenges that have confronted us from the moment of our birth as 
an independent nation.
• The first of these is the challenges of establishing a united Malaysian nation with a 
sense o f common and shared destiny. This must be a nation at peace with itself, 
territorially and ethnically integrated, living in harmony and full and fair partnership, 
made up of one 'Bangsa Malaysia' with political loyalty and dedication to the nation.
• The second is the challenge o f creating a psychologically liberated, secure, and 
developed Malaysian Society with faith and confidence in itself, justifiably proud of 
what it is, o f what it has accomplished, robust enough to face all manner of 
adversity. This Malaysian Society must be distinguished by the pursuit of 
excellence, fully aware of all its potentials, psychologically subservient to none, and 
respected by the peoples of other nations.
• The third challenge we have always faced is that of fostering and developing a 
mature democratic society, practising a form of mature consensual, community- 
oriented Malaysian democracy that can be a model for many developing countries.
• The fourth is the challenge of establishing a fully moral and ethical society, whose 
citizens are strong in religious and spiritual values and imbued with the highest of 
ethical standards.
• The fifth challenge that we have always faced is the challenge of establishing a 
matured,liberal and tolerant society in which Malaysians of all colours and creeds 
are free to practise and profess their customs,cultures and religious beliefs and yet 
feeling that they belong to one nation.
• The sixth is the challenge o f establishing a scientific and progressive society, a 
society that is innovative and forward-looking, one that is not only a consumer o f 
technology but also a contributor to the scientific and technological civilisation of 
the future.
• The seventh challenge is the challenge of establishing a fully caring society and a 
caring culture, a social system in which society will come before self, in which the 
welfare of the people will revolve not around the state or the individual but around a 
strong and resilient family system.
• The eighth is the challenge o f ensuring an economicallyjust society. This is a 
society in which there is a fair and equitable distribution of the wealth of the nation, 
in which there is full partnership in economic progress. Such a society cannot be in 
place so long as there is the identification o f race with economic function, and the 
identification of economic backwardness with race.
• The ninth challenge is the challenge of establishing a prosperous society, with an 
economy that is fully competitive, dynamic, robust and resilient.
Text available from http://www.wawasan2020.com/vision/p2.html
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